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THE MUTUAL FUND INDUSTRY: A LEGAL SURVEY
I. Introduction
The metamorphosis of the American system of property ownership is perhaps the most significant development in the economic growth and structure
of the American economy during the twentieth century. The control of productive wealth, long in the hands of the "classic 'owner-entrepreneur' so dear
to standard economics"'- has gravitated toward a new class of owners called
"institutional investors." 2 The entrepreneurial society of the past has become
the "paraproprietal" society3 of the present and future.

1 P. HARUREoHT, S.J. & A. BERLE, JR., TowAnR THE PARAPROPRIETAL SOCIETY 3 (1960).
2 Generally classified as institutional investors are investment companies (including mutual funds), banks, pension funds, insurance companies, savings and loan associations, college
and university endowment funds, and foundations. D. BAUM & N. STILES, THE SILENT
PARTNERS 29 (1965).
See also Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 19(e) (1), 15 U.S.C.A. §
78s(e)(1) (Supp. 1969).
As the table below shows institutional ownership of equity securities is clearly on the
upswing:
INSTITUTIONAL OWNERSHIP OF EQUITIES*
[Dollar amounts in billions]

Personal trust funds .............................
Corporate pension funds ..................
Mutual funds .......................................
Charitable trust funds ..........................
Fire and Casualty insurance companies
Life insurance companies ....................
Closed end investment companies ........
Banks .
......
.....

1954
$37.0
3 .5
5.5
7.0
6.1
3.0
3.6
0.8

1968
$87.0
51.3
42.8
15.0
13.3
10.7
8.2
1.9

Percent
change
+140
+1360
+680
+110
+120
+260
+130
+140

Total, institutional ........................
All equities ....
...
.

66.5
268.0

230.2
707.6

+250
+160

Institutional share (percent) ..............
25
33
..........
* 115 CONG. REc. E1327 '(daily ed. Feb. 24, 1969).
The view has been expressed that the role of institutional investors in the functioning of
the securities markets will increase in the coming decades. On October 31, 1968, Mr. John
C. Bogle, president of the Wellington Management Company (a mutual fund investment advisory firm), and now president of the Investment Company Institute [ICI], delivered an
address before the ICI entitled "The Financial Institution; [A] Vital Force in the Equity
Markets." Focusing his attention on the impact that institutional investors will have on the
equity markets during the coming decade, he observed that "we must look for continued
institutionalization of our equity markets. By the mid-1970's. today's 33% institutional ownership could well be 40%, and today's 50%-plus share of public trading volume could surge
toward the 60% level." Address by Mr. John C. Bogle, Investment Company Institute,
Oct. 31, 1968, reprinted in 115 CONG. REC. E1324 (daily ed. Feb. 24, 1969).
3 The phrase "paraproprietal society" was used by Reverend Harbrecht to denote the
new system of property ownership now common on the American economic scene whereby a
diffusion of corporate income distributed to the American public is achieved by the interpositioning of institutional investors between the corporation and the investing public. Reverend Harbrecht's observation was concurred in by Mr. Adolf A. Berle:
In 1960 the word [profits] suggests a flow of revenue derived from a large group
of [corporate] customers generally known as "the public," part of which is destined

SURVEY

[Vol. 44:732]

That institutionalization of investment has become the earmark of the
modem financial scene is nowhere better exemplified than in the phenomenal
growth of one member of the family of institutional investors, the mutual fund
industry.4 Between 1940 and 1968 the total assets held by mutual funds increased one hundred times, from $450 million5 to $45 billion," and by the end
of 1968, those assets had increased another twenty-two per cent, to $55 billion.'
The number of investors owning mutual fund shares increased from 300,000
in 1940,' to nearly five million at the close of 1968.' In addition, it has been

for distribution to an even larger group of shareholders, pensioners, insurance policyholders, and others who are even more "the public."
[Corporate] [m]anagements, that is to say, the operators, begin to acquire a
singular position quite unknown to nineteenth century [economic] theory. Since
they are increasingly immune to change or control by the former ownership group,
they are governors rather than agents. The system they operate thus ceases to be a
true "property" system and Father Harbrecht is entirely within his academic right in
christening it "paraproprietal" - that is, "beyond property." P. IARBRECHT,
S.J. & A. BERLE, JR., supra note 1, at 8. For discussions which reveal the rise of the paraproprietal system during the twentieth century see L. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY
AND How THE BANKERS USE IT (1914); J. FLYNN, INVESTMENT TRUSTS GONE WRONG!
(1931); P. HARBRECHT, S.J. & A. BERLE, JR., supra note 1; and D. BAUM& N. STILES, supra
note 2. Congress has recently expressed concern over the influence which the institutional investors exert on the securities markets. See notes 140-41 infra and accompanying text.
4 The designation of mutual funds as "mutual funds" has been generally attributed to the
reference to such companies as "Mutual Investment Companies" in the Revenue Act of 1936 §
48, 49 Stat. (Pt. 1) 1669, superseded by Revenue Act of 1942 § 361, 56 Stat. (Pt. 1) 878 (now
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 851). See, e.g., H. BULLOCK, THE STORY OF INVESTMENT COMPANIES 73 (1959) [hereinafter cited as H. BULLOCK]. Prior to 1936, the funds were commonly
known as open-end investment companies, a name presumably derived from the well known
"open-end mortgage," or simply as investment trusts. See Hearings on S. 3580 Before the
Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 76th Cong., 3 Sess., pt. 1, at 43 (1940)

[hereinafter

cited as 1940 Senate Hearings]. The reason why Congress chose the term is unclear, although
the record of the Senate hearings on the legislation does contain a statement prepared by two
mutual fund industry officials who refer to their respective funds as "mutual investment trusts"
which "merely constitute a conduit through which [their shareholders] have made investments
in stocks of about 130 different corporations." Hearings on an Act to Provide Revenue,
Equalize Taxation and for Other Purposes, Before the Senate Comm. on Finance, 81st Cong.,

1st Sess., 799-800 (1936), reprinted in part in SEC, INVESTMENT TRUSTS AND INVESTMENT
No. 279, 76th Cong., 3d Sess., 802 n.10 (1940) [hereIII]. When one of the fund spokesmen who prepared
the statement was questioned regarding the origin of the term, he "intimated that investment
companies like [his own] were commonly called 'mutual investment companies,' but he was
unable to state the origin of the term." Id. In 1940 one fund industry spokesman noted that
the Treasury Department "frequently" referred to open-end companies as "mutual funds."
1940 Senate Hearings 452. One possible reason for the use of the term "mutual" to describe
such companies was suggested in the testimony of one mutual fund director before an SEC
examiner in the 1930's. An SEC official noted that "it may be a very nice word to use in
connection with sales . . . it has that conservative ring." The mutual fund spokesman replied,
COMPANIES, PART THREE, H.R. Doc.
inafter cited as INESTMENT TRUSTS

"Yes."

INVESTMENT TRUSTS

III at 803.

5

Hearings on S. 1659 Before the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 90th Cong.,

6

TIME, Jan. 24, 1969, at 67.

1st Sess., pt. 1. at 125 (1967) [hereinafter referred to as 1967 Senate Hearings].
7 Id. Another periodical puts the figure at $54 billion. INV.
1969, at 54.
8 113 CONG. REc. S6107 (daily ed. May 1, 1967).

DEALERS DIGEST,

Feb. 10,

9
SENATE COMM. ON BANKING AND CURRENCY, 91st CONG., IST SEss., ANALYSIS OF S.
34, at v (Comm. Print 1969) [hereinafter cited as ANALYSIS OF S. 34]. Contra, 115 CONG.
REC. S289 (daily ed. Jan. 15, 1969) (remarks of Senator Sparkman). In the statement made
by Senator Sparkman when he introduced S. 34, he set the number of investors holding mutual
fund shares at four million. The Committee Print reproduces those remarks verbatim, with one
exception-the figure was raised to five million. The change was presumably made in the
interest of accuracy.
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estimated that by the end of 1969 one-third of all mutual funds will be less than
two years old.'0
Such remarkable growth has not failed to attract widespread attention,
much of it fostered by the funds themselves. Teaser ads which earnestly inquire,
"What! You still don't own any mutual funds?" are well known to all who
read weekly newsmagazines." "Fact Books" distributed by the mutual funds
trumpet their "success" :
Thirty-five years ago in 1933 . ..
Fundamental Investors began operations with fewer than 100 shareholders,
and less than $100,000 in total net assets.
Today
198,000 shareholders, including
13,765 trustees, guardians, administrators
731 corporations, partnerships, financial institutions
363 churches, ecclesiastical, benevolent associations
471 professional or fraternal groups, pension or employee funds
141 hospitals, libraries or educational institutions
have more than $1.4 billion invested in its shares. This book tells what has
happened in the past to investment programs
built on
1 2
Fundamental Investors and . . . TIME
The interest generated by the rapid growth of the mutual fund industry
has not spent its full force on the American investor. Concern over the public
policy implications of mutual fund growth has been registered by both the
Securities Exchange Commission [SEC] and the Congress. That concern is
centered upon the adequacy of the regulatory framework under which the mutual
funds now operate. The Investment Company Act of 1940 [the Act]," the Act
in question, has not been significantly amended since its enactment and the
SEC believes that the tremendous growth of the investment company industry,
particularly the mutual funds, has created problems which the Act, in its present
form, is incapable of solving. In December, 1966, the findings and recommendations of the SEC were submitted to Congress in a report entitled Public Policy
Implications of Investment Company Growth 4 [Public Policy Statement]. In
February, 1967, President Johnson gave the SEC's Public Policy Statement his
imprimatur,' and legislation designed to implement the SEC's proposals was
introduced before the Ninetieth Congress.'" Hearings on the proposed amendments were held in both houses; and although a bill embodying the SEC's ideals
10 BROAD STREET INVESTING CORPORATION, 1968 ANNUAL REPORT 7 (page proof ed.
1969).
11 E.g., NEwswEEx, Nov. 18, 1968, at 115; TIME, Nov. 15, 1968, at 81. The ad was
sponsored by the Investment Company Institute, a trade association whose member mutual
funds held assets in excess of $50 billion on Dec. 31, 1968. INv. DEALERS DIGEST, Feb. 10,
1969, at 54. According to the Investment Company Institute, the ads represented a "highly
creative approach to the Institute's advertising program." INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE,
1968 ANNUAL REPORT 17.
12 FUNDAMENTAL INVESTORS, INC., 1968 FACT BOOK.
13 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to -52 (1964).
14 H.R. REP. No. 2337, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966) [hereinafter cited as PUBLIC POLICY
STATEMENT].

15 See 113 CONG. REc. H1409, S2023 (daily ed. Feb. 16, 1967).
16 S. 1659, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967); H.R. 9510, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967); H.R.
9511, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
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was passed by the Senate in amended form,1" it was never reported out of the
House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, and hence was not
enacted into law.
Two bills, one identical to the bill that was passed by the Senate last year, 8
and a similar proposal, 9 have been introduced in the current session.t In very
general terms, the major aims of those bills are to:
1. Install a court-enforced requirement that the management expenses
paid by a mutual fund be reasonable;2
2. Permit banks to compete with mutual funds by
permitting them to
21
publicly offer shares in "collective trust funds" ;
3. Reduce the sales charges paid by many investors who acquire mutual
fund shares; 22 and
4. Limit the creation and proliferation of the mutual fund holding
company or "super fund."2 "
Predictably, such proposals have not been warmly received by the mutual fund
24
industry.
This Survey proposes to analyze the structure and development of the
mutual fund industry, and the regulatory systems, both existing and proposed,
designed to supervise it. To that end, Parts II and III are crafted to provide
a descriptive analysis of the functional characteristics of management investment
companies, 25 particularly mutual funds, as well as a perusal of the developmental
17 S. 3724, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968). The bill was passed by the Senate on July 26,
1968. See 114 CONG. Rzc. S9497 (daily ed. July 26, 1968).
18 S. 34, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. '(1969).
19 S. 296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
t A third mutual fund "reform" bill, H.R. 8980, was introduced in the House of
Representatives on March 13, 1969. 115 CONG. REc. H1764 (daily ed. March 13, 1969).
The bill's provisions differ from its Senate counterparts; and, although its late introduction
precludes discussion of it in the body of this Survey, the House proposal is analyzed in Appendix C infra.
20 S. 34, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 8(d) (1969) ; S. 296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 8(d) (1969).
21 S. 34, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 12(d) (1969); S. 296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 12(b)
(1969).
22 S. 34, 91st. Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 12(a)-(c), 16(a) (1969); S. 296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess.,
§§ 12(a), 16(a) (1969).
23 S. 34, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 7 (1969) ; S. 296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 7 (1969).
24 Senator Thomas McIntyre, author of S. 296, noted the unpopularity of his position
among mutual fund industry insiders. Writing in November, 1968, he said:
All of the proposals which I intend to make to the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency are designed to help the funds and their shareholders. Regrettably,
some persons in the fund industry seem to disagree with my views on the results of
My proposed legislation, much as the investment bankers of the 1930's believed that
the creation of the SEC would eliminate the stock market and make the grass grow
on Wall Street. Letter from Sen. Thomas J. McIntyre to John P. Freeman, Nov. 25,
1968, on file with the Notre Dame Lawyer.
The Senator has stated his position more vociferously:
The mutual fund industry, by its extreme defense of its own selfish interests, is
raising a cloud of scandal which cannot help casting a dark shadow over the brokers,
the Exchange, and the non-fund elements of the financial community. 114 CONG.
Rlc. S11082 (daily ed. Sept. 19, 1968).
25 As defined in section (4) (3) of the Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §
80a-'(4) (3) (1964), a management investment company is any investment company (as defined by section 3 of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3 (1964)), except a face-amount certificate
company or a unit investment trust. Those types of investment companies are defined in sections 4(1) and (2) respectively. According to those subsections:
"Face-amount certificate company" means an investment company which is
engaged . . . in the business of issuing face-amount certificates of the installment
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from the embryonic pre-1921 era

through the passage of the 1940 Act. Parts IV through VI focus primarily on
the sales and management aspects of the mutual fund industry; they are largely
devoted to evaluations of the merit of the legislation now pending before Congress, based upon the adequacy of the investor safeguards presently provided
by the 1940 Act.26
II. The Nature of Management Investment Companies
A. Introduction
Because Part III will deal at length with the history of the Act, which is
by no means solely a saga of the infancy of the mutual fund industry, a broadly
based insight into the operation of the investment company is needed if that
discussion is to be meaningful. Accordingly, the initial segment of this Survey
is devoted to an analysis of the nature and functional structure of the most

prominent class of investment company, the management investment company.
A management investment company is a voluntary organization that issues
securities to the public representing a pro rata share in the assets held by the
company, which primarily consist of securities issued by corporate enterprises.
Management investment companies are usually corporations or trusts,27 and are
type, or which has been engaged in such business and has any such certificate outstanding.
"Unit investment trust" means an investment company which (A) is organized
under a trust indenture, contract of custodianship or agency, or similar instrument,
(B) does not have a board of directors, and (C) issues only redeemable securities,
each of which represents an undivided interest in a unit of specified securities; but
does not include a voting trust.
All other types of investment companies are designated in subsection '(3) as management
investment companies. It should be noted that certain organizations which issue or propose
to issue securities, and which may be engaged primarily in the business of investing, reinvesting, or trading in securities, are not investment companies under the Act. Among the most
important exclusions are issuers: (1) whose securities are beneficially owned by fewer than
one hundred people and who are not, and do not propose to make a public offering of their
securities; (2) who are banks or insurance companies; (3) who are holding companies registered under the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935; and (4) who are charitable
institutions. Investment Company Act of 1940 § 3(b), (c), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(b), (c)
(1964).
26 Before proceeding with these analyses, the authors wish to make a declaration concerning the terminology that will be employed in this exposition. Terms such as "open-end,"
"closed-end," "front-end load," "no-load," "go-go fund," and the like, will be used repeatedly
throughout this Survey. They are examples of the type of jargon common to the investment
company industry, and their use may be justified by the same rationale as stated by Professor
Leach of Harvard Law School in defending the use of the jargon he employed in his unceasing
war versus the Rule against Perpetuities. In Professor Leach's words:
The use of jargon is usually deprecated, but a specialist's jargon can be defended on the ground that it permits shorthand reference to situations or doctrines
which, if spelled out at length every time, would bore the reader and spoil the prose.
LEACH, Perpetuities;The Nutshell Revisited, 78 HAzv. L. RFv. 973, 991 n.78 (1965).
27 PUBLIC POLICY STATEMENT 33. The range of organizational forms which an investment company may take is limited only by the exclusion made in sections 3(b) and (c) of the
Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-3(b), (c) (1964). Such breadth is achieved by the Act's definition of an
issuer as "every person who issues or proposes to issue any security, or has outstanding any
security which it has issued." Investment Company Act of 1940 § 2(21), 15 U.S.C. § 80a2(21) "(1964) (emphasis added). A person is defined in section 2(27), 15 U.S.C. § 80a2(27) (1964), as "a natural person or a company." (Emphasis added.) For an example of an
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designed to provide a service - professional management of the company's
"portfolio securities," typically common stocks 2s -in
the interest of achieving
a yield, including capital appreciation, for their shareholders. 9 Because the
assets of the management company are usually held in a varied assortment of
securities, an investor who purchases a share in the investment company is commonly able to attain diversification of his investment risk for a much lower cash
outlay than would be the case if he attempted to duplicate the company's portfolio by purchasing each of the company's portfolio stocks seriatim. It is the
"professional management" and "diversification of risk" features which are
the distinctive characteristics of the management company."0
Through the use of those features, and the implementation of a specific
investment policy, the company seeks to achieve an investment goal for its shareholders. The particular objectives sought vary among the different companies.
Some seek to invest their funds in securities favored for high yields, while others
select their portfolio securities with an eye toward possible capital appreciation;
still others follow an eclectic approach, striving to "provide reasonable current
income and long-term growth of capital and income.""1
A variety of policies are used by investment companies in their endeavor
to fulfill their objectives. Many companies choose to purchase only common
stocks, others hold mainly bonds and preferred stocks, and still others feature
"balanced" portfolios. Preference may further be shown for securities issued
by companies operating in certain industries, in groups of related industries, or
in a particular geographical region."2 The broad range of objectives sought and
investment company that was recognized as a "one man show," see notes 201-15 infra and
accompanying text.

28 INVESTMENT COMPANIES 1968, at 10 (L. Wessmann ed. 1968).
29 This fact seems to distinguish the operational characteristics of investment companies
from holding companies who use the medium of investment to control productive wealth. Note,
The Investment Company Act of 1940, 50 YALE L. J. 440, 440-41 (1941).
30 See, e.g., INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE, MANAGEMENT INVESTMENT COMPANIES
59, 71 (1962).
31 MASSACHUSETTS INVESTORS TRUST, PROSPECTUS, April 8, 1968, as amended October

9, 1968, at 1.
According to one mutual fund compendium, the income objectives of 222 open-end management companies as of December 31, 1968, were:

Number of
companies

Objective
Income
Balance

Percent
of all
companies

...........
.............
20
9
...........................................
25
11

Asset
size
(billions)

Percent
of
total
assets

$ 2.0
7.7

4
16

Growth and Current Income,
with Relative Stability ...................
21
Growth and Current Income .........
35

9
16

Primarily Growth ...
......................
38

17

2.1

4

Growth

83

38

21.2

40

222

100

51.2

100

Totals

............
...........-......

4.6
13.6

9
27

INVESTMENT COMPANIES 1968 (L. Wessmann ed., Supp. Dec. 31, 1968).
32 During fiscal 1968, the SEC registered three investment companies which have particularly unusual investment policies. Two intended to "focus their investments in the securities
of unseasoned or newly organized corporations in technological and scientific fields." The third
planned to invest between ten and fifteen per cent of its assets in industries that are based in
emerging nations and devote their resources to attempting to alleviate the world's "food and
population problems." 34 SEC ANN. REP. 129-30 (1968).
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investment policies employed by the myriad management investment companies
presents the investor with a veritable smorgasbord of investment vehicles. With
over 700 companies actively engaged in business it is a formidable array."3
Management investment companies are by far the most important of the
three types of investment companies. The other two, face-amount certificate
companies" and unit investment trusts,3 5 are dwarfed both in asset size and
number of active companies by the management companies. Roughly eighty
per cent of all active companies registered with the SEC on June 30, 1968 were
management investment companies, and those companies had assets in excess
of $62 billion on that date - nearly ninety per cent of all investment company
assets. While the nature and background of the face-amount certificate companies and the unit investment trusts will be discussed only briefly, certain unit
investment trusts are important in the distribution process related to the sale
of mutual fund shares and will receive a more detailed treatment.
B. The Two Types of Management Companies
A grasp of the functional characteristics of the companies lumped under
the management company heading may be attained by a comparison of the
two forms which such companies take, open-end and closed-end investment
companies.
1. The Redeemable Security Distinction
The most well-known and the largest form of management company is the
"open-end investment company," or, in common parlance, the mutual fund."
A mutual fund is a management company that offers for sale, or has outstanding, any redeemable security of which it is the issuer. 9 It is the "redeemability"
of the security issued by the open-end company that distinguishes it from the
other type of management investment company, the imaginatively named closedend investment company."0
By issuing a redeemable security, the open-end company puts itself under
a legal obligation to pay its shareholders the approximate proportionate share
of its net assets, or the cash equivalent, that the security tendered for redemption represents." The proportionate share of its net assets that the mutual fund
33 Id. at 113.
34 See note 25 supra.
35 Id.
36 34 SEC ANN. REP. 113 (1968).
37 See text accompanying notes 117-28 infra.
38 For a brief discussion of the etymology of the terms "open-end investment company"
and "mutual fund," see note 4 supra.
39 Investment Company Act of 1940 § 5(a) (1), 15 U.S.C. § 5(a) (1) (1964). See notes
25 & 27 supra for a short analysis of the sections of the Act which define investment companies and management investment companies.
40 Closed-end companies are members of a residual class of investment companies. The
Act defines a closed-end company as "any management company other than an open-end company." Investment Company Act of 1940 § 5(a) (2), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-5(a) (2) (1964).
41 Section 22(e) of the Act specifically provides that any redeemable security issued by a
registered investment company must be redeemed by the company within seven days '(exclusive
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is obligated to pay is known as the share's net asset value. The net asset value
of a mutual fund share is determined at least once daily,42 and is computed by
dividing the total net assets of the company (valuing the securities at their
market price as of a preselected time), by the total number of mutual fund
shares outstanding at that predetermined hour.
The total assets held by the funds active on June 30, 1968 was $53 billion,
43
comprising eighty-five per cent of all management investment company assets,
and representing a huge increase from the 1940 total of $.5 billion.44 Although
the funds now dominate the management investment company family, their
the time
position of ascendancy is a comparatively recent phenomenon -at
of the 1940 Act's passage, the funds accounted for only forty-four per cent of
all management company assets.45
As distinguished from an open-end company, the closed-end company
undertakes no such redemption obligation; hence capital raised by it through
the sale of its shares is viewed as being permanently committed to the enterprise.
In this respect the closed-end investment company does not differ greatly from
companies that operate in other segments of the economy.
2. The Preminum-Discount Phenomenon
The obvious effect of the difference between the capital structure of the
two types of companies is that, while a mutual fund shareholder may at any
time demand that the issuing fund "buy back" his security at its net asset value,
subject to the SEC's rarely exercised right to suspend the redemption privilege,"
the closed-end shareholder must dispose of his security through the market mechanism- either on a stock exchange or by use of the over-the-counter market. 47
Because the closed-end investor is subjected to the vagaries of the marketplace,
the price he receives for his share need not, and seldom does, reflect the share's
net asset value. Depending on the demand for the share, the sales price may
reflect a discount from or premium over the share's actual net asset value.
During the period between 1931 and 1968 the shares issued by the closedof days when the New York Stock Exchange is closed or trading thereon is restricted) after
it is tendered by the shareholder unless (1) an emergency exists which makes it "not reasonably practicable" for the company to pay off the shareholder or (2) the SEC permits the
company to suspend the shareholder's redeemability privilege. Investment Company Act of
1940 § 22(e), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-22(e) (1964). The Commission recently exercised its prerogative to grant the privilege of redeemability suspension to a fund registered under the Act.
See Mates Investment Co., SEC Investment Co. Act Release No. 5,571 (Dec. 20, 1968).
42 Rule 22c-1, promulgated by the SEC on October 16, 1968, and effective as of January
13, 1969, requires that the computation of the net asset value of mutual fund shares be made
"not less frequently than once daily as of the time of the close of trading on [the New York
Stock Exchange]." 17 C.F.R. § 270.22c-1 '(1969). For the background and purpose of that
Rule see notes 398-405 infra and accompanying text.
43 34 SEC ANN. REP. 113 (1968).
44 1967 Senate Hearings 125.
45 1940 Senate Hearings 459-63. Ten years earlier mutual funds accounted for less than
six per cent of the assets held by management companies. SEC, INVESTMENT TRUSTS AND
INVESTMENT COMPANIES, PART Two, H.R. Doc. 70, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 116 (1938) [hereinafter cited as INVESTMENT TRUSTS II].
46 See note 41 supra.
47 The most active market for the stock of closed-end companies is the New York Stock
Exchange. See INVESTMENT COMPANIES 1968, at 330-33, 370-72 (L. Wessmann ed. 1968).
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end companies tended to sell at discounts, prices lower than the net asset value
of the shares.4 8 That situation was anomalous for two reasons: First, closed-end
companies are, like mutual funds, management investment companies, and they
provide their investors with the same basic services - professional management
and diversification of risk. Indeed, in several cases the closed-ends and mutual
funds employ the same management talent.49 Second, the brokerage fee paid by
an investor who purchases the closed-end's security on the market is commonly
far lower than the sales charge paid by the mutual fund investor when purchasing the open-end security. The net result is that the dosed-end investor normally
pays a smaller sales fee and receives a greater interest in the company's assets than
the mutual-fund investor who purchases a mutual fund share at its net asset value
plus a high sales charge.5" It is anomalous that the closed-ends' shares sold at
discounts for such a long period while investors were flocking to the funds in
droves, because the discount represents a lack of demand for the shares, while
on paper at least, the dosed-ends appear to have been the better bargain.
Probably the most satisfactory explanation for the discount phenomenon is
historical. As will be seen, the closed-ends enjoyed their heyday during the early
days of the development of management investment companies, especially in
the years preceding the depression when they greatly outnumbered the mutual
funds in every category: number of companies, total assets, and total shareholders.51 Without now attempting to discuss the management practices or
intricate capital structures then prevalent among the closed-ends,"2 suffice it to
say that the image of the closed-ends in the minds of the investing public following the crash and the result of what has been politely termed "maladministration"53 on the part of the less scrupulous of the closed-end managers, was less
than glorious. The effect of the market decline, mismanagement, and the
unfavorable tax treatment accorded the closed-ends until 1942" led to a slackening in the demand for and a resultant discount on closed-end shares, which had
commanded premiums prior to the depression. One SEC official who played a
prominent part in the history of the 1940 Act had this to say about the reason
closed-ends sold at a discount during the depression:
[Tihese companies which were supposed to be managed by experts sustained
bigger losses, or as big losses as anybody else, whereupon the confidence

48 See the graph of sample closed-end companies, id. at 21. This phenomenon was reversed for the first time since the 1930's in 1968. On December 31, 1968. the average price
paid for the stock of the larger closed-ends reflected a premium. See INVESTMENT COMPANIES 1968 (L. Wessmann ed., Supp. Dec. 31, 1968).
49 E.g., Carriers and General Corporation, a closed-end company, is managed by Calvin
Bullock, Ltd., the same advisor hired by five mutual funds: Bullock Fund, Ltd., Canadian
Fund, Canadian Investment Fund, Ltd., Dividend Shares, and Nation-Wide Securities. IN-

VESTMENT COMPANIES 1968 (L. Wessmann ed. 1968).

See PUBLIC POLICY STATEMENT 210.
51 See, e.g., INVESTMENT TRUSTS II 115-16, 375.
52 See, e.g., text accompanying notes 300-12 infra.
53 Senator Robert Wagner, speaking at the 1940 Senate hearings on a regulatory scheme
designed to curb managerial malfeasance in the investment company industry, said with reference to one type of malpractice: "Let us say the money was lost through maladministration;
perhaps looting is too strong a term in some instances." 1940 Senate Hearings 332.
54 See notes 282-83 infra and accompanying text.
50
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. . . in'the expertness of the people who were managing these companies
faded a little bit....
So there was this reaction about these managements,. and an individual
who wanted to liquidate his interest in an investment company had to sell
his securities at a discount ranging in some instances up to 50 percent. 55
[The American public was] in effect saying that a dollar in the hands of
these expert managers is worth only 50 cents. 56
By 1940, the price of the average closed-end's shares reflected a discount
of roughly thirty-five per cent." The figure tended to decrease over the years,
and by the close of 1967 the average discount on closed-end shares was close to
five per cent." Finally, during 1968, the average price offered for a share in a
closed-end company exceeded the average net asset value of the industry's shares;
hence the average price denoted a premium" It would therefore appear that the
loss of the public's confidence in the closed-end companies has been the key
reason for the discount phenomenon, and that the lost confidence has very
gradually been restored.
3. Diversification
The two types of management companies, the open-end and closed-end
companies, are further divided within their respective categories on the basis of
the diversification of the assets which they hold. This refinement produces four
mutually exclusive categories:
(1)
Open-end, diversified;
(2)
Open-end, non-diversified;
(3)
Closed-end, diversified; or
(4) Closed-end, non-diversified.
A management investment company is "diversified" within the meaning
of the 1940 Act when, with respect to seventy-five per cent of its total assets,
it has not more than five per cent of its total assets invested in the securities of
any single company, and does not own more than ten per cent of the voting
securities of any one company.6" An exception is made in the case of a management company that loses its diversified status due to factors other than the
original acquisition of a security.61 Hence, a postacquisition appreciation in
the value of the security purchased would have no effect on the investment
company's diversified status. All other companies registered under the Act that
fail to meet the diversification test are, naturally enough, classified as non-diversified companies.
By virtue of section 13(a) (1)62 of the Act, an investment company is
55

Testimony of David Schenker, 1940 Senate Hearings 185.

58
59
60
61
62

Id.
See note 48 supra.
Investment Company Act of 1940 § 5(b) (1), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-5(b) (1) (1964).
Id. § 5(c), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-5(c) (1964).
Id. § 13(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-13(a)(1) (1964).

56 Id.
57 INVESTMENT COMPANIES 1968, at 21 '(L. Wessmann ed. 1968).
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required to receive shareholder approval of a management decision to alter its
diversification status; and section 12(c) imposes limitations on the ability of a
"registered diversified company to make any commitment as [an] underwriter .... ,,13
Otherwise, relative diversification makes virtually no difference
in the applicability of the Act's provisions to a particular company. The degree
of diversification of the management company's assets does have important tax
consequences, however.
The Internal Revenue Code allows a "regulated investment company"
special tax advantages that enable the investment company to avoid paying a
tax on up to one-hundred per cent of its investment income, 61 an obvious
advantage to its shareholders. The key Code provisions dealing with the classification of an investment company as "regulated" within the intent of the exemption
require the company to meet certain standards of diversification and income
distribution.6 5 The Code's diversification requirement is similar to that contained
in the 1940 Act, the major difference being that the Act permits unlimited concentration of up to twenty-five per cent of a company's assets, 66 while the Code
is more liberal, permitting up to fifty per cent of an investment company's assets
to be invested in a single company.67 The other major Code requirement that
must be met by an investment company seeking to avail itself of the desirable
tax status demands that the investment company pay at least ninety per cent
of the dividend and interest income received by it to its shareholders.68 If the
company pays out more than ninety per cent of such income, but less than
one-hundred per cent, the difference is taxable to it at whatever the regular
rate would be depending on the type of business association the investment
company is.
4. The Use of Leverage
Although the Act recognizes only four mutually exclusive categories of
management companies, they may be further distinguished by the presence or
absence of senior capital in the company's capital structure. The use of senior
capital in the form of bonds, debentures, preferred stock, or bank loans enables
a management company to create "leverage" which serves to magnify the changes
in the net asset value of the company's portfolio securities. During a market
upswing this works to the advantage of its shareholders. The effect of leverage
on the net asset value of investment company shareholder's security may be
seen by the use of a simple illustration:
1. Assume that two investment companies have identical total asset
values of $1,000,000. Assume further that the assets of the leveraged
63 Id. § 12(c), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-12(c) (1964).
64 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 852.
65 Id. § 851.
66 The concentration of an investment company's assets in the shares of other investment
companies is limited by section 12(d) (1) of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-12(d) (1) (1964). The
effect of that provision is discussed at notes 396-97 and accompanying text infra.
67 Compare Investment Company Act of 1940 § 5(b)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-5(b)(1)
(1964), with INT. Rv.CODE OF 1954, § 851(b) (4).
68 Ir. REv. CODE OF 1954 § 852(a) (1).
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investment company, Five Talents, Inc.,69 were supplied by the
issuance of $750,000 in bonds and $250,000 gained by the sale of
25,000 shares of $10 par stock; and that the assets of the nonleveraged company, One Talent, Inc.," are attributable solely to
the issuance of 100,000 shares of stock which also has a $10 par value.
Immediately after organization the balance sheets of the two companies would appear as follows:
Assets
$1,000,000
Cash

Total

$ 750,000
250,000
$1,000,000

$1,000,000

Assets
Cash
$1,000,000
Total

FIVE TALENTS, INC.
Capital
Bonds
Stock (25,000 shares
$10 par)

ONE TALENT, INC.
Capital
Stock (100,000 shares
$10 par)

$1,000,000
$1,000,000

$1,000,000

2. Now assume that one year has elapsed since the organization of the
companies, that each company invested its cash in equal amounts of
identical securities, and that the value of the securities they purchased
has quadrupled. Assuming that the portfolio securities of the companies are valued at their market price, and ignoring for the purpose
of illustration the interest charged on debt capital, the balance sheets
of the companies at year end would look like this:
Assets
Securities $4,000,000

Total

$4,000,000

FIVE TALENTS, INC.
Capital
Bonds
Stock (25,000 shares
$10 par)
Unrealized Appreciation

$ 750,000
250,000
3,000,000
$4,000,000

Net asset value per share of common stock:
Net Assets $3,250,000 --- Number of shares 25,000 = $130.00
69 See Matthew 25:14-30. "For it is like a man going abroad, who called his servants and
handed over his goods to them. And to one he gave five talents . . . and to another one, to
each according to his particular ability and then he went on his journey." Id. at 14.
It should be noted that the degree of leverage achieved by Five Talents, Inc., would be
prohibited by section 18 of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-18 '(1964). That section prohibits the
issuance of bonds by a mutual fund, and limits their issuance by closed-ends to instances
where the company maintains a 300 per cent asset coverage. The statutory standard was disregarded for illustrative purposes.
70 Matthew 25:14-30.
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Assets
Securities $4,000,000

Total

ONE TALENT, INC.
Capital
Stock (100,000 shares
$10 par)
Unrealized Appreciation

$4,000,000

[June, 1969]

$1,000,000
3,000,000
$4,000,000

Net asset value per share of common stock:
Net Assets $4,000,000 - Number of shares 100,000 = $40.00
As is apparent, the net asset value of the shares of the leveraged company,
Five Talents, Inc., increased appreciably more than that of the non-leveraged
company's shares. In essence, Five Talents, Inc.'s stockholders had "more assets
working for them," and benefited handsomely.
Leverage has been most commonly employed by the closed-end variety of
the management investment company family. In 1929, the leveraged closedends dominated the investment company industry, outnumbering the mutual
funds by more than six to one.7" However, as was discovered by those investors
who held shares in the leveraged companies during the depression, the leverage
mechanism works equally well in reverse, and a falling market will naturally
magnify the decline in a share's net asset value. For instance, it would have
taken only a twenty-five per cent decline in the market value of Five Talents,
Inc.'s original investment to eliminate the equity value of its shareholders. Negative net asset values were not at all uncommon during the depression; in fact,
by the end of 1932, the shares of two-thirds of all leveraged closed-end companies were "under water." 72 As might well be expected, the proven efficiency
of the leverage mechanism when working in reverse cooled investor ardor for
the leveraged closed-ends, and the number of companies using leverage decreased
until, by the end of 1966, only a handful of companies continued the practice.7
Leverage has since made a comeback. Early in 1967, a new form of investment package was made available to the American investor. A British innovation variously called the "dual fund" or "split-purpose" fund, this new investment strategy has been incorporated by eight closed-end companies and one
mutual fund to date. The dual funds possess a unique capital structure which
enables them to double up the principle of leverage, to the advantage of their
two classes of stockholders: those holding "income" shares and those holding
"capital" shares. The dual fund achieves double-barreled leverage by requiring
each class of security holder to make equal capital contributions and permitting
the income shareholders to receive all of the income derived from the investment
of the pooled funds, with all of the capital gains earned by the funds going to
the fund's capital shareholders. The fund's operating expenses are paid from
its investment income, and hence are paid by the income shareholders, while
all capital losses incurred by the fund are borne by the capital shareholders up
71
72
73

INVESTMENT TRUSTS

II 115.

Id. at 816-17.
INVESTMENT COMPANIES

1968 22 (L. Wessmann ed. 1968).
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to the point where the equity investment of the capital shareholder vanishes,
at which point the income shareholder begins bearing the losses. In essence, the
income and capital shareholders are "using each other's money" in their quest
to reach their respective investment objectives.
This unique investment technique has not proven extremely popular with
the investing public,74 and the companies offering dual funds account for less
than one per cent of the total assets held by management companies. 75 Their
significance for the purpose of this discussion lies solely in the fact that they
represent the resurrection of the principle of leverage, and, as will be seen, that
feature was important in the shaping of the modern investment company in76
dustry
C. The OperationalCharacte7isticsof Mutual Funds and Closed-end Companies
This discussion has heretofore centered on the differences between the
open-end and closed-end investment companies relating to the redeemable security
distinction, the closed-end's premium discount phenomenon, diversification, and
the feature most commonly used by the closed-end companies, leverage. The
next area to be considered deals with the manner in which the assets of the
mutual funds and closed-end companies are managed, and the way they distribute their shares to the public.
1. Management
The dosed-end companies tend to operate in much the same manner as
companies doing business in other sectors of the economy. They are generally
managed by their officers and a board of directors,7 7 and use the standard
underwriter-broker relationship when they seek to issue their securities, which in
many cases are traded on the New York Stock Exchange [NYSE].78 In these
respects, the practices of the mutual fund industry vary significantly from those
utilized by its closed-end cousin.
Unlike most other types of companies, which derive their managerial expertise from internal sources- the company's officers and board of directors the overwhelming majority of the mutual funds choose to hire their manage74 The capital shares issued by eight of the nine dual funds were selling at discounts on
December 31, 1968. at a time when most closed-end shares commanded premiums. INVESTMENT COMPANIES 1968 (L. Wessmann ed., Supp. Dec. 31, 1968).
Since the shares are exchanged at an auction market, the discount is attributable to a lack of investor demand for
the shares.
75 The total "investment assets" of the nine dual funds was $469.1 million on December
31, 1968, compared with assets of $55 billion on the same date for mutual funds. Compare id.
with TIME, Jan. 24, 1969, at 67.
76 For a more detailed discussion of the functional characteristics of the dual funds, see
FORTUNE, Feb. 1967, at 201. See also a sequel to that discussion which presents an analysis
of the reception given the dual funds by the investing public, FORTUNE, Aug. 1967, at 175.
The dual funds have also provoked some comment concerning the adequacy of the existing federal securities regulation to cope with various problems raised by their unique
capital structure. See Note, The Regulation of the Dual Funds, 54 VA. L. REv. 1396 (1968).

77

PUBLIC POLICY STATEMENT

87.

78 As noted, the shares of the majority of closed-end companies are listed on the New

York Stock Exchange. See note 47 supra.
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ment talent by contracting for the services of an "investment advisor." Usually
a corporation or partnership, the investment advisor renders many services to
the fund in addition to supplying the financial acumen required to manage
the mutual fund's portfolio securities. Among the extra-advisory services commonly rendered by a fund's investment advisor are: paying the salaries of the
fund's officers, keeping the mutual fund's books of account, and paying the rental
fees for the mutual fund's offices."9 As is apparent, the advisor is intimately
related with the operation of the fund; he is, in most cases, the ringmaster and
the mutual fund is the trained seal. Former SEC Commissioner Manuel Cohen
pointed this out in 1967 when testifying before the House subcommittee that
was considering a bill embodying the SEC's proposal to amend the 1940 Act.
Referring to testimony on behalf of the investment advisors, he said:
They also made the point that the investment adviser creates the
fund, and operates it in effect as a business. Many of them stated that
"It is our fund, we run it, we manage it, we control it," and I don't think
there is anything wrong in them saying it. They were just admitting what
is a fact of life.
The investment adviser does control the fund. 0
Quite naturally, the investment advisor does not provide such a broad
range of skills to the mutual fund gratis. The remuneration received by the
advisor, called the management fee, is most commonly calculated on the basis
of a percentage of the mutual fund's total net assets. The fee rate is often a
flat one-half per cent of the average total net assets managed," though many
funds have begun to utilize sliding scales in the computation of the management
fee, which results in a lowering of the fee rate as the asset size of the fund increases.82 In addition, some funds now base a portion of the advisory fee on the
fund's investment performance, adding to or deducting from the advisory fee
depending on how the net asset value of the fund's shares compares to a preselected market index.8
The median annual fee rate of the fifty-seven "externally managed" mutual
funds (those employing investment advisors), which had average net assets
79 PUBLIC POLICY STATEMENT 91. A table representing the various types of extra-advisory
services rendered by a selected group of advisors is presented in Part VI. See text accompanying note 1048-49 infra.
80 Hearings on H.R. 9510, H.R. 9511 Before the Subcomm. of Commerce and Finance of
the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 674
(1967) [hereinafter cited as 1967 House Hearings].
81 PUBLIC POLICY STATEMENT 46.
82 Id.
83 For example, the advisory contract between IVEST Fund, Inc. (a mutual fund), and
IVEST, Inc. (its advisor), provides for an annual base fee of one-half per cent of the fund's
average total net assets (based on end of month totals), subject to a decrease of one-eighth
per cent if the fund's investment performance is two per cent or more below that reflected by
the Dow Jones Industrial Index. If the fund "out-performs" the index by more than two per
cent, the one-half per cent management fee would be increased to five-eighths per cent. The
investment performance of the fund is measured by the net percentage change in the net asset
value of a fund share. IVEST FUND, INC., PROSPECTUS, January 2, 1969, at 5, 6.
The fund combines the performance fee with a sliding base fee scale which results in the
one-half per cent base fee being reduced to .48 per cent of net assets in excess of $250 million.
Id. at 6. For a more detailed discussion of performance fees see notes 1023-46 infra and
accompanying text.
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of over $100 million was .48 per cent in 1965.84 Ten of those companies,
taken individually, had assets greater than those managed by the entire mutual
fund industry in 1940,8- and in 1940 the average advisory fee rate was .5 per
cent. 6 Thus, while the management fee rate declined roughly four per cent between
1940 and 1965, the tremendous growth of the mutual fund industry has caused the
basis for the computation of that fee, the net assets of the mutual fund industry,
to rise by over 11,000 per cent.
This situation has led some to wonder whether, in light of the proven
economies of size present in the mutual fund industry,"7 the fees paid by the
fund to its investment advisor, who "runs it, manages it, and controls it," are
justified. Lendirig credence to the position of those who pursue this line of
inquiry is the fact that the fees charged the mutual fund for investment advice
by the advisor are commonly far in excess of those charged the advisor's nonfund clients,"8 and also far greater than those management costs incurred by
mutual funds which utilize internal sources to provide their management skill. 9
As noted, the advisor generally pays the salary of, or is associated with,
virtually all of the fund's officers and a substantial number of the fund's directors.
As former Commissioner Cohen perceptively noted, "[t]he investment adviser
does control the fund."8 " Since the advisory contract, which stipulates the
method by which the advisor will receive his compensation, may be, and usually
is, approved by the mutual fund's board of directors, several of whose members
are commonly associated with or employed by the advisor, it is apparent that
there may be a conflict of interest problem involved with the board's decision
to maintain the existing fee rate.9 1 This situation has been characterized as the
"fundamental ambiguity concerning the locus of control as between the board
of directors or trustees of the investment company and its presumptive agent
employed to advise it or to manage its security portfolio under board supervision. 092 Put more bluntly: "[N]othing - but nothing
- approaches the open
93
end mutual fund [sic] for incestuous relationships."
An extensive discussion of this "fundamentally ambiguous relationship,"
its legal ramifications, and the manner in which the proposed legislation is
intended to cope with it is presented in Part VI of this Survey.
2. The Security Distribution Process
As has been pointed out, the shares issued by the closed-end companies
84 PU3LIC POLICY STATEMENT 99.
85 Compare id. at 98 with id. at 2.
86 1940 Senate Hearings 453.
87 This phenomenon is treated in detail in Part VI. See notes 1068-88 infra and accompanying text.
88 PU3LIC POLICY STATEMENT 120.

89
90
91

Id. at 102-11.
See note 80 supra and accompanying text.
However, section 15(e) of the Investment Company Act of -1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-

15(e) (1964), does attempt to introduce a measure of independence to a board's vote. For a
treatment of the effectiveness of this section, see notes 382-86 infra and accompanying text.
92 WHARTON SCHOOL OF FINANCE AND COMMERCE, A STUDY OF MUTUAL FUNDS, H.R.
REP. No. 2274. 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 51 (1962) [hereinafter cited as WHARTON REPORT].
93 Statement of A. Pomerantz, University of Pennsylvania Law School Conference on
Mutual Funds, 115 U. PA. L. Rav. 659, 739 (1967).
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are traded on the stock exchanges or the over-the-counter markets while the
mutual fund must itself stand ready to redeem its shares. The result of this
situation is that while the asset size of the dosed-end company is only capable
of shrinkage from a decrease in the market value of the portfolio securities (assuming the company does not pay dividends to its shareholders out of capital), a
mutual fund's assets are susceptible to shrinkage from redemptions as well. The
threat of being forced to liquidate the portfolio to meet an onrush of redemptions
is one reason why the vast majority of the mutual funds choose to constantly
issue shares to the public.94 A more important reason for the funds to continuously offer their shares is linked to the earlier discussed fact that the investment advisor "runs the fund" and is compensated by a fee directly related to
the fund's size. An increase in the fund's net assets obviously serves to benefit
the advisor, and is probably the major explanation for the fact that mutual
fund shares are aggressively marketed. This viewpoint was impliedly accepted
by the SEC in the Public Policy Statement:
The industry's emphasis on sales has been viewed as a byproduct of redeemability. This position was expressed by one industry executive who recently
stated:
The inexorable law of this business is that when assets rise, redemptions rise proportionately so that the more you succeed, the harder
you have to sell, just to keep your place on the treadmill.
But sales of new fund shares have enabled the fund business to do more
than just keep its "place on the treadmill." Such sales account for most
of the increase in mutual fund assets since 1940.9- (Emphasis added.)
To credit the sale of fund shares with the major portion of a $50 billion increase
in mutual fund assets is to pay no mean tribute to the salesmanship ability of
the mutual fund dealer.
Although some mutual funds market their shares to the public at a pice
which reflects the share's net asset value, "at cost,"9 most funds retail their
securities at a price which includes a sales charge in addition to the net asset
value of the share. The sales charge, known as the "load," is used to compensate those who work in the fund's distribution chain: the principal underwriter 7
who "wholesales" the shares, the dealer who operates the "retail outlet," and
the salesman who sells the shares to the public.
94 The Act contains no provision which would require a mutual fund to continuously
offer its shares to the public.
95 PUBLIC POLICY STATEMENT 202.
96 As of June 30, 1968, over ninety mutual funds of this type were registered with the
SEC and actively engaged in business. See SEC, LIST OF COMPANIES REGISTERED UNDER THE
INVESTMENT COMPANY ACT OF

1940 (as of June 30, 1968) 52-65 (1968).

97 It should be noted that the underwriter in the mutual fund's securities distribution
process is not an underwriter within the common meaning of the word, since he assumes no
risk. The underwriter undertakes only to use his best efforts to sell the mutual fund's securities, but unlike the common "best efforts" underwriter, there is no specific time limit within
which the fund underwriter must dispose of the securities. Typically the function of underwriter is fulfilled by the investment advisor or one of his wholly owned subsidiaries. Although
the underwriting task is often a money losing proposition for the advisor, the income to be
gained by a rise in the management fee resulting from an increase in the fund's assets serves,
no doubt, as a powerful incentive for him to accept the position. See PUBLIC POLICY STATEMENT 55 n.137, 209, 213.
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The funds that sell their shares to the public at net asset value, without
charging a sales load, are called, logically enough, no-load funds. The no-loads
are accorded special treatment by the 1940 Act, and are permitted to distribute
their shares to the public without paying for the services of an underwriter."
There are about ninety no-load funds in operation and most have been organized
by brokerage houses or investment counsel firms as a service to customers whose
accounts cannot be profitably handled on an individual basis 9
The great majority of the mutual fund shares sold are those of the load
funds. The load funds have more in common with each other than the use of
the underwriter-dealer-salesman relationship- they generally charge the same
sales loads. The following schedule 00 is the one most commonly used by the
dealer when determining the load to be paid by the investor:

S
l
Sales load

Cash outlay

Sales charge
(as a percent of
net asset value
of shares received)

Percent
Less than $12,500 ........................................
8.50
9.29
$12,500 to under $25,000 ..........................
7.50
8.11
$25,000 to under $50,000 .---------------------5.75
6.10
$50,000 to under $100,000 .........................
4.00
4.17
$100,000 to under $250,000 ---------------------3.25
3.36
$250,000 to under $1,000,000 ...................2.50
2.56
$1,000,000 and over -------------------------------------1.00
1.01
In 1966, the median purchase made by a mutual fund shareholder was
estimated to be $1,240101 Using the above schedule the amount invested would
be $1,134.60 with $105.40 deducted as a sales load. The sales charge would
commonly be divided between the fund's underwriter, dealer, and the salesman
as follows:

Position
Underwriter
Dealer
Salesman

Concession as a
percentage of the
amount invested 10 2
2.00
3.25
3.25
8.50

Concession in
dollars
$ 24.80
40.30
40.30
$105.40

It should be noted that although brokerage houses commonly serve as dealers
in the mutual fund distribution process, there is virtually never a redemption fee
connected with the liquidation of a mutual fund share. The fund typically
Investment Company Act of 1940 § 12(b), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-12(b) (1964).
1967 Senate Hearings 215. See also PUBLIC POLICY STATEMENT 58-59.
100 The schedule is given at PUBLIC POLICY STATEMENT 210.
101 Id.
102 Id. at 207.
98
99
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redeems the share at its net asset value, making the initial sales load a "one time"
affair.
While a majority of the load funds sell their securities through independent
dealers, a sizeable minority utilize sales organizations that are directly controlled
by the underwriter. This distribution system, referred to as a "captive sales force,"
is used by a group of funds that account for over forty per cent of the industry's
assets."'3 The use of a captive sales force frees the underwriter from his two most
difficult tasks: convincing the independent dealer to recommend mutual fund
shares instead of common stocks, and persuading the dealer to "push" the underwriter's fund. Investors Diversified Services, Inc., the largest mutual fund complex,"'4 had a sales force of approximately 4,000 full time salesmen on August 3,
1967.1"5 Its asset value on that date was roughly $6 billion, or nearly fifteen
per cent of the total assets of the mutual fund industry.0
Because of the high sales load imposed on the sale of most mutual fund
shares, coupled with the fact that the portfolios of most funds consist of equity
securities traded on the NYSE, it is usually far more expensive for an investor
to invest indirectly in the stock market by buying a mutual fund share than it
would be for him to invest directly - by purchasing one share of stock in each
of a mutual fund's portfolio companies "on the market." For example, the
average mutual fund investor in 1966 paid a sales load that amounted to 9.3
per cent of the net asset value of the mutual fund shares he received.10 7 Had he
invested that money directly in securities listed on the NYSE, he would have
paid a sales charge of only 1.8 per cent (assuming he engaged in an odd lot
transaction and that the market value of the shares acquired was $40.00 per
share),."' The total commission paid by the investor to buy and sell those
securities would have aggregated only 3.5 per cent of the amount invested. 0 0
Hence, an investor who chooses to invest in the stock market indirectly, by purchasing an interest in a mutual fund, pays a sales charge that is 264 per cent
greater than he would have incurred had he invested in the market directly by
purchasing the portfolio stocks seriatim.
The huge popularity of the load funds relative to other similar investment
vehicles is evidenced by the fact that they outnumber the no-load funds by four
to one, accounting for over ninety-two per cent of the fund industry's assets,"11
and also by the lack of investor demand for the shares issued by the closed-end
companies that often results in the sales of their shares at discounts. The ability

103 Id. at 207 n.28.
104 A mutual fund complex is a group of investment companies which have different
investment policies but share a common management. See id. at 47-49.
105 1967 Senate Hearings 773.
106 Id. at 771.
107 This conclusion is based on the assumptions that: ( 1) the investor made the average purchase of mutual fund shares during that year ($1,240) ; (2) he purchased shares in the largest
class of fund, the load fund; and (3) the sales load on the shares purchased was that most
commonly charged by such funds. See text accompanying notes 98-100 supra.
108

PUBLIC POLICY STATEMENT 210 Table v-3.

109
110

Id.
34 SEC ANN. REP. 113 (1968).
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of the load funds to thrive despite the presence of the other, far less expensive, investment vehicles able to provide the same services gives cause to admire the
merchandising abilities of the load funds' sales system.
3. Dividend and Capital Gains Reinvestment
Another factor accounting for the increase in the size of the mutual fund
industry's total assets, in addition to appreciation in the value of the funds'
portfolio securities and the sale of new shares through the mutual fund distribution system, is the practice adopted by the vast majority of the funds of permitting their shareholders to automatically plow the dividend income and capital
gains distributions which they receive from the fund back into the fund, thereby
acquiring additional shares. This form of shareholder thrift is actively encouraged by the funds, an enthusiasm that is, no doubt, at least partially attributable
to the manner in which the investment advisor employed by most mutual funds
receives his compensation.
At year end 1965, roughly sixty per cent of the mutual fund industry's total
number of shareholder accounts provided for the regular investment of dividend
income and reinvestment of capital gains distributions."' Although no mutual
fund charges its shareholder a sales load on capital gains reinvestment, a sizeable
number of the funds indulge in the practice of charging their shareholders a
sales load on the dividend income invested." 2 This practice was vigorously
criticized by the SEC in its Public Policy Statement. Among the imprecations
heaped on the mutual funds by the SEC prior to its conclusion that "sales loads
on dividend investments generally are neither related to nor justified by any
special selling effort"" 3 was one drawn by innuendo. Regarding the necessity of
such loads to provide the incentive to "sell" mutual fund shareholders on dividend
investment programs, the SEC observed that:
A sampling by the Investment Company Institute showed that 52.4 percent of all dividends were invested in additional fund shares, but that the
investment rate for the funds which charged a sales load on such investments was only 29.9 percent." 4
The clear implication to be drawn from the SEC's observation is that sales
loads on dividend investment programs stifle rather than promote the accomplishment of the goal sought - an increase in the fund's total asset value.
4. Systematic Purchase Plans
Not all mutual fund shares are sold on a "lump sum" basis. Two different
plans, the voluntary accumulation plan and the contractual plan, are currently
available to the load fund purchaser which enable him to purchase mutual fund
shares systematically.
111

PUBLIC POLICY STATEMENT
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Id.
Id. at 216.

114 Id.
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a. Voluntary Accumulation Plans
By using a voluntary accumulation plan, an investor may purchase mutual
fund shares on a regular (commonly monthly) basis, through the fund's normal
distribution system. The voluntary plan shareholder pays a sales charge, generally eight and one-half per cent,115 on each share purchased. In this respect
his position is identical to that of the typical lump sum purchaser; indeed, the
position of the voluntary plan shareholder in relation to the lump sum purchaser is analogous to that of the bank Christmas Club depositor and the lump
sum depositor - both depositors seek the same end, one just goes about it in a
more roundabout or, if you will, "systematic" way.
The voluntary accumulation plan has its closed-end counterpart in the
Monthly Investment Plan which enables an investor to regularly purchase the
shares of those closed-ends listed on the NYSE." 6 The major difference between
the two methods of acquiring management investment company shares is that,
as pointed out, the brokerage cost on the stock exchange purchase would typically
be far lower than the cost of purchasing the mutual fund shares.
b. ContractualPlans
The other type of "plan" method of investing in mutual fund shares is
that offered by the so-called "contractual plan." Participation in a contractual
plan is achieved by the purchase of a security issued by a unit investment trust
(plan company), called a periodic payment plan certificate. The asset structure
of the plan company typically varies vastly from that of a mutual fund. Instead
of a diversified portfolio of equity securities ?t la mutual fund, the plan company's
assets almost invariably consist of mutual fund shares. Eighty-seven of ninety
plan companies operating in 1966 used this arrangement."' The three exceptions
were companies that invested the proceeds received from the sale of their securities
in equal amounts of a preselected and fixed list of equity securities. With these
exceptions, the contractual planholder, in substance if not in form, actually holds
an interest in the underlying mutual fund.
An investor who purchases a contractual plan undertakes to purchase the
plan company's certificates on a regular basis; the ten year, 120 payment plan
is the one most commonly utilized. l" Purchase of the certificate does not result
in immediate ownership of the shares issued by the underlying fund - the shareholder has only a beneficial interest in the undivided assets of the plan company
which are held in trust for the planholder by a custodian bank. For performing
this service, the custodian bank commonly receives two per cent of the amount
invested by the planholder." 9 Actual ownership of the shares is not achieved
115 Id. at 224.
116 INVESTMENT COMPANIES 1968, at 21 (L. Wessmann ed. 1968).
117 On June 30, 1966, ninety contractual plans were registered with the SEC, and only
three operated as "pure unit trusts." PUBLIC POLICY STATEMENT 226 nn. 100, 103.
118 It was noted by the SEC that as of 1966 over two-thirds of the plans adopted this
schedule. Id. at 227.
119
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until the certificates are redeemed by the plan company. At that time the planholder is entitled either to cash, or, if he prefers, the shares of the underlying
fund equivalent in value to his pro rata interest in the plan company's assets.
Since the planholder may present his certificate for redemption at any time he
chooses, the description of the arrangement as a "contractual" plan is a misnomer.
The planholder is never under a binding legal obligation to fulfill his payment
schedule.
It is apparent that the plan company-underlying fund relationship is a
closely knit one. The intimacy of that relationship is apparent in the manner in
which the plan company and the fund impose their fees on the planholders.
While the underlying fund charges the plan company a management fee, the
plan company does not charge its investors an additional one since, by purchasing the shares of the mutual fund, the plan company has effectively abdicated
any management responsibilities upon which it might justify the imposition of
such a fee. 2 ' However, the fund does permit the plan company to purchase its
shares at net asset value, i.e., without the imposition of a sales load. 2' As distinguished from a management fee, the plan company does charge its investors
a sales load, and it is the type of sales load imposed which is the contractual
plan's distinctive feature. The type of sales charge levied on its investors by the
plan company is called the "front-end load." The term is descriptive of the practice common among the contractual plans of deducting the major portion of the
sales charge to be paid by the planholder over the plan's life - the load during the early years of the plan's life - the "front-end."
Although the total amount deducted for sales charges over the life of a
voluntary plan and a contractual plan is often equal, usually amounting to eight
and one-half per cent of the total price paid by the investor, the practice followed by most of the contractual plan companies of deducting one-half of the
first thirteen payments made by the planholder for sales charges results in his
having considerably less of his net investment "working for him" during the life
of the plan than would be had by the lump sum investor or voluntary planholder.
In addition to the large front-end load deduction, the contractual plan company's
investors must foot the bill for the custodial service rendered by the plan company's trustee bank. The voluntary plan shareholder, on the other hand, deals
directly with a mutual fund, and incurs no custodial fee.
The effect of the front-end load and custodian fee charges of the contractual
plan is to burden the investor with a risk element and a fee charge that other
types of fund investors do not encounter. While there is a "built in" risk element
in any type of mutual fund investing - the risk that the value of the share
when redeemed will be less than the price paid for it - the front-end load of
the contractual plan serves to make that risk more acute by making it not just
a function of the fund's performance but also of the shareholder's perseverance.
This is so because a planholder who redeems his periodic payment plan certificate
immediately after making the first year's payments will normally receive only
fifty per cent of the sum he contributed (disregarding any rise or decline in the
120 PUBLIC
121 Id.

POLICY STATEMENT

226.

NOTRE DAME LAWYER

[June, 1969]

net asset value of his equity interest) *22 In essence, during the first year of the
plan's life the planholder pays the contractual plan company's sales machine one
dollar for each dollar the plan company invests for him.
Although the sales charge imposed by the contractual plan company does
taper off in the plan's later years, 23 it is abundantly clear that the purchase of
such a plan entails the substantial risk that an economic emergency may force
the planholder to liquidate his holdings early in the plan's life, after a meager
equity investment and a strikingly high sales load. The combination of the frontend load with the custodial fee paid annually by the planholder serves to make
the contractual plan the most expensive and risk fraught method of acquiring
mutual fund shares.
These considerations have led several states to question the utility of the
24
contractual plan as a means of mutual fund investment. Three states, Illinois,'
Wisconsin,"' and California,' either sharply limit or prohibit the sale of contractual plans within their boundaries. 2 Federal legislation designed to cope
2
with the contractual plan's front-end load is now pending before Congress.
The scope and intent of the legislation is discussed in Part IV of this Survey.
D. Four Unique Mutual Funds
As the reader has no doubt noticed, the breadth of the mutual fund industry precludes the use of bald assertions. Modifiers such as "most," "nearly
all," "commonly," "the vast majority," and "some" are liberally used, substituting
122 The fifty per cent front-end load deduction, the maximum deduction legally permissible
under section 27 of the 1940 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-27(a) (2) (1964), was employed by "most"
contractual plans analyzed by the SEC in 1966. PUBLIC POLICY STATEMENT 230.
123 As it must, since section 27(a)(1) of the 1940 Act makes it unlawful for any plan
company to sell a certificate if "the sales load on such certificate exceeds 9 per centum of the
total [scheduled] payments to be made thereon." Investment Company Act of 1940 §
27(a) (1), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-27(a) (1) (1964).
124 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 121Y, § 137.7 D.(2) (1960).
125 Wisconsin's State Department of Securities banned the sale of contractual plans in the
State by promulgating Rule 2.03 pursuant to Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 189.13(3) (a),(b),(e),(f) &
189.13(b). The Director of the State's Department of Securities stated the reason for the ban:
Pursuant to these statutory provisions and our rules, this department has always
taken the position that the high commissions involved in front-end load transactions
are contrary to public policy and against the public interest and the interest of
investors.

SPECIAL STUDY

185.

126 See CAL. CoRP. CODE § 25508 (West 1955), as amended, CAL. CORP. CODE § 25141
(West. Supp. 1969). Section 25508 permitted the State Commissioner of Corporations to
"impose conditions . . . limiting the expense in connection with the sale [of securities]," and
the Commissioner utilized that power to ban the sale of contractual plans in California.
Apparently the prohibition of the "contractuals" did not adversely affect the sale of mutual
fund shares in the state, since the SEC has observed that California leads the nation in
mutual funds sales, on both an aggregate and per capita basis. PUBLIC POLICY STATEMENT 225.

For the year ended December 31, 1966, mutual fund sales in California amounted to $55.08
per capita compared with the national average of $23.08 per capita. 1967 Senate Hearings
530.
127 Ohio recently reversed its position of restricting the sale of contractual plan shares.
Compare PUBLIC POLICY STATEMENT 225 with 1967 Senate Hearings 430.

128 S. 34, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 16 (1969); S. 296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 12(a) & 16
(1969). S. 34 proposes to limit the front-end load by prohibiting a plan company from
deducting a sales load of more than twenty per cent during any one year of the plan's life.
S. 296 would abolish the front-end load entirely by making it unlawful for a plan company
to vary the sales load provision. S. 34 would not change the existing nine per cent sales load
ceiling, while S. 296 would repeal it. For a more detailed treatment of the effects of S. 34
and S. 296, see text accompanying notes 854-65 infra.
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an artistic literary style for substantive accuracy. Still, not all types of mutual
funds lend themselves to the generalized treatment so far received by the garden
variety fund. For this reason, special attention will now be given to four distinct and fairly new forms of open-end companies: the tax free exchange funds,
the go-go funds, the variable annuity plans, and the fund holding companies or
"super funds."
1. The Tax Free Exchange Funds
The first tax free exchange fund or "swap" fund was organized in 1959,129
and began offering its shares publicly in 1960.13° The swap funds were unique
because they exchanged their shares with investors in return for marketable
securities rather than selling them for cash.'
In order to "swap into" the fund,
an investor had to tender securities worth a certain market value, commonly
$25,000, that were acceptable to the fund's management. In return the investor
received an equivalent value of the fund's shares, less, of course, a sales load.
The swap fund's unique advantage as an investment vehicle was that it
offered an investor the opportunity to diversify his portfolio holdings by swapping
his block of securities for a slice of the fund's potpourri of castoffs (and stocks
bought on the maket by the fund), without realizing an immediately taxable
capital gain. This delayed capital gains tax aspect found much favor among those
who could meet the $25,000 minimum entrance requirement, and by mid-1966
the more than twenty swap funds then in operation held assets of roughly $750
32
million.1
In 1966, Congress recognized the swap fund scheme for what it was - the
exploitation of a tax loophole that enabled the more affluent American investor
to dispose of his securities without paying a capital gains tax. Accordingly, legislation in the form of section 203 of the Foreign Investors Tax Act of 19661'3 was
enacted to plug the loophole. The effect of the section was to bar the formation
of new swap funds, and to prospectively strip the existing funds of their delayed
capital gains feature, making them, in one commentator's words "of only historical
interest,"' 34 except to those investors who held swap fund shares prior to the effective date specified in the Act, May 1, 1967.
2. Funds 'a Go-Go
The ill-starred swap fund has its antithesis in what have become known as
the go-go funds. Seeking to provide their shareholders with a feisty performance
by attempting to capitalize on short-term market movements, the go-go funds
129

SEC, supra note 96, at 5.

134
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130 BUSINESS WEEK, Jan. 19, 1963, at 97.
131 For a discussion of the rise of the swap fund industry and the advisability of the law
drafted to eliminate them, see Shechtman, Economic and Equity Implications of the Recent
Legislation Concerning Swap Funds, 45 TAxEs 550 '(1967).
132 Id. at 553.
133 Foreign Investors Tax Act of 1966 § 203, 80 Stat. 1539, 26 U.S.C. § 351 (Supp. III
1967).
COMPANIES

1967, at 96 (L.Wessmann ed. 1967).
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aim for investment in stocks with capital appreciation possibilities. Of course,
investment in this type of stock involves a greater than average risk element.
The go-go's emphasis on short-term market fluctuation results in its most distinctive feature-abnormally high portfolio turnover rates. While the average
mutual fund "turns over" about forty per cent of its portfolio annually, 88 it is
not uncommon for a go-go to achieve a turnover rate of ten per cent per month."'
Indeed, one fund with assets of about $600 million was recently noted to be
trading at the monthly rate of roughly $100 million."8
While the objectives of the go-go funds are both clear and noble, their
manner of achieving them has been questioned both from within and outside the
mutual fund industry. Specifically bothersome to many is the rise of the "performance cult," a relatively new phenomenon caused by investors vicariously
speculating in the stock market by purchasing the go-gos' shares. One mutual
fund executive, David L. Babson, made his views on the rise of the performance
cult known when, speaking at the First Annual Institutional Investors Convention,
he said:
I firmly believe that those of you who have joined this performance
cult, first, are responsible indirectly, if you aren't responsible directly, for the
speculative orgy which is sweeping the country, particularly among unknowledgeable investors.
And, second you are following a policy that may disrupt the whole
economy and which is sure to win no Brownie points for institutional investors in the long run.
When, on average, mutual funds churn their holdings at an annual rate
of 40 percent and some turn them two or three or four times faster than the
average, when even pension funds shift their assets at 20 percent a year,
can anyone seriously call this investing? In plain language, the securities
markets are being turned into a gigantic crap game. Yet, here we are,
hundreds of experienced and responsible portfolio managers, euphemistically
discussing what is going on as investment performance."39
Concern over the rapid growth of mutual funds and other institutional investors, as well as doubts regarding the efficacy of the trading practices alluded
to above, led to the enactment during the Ninetieth Congress of Public Law
90-438 which amended the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.140 Public Law
90-438 amends section 19 of the 1934 Act and authorizes and directs the SEC
135 The portfolio turnover rate is determined by comparing the average value of the
securies owned by the fund over a period of time with the dollar volume of market trading
in which it engaged over the same span.
136 114 CONG. REc. H6736 (daily ed. July 16, 1968).
137 See Louis, Those Go-Go Funds May Be Going Nowhere, FORTUNE, Nov. 1967, at 143.
138 Id. As the following table shows, the portfolio turnover rate for the mutual fund
industry has been on the upswing:
Year
1957*
1964**
1965**
1966*
1967*
Portfolio Turnover
Ratio (Per cent)
13.9
16.6
19.2
30.8
38.7
•
114 CONG. REc. H6736 (daily ed. July 16, 1968).
•* PUBLIC POLICY STATEMENT 304 n.67. (Average of quarterly turnover rates listed therein.)
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87-88 (1968).
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Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 19(e)(1), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78s(e)(1) (Supp. 1969).
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to make a study and investigation of the purchase, sale, and holding of
securities by institutional investors of all types (including . . . mutual
funds . . . ) in order to determine the effect of such purchases, sales, and
holdings upon (A) the maintenance of fair and orderly securities markets,
(B) the stability of such markets, both in general and for individual
securities, (0) the interests of the issuers of such securities, and (D) the
interests of the public, in order that the Congress may determine what
measures, if any, may be necessary 41and appropriate in the public interest
and for the protection of investors.1
While the results of the SEC's study have not as yet been reported to Congress,
it may be surmised that the rise of the performance cult, as exemplified in the
mutual fund industry by the go-go funds, will receive a healthy measure of
scrutiny.
3. The Variable Annuity Plans
The insurance industry's rejoinder to the mutual fund is a unique form of investment company called the variable annuity plan. 1 42 Participation in the fundstyle variable annuity plan involves the purchase by the annuitant, not of mutual
fund shares or periodic payment plan certificates, but of "units" which represent
an undivided interest in the plan company's assets which are held primarily in
the form of securities. The value of these units fluctuates with the market value of
the plan company's portfolio securities. Although an investor who purchases
such a variable annuity plan receives an undivided interest in a portfolio of
diversified securities, similar to a mutual fund investor, the imposition of the
sales commission common to the plans closely resembles the front-end load of the
contractual plan style of mutual fund investment.
Like the contractual planholder who endeavors to purchase periodic payment plan certificates for a specified period of time, the annuitant engages in the
systematic acquisition of units during a predetermined span of years (the "pay-in
period"). The maturity date of the plan marks the termination of the pay-in
period, and a computation is then made of the asset value of the accumulated
units purchased by the planholder. Another computation is made at that time
based on the units' ascertained asset value and the use of a standard annuity table
(including a specified interest assumption) to determine the dollar amount due
the planholder for the first pay-out period. The dollar amount thus derived is
divided into the total asset value of the equity interest amassed by the planholder
during the pay-in period. The quotient obtained from that calculation represents
the number of units from which income is to be systematically paid to the annuitant by the plan company. Since the pay-out units represent an undivided
interest in the plan company's pool of securities, which have a fluctuating market
value, the fact that the number of units to be paid out is fixed at the plan's
maturity date will have the effect of causing a fluctuation in the proceeds received
by the planholder. It is this gyration in the value of the annuitant's maturity
141

Id.

142 For a treatment of the insurance industry's entry into the mutual fund industry, see text
accompanying notes 946-1005 infra.
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interest which differentiates the variable annuity plan from the typical insurance
annuity program, and makes it comparable to the ownership of an investment
company's security. 4 ' If he chooses, the annuitant may liquidate his equity interest in the plan company's portfolio securities represented by the number of
units he has accumulated. Upon redemption he is entitled to receive the approximate net asset value of the units tendered, subject to a surrender fee levied
if redemption occurs during the plan's early years. In addition to the plan's
front-end load, the planholder is also assessed an annual management fee, in44
evitable in any form of mutual fund investment.
Despite the obvious similarities between the variable annuity plan and the
conventional mutual fund, there was until recently some doubt whether the
variable annuity plan was indeed an investment company within the meaning
of the 1940 Act, and hence subject to the Act's regulatory provisions. The reason
for the uncertainty centered on section 3 of the Act which defines an investment
company. 4 ' According to that section, an investment company is, inter alia,
any issuer which "proposes to engage primarily, in the business of investing,
reinvesting, or trading in securities.. . . ""' While that definition would arguably
be broad enough to encompass an insurance company that issues units in a
variable annuity plan, it is qualified by subsection (c) (3) which excludes
"[a]ny ... insurance company""x4' from the Act's coverage. An insurance company within the purview of the Act is any
company which is organized as an insurance company, whose primary and
predominant business activity is the writing of insurance or the reinsuring
of risks underwritten by insurance companies, and which is subject to
supervision by the insurance commissioner or a similar official or agency
of a State; or any receiver or similar official or any liquidating agent for
such a company, in his capacity as such. 4 '
The availability of the section 3 (c) (3) exclusion to insurance companies issuing variable annuity plans was tested in PrudentialInsurance Company of
America v. SEC. 4" While few organizations in the United States would seem
capable of fulfilling the Act's definition of an insurance company as ably as
5
Prudential, the Third Circuit adopted the "ectoplasmic theory"'" and held that
the issuer of the variable annuity contracts written by Prudential was required
to register as an investment company under the Act.
The "ectoplasmic theory," which, noted one financier, "must be a source
143 For discussions of the operational characteristics of the variable annuity plans, see
SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co. of America, 359 U.S. 65, 72 n.14 (1959); 1 L. Loss,
SECURITIES REGULATION

498-99 (1961).

144 See SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co. of America, 359 U.S. 65, 82-84 (1968), for
a discussion of the loads and fees charged in connection with the purchase of one company's
plan.
145 Investment Company Act of 1940 § 3, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3 (1964). For a brief discussion
of that section, see notes 25 & 27 supra.
146 Id. § 3(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(a) (1) (1964).

147 Id. § 3(c)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(3) (1964).

Id. § 2(17), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(17) (1964).
326 F.2d 383 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 953 (1964).
The term "ectoplasmic" relates to the ethereal phenomenon whereby movement in an
is effected by an outside source without physical contact. See WEBSTER'S THRD NEw
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 721 (1961).
148
149
150
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of constant joy to those whose wit conceived it,"15 follows the practice of ignoring
the corporate identity. Under the theory, the operation of the investment fund
is completely independent of the insurance company's normal operation writing insurance. The SEC argued that since the interest of the planholder is
limited solely to his interest in the investment fund, an account "completely
separate" from the company's regular insurance accounts, it is the ectoplasmic
fund and not the insurance company that issues the variable annuity plan's units.
The court wholeheartedly agreed with the SEC's position:
As the Commission observed, "Prudential would in fact be the writer of
the contracts - the insurance and annuity promises and the obligation to
set up the investment fund. But the investment fund, the 'company'
15 2 to
which the investment interests relate, is the 'issuer' of those interests."
While the upshot of the Prudentialdecision was to require the registration
of variable annuity plans in accordance with the 1940 Act, that requirement has
certainly not stifled the propagation of such plans by insurance companies. During the period between June 30, 1967 and June 30, 1968, the number of variable
annuity plans registered as open-end companies under the Act nearly doubled,
accounting for over ten per cent of all mutual fund registrations during that
year. The entry of the life insurance companies into the equity investment arena
via the mutual fund route moved one commentator to gush: "It's as if the Pope
had endorsed the pill[ !]' ' 1 Surprising or not, the variable annuities promise
to give the more conventional mutual funds some healthy competition for the
investor's dollar in the years to come.
4. The Super Funds
The development of "super funds" - the mutual funds that furnish professional management of a diversified portfolio of mutual fund shares - was
inevitable. Making their appearance in the early 1960's,"5 the super funds,
referred to legislatively as fund holding companies, were apparently spawned as
a result of the rapid propagation of mutual funds and the ability of some members
of a class of funds having homogeneous investment objectives to outperform
others. 55 The theory underlying the super fund seems to be that if the diversification offered by the ownership of a share in one mutual fund is good, then multiplication of that diversification by holding a variety of mutual fund shares must
be better. Added to that viewpoint is the argument that the rapid proliferation
151 Testimony of Robert D. Ferguson, Executive Vice President, Pittsburgh National Bank,
Hearings on S. 2704 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Banking and Currency Comm. 89th
Cong., 2d Sess. 34 '(1966).
152 326 F.2d 383, 388 (3d Cir. 1964).
153 Sheehan, Life Insurance's Almighty Leap into Equities, FORTUNE, Oct. 1968, at 142.
154 See PUBLIC POLICY STATEMENT 311-12.
155 During 1968 the change in the net asset value per share of twenty-two mutual fundseach of which had total assets in excess of $300 million and stressed capital appreciation as its
investment objective-varied greatly. Assuming reinvestment of capital gains, a share in Enterprise Fund would have increased 44.3 per cent in net asset value during 1968, while an investment in another of the twenty-two funds, IVEST, would have resulted in a decrease in net
asset value per share of 2.2 per cent. INVESTMENT COMPANIES 1968 (L. Wessmann ed. Supp.
Dec. 31, 1968).
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of new funds, more than one hundred in fiscal 1968 alone,'-" makes it difficult,
if not impossible, for the average investor to predict the basket in which his eggs
will best multiply. In short, the super funds seem to be designed to take the
"guesswork" out of mutual fund investing.
The largest super fund, Fund of Funds, Ltd., is headquartered in Geneva,
Switzerland and incorporated in Ontario, Canada. On December 31, 1967,
Fund of Funds had assets of approximately $620 million.""' Like many super
funds, it is organized as a foreign investment company, and as such it is not
required to register under the Investment Company Act of 1940.5 The ability
of the foreign super funds to avoid regulation under the 1940 Act has the important consequence of enabling them to achieve unlimited ownership of the
shares issued by domestic mutual funds. Such freedom is denied regulated companies by section 12(d) (1) of the Act which provides that a registered investment company cannot own more than five per cent of the total outstanding
voting stock of any other investment company which concentrates its investments
in a particular industry or group of industries, or more than three per cent of
the total outstanding voting stock of any other investment company. 59 As a
result of its ability to avoid the section 12(d) (1) limitations, Fund of Funds,
on December 31, 1967, held thirty per cent of the outstanding voting stock of
Fund of America, a domestic mutual fund registered under the 1940 Act.'
The 12 (d) (1) requirement has not, however, prevented the birth of American
super funds. Two such funds, First Multifund of America, Inc. (formerly First
American Fund of Funds, Inc.), and Pooled Funds, Inc., registered under the
Act in 1967, and had total net assets of $1.1 and $.1 million respectively on
June 30, 1968.1"1
The growth of super funds has been closely watched by the SEC. In its
Public Policy Statement the SEC examined the utility of the function performed
by the super funds, the value of that function to their shareholders, and the effects which the concentration of mutual fund shares in the super funds' portfolios
might have on the portfolio funds, their shareholders, and the securities markets
generally. The SEC concluded:
1. Investment in a super fund subjects the investor to double management and administrative fees - those charged by the super fund and
those levied by the portfolio fund on their shareholders - and, with the
exception of the no-load super funds, the chance of a double sales load. 6 '
156 See 34 SEC ANN. REP. 114 (1968).
157 The actual figure was $617,798,800.00. The authorities are not agreed whether the
sum reflects Canadian or American dollars. Compare MOODY'S BANK AND FINANCE MANUAL,
April 1968, at a54

(F. St. Clair ed. 1968)

(Canadian)

with INVESTMENT COMPANIES 1968

389 (L. Wessmann ed. 1968) (American).
158 The registration provisions of the Act apply only to companies "organized or otherwise
created under the laws of the United States or of a State ....

" Investment Company Act of

1940 § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-7 (1964). Among the other foreign super funds in existence in
1966 were: Capital Growth Fund (Bahamas); Capital Security Fund (Bahamas); North
American Investment Fund N.V. (Netherlands Antilles); Selected American Funds Enterprise
(Luxembourg).

159

PUBLIC POLICY STATEMENT 312 n.20.

Investment Company Act of 1940 § 12(d) (1), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-12(d) (1) (1964).

160

INVESTMENT COMPANIES 1968 197 (L. Wessmann ed. 1968).

161
162

NUVEEN CORP., MUTUAL FUNDS PANORAMA (1968).
PUBLIC POLICY STATEMENT 318-20.
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2. The value of the diversification advantage to the investor does
not outweigh the increased cost, since: "To argue that diversification of
investments is effected through the medium of the subsidiary
is merely
'1 3
to question the necessity for the holding company.
3. Most importantly, the unlimited power of foreign super funds to
buy mutual fund shares, coupled with the combined power of domestic
super funds to concentrate their holdings, could result in a demand by
the super funds that a particular portfolio fund redeem a huge block of its
shares, causing the portfolio fund to liquidate its holdings at possibly
unfavorable prices - to the damage of its remaining shareholders and,
not inconceivably, the market generally. 64 This problem is particularly
acute in the case of the foreign super funds which, as noted, are presently
permitted to concentrate their holdings in whatever companies they
choose, without any form of restriction. This unlimited concentration
of control could well result in dire consequences for domestic portfolio
funds if, for instance, a foreign monetary crisis made it expedient for
the foreign super funds to convert their equity holdings to cash.
The SEC's recommendation made at the conclusion of its analysis of the value
of the super funds to the American investor was unequivocal: "The Commission . . .recommends that section 12(d)(1) of the Act be amended so as to
65
prevent the creation and operation of fund holding companies."'
The Commission's proposal was legislatively adopted in three identical bills,
S. 1659,6 H.R. 9510,16 and H.R. 9511,18 which were introduced before the
Ninetieth Congress on May 1, 1967. The provision in those bills that would have
prevented "the creation and operation of [super funds]' 6 was opposed by Mr.
Milton Mound, one of the domestic super fund's representatives, at both the
Senate and House hearings on the bills. At the House hearings he argued:
If Congress should accede to [the] SEC's demand for prohibition it is not unlikely [that] this law will be cited in the future as a precedent for
prohibiting the sale of cigarettes, wines, liquors and oleo; and also all services
which some regulatory agency believes are not worth the prices charged, as
for example; tickets70 to football games, theatre, opera, ladies' beauticians,
dress designers, etc.'
Whether Congress was swayed by such ineluctable augury is indeterminable;
however, the provision was altered in the amended version of those bills,
163 Id. at 320. The Commission was quoting with approval a statement made in the text
of a previous SEC report regarding the justification for pyramided capital structures in the
investment company industry. See INVESTMENT TRUSTS III 2730. The pre-Act practice of
pyramiding is discussed at text accompanying notes 300-08 infra.
164 PUBLIC POLICY STATEMENT 314-18.
165 Id. at 323.
166 S. 1659, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. § 7 (1967).
167 H.R. 9510, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. § 7 (1967).
168 H.R. 9511, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. § 7 (1967).
169 PUBLIC POLICY STATEMENT 323.
170 Testimony of Milton Mound, 1967 House Hearings 388. For Mr. Mound's testimony
before the Senate Committee which studied proposed legislation see 1967 Senate Hearings

882-85.

NOTRE DAME LAWYER

[June, 1969]

S. 3724,171 to permit registered super funds that charge a sales load of one and
one-half per cent or less to remain in operation provided they limit their holdings
in the assets of other investment companies to no more than three per cent of
such other companies' outstanding voting stock. S. 3724 would also have prohibited any unregistered investment company from investing more than ten per
cent of its assets in the outstanding voting stock of any registered investment company, and any registered investment company from holding as assets more than
ten per cent of the outstanding voting stock of any other investment company." 2
The net effect of the alteration made in S. 3724 to the SEC's original proposal would have been to allow the domestic super funds, First Multifund of
America, Inc., and Pooled Funds, Inc., to remain in operation, subject to the
three per cent diversification limitation, 73 while forcing Fund of Funds, Ltd., to
elect between registering under the Act, thereby subjecting itself to the Act's expansive regulatory provisions and reducing its maximum sales load, presently
eight and one-half per cent. 7 4 to a less lucrative three per cent, or limiting its
holdings in registered investment companies to ten per cent of its total
assets. With the exception of the "low or no-load" super funds which registered
with the SEC under the 1940 Act, the S. 3724 proposal would effectively stymie
the formation and growth of the super funds.
Although S. 3724 was passed by the Senate on August 26, 1968, the bill
never reached the floor of the House and hence was not enacted during the
Ninetieth Congress. Its provisions are nonetheless of extreme current importance,
because two bills now pending before Congress7 5 have incorporated S. 3724's
17
super fund provisions in toto. 6
In view of the obvious validity of the SEC's criticisms of the super fund
171 S. 3724, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. § 7 (1968).
172 Id.
173 This is so because Pooled Funds, Inc., is a no-load fund, and First Multifund of
America, Inc., charges a maximum sales load of one and one-half per cent. See NUVEEN
CORP., supra note 161. For the text of a proposed amendment to S. 1659, H.R. 9510, and
H.R. 9511 which was designed to permit First Multifund and Pooled Funds to remain in operation, see 1967 House Hearings 398. The proposal was submitted on behalf of First Multifund
and was incorporated (with a few slight variations) into S. 3724.
174 See PUBLIC
POLICY STATEMENT 319 n.35.
175 S. 34, 9 1st Cong., 1st Sess. § 7 (1969) ; S. 296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 7 (1969).
176 By adopting verbatim the super fund provisions in section 7 of S. 3724, the pending
bills incorporated a typographical error that became engrafted onto the copied section of the
older bill between the time that the bill was reported from the Senate's Banking and Currency Committee and its post-passage referral to the House Committee on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce. As reported from the Senate Committee, the initial clause of the section
read: "Section 12(d) of the Investment Company Act of 1940 (15 U.S.C. 80a-12.(d)) is
amended to read as follows .... ...
S. 3724, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. § 7 (1968) (as reported
from the Senate's Banking and Currency Committee, July 1, 1968). The attested version of
the bill after Senate passage reads slightly differently: "Section 12(b) [sic] of the Investment
Company Act of 1940 (15 U.S.C. 80a-12.(d)) is amended to read as follows ....
" S. 3724,
90th Cong., 2d Sess. § 7 (1968) (as referred to the House Committee on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce, July 29, 1968).
On March 13, 1969, Congressman Stuckey introduced H.R. 8980 in the House of Representatives. 115 CONG. REC. H1764 (daily ed. March 13, 1969). Like the two pending Senate
bills, H.R. 8980 deals with the regulation of the mutual fund industry and has a section designed to cope with the super funds. See, H.R. 8980, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 7 (1969). Unlike
S. 34 and S. 296, however, the super fund provisions in the House bill differ slightly from
those of S. 3724. Nonetheless, the typographical error discussed above is repeated in Congressman Stuckey's bill. The substantive provisions of H.R. 8980, including those dealing with the
super funds, are discussed in Appendix C infra.
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concept there seems to be no reason, other than one founded upon purely political
motives, for the preferential treatment accorded to the low or no-load funds under
the proposed regulatory framework designed to cope with the super funds. Still,
it is the foreign super funds that present the most serious threat to the fiscal
stability of the domestic mutual funds, their shareholders, and our securities
markets. In this respect the proposed amendment represents a significant advance,
since it introduces a modicum of regulation designed to protect the investing
public from the unbridled use of power wielded by an alien interest group.
At present, except for a recent decision 7" that holds the foreign super funds
subject to the short-swing profits limitation in section 16 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,178 the might of the foreign super funds is unchecked. The
view expressed by the SEC, after careful deliberation, is that remedial legislation
is needed.'
If the needed regulatory legislation is not soon in forthcoming, can
the super-super funds be far behind?
III. The Development of the Investment Company Industry
A. Introduction
The major emphasis of the preceding discussion centered on the functional
characteristics of management investment companies, particularly mutual funds.
This Part is devoted to a perusal of the developmental stages of investment
company growth in the United States, from the relative infancy of the industry
prior to 1921 through the passage of the Investment Company Act of 1940.'
The Anno Domini period of the investment company industry's development
began with the enactment of the Investment Company Act of 1940. Because the
Act stands as a bench mark - a reflection of all that preceded it and a mold that
casts the shape of the industry which now operates under it - a brief discussion
of the Act's background and philosophy will be helpful in adding perspective to
the study that follows.
The Act's philosophy was shaped by the climate -in which it was drafted
and the industry's ills it was crafted to cure. It would not be an overstatement
to say that the attitude of Congress toward the investment company industry
during the period when the need for legislation was being considered was one
of restrained hostility, and the tenor of the resultant legislation mirrors that
disaffection. For instance, section 17(h) of the Act makes a nullity of any
exculpatory clauses used by an investment company's directors or officers to
177 Roth v. Fund of Funds, Ltd., 405 F.2d 421 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 37 U.S.L.W.
3395 (U.S. April 22, 1969) (No. 1122). Roth was a derivative suit brought on behalf of
Dreyfus Corp., a mutual fund investment advisor whose shares are traded on the NYSE.
178 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 16, 15 U.S.C. § 78p (1964). That section, in relevant part, provides that
any profit realized by [the beneficial owner of more than ten per cent of the outstanding shares of the issuer] from any purchase and sale . . . of any equity securities of such issuer . . . within any period of less than six months . . . shall inure to
and be recoverable by the issuer, irrespective of the intention on the part of such
beneficial owner ....
179 See text accompanying note 165 supra.
180 Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to -52 (1964).
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avoid liability in cases of "willful misfeasance, bad faith, gross negligence or reckless disregard of the duties involved in the conduct of [their] office." 18'
The inclusion of such a provision was manifestly not the result of mere
congressional hyperzealousness. As will be seen, the organizational structures
adopted and the management practices followed by some of the less scrupulous
operators in the industry during the "boom years" that preceded the depression
provide an instructive insight into man's ability to flimflam his fellow man.
Terms such as "looter," "embezzler," "maladministrator," and "predatory promoter" were used to describe such people.'8 2 The American public contributed
roughly $7 billion to the pre-Act industry 8 ' and incurred a capital shrinkage,
over and above the effects of the crash, of "at least $1,100,000,000 . . . attributable to mismanagement, looting, or improper actions of managements in
their own interest to the detriment of shareholders."'8 4
Alarm over the possibility of management malfeasance among the members
of the investment company industry was officially registered when Congress enacted the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935."5 In the course of the
investigations and hearings which preceded that Act, concern was expressed that
the financial malpractice prevalent among the holding companies in the electrical
and retail gas industries might also exist in the investment company industry.'86
Accordingly, section 30 of the 1935 Act authorized and directed the SEC
to make a study of the functions and activities of investment ... companies,
the corporate structures, and investment policies of such ... companies, the
influence exerted by such . . . companies upon companies in which they
are interested, and the influence exerted by interests affiliated with the
management of such... companies upon their investment policies, and to
report the results of its study and its recommendations to the Congress on or
before January 4, 1937.187
The study made by the SEC in compliance with that directive was extensive.
The record of the hearings conducted by the SEC consists of 33,000 pages of
testimony and 4,800 exhibits.'
The Commission's report to Congress was submitted in five parts8 9 over the span of three years, and it was supplemented by
six additional reports.'
Part Three of the SEC's report was entitled Abuses and
181

Id. § 17(h), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-17(h) (1964).

182 See, e.g., 1940 Senate Hearings 61-66, 332, 334; Note, The Investment Company Act
of 1940, 50 YALE L.J. 440, 451 (1941).

183
184

S. RaP. No. 1775, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 3 '(1940).

1940 Senate Hearings 797.

185 Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, 15 U.S.C. §§ 79 to 79z-6 (1964).
186 PUBLIC POLICY STATEMENT 64.
187 Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 § 30, 15 U.S.C. § 79z-4 (1964).
188 S. REP. No. 1775, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 5 (1940).
189 SEC, INVESTMENT TRUSTS AND INVESTMENT COMPANIES, (Part One), H.R. Doc.
No. 707, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. (1938) [hereinafter cited as INVESTMENT TRUSTS I]; INVESTMENT TRUSTS II, supra note 45; INVESTMENT TRUSTS III, supra note 4; SEC, INVESTMENT
TRUSTS AND INVESTMENT COMPANIES PARTS FOUR AND FIVE, H.R. Doc. No. 246, 77th Cong.,

Ist Sess. (1941).

190 SEC, INVESTMENT TRUSTS IN GREAT BRITAIN, H.R. Doc. No. 380, 75th Cong., 3d
Sess. (1939) [hereinafter cited as BRrrisH INVESTMENT TRUSTS]; SEC, INVESTMENT COUNSEL, INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT, INVESTMENT SUPERVISORY AND INVESTMENT ADVISORY
SERVICES, H.R. Doc. No. 477, 76th Cong., 2d Sess. (1939); SEC, COMMINGLED OR COMMON TRUST FUNDS ADMINISTERED BY BANKS AND TRUST COMPANIES,

H.R. Doc. No. 476,
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Deficiencies in the Organization and Operation of Investment Trusts and Investment Companies. It is a very thick volume.
So comprehensive was the Commission's report that Parts Four and Five
were not submitted to Congress until June 9, 1941, nearly one year after the
1940 Act became law and more than four years beyond the deadline stipulated
in section 30 of the 1935 Act.19' Perhaps the major reason for the delay in the
report's publication was that "there was no ultimate scarcity of examples of
shocking abuses"' 9 2 of the use of managerial discretion by a segment of the industry's entrepreneurial factions, some of the worst of which occurred while
the report was being prepared. Said one SEC official: "I thought every day,
'Thank God, I am through with hearings,' and then I would get a telephone
call. Somebody was looting another93 investment trust by some other method,
and we had to start all over again."'
The Act was drafted with such malfeasances in mind. Senator Robert
Wagner, who was instrumental in securing the passage of the 1940 Act, left
little doubt concerning its intent: "All of this legislation... is because of abuses
that exist by reason of irresponsible operators, and it is those abuses that we want
to prevent."'" 4 The investment company industry, matured and newly aware of its
duty to the American investor, worked diligently with the SEC in drafting
the legislation, and strongly endorsed the final product. 95 Congressional passage
of the bill was achieved with virtually no debate, a feat which one commentator
noted was probably without precedent for so comprehensive a piece of legisla99
tion.
The philosophy of the Act differs markedly from that expounded in the
Securities Act of 1933,' and in the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.198 Those
Acts are primarily disclosure statutes, founded upon the premise set forth by
Louis D. Brandeis in his book Other People's Money that "[p]ublicity is justly
commended as a remedy for social and industrial diseases. Sunlight is said to
be the best of disinfectants; electric light the most efficient policeman."' 99 The
need for regulatory rather than disclosure-oriented legislation was noted by SEC
counsel Schenker when testifying before the subcommittee of the Senate Banking
and Currency Committee that was considering the merits of the proposed legislation. Referring to Brandeis's famous quote, he said: "[T]here is no greater
76th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1939);

SEC,

COMPANIES SPONSORING

INSTALLMENT

INVESTMENT

PLANS, H.R. Do. No. 482, 76th Cong., 2d Sess. (1939) [hereinafter cited as INSTALLMENT
PLAN STUDY]; SEC, FIXED AND SEMI-FIXED INVESTMENT TRUSTS, H.R. Doc. No. 567, 76th
Cong., 3d Sess. (1940); COMPANIES ISSUING FACE AMOUNT INSTALLMENT CERTIFICATES,

H.R. Doc. No. 659, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (1940).
191 See text accompanying note 187 supra.
192 1940 Senate Hearings 40.
193 Id. at 53. See also id. at 38.
194 Id. at 661-62.
195 H.R. REP. No. 2639, 76th Cong., 3rd Sess. 5 (1940).
196 This viewpoint was taken by Alfred Jaretzki, Jr., who served as counsel to the investment company industry's representatives during the congressional hearings and the negotiations
with the SEC concerning the Act's substantive provisions. Jaretzki, The Investment Company
Act of 1940, WASH. U.L.Q. 303, 310-11 (1941). For an overview of the genesis of the 1940
Act, see North, A Brief History of Federal Investment Company Legislation, 44 NOTRE DAME
LAWYER 677 (1969).
197 Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-aa (1964).
198 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-jj (1964).
199 L. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY AND How THE BANKERS USE IT 93 (1914).
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believer in the prophylactic effect of sunlight than I am; but the unfortunate
thing is that unless there is an agency that goes in with a flashlight, the stockholder never gets the publicity."2 ° The regulatory nature of the 1940 Act gave
the SEC the flashlight it needed.
The primary concentration of the discussion which follows will be focused
on the malpractices once prevalent in the investment company industry which
the 1940 Act was drafted to cure, the way the Act dealt with those problems,
and the effect that the Act's passage has had on the industry. Those evils and
abuses were not hatched on moonless nights in dark places, nor did they affect
all investment companies. They were rather the result of a largely unregulated
evolutionary development which saw what was a handful of relatively small,
heterogeneous enterprises burgeon into a full-fledged industry within the space
of ten years.
Accordingly, the next topic of discussion will be the first stage of the
investment company industry's development, the period prior to 1921.
B. Stage One -

The Pre-1921 Industry

1. The Alexander Fund
Of the forty enterprises determined by the SEC to be investment companies
that did business during the pre-1921 period of the investment company industry's development,2"' only a few bore any resemblance to the modem diversified management investment company that now dominates the industry.
Indeed, the SEC noted that the origin and growth of that small, dissimilar
agglomeration of early investment companies was "to a large extent fortuitous
or often the result of motives little related to the concept of an independent
financial vehicle intended to offer to the general public participation in the
ownership of a diversified portfolio of securities."20 2 For example, it has been
theorized that the Boston Personal Property Trust, founded in 1893, and now
registered as a mutual fund,0 ' was organized not as an investment company,
but as a device whereby the original trustees evaded a Massachusetts restriction
on corporate real estate holdings.0 4
Another management-type investment company, the Alexander Fund,
was established in 1907, when three individuals entrusted a total of $1,200.00
to a Mr. W. Wallace Alexander. Since each of the individuals who made capital
contributions was ignorant of the participation of the others, it would appear
200

1940 Senate Hearings 259. See also text accompanying notes 347-69 infra.
INVESTMENT TRUSTS I 42.
202 Id. at 113.
203 The company was founded as a trust and was operated as a closed-end company until
January 23, 1967, when its shares became redeemable at net asset value, less a redemption fee
of $8 per redemption or two per cent of asset value, whichever is less. On that date the presence
of redeemable securities in its capital structure caused the Trust to become a mutual fund.
See INVESTMENT COMPANIES 1968 368 (L. Wessmann ed. 1968).
204 H. BULLOCK, supra note 4, at 15. Mr. Bullock did not cite a Massachusetts statute to
support the hypothesis. He was probably referring to MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 106, § 23
(1882), which prohibited corporations from conveying or mortgaging real estate, or executing
leases of more than a one year duration, "unless authorized by a vote of the stockholders at a
meeting called for the purpose."
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that Mr. Alexander's son was correct when, referring to the establishment
of
205
the fund, he said, "[i]ts founding was largely, shall I say, by chance."
The significance of the Alexander Fund for the purpose of this discussion
lies not, however, in its charmingly fortuitous conception or its admittedly informal method of operation, which led one author to characterize the fund as
"ca one-man organization." 206 Rather, the fund is important since it was the
prototype mutual fund, the initial, though unwitting, venture in what was to
evolve into a $55 billion industry.
Not a corporation, association, or trust, the Alexander Fund was merely
a descriptive name given to the commingled funds pooled by the group of persons who employed Mr. Alexander, and later his corporate successor, as their
agent for the purpose of investing and managing their money. From its coincidental origin the fund grew steadily, if not spectacularly, and by early 1928, its
883 shareholders had a combined equity interest in excess of $2.6 million." 7
Despite its increased size, the fund still retained an air of informality, leading
one author
to describe it as "the investment trust in its simplest or most primitive
8
20

form."

The "mutual fund-like" nature of the Alexander Fund flowed from its
possession of that singular characteristic common to all mutual funds- the
redeemable security. The fund issued securities called "units" to its shareholders.
The units were engraved receipts, similar in form to stock certificates, which
entitled the holder to "the asset or liquidating value for [his share], less 10 percent of any increment of such asset value over the original cost of [the share]""0 9
when he chose to withdraw from the fund by presenting his security for redemption. The ten per cent redemption fee, or, if you will, the "rear-end load,"
charged by the fund on the capital appreciation of the shareholder's unit, was
paid to Mr. Alexander and, later, his corporate successor. The rear-end load
supplemented the annual management fee charged the unit-holder, which
amounted to ten per cent of the fund's distributions to its shareholders, whether
in the form of income or a return of capital.
It has been noted by one author that the Alexander Fund "had definite
characteristics of the unit trusts of the 1920s and even greater similarities to
the mutual funds of today."21 It is submitted that such an appraisal, although
technically correct, does not go far enough. The Alexander Fund was a mutual
fund, and it registered as such under the Investment Company Act of 1940, on
July 11, 1941.11 The fund ceased operations shortly thereafter, on October 19,
1943.212
205 INVESTMENT TRUSTS 1 45.
206 T. GRAYSON, INVESTMFNT TRUSTS 255 (1928).
207 THE ALEXANDER FUND, TwENTY-FrRST ANNUAL STATEMENT (1928), reprinted in
T. GRAYSON, INVESTMENT TRUSTS 255-58 (1928).
208 L. ROBINSON, INVESTMENT TRUST ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT 308 (1926).
209 INVESTMENT TRUSTS I 46. No sales charge was levied at the time the shares were
purchased. Id.
210 H. BULLOCK, supra note 4, at

211

1940

SEC,

16.

LIST OF COMPANIES REGISTERED UNDER THTE INVESTMENT COMPANY ACT Of

(as of June 30, 1968), at 32.
On August 8, 1941, less than one month after the fund registered under the Act, it
filed an application with the SEC for a suspension of the redemption privilege enjoyed by its
shareholders preliminary to dissolution. The Alexander Fund, 9 S.E.C. 860 (1941). The re-
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Despite its rather truncated existence as a registered open-end management
company, there can be no doubt that the Alexander Fund was the archetype
mutual fund, actively engaged in business seventeen years before the organization
of Massachusetts Investors Trust [MIT], on whose prospectus is emblazoned
the claim: "AMERICA'S FIRST OPEN-END INVESTMENT COMPANY."21 Suffice it to say that the unique character of the Alexander Fund,
'
"entirely informal"214
and "primitive,"2 has not received the attention it properly
merits.
2. History of Investment Companies in Great Britain
The paucity of investment companies that operated in the United States
prior to 1921 is striking when compared with the investment company history
of Great Britain. According to some authorities, the investment company is of
English origin."' While it is uncertain whether it was Great Britain or Belgium..
that was the homeland of the first investment company, it is clear that it was
England where the companies enjoyed their most enthusiastic European recep-

tion.

218

The degree to which the early English companies prospered in comparison
to what was a fledgling American industry is exhibited by the fact that there were

more English companies formed prior to 1900 which were still in existence in
1935, than the total number of American investment companies formed during
the pre-1921 period.219 The greatest period of expansion during the early years
of the English investment company industry was between 1887 and 1890, when
twenty-six companies were organized.2 2 The rapid expansion during those years
was largely due to a combination of a substantial amount of "investable" funds
in the hands of the British public, low domestic interest rates, and the unprecedented industrial expansion in the United States which made foreign securities
investment attractive.2 2 '
quest was granted, dissolution followed, and on October 19, 1943, the Commission issued an
order, at the Fund's request, declaring that it had ceased to be an investment company. The
Alexander Fund, 14 S.E.C. 489 (1943).
213 MASSACHUSETTS INVESTORS TRUST, PROSPECTUS, April 8, 1968, as amended, October
9. 1968.
214 W. STEINER, INVESTMENT TRUSTS: AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 207 (1929). It has been
noted that the distinction between the closed-end and open-end investment companies seems
to have escaped Mr. Steiner. See, INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE, MANAGEMENT INVESTMENT COMPANIES 3 n.5 (1962).
215 L. ROBINSON, INVESTMENT TRUST ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT 308 (1926).
216 See H. BULLOCK, supra note 4, at 2; W. DURST, ANALYSIS AND HANDBOOK OF INVESTMENT TRUSTS 7 (1932).
217 Some authorities believe that the first investment company was the "Socit6 G~nrale des
Pays-Bas pour favoriser l'industrie nationale," later named the "Socit6 Grnrale de Belgique,"
founded in Brussels in 1822 by William I of the Netherlands. See, e.g., W. STEINER supra note
214, at 17. It has further been reported that "[t]he investment company concept is as old as
the history of commerce, going back, in rudimentary form, to the mercantile community of
Phoenicia." INVESTORS ADVISORY INSTITUTE INC., FORBES GUIDE TO MUTUAL FUND PROFITS
2 (1959).
218 See H. BULLOCK, supra note 4, at 8-9.
219 Compare BRITISH INVESTMENT TRUSTS 2 with INVESTMENT TRUSTS I 42.
220 H. BULLOCK, supra note 4, at 9.
221 See T. GRAYSON, supra note 206, at 12-16; H. BULLOCK, supra note 4, at 4-5; L.
ROBINSON, supra note 215, at 190-92.
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If a speculative fever was extant among the British financial community
just prior to 1890, it was definitely chilled by the "Baring crisis," the name
given England's 1890 crash. The crisis was precipitated by the collapse of Baring
Brothers, one of England's oldest and most honorable investment banking firms.222
The company became overextended as a result of the depression at that time
in Argentina, and was forced to liquidate its holdings. The firm's collapse triggered a period of depression in Great Britain which was so serious that one writer
Bank of England itself had sudnoted it "could only have been exceeded if the
223
denly passed into a condition of insolvency.)
The Baring crisis serves as a demarcation point in the English investment
company industry's developmental pattern. The rapid growth enjoyed by the
English industry during the years just preceding the 1890 crash was not to be
duplicated until the 1920's. By that time the importance of the British industry
was insignificant in comparison to the swiftly developing investment company
movement in the United States.
3. The Influence of the Holding Company
Surprisingly, what little growth there was in the pre-1921 American investment company industry does not appear to have been the result of, or stimulated
by, the popularity of the companies in England. While the "success" of the
British investment "trusts," as they were called, was later touted by their American counterpart.s,24 it is apparent that the financial institution that exercised the
greatest influence on the development of the American industry was the domestic
holding company.
The emergence of the holding company and the genesis of the corporate
form of investment company were both the direct result of legislation, first enacted
by New Jersey in 1888,225 which removed the restrictions on intercorporate
security holdings. The removal of that barrier by New Jersey, and later by the
remainder of states, enabled the holding company to cast off the "trust" identity
it had been forced to assume, and also paved the way for the formation of the
corporate investment company which was later to dominate the industry.
The SEC's study disclosed that it was the public utility holding company
industry that "probably had the greatest effect upon and closest relation to the
growth of investment companies." '26 A general influence was exerted merely by
force of the example of companies holding securities of other corporations, particularly common stocks. Indeed, in retrospect, the relationship between the
public utility holding company industry and the investment company industry
resembles that of a teacher and his impressionable pupil. Many of the management practices prevalent among investment companies during the late 1920's
which were later condemned by the SEC, the Congress, and the industry were
222 H. BULLOCK, supra note 4, at 10.
223 T. GRAYSON, supra note 206, at 17.
224 E.g., "Investment trusts are one of the most practical forms yet devised of affording the
investor a secure channel for profitable investment, as . . . proved by the 50-year record of
trusts in England and Scotland." Advertising brochure reprinted in INVESTMENT TRUSTS I 60.
225 Law of April 4, 1888, ch. 269, [1888] Laws of N.J. 385.
226 INVESTMENT TRUSTS I 40.
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"borrowed" from the experience of the holding companies. Among these practices
were: the use of voting trusts, unequal shareholder voting rights, and interlocking
directorates to maintain control of the company; the use of pyramided capital
structures to broaden the reach of the control thus obtained; and the purchase
of property from corporate insiders in excess of its reasonable value.227
The effect that these and other management techniques had on the financial
welfare of investment company shareholders will be considered shortly. For
present purposes it is sufficient to note that the obvious parallels between the
control devices utilized by the holding companies, and later by the investment
companies, are cogent indications of the degree to which the development of the
investment company industry was influenced by the holding companies.
C. Stage Two

-

1921 to 1927

The sporadic formation of, and local character common to the early investment companies changed significantly during the next period of investment company growth, the years between 1921 and 1927. This second stage of the industry's development may be typified as a period of rapid expansion, both in
terms of investor participation and investment company formation. The increasingly frequent organization of new companies during the years between
1921 and 1927 was primarily prompted by the presence of a happy combination of economic and psychological conditions which predisposed the investing
public to seek participation in the comparatively new investment vehicles.
1. Rise in Investor Participation
The unprecedented strength and growth of the American economy during
the second stage of the industry's development was probably the major factor
2 28
which led to the spurt in investment company popularity. The following table,

-0

"'

O

Year

1921
1922
1923
1924
1925
1926

Number of
issues listed
on the New
York Stock
rExchanje
(Jan. 1)

Volume of

trading on the
New York
Stock Exchange

1
1

0
5
.2

Corporate capital issues
(millions of dollars)

"____
0-

0<

58,343
59,706
69,706
70,369
74,846
79,477

67
85
101
95
104
108

756
792
778
889
927
1,043

1,115
1,156
1,234
1,262
1,332
1,367

173
261
236
284
460
452

1,367
1,945
1,994
2,927
2,723
2,266

53.6
64.6
67.0
72.7
89.9
100.0

458 1,823
4,570 2,336
6,308 2,703
5,363 3,322
7,621 4,101
7,505 4,357

568 2,391
737 3,073
530 3,233
516 3,838
637 4,738
943 5,300
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which lists indices of the more important economic indicators, clearly shows that
the years between 1921 and 1927 were a time of substantial financial and economic progress.
Accompanying the emergence of the United States as a creditor nation
following the First World War, and the thirty-seven per cent rise in national
income between 1921 and 1927, 29 which provided a pool of funds ripe for
investment, was a developing public awareness of the investment returns offered
through the purchase of securities. The increase in the public's interest is commonly attributed to the Liberty Bond and Victory Loan drives during the War
and immediately thereafter."'
The newly receptive mood of the small investor to the investment possibilities inherent in the ownership of equity securities was quickly noted by the
investment houses. Many new firms were formed to capitalize on a rising public
interest, and together with the established houses, they organized branch offices
throughout the country."' The brokers and investment bankers were not alone
in their desire to exploit a rising demand- investment company sponsors and
salesmen were likewise anxious to reap the whirlwind.232 The effect of the
financial community's expansion was the establishment of a widespread network
of investment centers ideally suited for the mass distribution of investment company shares.
Avidly seeking public support, the investment company industry became
more aggressive in taking its message to the public. While most of the public
discussion concerning the merits of investment company share ownership was
originally confined to discussions of the English investment companies in the
emphasis soon shifted to less technical fare published in
financial journals, the
"family" magazines.2 3 3
Supplementing the discussions that appeared in periodicals was sales literature prepared to aid in overcoming investor inertia. The brochures and pamphlets
usually stressed the growth possibilities inherent in the purchase of shares in an
investment company, and the relative safety of such a form of investment obtained
through the principle of diversification of risk. Unfortunately, the information
thus disseminated to the public did not always present a truly accurate picture
of the correlative risks involved in the purchase of the securities. 0. M. W.
Sprague, a member of the advisory board of Massachusetts Investors Trust, one
of the earliest mutual funds, noted that such literature is "apt to contain things
'
which may be apt to make one's hair curl a little bit."234
227 REPORT
4-5 (1935).

OF NATIONAL POWER POLICY COMm.,

H.R. Doc. No. 137, 74th Cong., Ist Sess.

228 The table appears at INVESTMENT TRuSTS I 57.
229 See chart accompanying note 228 supra.
230 E.g., L. ROBINSON, supra note 215, at 332: "The person of modest means came into
his own during the nation-wide Liberty Loan drives, and the salutary habit of clipping coupons
has continued with the American people." Id. As the SEC noted: "The change thereafter
by gradual steps from ownership of government bonds to other bonds and finally to ownership
of preferred and common stocks was perhaps only natural." INVESTMENT TRuSTS I 58.
231 INVESTMENT TRUSTS I 58.
232 Id.
233 Id. at 59.
234 1940 Senate Hearings 862.
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2. Structural Development of Modern Investment Companies
The increase in investor awareness was coupled with, and no doubt aided
by, the development of sponsor interest which resulted in the creation of new
investment companies. A substantial number of those companies were formed
by houses of issue, brokers, security distributors, and investment counsel, who
looked upon the benefits to be gained from the operation of such companies as a
valuable adjunct to their existing businesses."' Other investment companies
were organized by individuals intent on purchasing securities issued by companies engaged in a particular industry,2" 6 or for the purpose of holding foreign
securities,237 and some investment companies were formed as the result of a
change in the asset structure and business purpose of an already existing corporation. 3 s
It has been pointed out that investment bankers and brokers looked upon
investment companies as valuable adjuncts to their normal operations. The
brokerage fees to be earned from the sale and purchase of portfolio securities
on the company's behalf, the commissions earned through the sale of the company's shares, and the fees derived from managing the company proved to be
a healthy incentive for the formation of new companies by such financiers. Since
those profits could be derived only by the interest group that controlled the
company, control schemes were devised by which an investment company could
be controlled through a minimal investment of risk capital.239
Initial control over the investment company by the sponsoring interest was
of course obtained merely by virtue of the company's organization, since the
sponsor invariably selected the company's first managing board.240 More permanent control could be, and was, achieved in a variety of ways: issuing stock
carrying unequal voting rights;2 41 eliminating stockholder preemptive rights by
charter provision;242 establishing voting trusts;243 or entering into long term
management contracts with a management company operated by the sponsor.2 "
a. The Leveraged Closed-ends and Control
U.S. & Foreign Securities Corporation [U.S. & Foreign] was the first closed235 INVESTMENT TRUSTS I 76. By the end of 1929, more than sixty per cent of the industry's assets were held by companies sponsored by houses of issue, broker dealers, and investment
counsel. INVESTMENT TRUSTS 11 124.
236 See INVESTMENT TRuSTS I 69-76.
237 Id. at 65-69.
238 See, e.g., id. at 66-67, 84. One company, American International Corp., just "grew,"
Topsylike, into an investment company, without amending its articles of incorporation, obtaining shareholder consent, or, in the words of one of the company's officers, knowing "we were
changing ourselves." Id at 67. Among the members of the company's original board of directors were: J. Ogden Armour of Armour & Co.; Charles A. Coffin of General Electric Corp.;
Albert H. Wiggin of The Chase National Bank; Percy A. Rockefeller; and Joseph P. Grace.
Id. at 66.
239 For a discussion of the manners by which control of investment companies was achieved
and perpetuated prior to the passage of the 1940 Act, see INVESTMENT TRUSTS III 18741936.
240 Id. at 1875.
241 For an example of this practice, see text accompanying notes 247-48 infra.
242 INVESTMENT TRuSTS III 1908.
243 Id. at 1912.
244 Id. at 1921. See text accompanying notes 375-77 infra.
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end company organized as a large, diversified investment enterprise to publicly
offer its shares. Its establishment in 1924 by Dillon, Read & Co., then the most
active banking house in the United States, made U.S. & Foreign the first large
scale venture on the part of the investment banking industry into the investment
company industry. U.S. & Foreign is significant in two respects: first, its formation by the reputable Dillon, Read & Co. initiated a trend toward the formation
of investment companies by members of the investment banking industry; and
second, it possessed a remarkable capital structure that enabled sponsor Dillon,
Read & Co., and its associates, to combine the use of leverage with control of
the company-while making only a minimal (sixteen per cent) capital contribution. That feat was accomplished by the issuance of three classes of securities: $25 million of no-par first preferred; $5 million of no-par second preferred;
and one million shares of no-par common stock. 4 ' The first preferred was sold
24 6
to the public, who also received 250,000 shares of common stock as a "bonus."
The second preferred, carrying with it the right to 750,000 shares of common,
was sold to Dillon, Read & Co. The common stock carried the exclusive voting
power, and Dillon, Read & Co.'s ownership of seventy-five per cent of that stock
cemented them into the controlling position, despite their relatively small in247
vestment.
In October of 1928, Dillon, Read & Co. and U.S. & Foreign jointly organized a second investment company, U.S. & International Securities Corporation
[U.S. & International], as a subsidiary of U.S. & Foreign. U.S. & International's
capital structure was similar to that of its parent. The public purchased a total
of $50 million in first preferred, accompanied by 500,000 shares of voting common plus warrants for an additional 500,000 shares of common, exercisable at
$25 per share. The entire $10 million issue of second preferred was sold to U.S.
& Foreign, who also received 2,000,000 shares of voting common stock and outright control. 4 The net result of the formation of U.S. & Foreign, and the
"pyramiding" of it on U.S. & International, was the achievement by Dillon,
Read & Co. of complete control over two companies in which the public had
invested $75 million compared with Dillon, Read & Co.'s $5 million capital
contribution.
b. Mutual Funds and Control
While the desire of those sponsoring investment companies to acquire and
retain control of the sponsored companies' assets resulted in some fairly sophisticated control schemes, such as that employed by Dillon, Read & Co., the means
used by the sponsors of MIT, the first mutual fund to sell its shares on a large
scale, 4 was simpler than most methods and as effective as any control technique
245
246
247
248

I 78.
Id.
Id. J. FLYNN, INVESTMENT TRUSTS GONE WRONG! 39-40 (1931).
INVESTMENT TRUSTS

See

3. FLYNN, supra note 247, at 41.

249 It will be remembered that the Alexander Fund's shares were not widely held during
MIT's infancy. In fact, the Fund had less than 900 shareholders in 1928, more than twenty
years after its founding. See text accompanying note 207 supra.
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could be. Organized as a Massachusetts trust, MIT's original board of trustees250
was made self-perpetuating and given the power "in their absolute and uncontrolled discretion" to invest the company's funds."' The original trust agreement was quite explicit in delineating the freedom of action of the trustees.
They were to be "free from the control of the shareholders"; responsible only for
their personal "willful default or neglect"; and "any trustee, notwithstanding his
fiduciary position, [was permitted to] deal with the trustees in relation to the
trust estate as freely as if he were not a trustee hereunder."2' 2 Most of the
trust-style investment companies followed MIT's lead and made the original
board of trustees self-perpetuating.
The organization of U.S. & Foreign and MIT in 1924 was probably the
most important occurrence during the second stage of the investment company
industry's development. By the end of 1927, fifty-six other closed-end companies
had adopted U.S. & Foreign's leverage feature, and thirteen management investment companies had incorporated MIT's open-end capital structure.25 s The
250 MIT, like U.S. & Foreign, was organized by experienced financiers. The members of
the original board were Charles H. Learoyd and Hatherly Foster, Jr., partners in the Boston
brokerage house of Learoyd, Foster & Co., Sherman Adams, and Edward G. Leffiler who
originated the open-end theory upon which the trust was based. The genesis of the mutual
fund concept, adopted by MIT in 1924 when it first issued redeemable securities, was explained by Mr. Leffler:
[I]t was a question of providing a medium for the investor. I believed it could
grow into a tremendously large business, because if you were going to ask the average
individual the simple question: "What can I do for you?" that you would more
than anything else be convinced that he would probably answer, "Help me to get
somewhere financially." So it seemed to me that I had at least a very large potential
market. Out of that idea grew the Massachusetts Investors Trust.
Question. How long did it take you before you could get anybody interested?
Answer.
Three or four years.
Question. Then who picked up the idea?
Answer.
Learoyd, Foster & Co.
Question. As a result of that the Massachusetts Investors Trust was formed? Is
that right?
Answer.
That is right. INVESTMENT TRUSTS I 102.
Mr. Leffler's belief that helping the average individual "get somewhere financially" "could
grow into a tremendously large business" was certainly justified, as is indicated by the following
figures:
Massachusetts Investors Trust
Year End Totals
Shares Outstanding
32,296*
133,492**

Shareholders
200*
214,238*

Assets
392,000*
2,358,159,213**
ROBINSON, JR., MASSACHUSETTS INVESTORS TRUST 13 (1954).
INVESTMENT COMPANIES 1968 229 (L. Wessmann ed. 1968).
MASSACHUSETTS INVESTORS TRUST, supra note 213, at 4, 10.

1924
1967
* D.
**
***

$

It should be observed that the great growth and huge popularity which MIT has enjoyed
through the years among the investing public may in large part be attributable to the foresight
of its founders and the sound management policies which they established. The early adoption
by the company of a policy of full disclosure, "a pointed departure from established practice,"
D. ROBINSON, MASSACHUSETTS INVESTORS TRUST 15 (1954), among the investment company industry, as well as the diligent efforts of several MIT executives to insure that the
needed regulatory legislation of the industry was enacted are but two of many possible examples of the leadership role assumed by MIT during the mutual fund industry's formative
years. However, they still suffice to show that the modern fund industry owes much to MIT's
guiding influence during those crucial early years.
251

INVESTMENT

252
253

Id. at 101-02.
INVESTMENT

TRUSTS

TRUSTS

I

II

101.

115.

SURVEY

(Vol. 44: 732]

majority of the new companies had been sponsored, like U.S. & Foreign and
MIT, by investment houses or brokerage firms.7 4 It is clear that by the end of
the second stage of its growth, the investment company industry had begun to
assume its modem form.
D. Stage Three -

1927 to October 24, 1929

During the third stage of the development of the investment company
industry, the number of investors holding investment company securities increased tenfold, from 38,000 to 380,000,255 and the number of investment
companies in existence more than doubled."' By the end of the period investment companies had become a financial fad.
Motivating the rapid increase in investor participation during the predepression period were all the economic and psychological factors extant between
1921 and 1927, plus a greatly increased awareness on the part of the financial
community of the profits and power available through investment company sponsorship and control. The fact that the monetary rewards to be gleaned were
attainable without the risk of a significant personal investment on the sponsor's
part served to feed the desire to create new companies. Of the more than 590
investment companies that were formed between 1927 and 1930, nearly sixty per
cent were of the management investment company variety, the type that offered
the most lucrative management rewards.257

This rapid propagation of investment companies, organized to exploit the
public's growing demand for a form of "institutional investment," took place
during a period when the investor was virtually unprotected against managerial
overreaching on the part of those operating investment companies. Federal
regulation of investment company practices was nonexistent, the ability of the
common law to deal with injuries arising from the mismanagement of investment companies was limited at best and, California and Utah notwithstanding,
the state Blue Sky Laws, still in the embryonic stage, wanted much in terms of
providing adequate investor protection." 8
254 Id. at 58.
255 Id. at 374.
256 Id. at 115.
257 Compare id. at 30 with id. at 111.
258 California and Utah were the only states that required registration of investment companies prior to the crash. See CAL. GEN. LAws at 3814 (Deering 1927); Law of March 23,
1929, ch. 79, [1929] Laws of Utah.
One pre-crash author, Mr. William Steiner, noted the scarcity of effective Blue Sky Laws
capable of dealing with the problems raised by the rapid proliferation of investment companies. See W. STEINER, supra note 214 at 301-09.
Mr. Steiner showed himself to be an astute observer of the investment company scene.
Writing in 1928, the author mentioned several weaknesses in the industry which were already
apparent:
1. The existence of a considerable number of small, weak trusts, organized
under boom conditions. A few trusts are undoubtedly dishonest; somewhat more are
organized by salesmen with little knowledge of finance; and still more by well intentioned incompetents with inadequate backing.
2. The rearing of corporate capital structures which fully exploited the remarkable profit making possibilities through turnover of portfolios existing during the
rapidly rising security markets of recent years. This creates a considerable burden of
charges, whether fixed or contingent, the margin above which is supplied largely if
not entirely by turnover profits.
3. The existence of a speculative attitude, rather than an investment attitude,
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New York's experience in attempting to enact state legislation to protect
the investing public's interest against possible investment company malpractices
is especially instructive. In 1927, a survey conducted under the auspices of the
New York Attorney General's office examined the operations of the investment
companies then doing business in the state." 9 Following the study a report was
prepared and submitted to the New York State Department of Law. The report
recommended that legislation be adopted which would: permit investment companies to incorporate under the laws of New York; provide that supervisory
control over those companies be given to the New York Superintendent of Banks;
and empower the Superintendent to inquire into the managerial competence of,
and bookkeeping procedures employed by such investment companies.26
Particularly cogent were the remarks of Mr. Timothy Shea, who supervised
the study and transmitted the report to the state's Department of Law. Considering the advisability of the study's proposals, which he felt were "wise, reasonable, and constructive," 2 he observed that:
The history of all state regulation shows that there is a tendency on
the part of the people to permit individual enterprise to flourish until some
great public evil or catastrophe occurs and then restrictive and drastic
legislation is made effective, locking the barn door after the horse has been
stolen.
The legislation 26
I 2 suggest proposes to lock the barn door while the
horse is in the stable.

6
The bill which embodied those proposals died in the state's Assembly.1
By the end of 1929, the value of assets held by investment companies totaled

towards investment trust securities on the part of the public. With a lack of understanding of trust management problems, and looking only to the records of past years
in appreciation, any disillusionment in [the] future is likely to cause sharp revulsion
from the trusts as a group.
4. Variety of trust practice with respect to almost every phase of operation.
This makes it difficult to judge various trusts, and makes many represent a curious
combination of virtues and vices. It likewise means that those most intimately informed have as yet reached no agreement as to the field of use of various practices.
While no single form of trust or policy is perhaps ideal, and various trusts are
adapted to various needs, surely no such profusion as exists today is either necessary
or desirable.
5. Lack of understanding on the part of the general public. An uncritical snap
judgment is apt to espouse the bad, tempted by catchwords and rash promises, while
condemning the good, honestly prepared and presented in more conservative fashion.
At the same time, it is apt no less to be suspicious, and, where unjustified, easily
stampeded. Id. at 313-14.
Looking toward the future, Steiner saw:
1. The careful study by and of investment companies;
2. Widespread disclosure of company data; and
3. "A measure of regulation, coupled with assumption of responsibility by trust
managers." Id. at 315-16.
259 For a discussion of the study and a sample of the questions directed at the investment
trusts, see T. GRAYSON, supra note 206, at 288 n.8. See also W. STEINER, supra note 214, at
305-08.
260 See A. OTTINGER & T. SHEA, INVESTMENT TRUSTS, A SURVEY OF THE ACTIVITIES
AND FORMS OF INVESTMENT TRUSTS WITH RECOMMENDATIONS FOR STATUTORY REGULATION
BY THE N.Y. STATE DEPARTMENT OF LAW 100 (1927).
261 Id. at 101.
262 Id. at 100.
263 W. STEINER, supra note 214, at 302. Apparently some felt that the "high standards
prevailing" in the pre-crash era justified the avoidance of "unnecessarily restrictive State legislation." N.Y. Times, July 2, 1929, at 43, cols. 4-5.
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more than $6 billion.264 Twenty-two years were to pass before the industry's
assets again reached that figure.265
E. Stage Four-

October 24, 1929 to August 22, 1940

1. Effects of the Crash on Investment Companies
Black Thursday, October 24, 1929, marks the beginning of the fourth period
of industry growth, a stage of development for investment companies that did
not terminate until August 22, 1940, the date that President Roosevelt signed
the Investment Company Act of 1940.
That the depression years were unkind to most investors is so well established as to be eligible for judicial notice; yet the market crash was not alone
among the causes of many investment company shareholders' woes during the
'
investment company
depression years. A "fringe of thoroughly dishonest"266
managements plagued the infant industry during those years, costing the investing public an estimated 6 " $1.1 billion, and evoking a public outcry that was
loud and poignant:
The title of a battle-scarred but veteran institution of Scotland and England,
the Investment Trust, was imported to the United States; but its unsavory
early history on the other side (with honorable exceptions of course) and
its present accession to repute over there through tribulation and experience, were ignored. We divided the American translation of this institution into two kinds: blind speculative pools called Management Trusts, the
faults in the way of operating which Great Britain had largely eliminated,
and myopic speculative pools called Fixed Trusts, which Great Britain had
never known. Into these two kinds of co~perative offense against the principles of investment during the five years 1925-1929 we poured two billion
American dollars in a crescendo of folly that outdid th& Mississippi Bubble,
the South Sea Bubble and the oversea's orgy that ended in the Baring
crisis.
Nor was this all. Under the title of the British institution, which in
these days for the most part lives up to its signification: Investment Trust,
American banks, stock exchange firms and general investment houses
affiliated with themselves, and conferred their very names on these blind
pools and myopic pools that in numbers of cases have brought dishonor on
their sponsors and great loss to their certificate holders.
.. . It is not the aggregate of bank and commercial failures that best
records the price of such a business collapse. The greatest part of that price
In acute cases, where the mind has
can never be known or measured ....
become weakened, it is marked by bodies fallen from high windows and by
the crack of revolverg in secluded places of reckoning.
We all know cases. Does religious persecution or war furnish starker
tragedy or sublimer sacrifice than that of our two friends, partners in an
honored, conservative investment business that failed in this stress? Their
lives, insured in favor of their business to an amount exceeding their debts
264

265
266
267

II 31.
34 SEC ANN. RaP. 115 (1968).
Note, Investment Company Act of 1940, 50 YALE L.J. 440, 441 (1941).
See text accompanying note 184 supra.
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to customers and others, were snuffed out separately within the limits of
a weekend.
Therefore whether we are moved more by these poignant experiences
or by the revelations of mathematics, we defenders of an old investment
faith have a right to urge268with Browning "The truth for God's sake, lest
men should believe a lie.
In 1929, the leveraged closed-end companies led the management investment company industry in every category. In number of companies, shareholders,
and total assets managed, the leveraged closed-ends easily exceeded the combined totals of the open-end and non-leveraged closed-end companies.26 " Roughly
eighty per cent of the management investment company industry's shareholders
held stock in the leveraged closed-end companies, 7 ' and it was they who bore
the brunt of the mischief visited by the market's decline. One dollar invested
in the stock of the average leveraged closed-end company in July of 1929 would
have netted the stockholder two cents if he sold it in June of 1932, and a
27
nickel if he waited until the end of 1937 to dispose of his interest. 1
To be sure, the market decline was precipitous, and as will be seen, more
than a few leveraged closed-end shareholders were subjects of faithless managements; however the plunge in the market value of the leveraged closed-end's
shares cannot be fully explained by the drop in stock prices or managerial infidelity. The leveraged closed-end investor's travails were due, in part at least,
to the functioning of two leveraged closed-end characteristics: reverse leverage,
and the premium discount phenomenon." 2
Although the non-leveraged closed-end company's shareholders were affected
by the premium discount phenomenon, their freedom from the effects of reverse
leverage enabled them to weather the tempest fairly well. The dollar invested
in 1929 that would have netted the leveraged closed-end company's shareholder
a nickel at year end 1937, would have returned him forty-eight cents had he
268 L. CHAMBERLIN & W. HAY, INVESTMENT AND SPECULATION 4-6 (1931). Management investment companies were commonly referred to as "blind pools." See W. STEINER,
supra note 214, at 78.
The fixed trusts or "myopic pools," as the authors refer to them, were forms of "unmanaged" investment companies - companies which sold the public shares representing an undivided interest in a fixed group of pre-selected stocks. The portfolio stocks generally remained
the same. See INVESTMENT TRUSTS I 2.
269 The relevant figures are as follows:
Per
Number of
cent of
companiesa companiesa
Leveraged
Closed-ends ..........
118
Non-leveraged
Closed-ends ..........
44
Open-ends ...............
19
Totals

Per
cent of
assetsa

Shareholder
accounts
(thousands)b

Per
cent of
accountsb

65

2.25

74

448

77

24
11

.64
.14

21
5

85
49

14
9

........................
181
100

3.03

100

582

100

a INVESTMENT TRUSTS II 115.
b Estimate based on number of

270
271
272

Total
assets
(billions)a

shares per investment company. Id. at 373.

See note 269 supra.
INVESTMENT TRUSTS II 314.
See text accompanying notes 55-58 and 71-73 supra.
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invested in the non-leveraged closed-end instead. 3 Such a return, amounting
as it does to a fifty-two per cent shrinkage in the value of the original investment, is
not to be scoffed at. Had that dollar been invested in an index which reflected
the performance of the market generally, it would have returned only thirty-nine
cents at the end of the same period. 74
The ability of the non-leveraged closed-ends to outperform the market was
primarily due to the practice indulged in by many of the companies of repurchasing their shares from their shareholders at discounts of sixty-five to seventy
per cent below net asset value.27 5 By repurchasing its shares in that manner,
the non-leveraged closed-end company was able to materially improve the net
asset value of the shares held by the remaining stockholders. For example,
assume a non-leveraged dosed-end company had 1,000 shares of common stock
outstanding with a net asset value of $10 per share. The repurchase of 300
shares issued by the company at $5 per share would result in an increase in the
net asset value of the remaining shares to $12.14. To obtain the same effect
through stock market investment, the value of the company's portfolio securities
would have had to appreciate 21.4 per cent over the short span of time it would
take to make the repurchases, a rare occurrence during the depression.
Between 1929 and 1935 the net amount of stock repurchased by the closedend investment companies totaled nearly one-half billion dollars. 7 6 Such repurchases not only enabled the close-end companies to make "paper profits," but
also permitted them to peg the market price of the securities at what company
management considered a proper value. While some of the reacquired stock was
'
the majority of such transactions involved the unpurchased from "insiders,"277
disclosed repurchase of stock by the company from the general public.
Seldom was the selling stockholder aware that he was selling his stock to
the investment company, or even that he was selling his shares at a discount. In
its study of the investment company industry, the SEC noted the industry's attempted justification for the practice, but was obviously unimpressed:
Even more important, however, is the fact that these repurchases were
justified upon the ground that at the time these securities were reacquired
they were the "best buys" for the investment companies as investments in
whidh the companies could make immediate and substantial "profits." Yet
the managements, who were employed by the stockholders to safeguard their
interests, did not advise liquidating shareholders that their securities were
selling at discounts, that they would lose upon such sale the difference
between the asset value and the market value (the amount of the discount),
and that the company itself was repurchasing the securities, which it considered a good investment.s (Emphasis added.)

Little need be said about the effect of the crash upon the equity interest of
mutual fund shareholders. Freed from the machinations of the premium-dis273

274
275
276

INVESTMENT TRuSTS

Id.
Id. at 314 n.63.

II 314.

INVESTMENT TRUSTS III 953.
277 Repurchases from "insiders" accounted for roughly eight per cent of all investment
company repurchases. Id. at 977.
278 INVESTMENT TRUSTS III 967.
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count phenomenon by virtue of the redeemability of their shares, and generally
unaffected by reverse leverage, mutual fund shareholders fared relatively well
during the depression, if one accepts doing as well as the market generally as
faring relatively well." 9 Between July, 1929 and year end 1937, the price 0of an
28
average stock listed on the NYSE declined approximately sixty per cent.
Had the losses suffered by the industry's investors during the depression
years, particularly the leveraged closed-end investors, been solely attributable to
the effect of the declining market, the 1940 Act might never have been enacted
and most certainly not in its final form. What stirred Congress was not the $1.9
billion investment loss caused by the drop in stock prices during that period, but
rather the $1.1 billion capital shrinkage which resulted from dishonest and irresponsible management practices employed by a segment of those controlling
some of the industry's companies.
2. Effects of the Crash on the Structure of the Industry
Because it was the closed-end shareholders that suffered most from the
effects of the declining market and managerial maladministration, it was only
natural for those investors preferring to purchase investment company shares
to shy away from the closed-ends and look for some other form of investment
vehicle. Investors were attracted to three different investment mediums: mutual
funds, contractual plans, and the fixed or "unit" trusts.
a. Growth of Mutual Funds
Mutual funds offered their shareholders the right to redeem their shares at
the security's approximate net asset value, a feature highly valued by investors
who appreciated the capricious nature of the closed-end's premium-discount
phenomenon. In addition, the funds enjoyed a special exemption from the provisions of the Revenue Act of 1936,"' which enabled them to avoid taxation on
their investment income, providing certain criteria were met. " The closed-ends
279 See INVESTMENT TRUSTS II 890-91.
280 This assumes that the Standard Statistics Company's index of ninety stocks was an
accurate market index. Id. at 314.
281 49 Stat. 1648 (1936).
282 Revenue Act of 1936 § 48(e), 49 Stat. 1669 (1936) required that an investment company meet the following specifications in order to be eligible for preferential tax treatment:
(e)

MUTUAL INVESTMENT COMPANIES.-

'(1)
GENERAL DEINITION.-The term "mutual investment company" means
any corporation (whether chartered or created as an investment trust, or otherwise),
other than a personal holding company as defined in section 351, if(A) It is organized for the purpose of, and substantially all its business
consists of, holding, investing, or reinvesting in stock or securities; and
(B) At least 95 per centum of its gross income is derived from dividends,
interest, and gains from sales or other disposition of stock or securities; and
(C) Less than 30 per centum of its gross income is derived from the sale
or other disposition of stock or securities held for less than six months; and
(D) An amount not less than 90 per centum of its net income is distributed
to its shareholders as taxable dividends during the taxable year; and
(E) Its shareholders are, upon reasonable notice, entitled to redemption of
their stock for their proportionate interests in the corporation's properties, or the
cash equivalent thereof less a discount not in excess of 3 per centum thereof.
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were not similarly favored until 1942.83 The "tax break" enjoyed by the funds
doubtless made their shares more attractive to the investing public.
b. Growth of ContractualPlan Companies
The second type of investment company which became increasingly popular
during the depression was the periodic payment plan, now known as the "contractual plan." The first plan was offered publicly in 1929, and by 1937 there
were forty-five plan companies in operation. 8 4 While the vast majority of the
portfolio securities currently held by the plan companies are mutual fund shares,
the early contractual plans preferred to purchase shares issued by fixed trusts or
to hold their own diversified portfolio of securities. Mutual fund shares were
the underlying securities in only seven of the fifty-five plan companies studied
by the SEC. 2"'
(2) LImrTATiNs.-Despite the provisions of paragraph (1) a corporation shall
not be considered as a mutual investment company if, subsequent to a date thirty
days after the date of the enactment of this Act, at any time during the taxable
year(A) More than 5 per centum of the gross assets of the corporation, taken
at cost, was invested in stock or securities, or both, of any one corporation,
government, or political subdivision thereof, but this limitation shall not apply
to investments in obligations of the United States or in obligations of any corporation organized under general Act of Congress if such corporation is an
instrumentality of the United States; or
(B) It owned more than 10 per centum of the outstanding stock or
securities, or both, of any one corporation; or
(C) It had any outstanding bonds or indebtedness in excess of 10 per
centum of its gross assets taken at cost; or
(D) It fails to comply with any rule or, regulation prescribed by the Commissioner, with the approval of the Secretary, for the purpose of ascertaining
the actual ownership of its outstanding stock. (Emphasis added.)
Section 13 of the 1936 Revenue Act, 49 Stat. 1655 (1936), permitted enterprises which
qualified as mutual investment companies under section 48(e) to subtract the dividends paid

their shareholders (out of current earnings) from the company's net income in determining
the company's net taxable income.
283 Section 361 of the Revenue Act of 1942, 56 Stat. 878 (now INT. IEV. CODE of 1954,
§ 851), modified the definition of the 1936 Act to permit any investment company registered
under the Investment Company Act of 1940 to avail itself of preferential tax treatment
provided the section's other requirements were complied with:
(a) IN GENERAL.-For the purposes of this chapter, the term "regulated investment company" means any domestic corporation (whether chartered or created
as an investment trust, or otherwise), other than a personal holding company as
defined in section 501, which at all times during the taxable year is registered under
the Investment Company Act of 1940 (54 Stat. 789, 15 U. S. C., 1940 ed., secs.
80 a-1 to 80 b-2), or that Act, as amended, either as a management company
or as a unit investment trust, or which is a common trust fund or similar fund
excluded by section 3 '(c) (3) of such Act from the definition of "investment
company" and is not included in the definition of "common trust fund" by section 169.
No solid reason has been given for the preferential treatment received by the open-ends
but denied the closed-ends during the years between 1936 and 1942. However, David
Schenker, SEC counsel, volunteered his personal opinion while testifying before the Senate
subcommittee which conducted hearings on the need for regulation in the investment company
industry:
I think it was [President Roosevelt] who said in some address that he could visualize
if you had a simple company which was made available to small investors, a mutual
company, then it might be entitled to some tax exemption.
Now, the so-called mutual company, or open-end company, was designated as
the type of company which would be entitled to the tax exemption, although in my
opinion the only difference between an open-end company and a closed-end company
is the shareholder's right to redeem. 1940 Senate Hearings 802.
284 INSTALLMENT PLAN STUDY 9.
285

Id. at 19.
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The plans were originated and developed to appeal to the "small investor"
wage earning men and women who could afford to periodically set aside
small sums of money from their earnings. To provide an investment vehicle for
such people, the plans offered certificates which could be purchased on the installment basis for as little as $5 or $10 per month. The plans, designed to carry
the "advantages" of investment company ownership to such investors were
marketed aggressively by the plan company's sales force, and with good reason the purchase and completion of such a plan assured the plan company no mean
amount of revenue.
The average sales load charged the contractual planholder by the plan company, assuming the investor completed the plan, was 15.56 per cent of the amount
he invested.2 86 In addition, the planholder was often assessed a double management fee, payable to the plan company and to the underlying investment company. The contractual plan's distinctive sales commission feature, the front-end
load, was used to a fare-thee-well. Unfettered by effective state or federal regulation, the plan companies exploited their "customers" by commonly deducting
sixty per cent of the amount paid in by the planholder for the sales load, and
a front-end load of one-hundred per cent was not unknown.287 The built-in penalty
effect of the front-end load was seldom explained to the shareholder by the plan
company's salesmen. After receiving a number of complaints, the SEC conducted
an examination of sales practices used by the periodic payment plan companies.
That investigation "revealed that less than 5 per cent of the hundreds of subscribers who were examined really had any idea as to the nature of their investment."2 '
One of the major manifestations of the periodic payment plan investors'
ignorance concerning the effect of the front-end load on the size of their net
investment was the high number of lapsed accounts among the plan companies.
By the end of 1935, approximately forty per cent of the plans purchased since
1930 had lapsed. 89 The average loss to those investors, caused in large part
by the effect of the front-end load, was thirty-five per cent of the amount paid
into the plan.29 9 No doubt the losses incurred by those investors were a source
of great disillusionment, particularly in light of the grandiose claims made in the
plan companies' sales literature. For example:
-

Commonwealth Fund Provides Living Assurance by Enabling You Now to Create a Living Trust for the education of your children.
To buy your own home or establish a business.
To provide a sinking fund or business reserve.
To meet an emergency or an opportunity.
For travel and comfort in your later years.
LIVING ASSURANCE means
peace of mind - security and
29
freedom from financial worry. '

286
287
288

Id. at 47.
Id. at 76-77.
1940 Senate Hearings 166.

289

INSTALLMENT PLAN STUDY

290 Id.
291 Id. at 167.

65.
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As will be seen, the sales practices and loading charges used by the plan companies met with little congressional approval.
c. Growth of Fixed Trusts
Fixed trusts represent the investment vehicle that gained most in popularity
during the early years of the depression. 92 The trusts offered the investor certificates which evidenced a beneficial ownership of an undivided interest in a
pool of securities held by the trust as assets. In contrast to the other types of
investment companies, the discretionary range of the trust's management bloc
was extremely narrow since the trust's assets - the portfolio securities - were
literally "fixed" and could be changed only in limited instances.
This curtailment of management control appealed to investors who had
seen their closed-end shares evidence an undivided interest in, inter alia, construction of the Mississippi Valley Barge Line.'9 3 The fixed trust investment
companies boomed between 1930 and 1931, and the value of their shares rose
from two to seven and one-half per cent of the industry total. 294 The trusts declined in value thereafter, in part due to redemptions and also because of a
management malpractice called switching, which will be treated in the next
section.295
3. Investment Company Abuses
a. Illiquid Investments
By attaining and preserving control of an investment company, a group of
individuals had at their disposal a large pool of liquid wealth. In most instances,
the utility of that wealth to those in control was virtually unlimited - many of
the corporate investment companies copied the "corporate powers" section of
United States Steel's articles of incorporation.9 " The use of those broad powers
enabled some investment companies, organized ostensibly to provide expert
management of a diversified portfolio of securities, to commit the company's
assets to ventures in which the company had a less than, liquid position. Among
such ventures were the purchase of a subway located in Buenos Aires, Argentina,29r the acquisition of control of the Venezuela Oil Company, 29 8 and the
financing of the construction of a Mississippi River barge line.299
b. Pyramiding
Because of the broad discretionary powers conferred on many investment
company managements, the size of the liquid pools of assets controlled could
292 The trust's peak years were 1930 and 1931. During those years roughly $600 million
of their certificates were sold, representing two-thirds of all such sales between 1927 and 1936.
INVESTMENT TRUSTS II 39.
293 See text accompanying notes 297-99 infra.
294 INVESTMENT TRUSTS II 39-40.
295 See text accompanying notes 315-18 infra.
296 1940 Senate Hearings 183. By copying United States Steel's corporate powers provisions,
an investment company was entitled, inter alia, "[tlo plan, design, construct, alter, repair,
remove or otherwise engage in any work upon bridges, railroads, dams, canals, piers, etc." Id.
297 Id. at 125.
298 Id. at 184.
299 Id. at 229.
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easily be increased by investing in the securities issued by other investment companies. This practice, referred to as "pyramiding" and encountered previously
in the discussion of U.S. & Foreign,"' enabled a management group to expand
its field of power by organizing subsidiary investment companies, having them
issue stock with unequal voting rights and then sell the choice (and controlling)
stock to an investment company already controlled by the group. Pyramiding
also made it possible for a company whose policies prevented the purchase of
speculative issues to vicariously speculate in the market by purchasing the stock
of an established investment company that traded only in speculative stocks."0'
Such an investment not only ran counter to the spirit of the investing company's
stipulated investment policy, but also involved an unwarranted delegation of
management's responsibility by, in effect, putting its investor's money in the hands
of a second management team. This also resulted in the uneconomic duplication
of management fees and sales charges, paid ultimately by the investing company's
shareholders.
The classic example of pyramiding resulted from the combined exploits of
thirteen companies known as the Founders Group. The first member company
was established in 1922 when two individuals, one of whom was a bankrupt,
made a combined capital investment of $500.102 By 1929, the public's capital
investment in the pyramided interests controlled as a result of that venture exceeded $500 million. 0 ' At its peak, the Founders Group controlled or had a
dominant interest in companies whose combined resources totaled over $2 billion."0 ' Perhaps the major reason for the astounding growth rate of the Founders
Group was the investor interest generated by the handsome return its shareholders
received on their invested capital. It has been theorized that the Group's outstanding investment performance was aided in no small part by the unique accounting technique they employed which resulted in expenses being deferred or
capitalized, not charged to income. 0 5
The crash collapsed the Founders' pyramided capital structure, and the total
loss to the public exceeded $390 million. One of the Group's companies, the
United States Electric Power Corporation, which had an original paid in capital
of over $133 million, had a net worth in 1940 of $132.00.06 The collapse of the

300 See text accompanying notes 245-49 supra.
301 Precisely the same ploy has been used by a foreign super fund, Fund of Funds, Ltd.,
to circumvent one of its prospectus's investment restrictions, that "the Fund may not borrow
money, purchase any securities on margin, or sell securities short." The Fund has not engaged
in any of these activities, but some of its wholly owned subsidiaries have. PUBLIC POLICY
STATEMENT 322. For a discussion of the problems caused by the existence of super funds in
general, and foreign super funds such as Fund of Funds, Ltd. in particular, see notes 154-76
supra and accompanying text.
302 1940 Senate Hearings 82.
303 Id.
304 Id. at 83.
305 Id. at 87. Because of its pyramided structure, the Group was also able to employ a
devious technique to generate "profits." The mechanics of that practice may be seen in this
simplified example: Founder X issues $100 worth of securities to Founders Y and Z who
pay $50 each. Founders Y and Z then issue or "resell" those securities to the public, receiving
$100 each. The $100 surplus over the price paid for the securities would be picked up by Y
and Z as investment "profit." See INVESTMENT TRUSTS III 2795.
306 1940 Senate Hearings 83.
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Founders was so complete, and its management practices so corrupt ("[t]hey
did shocking things and stole plenty"3 0 7), that there can be no doubt of investment company industry spokesman Arthur H. Bunker's sincerity when he told
the Senate subcommittee that was hearing testimony on industry management
practices: "I would not be caught defending Founders for anything, Senator."
Replied Senator Wagner, "I know that." '
c. Self-dealing Transactions
While pyramided capital structures permitted an investment company to
increase its field of control and profits, the management of even one investment
company was not without the capacity of providing rich rewards. This was
especially so in the case of those companies sponsored by houses of issue, investment bankers, and brokers. Such companies constituted approximately sixty
per cent of the industry's organizations, 09 and were an extremely valuable source
of management fees and brokerage income."
In addition, they provided their
sponsors with a ready supply of funds which could be conveniently borrowed at
a low interest rate,"' and the companies were occasionally used as "dumping
grounds" for their sponsors' distressed securities, which the sponsors sold to the
controlled company at fictitious prices.'
d. Looting
Perhaps the crudest way in which those in control of an investment company
were able to profit from their position was simply by looting the company. One
such instance occurred in October of 1937 while the SEC's report on abuses
by management in the investment company industry was being prepared. The
looting was accomplished by a group that purchased control of the Continental
Securities Corporation for $580,000, although the shares purchased by the looters
had a negative net asset value of $638,000."3S The purchasers quickly elected
a new board of directors, raided the company's portfolio, and absconded with
securities worth $3.25 million before a trustee in bankruptcy was appointed, five
31 4
months after the looters assumed control.
e. Switching
Switching was a device used by those who were connected with the management of investment companies to generate sales commissions. In its simplest
307
308

Statement of Arthur H. Bunker, id. at 334.
1940 Senate Hearings 334.
309 INVESTMENT TRUSTS II 124.
310 An investment company manager who doubled as the company's broker could easily
supplement the management fees he received with brokerage commissions earned on the
company's portfolio transactions if he rapidly turned over an investment company's portfolio.
This helps explain why the portfolios of some investment companies were turned over as often
as fifteen times per year. 1940 Senate Hearings 191.
311 See, e.g., INVESTMENT TRUSTS III 2648-49.
312

Id. at 2589-624.

314

Id. at 57-70.

313

1940 Senate Hearings 59.
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form, switching occurs when a mutual fund salesman, purely in the interest of
generating a sales commission, induces an investment company's shareholders,
particularly those owning mutual fund shares, periodic payment plan certificates,
or fixed trust certificates, to "switch" their investment from one company to another. The purchase price of the company's share naturally includes the salesman's commission, which he pockets.' 15
Another form of switching was used by investment company managements
during the depression to generate commissions for their salesmen. By the use of
recurrent promotions - the continuous formation of investment companies by
one management group - those in control were able to switch investors in and
out of the various companies, thereby generating sales commissions. The most
complex form of switching, called the "preferential bid," was used, mainly in
1933, to switch investors from fixed trusts to open-end companies which were
often under identical control. In the case of one fixed trust-open-end switch,
the fixed trust's certificate holders were offered a three per cent premium above
the net asset value of their securities as an inducement to "swap" them for a pro
rata amount of mutual fund shares." 6 The price of the mutual fund shares included a nine and one-half per cent sales load.' 17 The effect of the switch was,
therefore, to generate a net sales load of six and one-half per cent."'

f. Dilution
Another sales practice utilized by the mutual funds and found by the SEC
to be abusive was a direct result of the "two price system" used in valuing mutual
fund portfolio securities. Because the purchase price of mutual fund shares was
based on the value of the fund's portfolio stocks, which fluctuated daily, the
net asset value of the outstanding shares had to be continuously recomputed.
The fund's total net asset value and the net asset value of the fund's outstanding
securities were commonly determined shortly after the close of the NYSE.
However, the net asset value per share calculated at that time was seldom put into
effect by the funds until ten o'clock the following morning. In the interim there
existed two known prices for the security, and an order to purchase a mutual
fund share could be, and usually was, executed at the lower of the two known
prices. The effect of this practice was called "dilution," a reference to the
impact of the practice on the equity interest of those holding fund shares at the
time the sale was made. The effect of such a sale on the interest of those shareholders may readily be seen in this exaggerative example:
315 For recent cases which in part dealt with switching by mutual fund salesmen, see Paine,
Webber, Jackson & Curtis, SEC Release No. 8501 (January 22, 1969), [Current Binder] OCH
FED. SEC. L. REP. f 77,651, at 83,412 (SEC 1969); Shearson, Hammill & Co., SEC Release
No. 7743 (November 12, 1965), [1964-1966 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
77,306, at 82,509 (SEC 1965).
316 See INVESTMENT TRUSTS III 832-33.
317 Id.
318 Investment company managements defended the use of the preferential bid to accomplish a switch, on the basis that the shares thus acquired represented valuable additions
to the company's portfolio, and that their purchase on the market would entail greater cost
due to brokerage fees. Despite this rationale, the acquired shares were, prior to the enactment
of the Investment Bankers Code in 1934, generally treated as temporary investments by such
companies. Id. at 832-33.
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1. Assume on day 1 that Mutual Fund X has 10 shares outstanding
and that the net asset value per share is $10:
Assets = Securities
$100.
Ten Shares -

Net asset value

$10.

2. On day 2 the value of the securities held in the fund's portfolio
skyrockets 50 per cent. If no dilution occurred, the net asset value
of Mutual Fund X's shares would be $15, a reflection of the rise
in the value of the portfolio stocks:
Assets = Securities
$150.
Ten Shares -

Net asset value

$15.

3. However further assume that Mr. A, aware that the value of Mutual
Fund X's portfolio securities has risen dramatically, purchases 10
shares from Fund X's dealer at the day 1 price, before the day 2
price becomes effective:
Assets = Securities
$150
+ Cash
100
Total
$250
Twenty Shares-Net asset value $12.50.
4. Because of Mr. A's purchase the net asset value of the original shareholders which should have been $15, has been diluted to $12.50,
50 per cent of the increase in the value of the Fund's assets having
been soaked up by Mr. A.
The use of the two price system in this manner was one of the principal selling
arguments used by mutual fund salesmen to encourage a prospect to purchase
fund shares."' 9 By being able to sell a product at the lower of two known prices
the salesman was in the enviable position of being able to instantly benefit his
customer.
i. Overnight Dilution
Because of the imposition of the mutual fund's sales load, the difference
between the two prices had to be fairly high before it would profit an investor
to buy at the "day 1" price, hold the share until the "day 2" price became effective, and then redeem his shares at the higher net asset value. But fund insiders, who were usually able to purchase the shares at a price "close to net asset
value," were easily able to profit from such shenanigans. 2
I. Underwriter-Dealer Dilution
Mutual fund purchasers were not the only beneficiaries of the two price
system. The fund's underwriter and dealer were also able to profit from it by
filling orders at the higher of the two known prices with shares purchased at
319

1940 Senate Hearings 138. See also id. at 844-46.

320

Id. at 142, 842.
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the lower price. 21 The only effective action which the SEC could take against
this form of riskless insider trading was to demand that the fact that such a
practice was engaged in be disclosed in the dealer or underwriter's registration
statement filed pursuant to section 5 of the Securities Act of 1933. 2 In the
event the company failed to disclose the practice, the Commission's sole recourse
was to issue a stop order under section 8(d) of the 1933 Act,123 suspending the
registration and forcing the firm to amend its statement or cease making sales.3 24
The effectiveness of even that weapon was severely retarded by the fact that the
majority of those engaging in the practice were not required to register under the
Act.
ifi. Effects of Dilution
Although the piecemeal effect of the dilution caused by selling to the public
at the lower of two known prices, or selling to the investor at the higher price
and pocketing the difference, was miniscule, the aggregate dilution caused by
such practices was determined by the SEC to "have a very, very material effect
on what the average person buys as an investment and into which the man of
small means puts his savings." 2 '
g. Other Abuses
Other practices engaged in by those in control, if less aesthetically offensive
than looting or diluting, were nonetheless effective in exploiting the investing
public. Insiders were commonly able to purchase the investment company's
securities at "cut rate prices."3 6 The undisclosed payment of dividends from
capital was a common industry practice, and in some cases involved including
the amount to be paid for a "dividend" in the price paid for the security by the
investor. A sales charge based on the total price was paid by the investor, meaning that the shareholder had paid a commission to the salesman on his dividend.
This practice was indulged in by many mutual funds. The president of one
mutual fund, on record as testifying that it takes "[j]ust brains"' 2 to start an
investment company, explained why his fund chose not to disclose the fact that the
purchase price of the share included the cost of the first dividend:
[Mr. Parker] I would never have put that into any sales literature, circular,
or quarterly report, because I don't believe any of my stockholders would understand it.

321 See id. at 144-45 for a discussion of this practice, referred to as "taking positions."
322 Compare Securities Act of 1933 § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 77(e) (1964) with T.I.S. Management Corp., 3 S.E.C. 174 (1938).
323 Securities Act of 1933 § 8(d), 15 U.S.C. § 77(h) (d) (1964).
324 See T.I.S. Management Corp., 3 S.E.C. 174 (1938).
325 1940 Senate Hearings 151-52.

326
327

See id. at 799;

INVESTMENT TRUSTS III 2635.
INVESTMENT TRUSTS I 104. The colloquy went

as follows:

[SEC examiner]

I was just interested in the fact that it doesn't take much money

[Mr. Parker]

Just brains.

to start one of these trusts.
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Q
They would not understand?
[Mr. Parker] And further than that, it would have given them a false idea
of what had happened.
Isn't that all the more reason to put it in?
Q
[Mr. Parker] Were you in the business, you wouldn't say that. It is not
stockholders to the point that they
practical to educate your
3 28
would understand that.
4. The Adequacy of Disclosure in the Pre-Act Investment Company Industry
MIT's former Chairman, Dwight P. Robinson, Jr., was absolutely correct
when he noted that the adoption by MIT of a policy of "full disclosure" a decade
before it was legally required "was a pointed departure from [the investment
company industry's] established practice." ' 9 The undisclosed repurchase of
securities by closed-end companies at a discount 3 . and the undisclosed payment
of dividends from capital were common industry practices.3 3 '
The merger or consolidation of investment companies was commonly carried
through without the affected shareholders being informed that they had appraisal
rights." 2 Counsel for one investment company testified before the SEC that since
a shareholder could ascertain his appraisal rights merely by consulting the dealer
who had sold him the shares, he was "negligent' if he failed to do so. 3"3 In addition, the SEC noted that the
solicitation literature prepared by management in many cases, whether from
design or for other reasons, may omit to disclose material facts essential to
for
an intelligent determination by a stockholder of the merits of a3 plan
34
consolidation, merger, or the sale of the assets of his corporation.
Perhaps the ultimate in nondisclosure was achieved by a member of the Founders
General Corporation, which published no financial statements
Group, Founders
335
for six years.
The effectiveness of federal legislation in compelling investment company
managements to disclose information of a material nature to their shareholders
was, at best, limited. The reach of the two federal disclosure statutes, the
Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, was truncated
by the ability of many investment companies to continue in operation without
the necessity of registering their securities with the Commission in compliance
with either Act. " 6 Of the 650 investment companies in existence in 1940, only
328
329
330
331
332
333
334
335
336

INVESTMENT TRuSTS III 816.
D. RoBXNSON, JR., MASSACHUSETTS INVESTORS TRUST
See INVESTMENT TRUSTS III 953-55.

15 (1954).

Id. at 816-17.
Id. at 1507-09.
Id. at 1508.
Id. at 1509-10.
See id. at 2306-07.
The provisions of the Securities Act of 1933 apply only to companies that issued

securities after July 26, 1933. Securities Act of 1933 § 3(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77(c) (1) (1964).
Hence, it was possible for a company to avoid registration under the 1933 Act merely by not

offering shares after the July deadline. Indeed, it was impossible for those closed-end com-
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130, mainly mutual funds, had registered under the 1933 Act, and not all of
those companies were actively selling securities. 37 Although the SEC vigorously
policed the disclosure policies of the registered companies - to the point of issuing over forty stop orders3 ' - the ability of a large number of companies to
continue in operation free from any measure of SEC scrutiny necessarily hampered the Commission's ability to protect the interests of the investment company
shareholder.
5. The Need for Regulation
Although the SEC made it clear that an industrywide policy of full and
complete disclosure was essential for the protection of the investing public, it
was quick to point out that mere disclosure was an inadequate cure. Former
SEC Commissioner Healy emphasized this point at the Senate hearings on legislative proposals designed to cope with the industry's maladies: "The mere recital
of the abuses which have occurred since 1933 and 1934, tends to prove that the
Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, valuable as they
are in most fields, are inadequate here." ' 9
The SEC was not alone in that belief. As early as November, 1936, the
New York Times had editorialized on the merits of disclosure in relation to the
investment company industry:
Many investment trust officers would stop here [publicity], holding that
"bright sunlight" is all that is needed, and that once this is brought to bear
on trust affairs the investor himself must make his choice. But the experience
of the last decade indicates that more than this is needed ....

has been long overdue.3 40

Regulation

On March 14, 1940, Senator Robert Wagner introduced S. 3580, Title I
of which was amended and incorporated into a later bill, H.R. 10065, which
eventually became the Investment Company Act of 1940. 11 The regulatory
nature of Senator Wagner's proposed legislation was clearly spelled out in the
explanatory statement which accompanied the bill's introduction:
[C]onsidering the investment-company industry as a whole, fundamental
deficiencies and abuses actually or potentially exist in all classes of investment companies and, in the absence of legislative regulation, will continue
panies whose shares were selling at a discount to issue any equity securities, since such an
issuance would automatically dilute the equity interest of its shareholders.
Since the open-end companies were not bothered by the discount phenomenon, many of
them chose to issue shares and comply with the Act's registration provisions. Consequently,
mutual fund registrations under the Act exceeded those by closed-ends by nearly three to
one, although there were almost three times as many closed-end companies doing business

during that period. Compare INVESTMFNT

TRUSTS

II 757 with id. at 115.

337 1940 Senate Hearings 135.
338 Id. at 157. A stop order may be issued by the Commission under section 8(d) of the
1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77(h) (d) (1964), if it appears that the registration statement filed
by the company is materially misleading. If the Commission issues a stop order, it becomes
unlawful for any person to make use of the mails or interstate commerce to sell the securities.
339 1940 Senate Hearings 38.
340 N.Y. Times, Nov. 12, 1936, at 26, col. 2.
341 S. 3580, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (1940). H.R. 10065, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (1940), an
amended version of S. 3580, was signed into law by President Roosevelt on August 22, 1940.
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or recur. The problem of the protection of the investor and the national
economy is too vital to permit of haphazard voluntary solutions.3 42 (Emphasis added.)
The hearings held on S. 3580 disclose an acute awareness on the part of the
Congress, the SEC, and the investment company industry of the need for constructive regulatory measures designed to prevent the recurrence of past misdeeds and to provide a solid foundation for future industry development. The
cooperative attitude of both the SEC and the industry during the preparation
of the Act provides a valuable insight into the harmony that can exist between
a governmental agency and the financial community when the welfare of the
investing public is at stake. By the close of the hearings, even the Senate subcommittee's members were impressed:
Senator DOWNEY. Do I understand that the representatives of the investment trusts and the Securities Exchange Commission are virtually in agreement now?
Senator WAGNER Not virtually but actually in agreement.
Senator DOWNEY. That is a most amazing thing in this chaotic world right
now.
Senator WAGNER. I think it is.
Senator DOWNEY. It is really the first encouraging thing I have heard in
several weeks. How was this miracle brought about?
Mr. SCHENKER. I think I might fairly say that a great deal of it is attributable to the cooperative spirit of the industry.
Senator DOWNEY. I am glad34 to hear that and hope it is an index of what
we may expect from now on. 3
President Roosevelt expressed similar sentiments in a statement issued on the
occasion of his signing of the Act:
There is no necessity of reviewing in detail the many unhealthy practices which this legislation is designed to eliminate. It is enough to point
out that the investment trusts have themselves actively urged that an agency
of the Federal Government assume immediate supervision of their activities.
This attitude on the part of the investment trust industry and investment
advisers is most commendable.
This in itself is enough to demonstrate that we have come a long way
since the bleak days of 1929, when the market crash swept away the veil
which up to then had hidden the "behind the scenes" activity of our high
financiers and showed all 3too clearly the sham and deceit which characterized
so many of their actions. 4
The Investment Company Act of 1940 was drafted to eliminate and prevent the propagation of management malpractices such as those discussed above.
David Schenker, one of the Act's draftsmen, and once described by a leading
mutual fund spokesman as the "[m]ost colorful of all the SEC team, 3 4 cap342

343
344

345

REc. 2845 (1940) (statement of Senator
1940 Senate Hearings 1130.
86 CoNG.

86

CoNG.

REc. 5230-31 (1940)

Wagner).

(statement of President Roosevelt).

H. BULLOCK, supra note 4, at 77.
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tured the thrust of the Act's provisions when, referring to one of the most blatant
instances of managerial malfeasance, he said:
We did not intend to mess with people who were trying to do a good job,
those who had a real interest in the industry of investment, but look to
special situations
like Continental Securities. And that is all that this bill
6
contemplates..3
6. The Investment Company Act of 1940
The following discussion of the Act's key provisions, primarily designed to
eliminate the "special situations" which Mr. Schenker referred to, is organized
by correlating the relevant sections of the Act with the managerial malpractices
which they were designed to eradicate. The primary focus will be on those sections which affect management investment company disclosure policies, control
practices, structural requirements, and security distribution processes as well
as the regulation of the periodic payment plan companies.
a. Disclosure
It has been noted that the lack of complete and accurate disclosure of material information was one of the pre-Act industry's major shortcomings. Feeling,
no doubt, that had investment company managements been required to keep
their shareholders informed regarding company practices and policies the travails
of the industry's shareholders might have been eased, the Act's draftsmen ineluded a series of important disclosure provisions in section 8 of the Act. "4 '
i. Management Policies
That section, which defines the registration procedure for investment companies, demands that every registered company disclose in detail:
1. the policy of the company in relation to a series of enumerated
activities, e.g., "borrowing money . .. making loans to other per,348

sons ....

2. any policies not required by law to be disclosed, but "which the
registrant deems a matter of fundamental policy and elects to treat
as such" ;

49

3. the identity and addresses of those persons affiliated with the company, and "a brief statement of the business experience for the
preceding five years of each officer and director of the registrant" ;.50
and
4. "the information and documents which would be required to be
filed in order to register under the Securities Act of 1933 and the

346
earlier.

347
348
349
350

1940 Senate Hearings 125-26. The looting of Continental Securities Corp. was discussed
See text accompanying note 313 supra.

Investment Company Act of 1940 § 8, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-8 (1964).
Id. § 8(b)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-8(b)(1) (1964).
Id. § 8(b)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-8(b)(2) (1964).
Id. § 8(b)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 8a-8(b)(3) (1964).
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Securities Exchange Act of 1934, all securities (other than shortterm paper)
which the registrant has outstanding or proposes to
3
issuze.'2 51
The obvious intent of the "management policies" provisions in section 8 was
to clip the discretionary wings of investment company management. Section 13
of the Act put "teeth" into the section 8 disclosure provisions by making it unlawful for any registered company to deviate from its specified management
policies without having first received the approval of those holding a majority
of the company's outstanding voting securities.352
ii. Undisclosed Repurchases
The abuse related to the surreptitious repurchase of closed-end shares which
were selling at discounts was eliminated by section 23(c) which requires a preacquisition disclosure of management's intention, the submission of tenders to
the affected class of security holders, or acquisition of the shares in conformance
with whatever "rules and regulations or orders [the SEC elects to promulgate]
for the protection of investors in order to insure that such purchases are made
in a manner . . . which does not unfairly discriminate against any holders of
35 3
the class... of securities to be purchased.
iii. Undisclosed Payments of Dividends from Capital
The practice of paying dividends from capital was not banned by the Act,
but section 19 makes it illegal for an investment company to pay dividends out
of capital "unless such payment is accompanied by a written statement which
adequately discloses the source or sources of such payment."3'5 4 The section empowered the SEC to prescribe the "form of such statement."3 55
iv. Sales Literature
The sales literature distributed by some investment companies, particularly
those selling periodic payment plans, which seemed to vary in tenor from exuberant optimism to outright misrepresentation, was subjected to SEC scrutiny
by section 24(b).56 It should be noted that in 1950, the SEC supplemented the
disclosure philosophy of section 24(b) with a list of guidelines.357 The guidelines were promulgated, in the Commission's words, "so that issuers, underwriters
and dealers may understand certain of the types of advertising and sales literature
3 55
which the Commission considers may be violative of statutory standards." 1
The permissible range of sales "puffing" was narrowed somewhat by section
35 of the Act, which outlaws the use of representations by those engaged in the
issuance of investment company securities that the security issued, or the com-

351

Id. § 8(b)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-8(b)(4) (1964).

352 Id.§ 13(a) (3), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-13(a) (3)(1964).
353 Id. § 23(c), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-23(c) (1964).
354 Id. § 19, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-19 (1964).

355 Id.
356 Id. § 24(b), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-24(b) "(1964).
357

15 Fed. Reg. 5468 (1950).

358 Id.
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pany issuing it, has been in any way approved by "the United States or any
agency or officer thereof." '59 Subsection (d) of that section permits the SEC
to obtain an injunction prohibiting a company from using a name that a court
determines to be "misleading." 360
v. Accounting Practices and Procedures
In order to supplement and strengthen the Act's disclosure provisions, section
31 grants the SEC the power to supervise industry accounting practices and
policies in the interest of achieving a reasonable degree of consistency between the
form of the statements issued by the various companies in the industry. 6'
Section 30,362 the second of the Act's three accounting sections, requires
the registered company to continually update its financial statements on file with
the SEC, and to transmit, at least semi-annually, certain specified information
and financial statements to its shareholders, e.g., "a balance sheet accompanied by
a statement of the aggregate value of investments on the date of such balance
sheet ....
"36' The section also empowers the Commission to require that an
independent public accountant certify the financial statements contained in the
annual reports filed under the section.'
In 1962 the SEC exercised its section
30 power, and amended Rule 30d-1, previously promulgated under that section,
to require certification of the annual reports made by the investment company
to its shareholders. 365
Insurance that the "independent public accountants" mentioned in section
30 and demanded by Rule 30d-1 are in fact "independent" of management is
provided by section 32 of the Act.'66 That section enumerates a series of steps
which must be taken regarding the appointment of the accountant. Among the
requirements of section 32 is annual shareholder ratification or rejection of the
firm selected by the company's board of directors to conduct the audit. Although
the section prohibits members of the board who are investment advisors, affiliates of investment advisors, or officers and employees of the investment company from voting on the matter, that restriction was modified by the SEC in
1941, when it promulgated Rule 32a-1.. 7 which permits most investment companies to select the accounting firm by vote of a majority of the entire board.
The board's selection pursuant to Rule 32a-1 remains subject, however, to annual
shareholder approval.
vi. Disclosure - Summary
The Commission's position regarding the need for timely, comprehensive, and
consistent financial statements, which accurately reflect the financial position of
the industry's member companies, was unequivocally expressed by Commissioner
Healy at the Senate hearings on the proposed legislation: "[I]f this Commission
359

Investment Company Act of 1940 § 35 (a)(b), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-34(a)(b)

360 Id. § 35(d), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-34(d) (1964).
361 Id. § 31, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-30 (1964).
362

Id. § 30, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-29 (1964).

363

Id.§ 30(d)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-29(d)(1) (1964).

366
367

Investment Company Act of 1940 § 32, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-31 (1964).
17 C.F.R. § 270.32a-i (1968).

364
365

Id. § 30(e), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-29(e) (1964).
17 C.F.R. § 270.30d-1 (1969).

(1964).
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is not going to be allowed to have some real power with regard to accounting, it
is better to tear the bill up. Accounting is at the heart of the whole thing." 6 !
The sections of the Act which deal with the preparation, certification, and filing
of the various specified financial statements dearly provided the Commission with
the "real power" it sought." 9 Teamed with the other disclosure provisions, the
Act's accounting requirements go far toward remedying the inequities foisted
upon unwary pre-Act investors which were attributable to the clandestine manner
in which some early investment companies were operated.
b. Control
If the predatory promoter was not commonplace in the pre-Act industry,
he at least left his mark on it. The use of, inter alia, voting trusts and long term
management contracts, coupled with the unlimited discretion generally bestowed
on the management bloc, enabled those controlling other people's money to wheel
and deal with impunity. The Act uses a three-pronged attack in its attempt to
curb the abuses which resulted from the wielding of such unbridled power:
it discourages the formation of fly-by-night companies; it attempts to introduce
some modicum of "arm's length bargaining" to the negotiation of management
contracts between the company and its investment advisor; and it prohibits management from engaging in certain self-dealing transactions.
i. Company Formation
In order to discourage insecurely financed organizations from preying on the
public, the Act's draftsmen included a minimum capital requirement provision
in section 14(a).1 70 Clearly mindful that the disastrous collapse of the Founders
flowed from an initial capital investment of $500, that subsection demands that
a registered company have a minimum net worth of $100,000 before publicly
offering its shares.
The intent of the minimum net worth requirement of section 14(a) is
complemented by section 9,371 which makes it illegal for certain persons to serve
as officers, directors, members of an advisory board, investment advisors, or
depositors for any registered investment company, or as underwriter for registered
mutual funds, unit investment trusts, or face-amount certificate companies. The
thrust of the provision was well captured by one of the Act's draftsmen, Mr.
David Schenker:
368 1940 Senate Hearings 934.
369 Investment Company Act of 1940 §§ 30-32, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-29 to -31 (1964).
370 Id. § 14(a), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-14(a) (1964). Mr. Baldwin B. Bane, chief of the SEC's
registration division, had this to say about fly-by-night companies when testifying before the
Senate subcommittee:
These investment trusts are as easy to form as they are to disappear. In fact,
it is probable that they are too easy to form. Practically all you have to do is draw
up a so-called trust indenture or agreement, setting up a so-called trustee who, in
reality, is little more than a custodian, granting powers to the managers and sponsors, limited only by the consciences of those managers and sponsors. Then you
start manufacturing your securities and peddling them to the public. 1940 Senate
Hearings 135.
371 Investment Company Act of 1940 § 9, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-9 (1964).
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Section 9 says what? A person who is an officer, director, manager,
or distributor should not be in the position of having uncontrolled discretion
with the management of other people's savings, if (1) he is a jailbird who
has been convicted in connection with a securities fraud, or (2) if3 7 he
has
been subject to an injunction in connection with a securities fraud. 2
ii. Arm's Length Bargaining Over Management Contracts
In its report on investment companies, the SEC noted that management
contracts were used "in a great many instances" by investment companies in
their attempt to secure managerial talent."' Such a practice comports with
that presently engaged in by a majority of the mutual funds." 4 The retention of
managerial talent was not the sole motivating factor that induced the majority
of the pre-Act industry to turn to external sources for managerial expertise,
however. The use of management contracts also furnished an investment company's sponsor with an uncomplicated and extremely effective tool with which
he could dominate every segment of the investment company's sphere of operation.
Such an arrangement was quite simple to implement. Since the sponsor
invariably controlled the company's original managing board, it was a fairly
easy matter for him to arrange a management contract between the investment
company and a firm controlled by the sponsor to serve as an investment advisor.
A long term management contract was obviously to the advisor's advantage, and
the SEC noted that ten years was "the usual provision." '75 Retention of the
control thus obtained by the sponsor-advisor was effected by the use of automatic
renewal clauses 76 or provisions which empowered the manager "to nominate
several or all of the directors and officers of the investment company, or [which
required] approval by the manager of the directors elected by the stockholders." '77 In practice, the results obtained by the use of automatic extension
clauses, or vote by the board of dummy directors or impotent shareholders on
the advisability of a continuation of the existing management arrangement, were
identical.
Because of concern that the terms of such management contracts might
perchance be more beneficial to the sponsor-advisor than a prudent judgment
made by a disinterested board of directors would permit, the Act contains restrictions designed to subject the approval of management contracts to the process
of arm's length bargaining, and to hamper the ability of those controlling an investment company to stock its board with their hand-picked stooges.
Section 10... of the Act represents an attempt by the draftsmen to insure
that some degree of independence is maintained by the company's board of directors. To that end, the section requires that an investment company have no
less than a specified quota of "independent" directors on its board. For present
372
373
374
375

1940 Senate Hearings 201.
INVESTMENT TRuSTS III 1918.
PUBLIC POLICY STATEMENT 45.
INVESTMENT TRUSTS III 1921.

376 The use of these clauses was quite common. The SEC found them in twenty-seven
of forty-three management contracts that were to run for a specified duration. Id.
377 Id. at 1919.
378 Investment Company Act of 1940 § 10. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-10 (1964).
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purposes the term independent director means a person who is not a registered
company's investment advisor, afliated with an investment advisor, or an officer or employee of the company." 9 The quota of independent directors demanded by the section varies from one person - in the case of a no-load mutual
fund - to forty per cent of the board for all other companies. The quota system
was devised, in draftsman Schenker's words, to "provide the independent directorships where you have a management contract."380
To further strengthen the section's intent - that the company's board
would be free from interest ridden domination - provision is made that if an
investment banker, the investment company's broker or underwriter, or any
person affiliated with such financiers is a board member (or an officer or employee of the company), a majority of the board must be composed of persons
who do not share the same vocation.38 '
The purpose of section 10 was advanced somewhat by the provisions of
section 1 5 .s That section requires that all management contracts entered into
after March 15, 1945 be initially approved by those holding a majority of the
company's outstanding voting securities. Additionally it requires that the contract
either terminate at the end of two years or be annually approved, either by
stockholder or board vote. In the case of board approval, the board's majority
vote must include that of a majority of those directors who
are neither the
83
company's investment advisor nor affiliated with the advisor.
If sections 10 and 15 were designed to prevent the board's vote on the
renewal of the advisory contract from being little more than a "rubber stamp's"
reflection of management's wishes, they were inartfully drafted because, in most
cases, affiliates of the investment advisor are entitled to at least sixty per cent
of the investment company's directorships. In effect then, the Act enables the
affiliates to "hand-pick" those who are required to occupy the independent
directorships. Although section 16(a) requires that their selections must receive
shareholder approval, 4 the fact that the "interested directors" are in control
of the proxy machinery makes shareholder ratification a virtually automatic
procedure. As one attorney has noted: "The men who need to be watched
pick the watchdogs to watch them." 8 5 In short, there is nothing in the Act
which prevents the son of a leading stockholder of an investment company's
379 Id. § 10(a), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-10(a) (1964).
380 1940 Senate Hearings 1113.
381 Investment Company Act of 1940 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-10(b) (1964). Subsection
(c), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-10(c) (1964), limits "officers or directors of any one bank" to a
minority of investment company directorships, with the exception that
if on March 15, 1940, any registered investment company shall have had a majority
of its directors consisting of persons who are directors, officers, or employees of any
one bank, such registered company may continue to have the same percentage of its
board of directors consisting of [such] persons ....
Id.
Subsection (g), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-10(g) (1964), makes the section's directorship requirements
applicable to an investment company's advisory board.

382

Investment Company Act of 1940 § 15, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15 (1964).

383 Id. § 15(c), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15(c) (1964).
384 Id. § 16(a), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-16(a) (1964). That section, in relevant part, provides
that "[n]o person shall serve as a director of a registered investment company unless elected
to that office by the holders of the outstanding voting securities of such company . . . ." Id.
385 Statement of Abraham Pomerantz, University of Pennsylvania Law School Conference
on Mutual Funds, 115 U. PA. L. Rnv. 659, 739 (1967).
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investment advisor from sitting on the company's board as an independent
director. Such instances are not unknown. 6 The ramifications of the sections
10 and 15 independence requirements, and the extent to which the arm's length
dealing envisioned by the Act's draftsmen has been stunted to palm's length
size, are examined in detail in Part VI infra.
iii. Self-dealing Transactions
The Act's most overt attack on the misuse of investment company assets
by those in control of the company is represented by section 17.7" While
sections 10 and 15 were designed to close the corridor of control that led to
incestuous advisor-company relationships, section 17 represents a far more direct
approach. In Mr. Schenker's words:
These provisions prohibit self-dealing between the officers and directors
and the investment trust. They cannot knowingly purchase from such
registered company or from any company controlled by such registered
company, any security or other property, except securities of which the
seller is the issuer .... 388
The section also outlaws the borrowing of "money or other property" from
the investment company by insiders;... empowers the SEC to demand that the
company's officers and employees be "bonded by a reputable fidelity insurance
company against larceny and embezzlement,""39 which power was exercised in
1947 when the SEC promulgated Rule 17g-l ;291 and strikes down the use of
broad exculpatory clauses by company management which are designed to "protect such person against any liability to such company or its security holders to
which he would otherwise be subject by reason of willful misfeasance, bad faith
or gross negligence . . .. ," "' That the Congress found it necessary to include
the self-dealing prohibitions of section 17 in the Act which was designed to
serve as the industry's regulatory framework is, in itself, a stinging indictment
of the ethical level at which a portion of the infant industry's business had
been transacted.
c. Structure
Clearly mindful of the financial folly wrought by the disintegration of the
Founders Group's pyramided capital structure, and also of the fact that a
dollar invested in the average leveraged closed-end in July of 1929 would have
netted the investor a nickel if he liquidated at the end of 1937, Congress sharply
circumscribed the use of leverage and the practice of pyramiding in the investment company industry.
386 Id. See also Kilaw, Abe Pomerantz is Watching You, FORTUNE, Feb. 1968, at 144, 159.
387 Investment Company Act of 1940 § 17, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-17 '(1964).
388 1940 Senate Hearings 1116.
389 Investment Company Act of 1940 § 17(a)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-17(a) (3) (1964).
390 Id. § 17 (g), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-17(g) (1964).
391 17 C.F.R. § 270.17g-1 (1968). The Rule was initially adopted as Rule N-17G-1.
SEC, GENERAL RULES AND REGULATIONS UNDER THE INVESTMENT COMPANY ACT OF 1940

37 '(1968).
392

Investment Company Act of 1940 § 17(i), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-17(i) (1964).
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i. Leverage
The permissible capital structure of a regulated investment company is
detailed in section 18 of the Act. 9 That section does permit closed-end cornpanies to borrow from a bank, or to issue bonds, debentures, and preferred stock
in the interest of achieving leverage for their common stockholders. The amount
of the senior capital thus obtained is limited, however, by the section's restrictions on asset coverage. If the closed-end achieves leverage through the issuance
of bonds or debentures, or by "bank borrowing," the company must have a
ratio of assets to debt of at least three to one; and, if preferred stock is issued,
the ratio must be at least two to one.
Although leveraged mutual funds were, and still are, relatively rare, the
Act's draftsmen were obviously aware of the plight in which a highly leveraged
fund might be placed by a massive onslaught of redemptions, and severely restricted the use of leverage by open-end companies. Section 18 prohibits mutual
funds from issuing bonds or debentures, and the use of bank loans is restricted
by a three to one asset coverage requirement. The fund is permitted to issue one
class of preferred or "special" stock, provided that
the only other outstanding class of the issuer's stock consists of a common
stock upon which no dividend (other than a liquidating dividend) is permitted to be paid and W9hich in the aggregate represents not more than
one-half of 1 per centum of the issuer's outstanding voting securities. 394
It is apparent from the regulatory treatment given leveraged companies that
Congress was not at all enamoured with the investment opportunities bestowed
on the public by the highly leveraged pre-crash closed-ends. In fact, section 18
is a watered down version of the proposal contained in S. 3580 which would
have outlawed the use of leverage altogether. 95
ii. Pyramiding
The practice of purchasing substantial interests in other investment companies, which some companies, most notably the Founders Group, engaged in,
was banned by section 12(d) (1).9 That section restricts the holdings of the
"acquiring" company to no more than five per cent of the "acquired" company's
stock. Congress was so disenchanted with the practice that the Acts preamble
states inpart "that the national public interest and the interest of investors are
adversely affected . . . when the control of investment companies is unduly
concentrated through pyramiding ....
393 Id. § 18, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-18 (1964).

394 Id. § 18(f)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-18(f)(2) (1964).
395 S. 3580, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. § 18 (1940) provided in relevant part that
(a) It shall be unlawful for any registered management investment company to issue
any security (other than short-term paper or periodic payment plan certificates), or
to sell any such security of which it is the issuer, unless such security(1) is a common stock ... ;
(2) has no preference as to distribution or dividends ...
(3) is a voting security .... Id.
396 Investment Company Act of 1940 § 12(d) (1), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-12(d) (1) (1964).
397 Id. § I(b) (4), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-1(b) (4) '(1964). For the Commission's view on the
efficacy of the "preamble" provisions, see 1940 Senate Hearings 176.
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d. Securities Distribution
i. Dilution
More than fifty pages of the record of the Senate hearings on S.3580 are
devoted to the abusive practices engaged in by members of the mutual fund
industry which diluted the net asset value of the shareholders' equity interest.
SEC spokesman Baldwin B. Bane, chief of the Commission's Registration Division, asserted that practices which resulted in dilution had a "very, very material
effect" on the equity interest of a mutual fund shareholder. 9 8 Industry spokesman Mahlon E. Traylor, president of the firm that served as MIT's underwriter,
rebutted Mr. Bane's observation and argued that there were two causes for dilution: the mechanical operation of the pricing system, and the techniques which
"a small fringe element may have practiced unethically to further their own
selfish ends. "The former," according to Mr. Traylor, "[was] of negligible proportions. The latter [represented] unethical practice, pure and simple [which
could be] eliminated entirely by the imposition of a few simple rules which most
of the industry already observes in practice." 9
Mr. Traylor apparently won out, because section 22 (a)4 .. gave the National

Association of Securities Dealers [NASD], a voluntary securities association
registered under the section 15A amendment to the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934,"9' the power to establish rules "for the purpose of eliminating or reducing
so far as reasonably practicable any dilution of the value"40 2 of the equity interest
of mutual fund or unit investment trust shareholders. The SEC was given concurrent jurisdiction over industry practices which led to dilution, commencing
one year after the Act's effective date.
If Mr. Traylor's viewpoint won the battle - congressional approval - Mr.
Bane's won the war, because on October 16, 1968, the SEC promulgated Rule
22c-1, effective January 13, 1969, which requires all registered mutual funds
and unit investment trusts to
sell, redeem, or repurchase [their shares] at a price based on the current
net asset value of [the shares] which is next computed after receipt of a
tender of [the shares] or of an order to purchase or sell [them].403 (Emphasis
added.)
The Rule further demands that the companies affected by it calculate the net
asset value of their shares at least "once daily as of the time of the close of
trading on [the NYSE]."4 4 The effect of the Rule is to make what had commonly been referred to as a "two-price system" a system having one price only.
Since the Rule has the obvious effect of carrying out the manifested congressional intent of "eliminating or reducing so far as practicable"4 the key malprac398
399
400
401
402
403

1940 Senate Hearings 151.
Id. at 515.
Investment Company Act of 1940 § 22(a), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-22(a) (1964).
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 15A, 15 U.S.C. § 780-3 (1964).
Investment Company Act of 1940 § 22(a), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-22(a) '(1964).
17 C.F.R. § 270.22c-1(a) (1969), reprinted in SEC, GENERAL RULES AND REoULA-

TIONS UNDER THE INVESTMENT COMPANY ACT OF 1940, at 43 (1968).

404
405

17 C.F.R. § 270.22c-1(b) (1969), reprinted in SEC supra note 403, at 43.
Investment Company Act of 1940 § 22(a), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-22(a) (1964).
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tice that resulted in dilution, selling shares at the lower of two known prices,
the only question raised by the SEC's promulgation is why the Commission waited
so long.
ii. Retail Price Maintenance
Section 22 (d), 00 contains the Act's infamous retail price maintenance provision. In essence, that subsection makes it a federal crime for a securities salesman to sell either mutual fund or unit investment trust shares to the public at
a price different from that specified in the company's prospectus. The effect of
the subsection is to eliminate any semblance of competition between mutual
fund and unit investment trust salesmen regarding the prices charged the public
for the shares issued by such companies. Whether section 22(d) serves any
purpose-other than providing a large segment of the investment company
industry with a "built in" antitrust exemption - is a hotly debated topic. The
opposing viewpoints are discussed in Part IV infra.
e. PeriodicPayment Plans
The sales practices of the periodic payment plan companies met with much
congressional disfavor."' As a result, section 274"8 limits the maximum front-end
load chargeable. by a plan company to fifty per cent of the planholder's first
annual payment. That section also abolishes the "$5.00 plan," requiring that
the company receive an initial payment of $20.00, and no less than $10.00 in
regular installments thereafter. " The sales literature used by the contractual
plan companies was, as pointed out earlier, required by section 24(b) to pass
muster with the SEC.
The effect of the Act on the contractual plan industry was, no doubt, to
modify its "gospel," which, according to testimony
at the Senate hearings, con410
sisted of just three words: "[S]ell, sell, sell."

f. Enforcement
Sections 36, 38 through 46, and 49411 provide the SEC with the adminis406 Id. § 22(d), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-22(d) (1964).
407 See, e.g., S. REP. No. 1775, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 9 (1940). The Senate Committee
was plainly displeased:
These periodic payment plan certificates, which were sold for as low as $5 a
month, were specifically designed to make their strongest appeal to wage-earning
men and women who were not in a financial position to invest or speculate in
common stocks. As a result, these certificates were sold to housewives, domestic
workers, laborers, nurses, stenographers, clerks, and others who had little financial
experience. Inasmuch as the refinement and technique of the operation of periodic
payment plans are intricate, they were far beyond the comprehension of the class of
persons to whom these certificates were sold.
In addition to the fact that persons unqualified to understand the intricacies of
the plan were employed as salesmen, the committee was impressed by the evidence
that salesmen often flagrantly misrepresented these plans.... Id. (Emphasis added.)

408 Investment Company Act of 1940 § 27, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-27 (1964).
409 Id. § 27(a)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-27(a)(4) (1964).
410 1940 Senate Hearings 172. For the story of one contractual plan salesman who sold a
plan to a minister by holding himself out as a "prospective convert into the minister's faith,"
see id. at 170.
411 Investment Company Act of 1940 §§ 36, 38-46, 49, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-35, 37-45, 48

NOTRE DAME LAWYER

[June, 1969]

trative and enforcement machinery to enable it to employ the powers and assume
the duties vested in it by the Act. Judicial review of the Commission's actions
is also provided for in section 43.
g. Maximum Assets-

A Compromise

Before concluding this brief discussion of several of the Act's most important provisions and the effect they were designed to have on the industry, mention should be made of one proposal made by the SEC that was not enacted,
and the compromise that was enacted in its stead.
Prompted mainly by concern over the possibility of a "run" on an openend investment company, the SEC proposed that investment companies be prohibited from issuing securities once their total assets reached a certain maximum
size." 2 The stated maxima, listed in section 14 (a) of S. 3580,"' s varied among
different classes of investment companies, but the effect of the provision would
have been to require virtually all modern management investment companies
to cease selling securities when the value of each company's total assets exceeded
$150 million.
(1964). Section 37 makes larceny, embezzlement, or conversion of a registered investment
company's property a federal crime. Id. § 37, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-36 (1964). The section will
support a civil action as well. See Brown v. Bullock, 194 F. Supp. 207 (S.D.N.Y. 1961),
aff'd, 294 F.2d 415 (2d Cir. 1961).
412 Draftsman Schenker's testimony before the Senate subcommittee indicates that the
limit on size was intended to protect the funds from a spontaneous onslaught of redemptions:
Senator, we have no interest in size per se. But in the open-end company, the
stockholder has the right at any time to tender his stock and get his asset value:
If you were to have a run on that type of company-and it is no different from a
run on a bank, Senator-you can see that if you had $150,000,000 invested in large
blocks of stocks, if the time comes when for some reason or other the stockholders
in the company are dissatisfied with the management and they decide to tender their
stocks for redemption, you will get a program of liquidation which may result in two
things: In the first place, an undesirable effect upon the stock market in general. In
the second place the stockholder who tenders his stock for redemption a little later
may find himself with an illiquid stock and who may not be able to get his asset
value. . . . 1940 Senate Hearings 247.
The following colloquy between former SEC Commissioner Healy and Senator Hughes
indicates that at least two of the participants in the 1940 Senate hearings did indeed have an
interest in size per se:
[Mr. HEALY] There is a phobia in connection with the American worship of
size. You get to thinking sometimes that anything that is big must be wonderful.
That is not so, in my opinion. Primo Camera was big but he could not punch his
way out of a paper bag. United Founders was big; it was $500,000,000 big, but it
was far from wonderful. Even in manufacturing concerns any good economist will
tell you that there is a point at which size does not increase efficiency. There is a
point where you begin to go down the other side of the hill.

413

Senator HUGHES. Judge, I have a more radical view than that. I think there
ought to be a limit to the size of cities, especially when a city gets to a size where
so many people have accumulated there that it makes it impossible to police them.
I think, if it were possible, it would be a mighty good thing if we could limit the
size of cities to, say, 500,000 people.
Mr. HEALY. Managing a big city is no more difficult than managing $150,000,000 of common stocks. I think in some of these situations, certainly in the
business world, it is not a question how big you are; it is a question of how good
you are. If you can keep on being good and doing a good job, then I for one would
be willing to have you grow as big as you want to, as long as you keep on doing a
good job. My doubt is whether anybody who is not a double or triple Napoleon can
run $150,000,000 of common-stock investments and do a good job for the people
who have entrusted $150,000,000 to him. 1940 Senate Hearings 937.
S. 3580, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. § 14(a) '(1940).
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Mr. Merrill Griswold, chairman of MIT, then the largest mutual fund in
America, challenged the need for such a restriction. In his view it was clearly
unnecessary:
[A]n open-end trust could never be a billion dollar company or a five
hundred million dollar company, because redemptions, which are a fixed
percentage, around 8 or 10 percent, get to be so large, when your fund gets
to those big proportions, that you could not resell that amount of shares;
and we therefore claim that economic conditions absolutely take care of
trust
this situation, and that there never will be an open-end investment
with assets like life insurance companies and large banks.114 (Emphasis
added.)
For the record, on December 31, 1967:
1. ten domestic mutual funds had net assets in excess of one billion
dollars;415
2. the net assets of twenty-three registered funds exceeded five hundred
million dollars;41
total net assets in excess of one
3. sixty-one domestic mutual funds had
41 7
hundred and fifty million dollars;
4. the mutual fund that ranked last on a list of one hundred registered
mutual funds, listed according to the size of their net assets, had a
greater total net asset value than the total gross asset value of 280
insurance companies; 4" and
5. each of the ten largest domestic mutual funds held net assets in
of the total capital of the largest bank in the
excess of the 4amount
19
United States.
If Mr. Griswold was blessed with the gift of prophecy, it is not readily apparent.
Whether it was the force of Mr. Griswold's argument that persuaded Congress to discard the maximum size limitation is not known, but, after consultations between the SEC and the industry, Congress approved a compromise solution. That compromise is now section 14(b). 2 of the Act. Section 14(b)
authorizes the Commission
at such times as it deems that any substantial further increase in size of
investment companies creates any problem involving the protection of
investors or the public interest, to make a study and investigation of the
effects of size on the investment policy of investment companies and on
security markets, on concentration of control of wealth and industry, and
414 1940 Senate Hearings 500. Other investment company industry objections to a statutory
size maximum were: "competition will take care of [it]," id.at 484; "if you are fearing that
power that goes with accumulations of capital, you may be taking a step that will increase that
power, and not decrease it .... ." id.at 622; "We should stop look and listen before adopting
anything so un-American as a measure to penalize success . . . ." d. at 435; "the record
shows that large size brings substantial benefits to shareholders in the form of lower operating
costs . * *

."

id.at 457; "it is easy to agree that the maximum size proposed by the bill seems

ample, but who knows?" id.at 688.
415 MooDY'S BANK AND FINANCE MANUAL April, 1968, at a53 (F. St. Clair ed. 1968).
416 Id.
417 Id.
418 Compare id.with id.at a47-48.
419 Compare id.at a53 with id.at a37.
420 Investment Company Act of 1940 § 14(b), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-14(b) (1964).
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on companies in which investment companies are interested, and from
time to time to report the results42of its studies and investigations and its
recommendations to the Congress. '
The ramifications of that subsection are, as will be seen, currently of extreme

significance.
h. Conclusion
It is safe to say that the Act, which in Senator Wagner's words was "a very
mild form of supervision to protect the American public, '42 2 has served to benefit
both the investment company industry and the public. This fact was recognized
by the former Chairman of the SEC, Manuel F. Cohen, when he testified on
the Commission's behalf before the Senate Banking and Currency Committee:
"The purpose of [the 1940 Act's] regulatory pattern was primarily to
deal with
423
specific and then recognized abuses. This it has done successfully."
In addition to the direct benefits reaped by both the investing public and
the industry by virtue of the Act's achieving its designed mission - the elimination of the flagrant malpractices formerly present in the industry - the financial community also received an indirect benefit, the formation of the Investment
Company Institute (formerly the National Association of Investment Companies). The Institute, which now represents the interests of a group of mutual
funds that hold approximately ninety-five per cent of all fund assets, was a
direct outgrowth of the investigations conducted by the SEC and the congressional scrutiny of industry practices. It was formed by the "informal group of
individuals who cooperated with the SEC in drafting the Investment Company
Act of 1940,'"' and now serves to represent its member companies' viewpoint
on state and federal legislation, functions as a clearing house for the industry's
statistical data, and, most importantly, strives to promote high ethical standards
within the investment company industry.
In short, the fourth stage of investment company growth was a period of
rapid transition within the investment company industry. During the years
between October 24, 1929, and August 22, 1940, the industry evolved from an
unregulated hodge-podge of companies - operated by managements which ran
the ethical gamut from ne'er-do-well to honest, intelligent businessman - into a
resolute and unified economic power.
F. Post-1940 Industry Growth
In the SEC's extensive study prepared pursuant to section 30 of the Holding Company Act, it was noted that at its pre-crash peak, the total assets managed
by the investment company industry probably exceeded $8 billion.425 As the
following table42" shows, many years elapsed before that figure was surpassed:
421 Id.
422 1940 Senate Hearings 204.
423 1967 Senate Hearings 3.
424 H. BULLOCK 103. Mr. Bullock was one of the Institute's founders. Id.
425 INVESTMENT TRUSTS III 4.
426

34 SEC ANN. REP. 115 (1968).
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Number of investment companies registered under the Investment Company Act
and their estimated aggregate assets, in round amounts, at the end of each fiscal
year, 1941 through 1968
Fiscal
June yea ended
eedNumber
Registered
at beginning
of year

1941
1942
1943
1944
1945
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968

................
...............
................
---------------................
..............
...............
--------------...............
...............
---------------...............
-----------------------------...............
...............
...............
................
...............
----------------------------..............
...............
...............
--------------------------------------------

Estimated
aggregate
mar
iet value

of companies
Registered
during year

Registration
terminated
during year

Registered
at end of
year

of assets at
end of year
(in millions)a

450
17
14
8
14
13
12
18
12
26
12
13
17
20
37
46
49
42
70
67
118
97
48
52
50
78
108
167

14
46
31
27
19
18
21
11
13
18
10
14
15
5
34
34
16
21
11
9
25
33
48
48
54
30
41
42

436
407
390
371
366
361
352
359
358
366
368
367
369
384
387
399
432
453
512
570
663
727
727
731
727
775
842
967

$2,500
2,400
2,300
2,200
3,250
3,750
3,600
3,825
3,700
4,700
5,600
6,800
7,000
8,700
12,000
14,000
15,000
17,000

20,000
23,500
29,000
27,300
36,000
41,600
44,600
49,800
58,197
69,732

a The increase in aggregate assets reflects the sale of new securities as well as capital appreciation.

It is also clearly apparent from a perusal of the above figures that the postAct growth of the industry, particularly during the last fifteen years, has indeed
been "dramatic." A large portion of the rapid growth rate enjoyed by the industry is attributable to the emergence of the mutual fund as a highly popular
investment vehicle. Since 1940, the total assets held by the funds have advanced
from $450 million to over $53 billion, and the percentage of the industry's assets
held by the funds has increased from twenty to seventy-five per cent. By way
of understatement, it may be noted that the passage of the 1940 Act does not
appear to have deterred the industry's development.
As was pointed out in the Introduction to this Survey, the dramatic growth
rate enjoyed by the industry, particularly its mutual fund segment, has attracted
the attention of both the SEC and the Congress. Their concern is centered on
the effects which the industry's rapid growth has had on the avowed objective
of the 1940 Act: the protection of the American investor. The SEC's position,
stated in 1967 by then Commissioner Cohen, is that "[the 1940 Act's] safeguards
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no longer meet the needs of the investing public."'4 27 In arriving at that conclusion, embodied in the Commission's Public Policy Statement, the SEC utilized
the reports prepared by two research teams which examined the operational
structure of the mutual fund industry: the Securities Research Unit of the
Wharton School of Finance [Wharton Group], and the SEC's own research
unit which prepared the multi-volume Special Study of the Securities Markets
[Special Study]."8
The Wharton Group's investigation had its genesis in 1958, when the SEC's
concern over the burgeoning size of the mutual fund industry caused it to use
its section 14(b) power, and engage the Wharton Group to
make a study and investigation of the effects of size on the investment
policies of investment companies and on security markets, on concentration
of control of wealth and industry, and on companies in which investment
companies are interested ....
9
Accordingly, the Group conducted a study of the mutual fund industry, the most
comprehensive examination of any aspect of the investment company industry
since the SEC's monumental investigation which led to the passage of the 1940
Act. Through the use of two sets of detailed questionnaires, the Group compiled
data on the functional characteristics and market impact of 189 mutual funds
which operated during the study's target periods: from 1952 to October, 1958,
and during 1960.
The information gathered by the Wharton Group dealt with four major
areas: (1) the utility of the existing management fee rate structure in the mutual
fund industry; (2) the effect which mutual fund portfolio trading has on the
securities markets; (3) the investment performance records achieved by the
funds; and (4) the effects which an increase in the size of a fund has on its
ability to function efficiently. The Group's conclusions relative to these four
topics of inquiry were presented to the SEC in August of 1962, and transmitted
by the Commission to Congress shortly thereafter.
The major conclusions of the Wharton Group summarized in outline form
were:
(1) Management Fee Rates
(A) Approximately eighty per cent of all investment advisors were
compensated by a fixed fee rate which did not vary with the
asset size of the fund managed, although the operating expenses
of the advisor "were generally lower per dollar of income
received, and also lower per dollar of assets managed .
."
,,
(B) The advisory fee rates charged the mutual funds by investment
advisors tended to be "substantially higher than those charged
by the same advisers to the aggregate of their clients other
427

1967 Senate Hearings 3.

428

REPORT OF THE SPECIAL STUDY OF SECURITIES
CHANGE COMMISSION, H.R. Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong.,

MARKETS

OF

THE

SECURITIES

Ex-

1st Sess., pts. 1-6 (1963).
429 Investment Company Act of 1940 § 14(b), 15 U.S.C., § 80a-14(b) (1964).
430 A STUDY OF MUTUAL FUNDS, H.R. REP. No. 955, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 29 (1962). See

id. at 480-81.
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than investment companies, for comparable asset levels,"4 "
despite the fact that "the expenses involved in advising mutual
funds are less than those incurred in advising other clients."4 2
(C) The mutual funds that used internal management to provide
services comparable to those furnished other companies 43
by
3
investment advisors tended to have lower management costs.
(2)

The Effect of Mutual Fund Trading on the Securities Markets
(A) "[I]t seems likely that the growth in the funds' net purchases
of common stock [had] stimulated stock prices markedly during
the last decade or so, during which the industry has expanded
434
enormously."
(B) "There [was] some but not strong evidence that net purchases
by mutual funds significantly affect the month-to-month movements in the stock market as a whole."43

(3)

Mutual Fund Investment Performance
(A) For the five and three-fourths years covered by the Wharton
Group study, the performance of Standard and Poor's Composite Common Stock Index was "definitely superior to the
performance of the funds."4'36
(B) "The average yield for all funds was lower than that of the
Standard and Poor's Index for every year prior to 1958." ' '

(4) Size
(A) There was a positive relationship between the level of the
sales load charged by the companies surveyed and the "inflow
438
of new money" into the funds.
(B) The ratio of operating expenses incurred by a mutual fund
(exclusive of the management fee) to the asset size of the
fund tends to decrease if the size of the fund's assets increases.4
(C) "Mhe main problems affecting mutual funds do not seem to
relate to the size of individual funds or companies but rather
to the industry as a whole."44
Because the Wharton Group's study did not embrace the areas related to
the manners in which mutual fund shares are distributed to the public, the Commission's Specidl Study task force, which had been organized pursuant to section
431
432

Id. at 29; see also id. at 500-04, 508.
Id. at 29.

433 Id.

434 Id. at 21.

435 Id. See also id. at 371-73.
436 Id. at 17.
437

Id. at 21. See also id. at 351-53.

438 Id. at 6, 109-10.
439
440

Id. at 498-503.
Id. at 3.
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19(d) of the Securities Exchange Act,44' was directed by the Commission to
examine the methods used to sell mutual fund shares.
Among the areas examined by the Special Study's research team were:
mutual fund selling practices,442 the utility of the contractual plan as a mutual
fund sales technique,443 the use of brokerage commissions to reward dealers engaged in the sale of mutual funds, 4" and the extent of insider transactions in
fund portfolio securities.445 The conclusions drawn by the task force as a result
of that investigation were reported to Congress on August 8, 1963, in Chapter
XI of the Special Study. Very briefly stated, the recommendations made in that
report to Congress were: (1) A joint attempt to eliminate "undesirable selling
practices" 4 6 which, the research unit indicated, may have been present in the
mutual fund industry "to an unfortunate degree,"4 ' should be undertaken by
the SEC, the NASD, and the industry through the strengthening of existing
ethical guidelines;44 s (2) congressional consideration should be given to the
abolition of the contractual plan industry's distinctive feature, the front-end
load;449 (3) action should be taken by the SEC, the NASD, and the industry
to promulgate guidelines to insure that the benefits gained through mutual fund
portfolio transactions redound to the benefit of the fund's shareholders whenever
possible,"" and consideration should be given to modifying the NYSE's minimum
commission rate structure to enable fund portfolio transactions to be executed
at the lowest possible cost; 45' and (4) each registered investment company should
formulate and implement guidelines designed to eliminate insider trading "which
are satisfactory to the Commission."4"2
Because the recommendations and conclusions of both the Wharton Group
and the Commission's research unit which prepared the Special Study served
merely an advisory function - they were reports to, not reports by the Commission - they could only suggest courses of action which might be taken to cope
with the problems created by the dramatic growth of the mutual fund industry.
Late in 1966, however, the Commission did take a stance on the effects which
the growth of the mutual fund industry has had on the need for additional
safeguards designed to protect the investing public from management and sales
practices which tend toward a form of exploitation unenvisioned by those who
drafted the Investment Company Act of 1940.
The Commission's position, expounded in the Public Policy Statement, was
that the Investment Company Act of 1940 has substantially eliminated the
serious abuses at which it was aimed, but that the tremendous growth of
the industry and the accompanying changes have created a need for additional protections for mutual fund shareholders in 4 areas
which were either
3
unanticipated or of secondary importance in 1940. ,
The Commission's recommendations were embodied in legislation designed,
in SEC Chairman Cohen's words, "to give a fair shake to the more than 4
441
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million Americans who now [mid-1967] own mutual fund shares and to the
uncounted millions ... who will invest in such shares in the future." 454 Mr.
Cohen explained the thrust of the legislation, the "result of 8 years of hard and
diligent study by the Securities and Exchange Commission": 455
The bill will [provide that "fair shake"] by reducing the sales loads
imposed on the acquisition of fund shares where those loads are excessive
and by providing a way in which unreasonably high management
fees can
456
be reduced. That is the sum and substance of the bill.
Although the bill to which Mr. Cohen was referring, S. 1659, was not
enacted during the Ninetieth Congress, similar legislation incorporating sales
load and management fee provisions, as noted in the Introduction, are now
pending before Congress. The substance of those bills and the effect which
the enactment of either of them will have on the mutual fund industry will be
discussed in the remaining segment of this Survey. Parts IV and V consider
the effect which the enactment of the various measures utilized by the bills to
reduce sales loads will have on the distributing system currently used to market
mutual fund shares. Part VI examines in detail the existing standards governing
management compensation - its potential and its deficiencies - and explores
the SEC proposals which would improve that body of law.
IV. Regulation of Mutual Fund Distribution System
A. Introduction
Since their inception mutual funds have provided what is undoubtedly a
meritorious service to the investing public.457 According to leaders of the industry,
the primary attributes of that service consist of making available to the public the
advantages of equities investing, along with expert management and a lessening
of investment risk at costs far below those otherwise available to the aspiring
investor. 45 Many Americans, because of their desire to accumulate a separate
source of wealth, are potential investors in mutual funds, since fund investing
requires neither a significant capital outlay nor a knowledge of the securities
444 Id. at 213-33.
445 Id. at 235-54.
446 Id. at 212.
447 Id.
448 Id.
449 Id.
450 Id. at 235.
451 Id. at 234.
452 Id. at 255.
453 PUBLIC POLICY STATEMENT, Letter of Transmittal vii.
454 1967 Senate Hearings 3.
455 Statement of Senator John Sparkman, Chairman of the Senate Banking and Currency
Committee. 1967 Senate Hearings 1.
456 Id. at 3.
457 Former Chairman of the SEC, Manuel F. Cohen, testifying before the House Subcommittee on Commerce and Finance, stated: "[None of our proposals are directed at mutual
funds as such, their viability, continued viability, growth, and usefulness." 1967 House Hearings 706.

458 Testimony of Francis S. Williams, 1967 Senate Hearings 188.

NOTRE DAME LAWYER[

[June, 1969]

market. The mutual funds, knowing that many citizens of modest means are
more than receptive to the thought of accumulating capital, but faced with the
task of ferreting out these potential investors, have developed a distribution system
by which the funds approach the investors, rather than the investors, the funds.
In fact, because of the factors outlined above, it is the custom of the industry
to fairly shout that mutual funds are sold, not bought.459 Most funds seek out
the investor and "sell" him on the merits of fund investing through the activities
of a salesman employed by the mutual fund distribution system. Selling mutual
fund shares constitutes the primary objective of fund distribution systems, though
other related activities, such as servicing established accounts, are also performed
by members of the ditsribution process. 6
As indicated in Part II, the investment advisor, who forms the fund,46
usually initiates the distribution chain as well.462 The underwriter, usually either
the fund's investment advisor or a subsidiary of the advisor, 6 ' superficially performs the traditional functions of an underwriter, i.e., purchase of the shares of
the issuer for resale to another buyer.464 But in ordinary underwritings there
exists the possibility that the underwriter will be unable to resell the shares at
a profitable margin and thus will have to "unload" them at a loss, or retain
them on his "shelf" until a more advantageous market for them develops.465
The mutual fund underwriter, however, is not allowed to underwrite any shares
that are not already the subject of a purchase order from the customer to the
broker-dealer. 66 This fact, coupled with the corollary statutory mandate that
muitual funds must stand ready to redeem their shares at net asset value,46
produces an essentially risk-free transaction for the advisor or subsidiary-underwriter. The relevance of this feature will be borne out below. 6 '
The second link in the usual form of the distribution process is the brokerdealer.46 9 Connected to the management company-subsidiary underwriter only

E.g., testimony of Robert M. Gardiner, 1967 Senate Hearings 554.
NASD. ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES FOR THE SECURITIES BUSINESS 35 (1967).
461 See text accompanying note 80 supra.
462 PUBLIC POLICY STATEMENT 201.
463 SPECIAL STUDY IV 105. See also PUBLIC POLICY STATEMENT 55. Under the provisions
of section 22(d) of the Investment Company Act of 1940, a mutual fund must sell its shares
to or through a principal underwriter if it wishes to sell them at a price other than the current
net asset value, i.e., by levying a sales load. Investment Company Act of 1940 § 22(d), 15
U.S.C. § 80a-22(d) (1964). Section 22(d) also provides that the fund may sell its shares
directly to the public at the current public price described in the prospectus, but section 12(b)
requires any fund acting as its own distributor to adhere to regulations prescribed by the SEC.
Investment Company Act of 1940 §§ 12(b), 22(d), 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-12(b), 22(d) (1964).
464 I. FRIEND & OTHERS, INVESTMENT BANKING AND THE NEw ISSUES MARKET 2 (1967).
465 PUBLIC POLICY STATEMENT 212-13.
466 NASD Rules of Fair Practice, art. III, § 26(f) (2) provides:
No member shall purchase the securities of any open-end investment company
of which it is the underwriter . . . except for the purpose of covering purchase orders
already received and no member shall purchase such securities from the underwriter
other than for investment except for the purpose of covering purchase orders already
received. NASD, REPRINT OF THE MANUAL ff 2176, at 2106 (CCH 1968) [hereinafter cited as NASD REPRINT].
467 Section 22(e) of the 1940 Act provides that the right of redemption may be postponed
no longer than seven days except in isolated instances. Investment Company Act of 1940, §
22(e), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-22(e) (1964).
468 See text accompanying notes 643-58 infra.
469 Section 2(a)'(6) of the Investment Company Act defines "broker" as "any person
459

460
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by a sales agreement,"' the dealer is able to obtain fund shares at net asset
value. The agreement must set forth the "concession" to be received by the
dealer,"' and many agreements further provide that an additional percentage
may be retained for sales over a stated volume. 2
In the broker-dealer's employ will be the final link in the chain, the salesmen (who prefer to be called "registered representatives" 47 ) who make direct
contact with the potential investors. Ordinarily the salesmen must resort to a good
deal of ingenuity in seeking out these investors, since in many instances they will
not have been the target of previous securities merchandising campaigns. 4
Another form the distribution process may take is the totally integrated
distribution organization. Under this form, one company "combines the functions of sole underwriter for, investment adviser to, and retailer of" one open-end
investment company.7 5 Sales personnel retained by the company constitute
what is termed in the trade a "captive sales force." As of 1966, funds distributed
by captive sales forces held more than forty per cent of all fund assets.4 7 This
treatment of the mutual fund distribution systems will focus on non-integrated
systems. However, integrated systems will be given consideration in those areas
where a difference in the systems merits noting.
The independent broker-dealer is of extreme importance to the entire
mutual fund distribution operation and, ordinarily, will have contracts with
several different underwriters so that he can offer to the public shares of a
variety of mutual funds.4 77 The broker-dealer may be a firm that engages in
general securities transactions, as for example, Bache & Co., or one that specializes
in the sale of mutual fund shares. As a practical matter, it appears that members
engaged in the business of effecting transactions in securities for the accounts of others . ...
15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(6) (1964).
Section 2(a) (11) defines "dealer" as "any person regularly engaged in the business of
buying and selling securities for his own account .... ." 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2 (a) (11) (1964).
While the principal difference between the two functions consists of the distributor's
acting as either principal or agent, this distinction recedes into the background in the normal
distribution of fund shares.
470 Under this contractual scheme, the dealer purchases as principal from the underwriter
for resale to the customer. The underwriter is thereby insulated from liability for the selling
practices of the broker-dealer. SPECIAL STUDY IV 107. Apparently, therefore, the qualifications
of the individual broker-dealers are of little consequence to the underwriter. Id. at 105.
471 Rules of Fair Practice, art. III § 26(c), reprinted in NASD REPRINT 112176, at 2104.
472 1967 House Hearings 519. The sales agreement also binds the dealer to other obligations;
NASD Rules of Fair Practice, article III, section 26(c) forbids any member underwriter to
sell its shares to non-members except at the current public offering price, which includes the
sales load. It may sell shares below the current public offering price, i.e., at net asset value,
only to NASD members with whom it has a sales agreement. In addition, section 26 contains
other provisions relating to purchase orders (subsection (f)), conditional orders (subsection
(g)), return of concession on immediate resale to the issuer (subsection (i)), and purchases
as principal (subsection (j)). NASD REPRINT If 2176, at 2104.
473 Upon registration as a representative, a salesman must qualify to sell securities by passing either an NASD examination or one prescribed by the SEC for non-NASD members, and,
in a few instances, a state examination. Upon successful completion of the tests, the salesman's
registration becomes effective. Compare NASD By-Laws, art. I, § 2(d), Schedule C, reprinted
in NASD REPRINT % 1102, at 1052-53 with Rule 15b8-1(ii), 17 C.F.R. § 240.15b8-1 (1968).
474 See generally SPECIAL STUDY IV 125-29 for a description of the solicitation process.
Many times the salesman who runs out of "prospects" will simply have to resort to the bane
of all salesmen, the "cold turkey" or "cold canvass" calls, where, the theory is that if he knocks
on enough doors, he will find a promising investor. Id. at 127.

475
476
477

SPECIAL STUDY IV 102.
PUBLIC POLICY STATEMENT
SPECIAL STUDY IV 106.
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of the latter group dominate the field, for data compiled in 1962 by the Special
Study indicates that "retailing of mutual funds is to a considerable extent a
specialized business."47 The Special Study found that sampled firms doing more
than half their business in fund shares averaged nearly eighty-seven per cent of
their total income in sales of mutual fund shares, while other firms derived only
ten per cent of their gross income from sales of fund shares. 47 9
The distribution process, it is contended by many, is cumbersome and uneconomic."' It is unquestionably expensive, in relation to other types of securities
merchandising.4"' It depends for its financial existence almost exclusively on the
load assessed the investor when he invests in the fund. As previously noted," 2
this load, averaging eight and one-half per cent, represents a percentage of the
current public offering price. Of the eight and one-half per cent deducted from
the investor's payment, the underwriter receives approximately two per cent.48
The remaining six and one-half per cent is allocated to the broker-dealer, who
splits it with the salesman responsible for the sale, retaining about three and onefourth per cent and giving the salesman three and one-fourth per cent, though
this proporton is subject to readjustment in favor of the salesman, depending
upon his length of service and productivity.484 The "sales load" constitutes the
sole source of income from mutual fund transactions for all salesmen not 48in5
a supervisory capacity, since the broker-dealer provides no salary or draw.
The load constitutes the primary source of return from mutual fund transactions
for broker-dealers as well.
However, a possible additional source of return for the broker-dealer, one
that will be discussed in detail in Part VI, is the return from brokerage commissions directed to the broker-dealer on transactions in which he took no part.
Known as a "customer-directed give-up," this type of transaction was formerly
used to supplement the income of broker-dealers. It existed because the NYSE
allowed its members to split commissions with other NYSE members.. and
because transactions for fund portfolios were so lucrative that firms were willing
to give up a substantial portion of the commission gained on the transaction.
As will appear below, the abuses connected with the give-up required
the NYSE to amend its constitution so as to proscribe their use.487 Consequently,
give-ups are no longer allowed on transactions on the NYSE. However, the
478
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480

Id.
SPECIAL STUDY

I 33 (Table 1-11).

The accuracy of contentions that sales loads are high constitutes one of the major dis-

putes over the proposed amendatory legislation.

Voluminous material has appeared advocat-

ing reductions in sales loads, and an equally voluminous amount has appeared rejecting that
position. This debate is examined in detail at notes 662-700 infra and accompanying text.
481
482

See notes 107-09 supra and accompanying text.
See notes 100-02 supra and accompanying text.

483

The figures contained in this example are suggested for illustrative purposes only. Wide

variations exist in the allocation of splits of the mutual fund sales load; the underwriter may

receive from one to two and one-half per cent, while the dealer may receive six to seven
and one-half per cent and the salesman one and one-half to four and one-half per cent.
SPECIAL STUDY IV 108-09.

484 See, e.g., the commission schedule of Investors Planning Corporation, id. at 122.
485 Id. at 121.
486 NYSE CONSTITUTION art. XV.
487 See letter from R. W. Haack, President, NYSE, to Securities and Exchange Commission, August 8, 1968, [Current Volume] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
77,585, at 83,227, and g
77,631, at 83,363.
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NYSE ban on give-ups does not extend to "non-customer directed inter-dealer
[broker] reciprocal business on regional exchanges ...."4's Under this arrangement, NYSE dealers could give "their regional exchange business to regionalonly members in reciprocity for NYSE business which the regional members have
'
obtained casually in the course of their other business."489
Thus, it would be
possible to circumvent the ban on "give-ups" by a broker-dealer's purchase of a
seat on a regional exchange and having business channelled to it by an NYSE
member. However, the NYSE has made clear that it will change its view on
this inter-broker reciprocity if experience indicates that it is being used not in the
49 0
course of legitimate business but to avoid the give-up prohibitions.
For the purposes of Part IV, the distribution process and allied selling
practices will constitute the basis for an examination of abuses by salesmen and
points of contention between the industry and the SEC over the entire process
by which mutual fund shares reach the investor.
B. Supervision of Mutual Fund Selling Practices
1. Introduction
Though the lessons of history are learned hard, they are remembered well.
The flagrant abuses throughout the securities industry which led to the Crash and
the Depression of the early 1930's brought the spotlight of congressional attention
squarely to bear on the industry. 9' Congress responded during the following
decade with six pieces of legislation designed to control securities investment
practices.49 2 One of these, the Investment Company Act of 1940, was aimed
at the investment company industry, including mutual funds. 493 In it the Congress, conscious of the highly volatile nature of that part of the securities business
and having the misery of the Depression fresh in mind, adopted a scheme of
regulation that went beyond the disclosure rationale it had applied in previous
494
acts.

Congress adopted various supervisory approaches to satisfy its estimation
that the mutual fund industry required a good deal more policing than did other
securities industries. Supervisory responsibility was placed on the industry itself.
In addition, provision was made for SEC regulation. At the state level, super488 Letter of R. W. Haack to SEC Chairman Manuel F. Cohen, November 18, 1968,
[Current Volume] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. f 77,631, at 83,364.

489
490

Id.
Id.

491 That history is darkest when the chapter on periodic buying of mutual fund shares is
opened. Nearly one-quarter of the SEC's supplemental report on investment trusts, entitled
Companies Sponsoring Installment Investment Plans, is devoted to a detailed examination of
selling practices in that segment of the mutual fund industry prior to the 1940 Act's passage.
INSTALLMENT INVESTMENT PLANS STUDY 143-89.
492 Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a to 77aa (1964); Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78 to 78jj (1964); Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, 15

U.S.C. §§ 79 to 79z-6 (1964); Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77aaa to 77aaaa
(1964); Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a to 80a-52 (1964); Investment
Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to 80b-21 (1964).
493 For a discussion of the general background of the 1940 Act, see text accompanying
notes 347-421 supra.
494 See text accompanying notes 339-42 supra.
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vision was introduced in various Blue Sky laws, whose effect on the mutual fund
distribution system is not to be underestimated.
2. NASD Supervision
The first approach utilized by Congress, which is best referred to as "internal," consisted of authorizing any securities association registered under section
15A of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934... to prescribe for its members
regulations geared to eliminate certain proscribed abuses. 9 Section 15A, known
more popularly as the Maloney Act Amendment to the Exchange Act, 97 resulted from the combined efforts of representatives of the securities industry, the
SEC, and members of the forerunner securities association, the Investment
Bankers Conference, to forge an effective program for self-regulation.498 Pursuant
to the Act's terms, a newly organized association, the National Association of
Securities Dealers [NASD], registered with the SEC, and was approved by it
in August, 1939."' 9 No other organization has since filed a registration with the
Commission.
While at first glance it appears incongruous that Congress would have
provided the industry with a convenient device to cloak itself from all outside
sources of light and revelation, the provisions of the Maloney Act must be read
in light of the SEC's general supervisory control over the entire industry. The
Maloney Act provides that the SEC may abrogate any NASD rule if it appears
to the Commission that such abrogation is "necessary or appropriate to assure
fair dealing by the members of such association, to assure a fair representation of
its members in the administration of its affairs or otherwise to protect investors or
effectuate the purposes of this chapter." 9 ' In addition, it is readily apparent
that unilateral SEC responsibility for inspection and control would have been
a burden beyond the reach and budget of that agency.501
Nevertheless, the grant of self-regulation to the securities industry has not
proven to be a vacuous congressional concession to mask a real grant of authority
to some governmental regulatory agency. Developments subsequent to passage
of the Maloney Act bear out this appraisal, particularly in regard to the mutual
fund industry. For example, under one provision of the Investment Company
Act of 1940, all sales literature used in connection with sales activities must be
filed with the SEC for its inspection.0 2 Increased volume in sales activities after
1940 led to a proliferation of sales literature, a sufficient proportion of which the
495

15 U.S.C. § 78o-3 (1964).

496 See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-22(a), (b) (1964).
497 83 CONG. REc. 9616 (1938).
498 For a history of this halcyon period of mutual cooperation, see NASD REPRINT % 101,
at 109-10.
499 Id. at 110.
500 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(k)(1) (1964). The Commission may also request the NASD to
alter or supplement any of its rules relating to membership policies, adoption of new rules,
election of NASD officers, and affiliation of other securities associations. 15 U.S.C. § 78o3(k)(2) (1964).
501 The SEC's budget for fiscal year 1970 is $20,116,000. In 1940, it was $5,300,000.
Compare THE BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT: FISCAL YEAR 1970, at 959
(1969) with THE BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERN3tENT FOR 1940, at 80 (1939).
502 15 U.S.C. § 80a-24(b) '(1964).
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Commission considered misleading enough to require it to issue a special set
of guidelines, which are contained in the SEC's Statement of Poliy.0 3 Significantly, the SEC has, since 1950, delegated enforcement of the Statement Of
'Policy to the NASD insofar as it pertains to NASD members. 50 4
The Maloney Act, in providing for registration of a securities association,
required that such association compile rules for its members, any violation of
which was to be sanctioned by discipline, expulsion, suspension, fine, censure,
or some other appropriate penalty. 55 In complying with that mandate, the
0
NASD has compiled its own Rules of Flair Practice."'
These Rules are in some
respects similar to the Statement of Policy, but they also prescribe general forms
of accepted securities practices 0 ' and delineate the mannner in which certain
transactions must be performed. 0 8
"Membership in the NASD is not a legal requirement for firms engaged
in the securities business."5
However, it is a financial necessity for non-integrated distribution organizations. Subsection (i) of the Maloney Act provides:
The rules of a registered securities association, may provide that no
member thereof shall deal with any nonmember broker or dealer . . .
except at the same prices, for the same commissions or fees, and on the same
terms and conditions as are by such members accorded to the general
public. 510

While the NASD rules promulgated under subsection (i) make the provision
generally significant to all members of the NASD,5"" it is particularly relevant to
those broker-dealers whose businesses consist primarily in distribution of mutual

fund shares. 12 If the broker-dealer were forced to obtain the shares from the
underwriter at the normal public offering price - net asset value plus a sales
load - not only would he be unable to market them at anything but a loss but
he would also have paid a sales commission to some other selling organization.
By and large, therefore, most broker-dealers for whom distribution of mutual
fund shares constitutes a substantial source of revenue are members of the
503 15 Fed. Reg. 5468 (1950). In general, the Statement forbids representations as to the
safety of investing in securities, stability of return, or incomplete comparisons with other investment media. Id. A copy of the Statement may also be found in NASD REPRINT
5101-223, at 5021-67.
504 See SPECIAL STUDY IV 159. The NASD has subsequently published a compilation of
standards for preparing sales literature that meets the requirements of the Statement of Policy.
NASD, WHAT You MusT KNOW... (1964).
505 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(b)(9) (1964).
506 NASD REPRINT 2001-401, at 2011-116.
507 NASD Rules of Fair Practice, art. III, §§ 1-4, reprinted in NASD REPRINT 2151-54,
at 2014-54.
508 Id. §§ 13-27, reprinted in NASD REPRINT 2163-77, at 2077-108.
509 SEC, REPORT OF SPECIAL STUDY OF SECURITIES MARKETS H.R. Doc. No. 95, 88th
Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 72 (1963) [hereinafter cited as SPECIAL STUDY 1].
510 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(i) (1964).
511 NASD Rules of Fair Practice, art. III, § 25(a) provides that "[nlo member shall deal
with any non-member broker or dealer except at the same prices, for the same commissions
or fees, and on the same terms and conditions as are by such member accorded to the public."
NASD REPRINT 1[ 2175, at 2098.
512 Article III, section 26(c) of the NASD Rules of Fair Practice allows an NASD underwriter to sell shares below the current public offering price only to NASD members with
whom it has a sales agreement. See note 470 supra and accompanying text.
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NASD.51 As a result, the NASD has under its aegis a sizeable proportion of the
514
securities dealers of the country.
In theory, the enactments which the NASD is entrusted with enforcing make
it a powerful body capable of exerting great influence to insure healthy securities
practices. But while the NASD has not proven itself to be an entirely inept and
inert organization,"'5 neither has it proven itself entirely disinterested in the welfare of its members.515
While in principle the powers of the NASD are sweeping, in practice its
outlook has been narrowed primarily to a program aimed at preventing the
dissemination of sales material that does not conform to the Commission's
Statement of Policy.1 Its Investment Companies Committee reviews sales material filed with it. Since most material is filed prior to public use, a good deal
of all objectionable material is eliminated by the NASD before it is used in actual
sales activities. 18 To reach improper practices that do not involve sales material,
the NASD has also developed an inspection program through which it periodically
inspects its member broker-dealers. 1 5 Rule of Fair Practice 21 requires NASD
members to adhere to therein prescribed rules of accounting practice
and procedure. 2 It is compliance with these practices that the inspection program is intended to insure.
3. SEC Supervision
Aside from the potential conflicts of interest inherent in any scheme of
self-regulation, the very complex nature of the securities industry necessitates other
than mere internal supervisory forms. Congress recognized this need and provided in the 1940 Act that the SEC should exercise the dominant supervisory role
in regulating the mutual fund industry.
Although members of the mutual fund industry prefer to brand fund shares
as a "packaged financial program" rather than as securities, 5"' sales of fund shares
513 1967 House Hearings 316.
514 "This condition is in a very real sense the NASD's lifeline, because" the Maloney Act
specifies that:
An applicant association shall not be registered as a national securities association unless it appears to the Commission that(1) by reason of the number of its members, the scope of their transactions,
and the geographical distribution of its members such association will be able to
comply with the provisions of this chapter . . . and to carry out the purposes of this
section. 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(b)(1) (1964),
515 See generally SPECIAL STUDY I 116-20, 164-67 & Tables II- 2, 3.
516 Cf. 1967 Senate Hearings 551-56.
517 See SPECIAL STUDY IV 166-67.
518 Id.
519 Id.
520 NASD Rules of Fair Practice, art. III, § 21(a), (b), reprinted in NASD REPRINT
2171, at 2095.
521 The Special Study noted the following conversation between Walter Benedick, an industry official, and its own Chief Counsel:
Q. A person who has taken your course and passed the [NASD] exam is now
free to go to customers and sell the securities?
A. Not securities; mutual funds.
Q. A share of a mutual fund is a share of a corporation, is it not?
A. We don't look upon mutual funds as a security. We regard it as a packaged
financial program, not a security.
Q. You do sell shares of a corporation, do you not?
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are subject to the applicable federal securities statutes. Of primary relevance are
the provisions of the Federal antifraud statutes,rs21 the disclosure provisions

2 1
of the Securities Act of 1933,[' 3 and Investment Company Act of 1940,t5241
2
filing with
requiring
and the provisions of the Investment Company Act[5SJ
52

the Commission of advertising material and sales literature ....

6

Under all these acts, the SEC is empowered to bring its authority to bear on
broker-dealer malpractices.

While the Securities Act of 1933 provides for the registration of securities,
section 24(a) of the Investment Company Act of 1940 provides for registration
of mutual fund shares in accordance with section 8 of the 1940 Act, in lieu of

registration under the Securities Act. s27 Section 24 requires the registrant to list

such additional information as the Commission might, by appropriate rules and

Act requires registration of the fund
regulations, require.5 28 In addition, the 1940
5 29

itself if it is engaged in interstate activities.

In numerous other provisions of the 1940 Act, the SEC is given the power
to make rules and regulations to carry out the scheme of the Act.530 It is also
given authority to exempt an applicant from provisions of the Act.5 '
A. A mutual fund consists or has in its fund or portfolio the shares of a corporation.
Q. You are selling the shares of an investment company?
A. Yes.
Q. And this is generally regarded as a security?
A. From that point of view you are right, Mr. Paul. Selling shares of an investment company, and therefore a security, in a certain sense. SPECIAL STUDY IV 153.
The hesitant concession finally wrung from Mr. Benedick rings with the same tones often
sounded by Cornelius Roach, Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Association of Mutual Fund Plan Sponsors, Inc.: "The mutual fund share is a security, but it is different." The
Front-End Load; Suitability Requirements and Present Status, in CONFERENCE ON MUTUAL
FUNDS 135 (S. Hodes ed. 1966).
522 Securities Act of 1933 § 17(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77q (1964); Securities Exchange Act of
1934 §§ 10(b), 15(c), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j(b) 78o(c) (1964). See text accompanying notes
551-71 infra.
523 Securities Act of 1933 §§ 7, 10, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77g, 77j (1964).
524 Investment Company Act of 1940 §§ 24, 30, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-24, 30 (1964).
525 Id. § 24(b), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-24(b) (1964).

526

SPECIAL STUDY IV

156.

527 Investment Company Act of 1940 § 24(a), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-24(a) (1964).
528 Id. § 24(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-24(a)(2) (1964).
529 Section 7 of the Investment Company Act of 1940 prohibits any investment company
engaged in interstate commerce from carrying on operations unless registered in accordance
with section 8 of the Act. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-7 (1964).
530 Most general of these provisions is section 38(a) of the 1940 Act which provides:
The Commission shall have authority from time to time to make, issue, amend,
and rescind such rules and regulations and such orders as are necessary or appropriate
to the exercise of the powers conferred upon the Commission elsewhere in this subchapter, including rules and regulations defining accounting, technical, and trade
terms used in this subchapter, and prescribing the form or forms in which information required in registration statements, applications, and reports to the Commission
shall be set forth. For the purposes of its rules or regulations the Commission may
classify persons, securities, and other matters within its jurisdiction and prescribe
different requirements for different classes of persons, securities, or matters. 15 U.S.C.
§ 80a-37(a) (1964).
531 Section 6(c) of the Act authorizes the SEC to make exemptions from any provision of
the Act:
The Commission, by rules and regulations upon its own motion, or by order upon
application, may conditionally or unconditionally exempt any person, security, or
transaction, or any class or classes of persons, securities, or transactions, from any
provision or provisions of this subchapter or of any rule or regulation thereunder, if
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Further, the SEC has authority over all broker-dealers dealing in interstate
commerce and through the mails by virtue of their registration under the Exchange Act,532 and exerts added control, indirectly over NASD members by
virtue of the Maloney Act provisions discussed earlier, and directly over nonNASD members through a 1964 amendment to the Securities Exchange Act
which will be discussed below. 3 These various legislative grants give the SEC
a great deal of authority to use in its external policing, of the industry.
4. Blue-Sky Laws
State regulation of securities distribution has in the past suffered from a
lack of uniformity, resources, and ability to reach interstate distribution set-ups
(so-called "boiler-room" operations). Thus, although forty-nine of the fifty
states have blue-sky laws" 3-the state equivalent of federal securities legislationthey have thus far proven "inadequate to cope with what is essentially a national
problem." ' 5 While most of them adhere to a regulatory philosophy,3 6 their
53
practical implementation has failed to secure the goals they set out 7 The most
valuable function they now perform consists of restricting the entry of brokerdealers into their jurisdictions by requiring them to register and to provide information indicating their integrity and financial capacity. 3 8 For example, the
state of New York, situs of a substantial portion of the country's securities transactions, requires only that the firm register and include in its registration the
firm's business history for the preceding five years, any criminal record of its
partners and the educational background of its partners and salesmen. 9
A movement is presently under way to render state laws more effective.
In 1956, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
approved the Uniform Securities Act, drafted by the noted securities authority,
Professor Louis Loss of Harvard Law School. 4 9 The Act, thus far approved by
eighteen states, Puerto Rico, and the District of Columbia,54 1 is comparable to

532
533
534
vided

535
536

and to the extent that such exemption is necessary or appropriate in the public interest and consistent with the protection of investors and the purposes fairly intended
by the policy and provisions of this subchapter. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-6(c) (1964).
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 15(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(a)(1) (1964).
15 U.S.C. § 78o(b) (8) (1964). See text accompanying notes 583-86 infra.
Delaware has no blue-sky law. The District of Columbia has only recently been prowith one, Act of August 30, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-503, 78 Stat. 620.
SPECIAL STUDY

I 81.

537

See L. Loss & E. COWETT, BLUE SKY LAW 36 (1958).
Cf. id. at 37.

538
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540
541

I

81.

N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 359(e) (McKinney 1968).
Uniform Securities Act, 9C ULA 84 (1957).
ALA. CODE tit. 53 §§ 28-50 (Supp. 1967); ALASKA STAT. §§ 45.55.010 to 45.55.170
(1962); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 67-1235 to 67-1262 (1966); D.C. CODE ENCYCL. ANN. §§ 2-2401
to 2-2418 (Supp. 1968); HAWAII REV. LAWS §§ 199-1 to 199-20 (1955); IND. ANN. STAT. §§
25-854 to 25-876 (Supp. 1968); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-1252 to 17-1275 (1964); Ky. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 292.310 to 292.550, 292.991 (1963); MD. ANN. CODE art. 32A, §§ 13-44
(1967), as amended, MD. ANN. CODE art. 32A, §§ 15, 16, 18, 26, 34 (Supp. 1968); MIcH.
CoMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 451.501 to 451.818 (1967) as amended, MicH. ComP. LAWS ANN. §
451.802 (Supp. 1969); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §§ 15-2001 to 15-2025 (1967); NEv. REV.
STAT. §§ 90.010 to 90.210 (1967); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§§ 49:3-48 to 49:3-76 (Supp. 1968);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, §§ 101-504 1965), as amended, OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, §§
202, 305, 326, 401 (Supp. 1968); P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 10, §§ 851 to 895 (Supp. 1967);
S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 62-1 to 62-319 (1962), as amended, S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2 (Supp. 1968);
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the federal securities legislation: 2 the application for the broker-dealer requires
that he disclose a variety of information, including his intended plan of operation,
the business history of all persons associated with him, and any record of securities
injunctions, administrative proceedings and the like bearing on his ability. 4
The State Administrator is authorized to deny the application where it appears
that the persons have engaged in "dishonest or unethical practices in the securities
business" '44 or where it appears that they are "not qualified on the basis of such
factors as training, experience, and knowledge of the securities business ....""'
To determine the applicant's abilities, provision for an examination is made;
not all the states have thus far established examination programs, but the trend
now is to require them.546
Despite this movement toward more effective control, the Special Study has
noted that until more states adopt the Uniform Securities Act, "the most that
can be expected from even the best of the State laws and administrations is to
point the directions in which a system of national controls can profitably move." ' 7
5. Conclusion
Neither the NASD nor the SEC has the fundamental responsibility
for securing abuse-free selling practices. The primary supervisor, in contemplation
of both the NASD and the SEC, is the employer broker-dealer itself. Under the
regulatory provisions of both organizations, it is the broker-dealer who must establish within its own framework primary safeguards to control unlawful selling practices. 4 s The interwoven effect of these various sources of broker-dealer regulation
is formidable indeed.549 But in light of the circumstances surrounding its birth,
it does not seem improper.
C. Remedies for Abusive Selling Practices
The federal and state legislation just discussed concerned the supervisory
scheme established for the investment company industry. By definition, the
elaborate supervision is intended to prevent the development of unsavory selling
practices. However, judging from the frequency of reported abuses,55 the antic§§ 61-1-1 to 61-1-30 (1968); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-501 to 13.1-527
(1964), as amended, VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-501, 13.1-514 (Supp. 1968); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. §§ 21.20.005 to 21.21.940 (1961), as amended, WASH. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 21.20.005
et seq. (Supp. 1968); Wyo. STAT. ANN. §§ 17.117.1 to 17.117.29 (1965).
542 See Commissioners' Notes to §§ 101-419, Uniform Securities Act, 9C ULA 86-149
(1957).
543 Uniform Securities Act § 202(a), 9C ULA 90-91 (1957).
544 Id. § -204(a) (G), 9C ULA 96 (1957).
545 Id. § 204(a) (I).

UTAH CODE ANN.

§

546

Id.

547

SPECIAL STUDY I 81.

204(b)(6).

See SPECIAL STUDY I 132-33.

548 NASD Rules of Fair Practice, art. III, § 27(b) states: "Final responsibiliy for proper
supervision shall rest with the member." NASD REPRINT I2077, at 2108. The SEC's rules
for regulation of non-NASD members state: "Every nonmember broker or dealer shall exercise
diligent supervision over all the securities activities of all of his associated persons." 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.15b10-4 (1968).
549 CONFERENCE ON SEuUrTIs REGULATION 50-51 '(R.Mundheim ed. 1965).

550

See Tables 11-2, 11-3,

SPECIAL STUDY

I 164-67.
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ipated deterrent effect of supervision has not been as cogent as hoped. Where
abuses have already occurred, the federal supervisory regulations give way to the
remedial prescriptions contained in the securities acts. Essentially these are the
antifraud provisions of the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934.551 The effect of these provisions as they relate to specific selling
abuses will now be examined.
1. Antifraud Provisions
a. Selling Below the Breakpoint
One of the selling practices which has come to be recognized as violative
of the securities statutes' antifraud provisions is the practice of persuading a
mutual fund purchaser to invest an amount of money that falls just below a
level at which he could receive a reduction in the sales load applicable to his
purchase. From the salesman's point of view, this practice - known as "selling
below the breakpoint" - combines both large dollar amount with the highest
applicable sales load. For the purchaser, though the reduction in sales load
from one level to the next does not represent an overwhelming display of generosity by the underwriter,"5 2 the large dollar amount involved makes the savings
in sales commissions substantial.
The leading case on the subject is Mason, Moran & Co.55 s Respondent, a
broker-dealer registered with the SEC since 1935, opened an account with a
religious order of nuns in 1938. That account, totaling $3 million and supplying
one-sixth of the firm's annual income, was serviced for eleven years, until 1949,
when the order indicated it wished to liquidate part of its portfolio to begin a
building program. One of the firm's officers then persuaded the order to invest
in mutual fund shares. In elevent subsequent transactions, the order invested
$254,813 in fund shares, the average transaction being approximately $24,200.
On transactions of $25,000 or more, the order would have benefited from a
reduction in the sales load. Had the order taken advantage of the breakpoint, it
would have saved $8,169.92 in commissions. On these facts, the SEC found
' 554
that a "confidential relationship existed between registrant and the customer."
Though the savings in commissions were ultimately returned to the order and
the delinquent officers released from the firm, the SEC revoked the firm's registration, holding that the violations did not involve
merely an error of judgment as to the appropriate markup to be charged
in connection with particular transactions. They represent, in most part
rather a deliberate scheme for defrauding a particularly unsophisticated
customer by patterning riskless transactions so as to deprive the customer

551 See note 522 supra and accompanying text.
552 The typical dealer breakpoint schedule is illustrated in a table at text accompanying
note 100 supra.
553 35 S.E.C. 84 (1953).
554 Id. at 89.
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of established
and clearly available price benefits, in order to swell registrant's
5
profits.

A more recent case that concerns, in part, selling below breakpoints is
Shearson, Hammill & Co.556 The salesman contended that he had informed the
purchaser of the higher cost involved in buying immediately below breakpoints
and that she had ordered him to proceed, in effect making a "gift to the salesman"
of the additional commissions.s" 7 The SEC rejected registrant's defense outright." 5
Even more recently, the SEC has held that registered representatives have,
in this situation, "a responsibility, particularly where [they make] a recommendation, to be sure the customer has had adequate opportunity to study and understand the alternatives.""55 The SEC held that failure to do so constituted a

deceptive practice within the ambit of section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and
Rule lOb-5 adopted pursuant thereto.5 60
b. Switching

Another device by which a salesman increases his commissions at the expense
of the customer is known as "switching." The practice, as already noted,5"' entails
advising a customer who has already invested in one fund (and consequently paid
the sales load applicable to it, unless it is a "no-load" fund) to "switch" his investment to another fund. Of course, this requires payment of another sales load, in
which the salesman shares. Oftentimes, there are legitimate justifications for a transfer from one fund to another; 6 ' in instances where investigations have been made,
the primary reason asserted for the transfer has been poor performance of the
initial fund.563 This reason has rarely served as a satisfactory explanation for
the transfer. 6 '
555 Id. at 94.
556 SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7743 (November 12, 1965), [1964-66 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. I[ 77,306, at 82,509 (1965).
557 Id. at 82,534.
558 Id.
559 Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8501
(January 22, 1969), [Current Volume] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. l 77,651, at 83,412, 83,413.
560 Id. at 83,412.
561 See note 315 supra and accompanying text.
562 The classic example of justified switching is transferring the investment of an eighty
year old widow from a growth fund to an income fund. See Hopper Antifraud and Disclosure
Requirements in Selling Investment Company Securities, in CONFERENCE ON MUTUAL FUNDS
15, 21 (S. Hodes ed. 1966).
563 In Shearson, Hammil & Co., poor performance was cited by the registrant as cause to
switch an investment from the poor performer to a fund with a superior past growth performance. The SEC held that this practice violated the antifraud provisions of the Securities and
Securities Exchange Acts. Shearson, Hammill & Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release
No. 7743 (November 12, 1965), [1964-66 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 1 77,306,
at 82,509, 82,534-35.
564 Id. It apparently had been the belief of the registrant in Shearson, Hammill that a
letter from the account holder to the registrant approving the switch would shield it from liability. The SEC did not pass specifically on the point, since the letter, if written, was not produced for the record. Id. at 82,534 n.82. However, the use of such letters as a mere pro
forma ratification of the switch has not found favor with the NASD:
The [district NASD] committee noted that a member's responsibility is far greater
than to accept such letters at fact [sic] value and that respondent did not fulfill its
responsibilities in approving such transactions ....
The letters from the customers indicated that they were satisfied with their
purchases, had initiated them, and that fines imposed [by the NASD district Coin-
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Accordingly, the SEC requires that all sales literature aimed at persuading
customers who have already invested in one fund to transfer their account to
another fund contain the following warning:
Switching from the securities of one investment company to another, or
from one class of security of an investment company to another, involves
a sales charge on each such transaction, for details of which see the prospectus. The prospective purchaser
should measure these costs against the
5 65
claimed advantage of the switch.
The value of this warning is limited by the fact that the salesman usually relies
on oral, rather than written, exhortations.5 6 To that extent, however, the antifraud provisions mentioned earlier supplant the SEC requirement. For example,
the SEC recently accepted an offer of settlement suggested by the firm of Paine,
Webber, Jackson & Curtis, who consented to findings that its salesmen had willfully violated section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule
lOb-5 by orally inducing customers to switch their investments from one fund
to another without explaining the sales load involved in the switch. In the
settlement, the responsible parties were temporarily suspended from selling mutual
fund shares." 7
c. Selling Ex-dividend
A third selling practice that abuses the relationship between salesman and
customer consists of the salesman's assertion that the prospective customer can reap
extra benefits by buying shares of a mutual fund immediately prior to its execution
of a dividend. The unsophisticated investor with whom the mutual fund salesman
commonly deals will ordinarily be unaware that the price he pays for the fund
shares will reflect the imminent distribution of the dividend.5 6 "Further, the practice may result in a disadvantage to the customer because the investor must treat
569
the dividend as ordinary income for tax purposes."
In Boren & Co.57 the SEC upheld an NASD finding that the dealer had
violated sections 1 and 18 of the NASD Rules of Fair Practice by urging an
565

mittee] were, therefore, unwarranted. We do not find that these letters exonerate the
respondent from responsibility. SPECIAL STUDY IV 165 (emphasis added).
Statement of Policy § (p), 15 Fed. Reg. 5468, 5469 (1950).

566

See

SPECIAL STUDY

IV 164.

567 Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8501
(January 22, 1969) [Current Volume] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 1 77,651, at 83,412.
568 In a section of its Manual devoted to explanations of the sale of investment company
securities, the NASD discussed the sale of fund shares ex-dividend:
No advantage accrues to the buyer of the shares of an investment company by
reason of his purchase of such shares in anticipation of a distribution soon to be paid.
The amount of such distribution is included in the price he pays for the shares and
the shares decline in price on the ex-distribution date by the amount of the distribution.
A member who induces the sale of investment company shares by implying to a
customer a rate of return that is based in whole or in part upon distributions of
realized security profits or who, without full explanation and disclosure, uses any
impending dividend or distribution as an inducement for the purchase of such shares
may be making representations to a customer contrary to the provisions of Article
III, Section 1, of the Rules of Fair Practice. NASD REPRINT 5264, at 5096.
569 Hopper, supra note 562, at 22.

570

40 S.E.C. 217 (1960).
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investor to withdraw funds from a bank account to purchase fund shares immediately prior to execution of a fund dividend. The dealer's salesmen had indicated to the investor that although the funds would be withdrawn prior to a
bank interest date, the investor would not be harmed because the fund dividends
would compensate for her loss of bank earnings.571 The SEC summarily dismissed this conduct as violative.
2. The Test of Suitability
The foregoing abuses represent those most commonly investigated under
the antifraud provisions of the securities statutes or the NASD Rules. Besides
the antifraud provisions, however, another criterion generally applicable to all
sales of securities is the requirement contained in NASD Rule of Fair Practice
section 2:
In recommending to a customer the purchase . ..of any security, a
member shall have reasonable grounds for believing that the recommendation is suitable for such customer upon the basis of facts, if any, disclosed
by such customer as to his other security holdings and as to his financial
situation and needs.572
This provision stands as a warning to all member firms that their sales must
pass the test of suitability, that is, the sale must be reasonably suited, other things
being equal, to the investor. Although the wording of the provision ("facts, if
any, disclosed by such customer") suggests that the member has no affirmative
duty to elicit the nature of the purchaser's financial condition, the SEC has
already held that:
The clear purpose of the Rule would be defeated if it were construed as
permitting a broker or dealer to engage in a practice of recommending low
price speculative securities to unknown customers ... without any knowledge or attempt to obtain information concerning the customer's other
security holdings, his financial situation, and his needs so as to be in a position to judge the suitability of the recommendation. 57 3 (Emphasis added.)
The industry has quarreled with this conclusion as "unrealistic" since it
"would raise serious theoretical and practical problems," '74 paramount among
which would be the possibility that the salesman would become, in effect, a
guarantor of suitability. This fear, based on the industry feeling that hindsight
would control any judicial determination of the salesman's solicitude for his
customer, appears to be groundless, since a standard of reasonableness would
obtain in such investigations and meeting that standard would require neither
more nor less than is required in any civil action.
The SEC has established a suitability rule for non-NASD members that is
571
572
2051.
573
574

Id. at 222.
NASD Rules of Fair Practice art. III, § 2, reprinted in NASD
Gerald M. Greenberg, 40 S.E.C. 133, 137-38 (1960).
ASSOCIATION OF MUTUAL FUND PLAN SPONSORS, INC.,

REPRINT

f

2152, at

PRESENTATION BY THE AsSOCIATION OF MUTUAL FUND PLAN SPONSORS, INC., TO THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMrSSION RELATING TO CHAPTER XI OF THE SPECIAL STUDY OF SECURITIES MARKETS,

Part IV, at 109 (1964) [hereinafter cited as PRESENTATION].

NOTRE DAME LAWYER

[June, 1969"]

substantially similar to the NASD rule but more explicit as to the responsibility
of salesmen:
Every nonmember broker or dealer and every associated person who
recommends to a customer the purchase, sale or exchange of any security
shall have reasonable grounds to believe that the recommendation is not
unsuitable for such customer on the basis of information furnished by such
customer after reasonable inquiry concerning the customer's investment
objectives, financial situation and needs, and 5 7any
other information known
5
by such broker or dealer or associated person.
The SEC has stated that its rule
is not an attempt to second-guess the exercise of the reasonable business
judgment of a broker-dealer or to make him an insurer of favorable investment performance. The recommendation must be judged in light of
the information available to the broker-dealer after reasonable inquiry as
to the customer's situation at the
time of the recommendation and not
5 76
by reference to subsequent events.
The SEC suitability rule was not adopted under the antifraud provisions
of the Securities Exchange Act; it exists as a separate criterion applicable to
securities investment recommendations. However, as one authority has noted,
"it takes no great prophet to foresee a closer connection between suitability and
the fraud rules."577 This confluence would appear to be part of a larger movement designed to fix more far-reaching responsibility on the broker-dealer in
dealings with his customers.578 Since the scope of that movement has yet to be
finally determined, it would be premature to speculate as to the boundaries it
will ultimately occupy. However, the investor safeguards that now exist or are
rapidly being defined are adequate to deal with most of the historically recognized
abuses.
D. Salesmen and Their Selling Methods
1. Qualifications
The preceding discussion on the supervisory and regulatory devices available
for control of the distribution process might lead an observer to conclude that
they exist because of the numerous opportunities for the breakdown of that system.
Such an observation would be well-founded indeed, as an examination of Part III
would indicate.579 While no segment of the securities industry has maintained
itself inviolate of sales abuses, the mutual fund industry has contributed more than
its share of instances of customer abuse. A part of the problem lies in the
composition of the mutual fund sales force itself.
575
576

17 C.F.R. § 240.15blO-3 (1968).
32 Fed. Reg. 11,638 (1967).

577 A. BROMBERO, SECURITIEs LAW: FRAuD-SEC RULE 10b-5 § 5.4, at 100 (1968).
578 See generally Cohen & Rabin, Broker-Dealer Selling Practice Standards: The Importance of Administrative Adjudication in their Development, 29 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 691

'(1964).
579

See text accompanying notes 296-328 supra.
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Federal regulation of the character and competence of fund salesmen is
accomplished in two ways: the first utilizes the internal control of the NASD,
and the second employs the rules and regulations of the SEC. The Maloney Act
specifies as a requirement for registration of a securities association that its
members, and all persons associated with its members, must qualify for membership by conforming to such standards of training, experience, and other qualifications as the association might set.5"' Accordingly, the NASD has established, in
article I, section 1 of its By-Laws, its membership policy: all broker-dealers
authorized by the laws of any state or by the laws of the United States to conduct
transactions in any branch of the investment banking or securities business are
eligible for membership, so long as they have not previously been expelled from
the NASD or are not the subject of an SEC order suspending or revoking their
registration under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934."'8
Persons associated with a member are designated as either Principals or
Representatives, with a written examination prescribed for those registering under
each category. Representatives must pass a two-hour, multiple-choice examination, while Principals are required to complete a three-hour, variable answer examination."'
The second means of control - the SEC's rules and regulations - applies
to securities dealers and their representatives who are not members of the NASD.
Prior to 1964, gaps in the regulation of the two groups existed, but this problem
has been corrected by the Securities Acts Amendments of 1964513 which amended
section 15 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 by authorizing the SEC to
establish standards of training, experience and other qualifications which it might
determine necessary. 84 "This provision for comparable regulation has," in the
words of one observer, "led to the formation of an organization within the SEC
referred to as SECO (SEC only)."58' The SECO regulations for non-member
companies are similar to the regulations of NASD securities dealers and their
representatives. They require all persons associated with non-member brokerdealers to pass a general securities examination designed to test knowledge of
corporate and government securities, investment companies, brokers and dealers
and their associated personnel, distribution of securities, and stock exchanges and
over-the-counter markets." 6
By and large, however, the SEC and NASD regulations have not provided
insurmountable barriers to entrance into mutual fund selling by those whose
qualifications are minimal. The Special Study considered in great detail the
general qualifications of fund salesmen.8 It found that of the salesmen joining
large mutual fund selling groups in 1961, ninety-five per cent were inexperienced
in the sale of securities (compared with forty-nine per cent in other securities
580

15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(a) (5) (1964).

581 NASD By-Laws art. 1, § 1, reprinted in NASD REPRINT ff 1101, at 1051.
582 Id. Schedule C, at 1053-54.
583 Securities Acts Amendments of 1964, 15 U.S.C. § 78o (1964).
584 Id. § 6, 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b) (8) (1964).
585 Wilson, The NASD's Role in Relation to the Hiring, Training and Supervision of
Mutual Fund Salesmen, in CONFERENCE ON MUTUAL FUNDS 67, 68 (S.Hodes ed. 1966).
586 17 C.F.R. § 240.15b8-1 (1968). Salesmen must also pass any examination required by
the state in which they plan to sell securities. See note 546 supra and accompanying text.
587 SPECIAL STUDY I 93-133.
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industries) .58' Sales organizations find nothing objectionable in this lack of experience. As a matter of fact, they insist strenuously that the only possible source
of experienced salesmen is the supply of representatives who shift periodically
from one fund organization to another - the so-called "floaters" - and that
they would be doing a disservice were they to rely on this type of salesman with
his questionable motives.' 9 Despite the inexperience of new recruits in securities
selling, for the most part they are experienced in other types of sales activities. 9 '
Mutual fund recruiters are urged to be on the lookout for able salesmen with
backgrounds in intangible sales or in sales of household durables. 91 Another
apparently fertile ground for recruiters anxious to find sales personnel has been
the armed services. According to the records of one large firm, one-third of its
salesmen in 1962 were either retired or active-duty military personnel. 92
As mentioned earlier, mutual fund salesmen are rarely provided with a
salary or draw. 9 3 (The primary exception is the IDS complex,59 4 the leader in
the field, which will be examined below. 95 ) The trainee-salesman, who is
provided with no compensation during the training period,59 ' must engage in
some other form of work to sustain himself. 9 On the whole, the resultant parttime training programs do not compare favorably with those employed for the
education of other types of securities representatives. 98
In concise terms, mutual fund training programs have two aims: assisting
the salesman in his own private preparation to take and pass the NASD examination and acquainting him with the sales methods used in the sale of fund shares. 99
While techniques of training vary widely in the industry, ordinarily they require
little classroom work. Typically, however, these programs do include evening
seminars at which the trainee presents his memorized "sales pitch" for observation by supervisory personnel and receives some instruction in the fundamentals
of securities law. The Special Study summarized its findings regarding training
programs by stating:
The overwhelming majority of mutual fund salesmen without prior experience in the securities business begin selling their merchandise to the
public after completing part-time training programs consisting of a few
hours a week for a period of 1 to 3 months.600
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Id. at 95.
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Part IV, at 52-53.

115.

591 Id. The connection with those fields and fund selling would apparently lie in the intangible quality of securities or the general relevance savings has to household activities.
592 Id.
593 See note 485 supra and accompanying text.
594 SPECIAL STUDY IV 116.
595 See note 860 infra.
596 The industry finds this an advantage - aside from the obvious economic consequences
to the broker-dealer - because it attracts only those salesmen who look upon fund selling as a
means of self-improvement. SPECIAL STUDY IV 116.
597 Id.
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See Table 11-12,

600

Id. at 121.
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2. Markets and Methods
Once the mutual fund contractual plan salesman is qualified to sell securities,
statistics show that the first sale he makes may well be to himself.6 ' He is urged
by supervisory personnel and by his training literature that since he knows the
advantages of fund investing, he should show others that he himself believes in
those advantages. "Proof of the pudding is in the eating," he is told."' Supposed
advantages of personal ownership of investment programs are the memorabilia
that might be used to show prospective purchasers that the product has the
endorsement of the salesman. Additionally, some selling firms affiliated with the
fund make personal investing more attractive by remitting substantially all of
the sales load on the salesman's purchase." 3
Since mutual fund salesmen are paid only by commissions payable on sales
of fund shares, and since they cannot profit from commissions obtained by
trading for customers' accounts, they must continually expand their clientele;. 4
the only limit to that expansion is the last name in the white pages, for salesmen
are urged to use every means possible to seek out potential investors. Data contained in the Special Study indicates that the most, lucrative sources of prospects
are the salesman's relatives and friends. 0 s Thirty-five per cent of all contractual
plan owners and twenty per cent of all regular account holders are introduced to
mutual fund investing by salesmen who are their relatives or close friends.0 6
It is out of fairness and friendship, the salesman is told, that he advises family
and friends of the advantages of mutual fund investing. After his most fruitful
sources have been panned, the salesman must turn to other streams of commerce. Often he is given directions by means of "referral" or "radiation" cards,
on which are written the names (usually only two or three)0 7 of friends of the
6
purchaser who might be interested in mutual fund investing.
Once the salesman is presented with the opportunity to introduce a prospect
to fund investing, he produces a skillfully-prepared "presentation" that combines,
for the most part, well recognized techniques in salesmanship with special emphasis on the advantages of equities ownership. Generally the presentation consists of three parts: an attention-getting opening, an emphatic demonstration under
the name of "financial planning" and a closing aimed at securing an investment
as favorable as possible to the salesman.0 8
Much of this presentation is based on training material made available by
publishing firms connected with dealer organizations that are interested in mutual
fund distribution.0 ' Presentations are thus fairly standardized, with most of the
601
602
603
of the

Id. at 126.
Id.
Id. The sales load cannot be omitted on the salesman's purchase because section 22(d)
1940 Act requires that all sales to the public be made at the current public offering
price. See note 463 infra. See generally Simpson & Hodes, The Continuing Controversy Surrounding the Uniform Price Maintenance Provisions of the Investment Company Act of 1940,
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salesmen concentrating on comparisons between mutual fund investing and other
potential uses of the investor's dollar. The emphasis is on "awakening" the
investor to such future needs as college for the children or retirement benefits, 1"
and persuading him that "frozen dollars" cannot provide the hedge against inflation that equities investing can. Comparisons with other investment media,
such as government bonds, savings and loan shares, or simple savings accounts are
frequently made.611 Of course, such references by salesmen are apt to run afoul
of the Statement of Policy's proscription of misleading statements.612 While the
salesman may refer to funds as hedges against inflation or compare mutual
funds with other economic institutions, those comparisons must be made on an
historical basis and may not be predictions as to future growth.1 ' The Statement
61 4
flatly prohibits guarantees of future benefits.
Salesmen are cautioned to act with the circumspect sobriety of professionals
by underselling their product. Thus, they are told to "[a]lways Sell Down" since
61 5
that erases doubts in the investor's mind about the wisdom of his investment.
Yet, selling down is to a large extent compensated by a request for multiple prepayments, at least where contractual plans are concerned. Special Study statistics
indicated that, on an average, the prospect invested an amount equivalent to
six times the required monthly investment. 6
The closing is without question the most significant portion of the presentation. It is at this point that the customer either writes a check or does not. And
as the Special Study succinctly states, "Here, where the salesman's potential
com61 7
mission may become a reality, is the acid test of his ethical standards."
By and large, the typical salesman's lot has not been an extremely profitable
one. The Special Study found that two-thirds of all mutual fund salesmen were
employed only part-time1 8 and that their average compensation was only $1,000
annually. 19 Full-time personnel operate under more favorable conditions, however; NASD data indicates that 55.7 per cent of full-time salesmen earn from
$5,000 to $20,000 per year.6"'
The difficulty in obtaining prospects, the small average annual earnings,
and the comparatively minor commitment made to enter the field provide little
incentive for the salesman to remain in the selling process. Consequently, the
industry suffers from a high turnover rate, with the larger organizations hiring
half their sales force every year."' This isan important consideration in evaluating service by reciprocal brokerage business and fund-directed giveups on other brokerage transactions. Id. Accordingly, the mutual fund investor bore, indirectly, the cost of training the
salesman who approached him about fund investing. The ramifications of customer-directed
"give-ups" are discussed at note 1012 infra and accompanying text.
610 SPECIAL STUDY IV 131.
611 Id. at 132.
612 See note 503 supra.
613 Statement of Policy § (a), 15 Fed. Reg. 5468 (1950).
614 Statement of Policy §§ (b), (2), (c), 15 Fed. Reg. 5468 (1950).
615 SPECIAL STUDY IV 138.
616 Id. at 138, 191.
617 Id. at 138.
618 See Table 11-13, SPECIAL STUDY I 173.
619 SPECIAL STUDY IV 121.
620 NASD, ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES FOR THE SECURITIES BUSINESS 20 (1967).
621 SPECIAL STUDY I 97.
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ing industry contentions that the sales load - the bread and butter of the selling
groups - is necessary to maintain stable selling forces.
E. The Sales Load
1. Introduction
While there are several pieces of proposed legislation designed to affect some
aspect or other of the mutual fund distribution process,6s 2 none of them purports
to correct the selling abuses detailed earlier.623 There is general agreement (genuine or not) among mutual fund leaders, the SEC, and the general public that
the present legislation is adequate to curb or remedy these abuses.2 4 However,
there is far from unanimous thought on the larger topic of the fair amount for
the mutual fund salesman's commission. Under present circumstances, salesmen
are compensated in a relatively simple manner. After an investor has been persuaded of the merits of fund investing, he agrees to purchase, through one investing device or another, shares of a mutual fund. Shares are sold on the basis
of an offering price (comparable to the "asked" price of over-the-counter securities), which is the net asset value of the fund, and which may vary as the market
value of the underlying securities varies. Most funds also impose a sales charge,
computed as a percentage of net asset value.s
The sales charge, which is the price the investor pays for having the advantages of fund investing brought to his attention and explained to him, produces the greater part of the revenue for the selling group, 26 since non-supervisory personnel
depend for their compensation entirely on their share of the
"load." 27
The importance of the sales load to the distribution process is clear. Under
the present method of compensating salesmen, the salesman starves unless he sells
fund shares. Wearing as he does the two hats of investor advisor and breadwinner, 628 the potential for conflicts of interest is manifest. Insofar as that poten622 The various pieces of legislation relating to the sales load issue are discussed at notes
706-39 infra and accompanying text.
623 See notes 296-328 supra and accompanying text.
624 See, e.g., 1967 House Hearings 226.
625 Training material used in preparing mutual fund salesmen urges them to meet the
objections to sales loads by turning them to their advantage:
You've raised a good point, Mr. Prospect. That sales charge is mighty important to you. It pays me and thousands of other salesmen to bring investors like yourself together in the ownership of this Mutual Fund so that you can afford skilled
investment Management. SPECIAL STUDY IV 136.
626 Revenue from sales loads charged to investors totalled $260 million in 1965. PUBICa
POLICY STATEMENT 201.
627 Ninety-seven per cent of all mutual fund salesmen do not receive a commission or draw.
SPECIAL STUDY IV 121. The remaining three per cent act in a supervisory capacity and devote, as well, a substantial portion of their time to sales activities. In addition to commissions
from their own sales, they receive "overrides" - a portion of the commission earned on other
salesmen's sales - for sales by those salesmen assigned to them for supervision. Id. at 147.
628 The securities business seems to have a penchant for describing the various activities of
its members by referring to the hats they wear. A Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith advertisement entitled "Hat Trick" explains that a Merrill, Lynch salesman wears a variety of hats
and performs a variety of tasks. SPECIAL STUDY I 93-94. Evidently that wardrobe now includes one too many chapeaus, for Merrill, Lynch was recently sanctioned by the SEC for
releasing prematurely information material to a security's selling price to some of its customers
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tial erupts in the form of fraudulent or misleading statements, the previously

mentioned judicial and statutory antifraud devices are adequate to deal with
those abuses. 29 However, where that potential appears in the form of highpressure selling which steers the investor into an investment that results in higher
commissions for the salesman, there exists a serious question as to the adequacy
of present legislation."'
In general, it is not this basic conflicts of interest problem that now constitutes the primary focus of debate concerning the distribution process; it is the
SEC's contention that sales loads are too high. The industry has countered that
the loads are not at all high for the type of merchandising prevalent in the
mutual fund industry. The proposed amendments to the Investment Company
Act adopt, in some form or other, the SEC's stance, and the lines of battle have
been drawn.6"'
2. Economic Justification: The Redemption -

Liquidation -

Ruin Spiral

By statutory mandate," 2 a mutual fund is required to stand ready to redeem
any security that it has issued. 3 Quite unanimously, and with perhaps some
cause, industry leaders have theorized that the redemption privilege, which
creates a standing, easily accessible investor market for the fund's own shares,
invites self-immolation: when redemptions rise above sales of new shares, the
fund no longer has a supply of cash to satisfy its statutory obligation of redemption;63 4 it therefore must dispose of some of its portfolio holdings to raise the
requisite cash to pay for shares tendered for redemption.3
Carried far enough,
investor redemptions could cause a fund to liquidate all its holdings or, in a sense,
milk itself dry. To forestall the specter of a fund's redeeming itself right out
who effected sales of the security prior to its public dissemination. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8459 (November 25, 1968),
[Current Volume] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. g 77,629, at 83,347.
629 See notes 553-71 supra and accompanying text. A possible approach for attorneys
attempting to vindicate rights of clients abused by improper selling practices is suggested in
Sullivan, Some Common Problems of Mutual Fund Shareholders, 13 Pazc. LAW. 23 (May
1967).
630 This is particularly true of periodic investing plans, whose unique compensatory features may sway the salesman into channeling the investor's desire to purchase mutual funds
into that investment media. See text accompanying notes 775-81 infra.
631 The proposed amendatory legislation is discussed at notes 706-39 infra and accompanying text.
632 Section 22(e) of the Investment Company Act provides in part:
No registered investment company shall suspend the right of redemption or postpone the date of payment or satisfaction upon redemption of any redeemable security
in accordance with its terms for more than seven days after the tender of such
security ....
15 U.S.C. § 80a-22(e) '(1964).
633 Id. Section 22(e) (3) further provides for suspension of the redemption right in certain
isolated instances, the most important of which is an SEC order to that effect for the "protection of security holders of the company." The most recent SEC order to suspend the redemption right has come in Mates Investment Fund, Investment Company Act Release No.
5571 (Dec. 20, 1968).
634 The industry views its emphasis on sales as a "byproduct of redeemability." One industry leader stated: "The inexorable law of this business is that when assets rise, redemptions
rise proportionately so the more you succeed, the harder you have to sell, just to keep your
place on the treadmill." PUBLIC POLICY STATEMENT 202.
635 See, e.g., Testimony of H. Lawrence Bogert, 1967 House Hearings 285.
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of existence, the industry has concluded that sales of new shares 63 constitute a
most effective prophylactic.
While there does exist the theoretical possibility of ruinous redemption, not
much can be shown to justify it in fact. 3 ' Historically, redemptions, though
occurring on a regular basis,138 have never amounted to a threatening proportion of total assets. Sales of new shares in dollar amount exceeded redemptions
by at least 44.9 per cent in each year from 1955 to 1965, and on the average excluded redemptions by 62.9 per cent during that period.3 9 More significantly, however, new shares issued for reinvestment of capital gains and investment of dividend
income absorbed 60.5 per cent of total redemptions in 1965.640 Further, as a
per cent of total assets, redemptions amounted to only 5.6 per cent in 1965.641
This data readily suggests that redemptions do not represent in practice the
threat they present in theory. Thus, there does not appear to be a reasonable
basis for the sense of economic urgency that the industry has thus far attached
to the selling of shares. Although this conclusion necessarily amounts to what
some sources have candidly termed "crystal ball" gazing," 2 it nevertheless is
suggested by past economic indicators.
One might observe that the industry's well-spoken fears for the vitality
of the economy are not so altruistic as they might appear. Sales of new shares
are very attractive to the industry from a number of standpoints. It will be
m
recalled, for example, that underwriting new shares is a riskless operation.
" In
addition, the cost of selling new shares is borne by the purchaser, not by the
selling group or the fund. Finally, sales of new shares must result in an increase
of net assets, and an increase in net assets means an increase in the advisory
fees of the fund advisors."" This is an important consideration in light of the
tightly-knit promoter-underwriter-advisor organizations that dominate the industry. These factors, combined with historical data indicating that redemptions
do not pose an overawing threat to the industry,64 demand that the distribution
process and its features - particularly the high sales load and the aggressiveness of fund salesmen - be treated less as an unchangeable fait accompli and
more as a source of legitimate concern to the investing public.
3. The Pneumodynamic Distribution Organization
As an earlier examination of selling practices indicated, industry leaders
636 Section 24(e) of the Investment Company Act of 1940 authorizes amendment of the
registration statement of an open-end investment company to provide for sales of additional
shares. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-24(e) (1964).

637

PUBLIC POLICY STATEMENT

202.

638 For example, the periodic investment method of purchasing mutual fund shares allows
for redemption of shares at the completion of the installment plan. The systematic maturation
of these plans requires an outflow of cash. Moreover, the average holding time for mutual fund
shares is thirteen years.
DUSTRY 111-23 (1967)

A.

D.

LITTLE, INC., ECONOMIC STUDIES OF THE MUTUAL FUND IN-

[hereinafter cited as LITTLE STUDY]. For both of these reasons the
industry must expect to maintain a certain supply of cash to satisfy projected redemptions.
639 PUBLIC POLICY STATEMENT 203 (Table V-I).

640
641
642
643
644
645

Id.
Id.
Statement of Manuel Cohen, 1967 House Hearings 112.
See notes 465-68 supra and accompanying text.
For a treatment of advisory fees, see notes 81-93 supra and accompanying text.
See notes 633-42 supra and accompanying text.
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have unreservedly stated that their mutual fund shares must be sold to the typical
investor. 6" They are also willing to accept the corollary fact of life that salesmen must be paid for their efforts. 47 This is a minimal economic concession by
the advisor-controlled industry, however, since the entire cost of distribution is
borne by the purchaser.
The applicable load level must be stated both in the prospectus64 and in
the sales agreement between the underwriter and the broker-dealer distributors."
Ordinarily, since the underwriter either is the fund's advisor or is controlled by
the advisor, the advisor will set the terms of the sales agreement. The SEC
has suggested that the terms of such agreements, and consequently the costs of
investor acquisition, have been set not to provide the most economical product
for the investor but rather to provide the advisor with more revenue from his
advisory fees."5" This contention is sound and readily demonstrable: advisory fees
are increased by increasing net assets, and it is widely known and empirically
verifiable that sales of new shares constitute the major portion of increases in
net assets of funds.65' As the industry more than willingly admits, sales of new
shares depend heavily on the efforts of sales organizations. Quite naturally, sales
organizations may be expected to show more interest in soliciting sales of fund
shares which compensate them more handsomely than sales of other fund shares.
Thus, the SEC's position is that sales loads reflect not a consciousness of the investor's financial goal, but rather a consciousness of the necessity of maintaining
the loyalty of selling groups. 2
Recently compiled data lends practical support to the SEC's argument 5 '
Adjustment of the sales load in the broker-dealer's favor can be accomplished
in either or both of two ways: by increasing the sales load, e.g., from seven to
eight and one-half per cent of offering price, with the dealer's share taking the
net increase, or by decreasing the underwriter's share of the sales load. 5 4 (Since
the underwriter in most cases is considered primarily a channel for distribution
and not a profit-making organization, the latter step requires no great economic
sacrifice by the advisor-underwriter group.) 5 The recent industry statistics 5 6
indicate that both of these approaches have been taken by the various funds:
646 See text accompanying note 459 supra.
647 Testimony to this effect abounds in the congressional hearings on the proposed legislation. See, e.g., Testimony of John R. Haire, 1967 House Hearings 235.
648 Section 22(d) of the 1940 Act requires the current public offering price to be stated in
the prospectus. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-22(d) (1964). Therefore, if the fund wishes to sell its shares
subject to a sales load, it must describe the sales load in the prospectus as part of the public
offering price.
649 See notes 471-72 supra and accompanying text.
650 PUBLIC POLICY STATEMENT 125.
651 "[S]ales account for most of the increase in mutual fund assets since 1940." Id. at 202.
652
There is, of course, intense competition within the mutual fund industry among
principal underwriters for different funds. It is, however, what has been described as
"perverse competition" because it is cost-raising rather than cost-lowering. It is a
competition for the favor and the services of fund dealers and salesmen rather than
the conventional form of competition for the favor of investors. This vigorous competition for dealer interest results in powerful upward pressures on selling compensation and sales loads and because of Section 22(d), the countervailing pressures of
653

retail price competition cannot operate.
See text accompanying note 656 infra.

654
655

Id.
See WHARTON REPORT 514-17.
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The chart appears at PUBLIC POLICY STATEMENT 208.

1967 House Hearings 110.
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Basic sales loads and dealer concessions of 30 mutual funds, 1950 versus 1966
Sales load

1. Affiliated Fund, Inc ........................... .

2. American Business Shares, Inc..........
3. American Mutual Fund, Inc................
4. Axe-Houghton Fund B, Inc ..................
5. Century Shares Trust .
.............. .
6. Chemical Fund, Inc ...........................

7. Colonial Growth & Energy Shares, Inc.
8. Commonwealth Investment Co ......
.
9. Delaware Fund, Inc............................. .
10. Dividend Shares, Inc ......................... .
11. Eaton & Howard Balanced Fund ........
12. Equity Fund, Inc ..............................
13. Fidelity Fund, Inc ..................................

14. Financial Industrial Fund, Inc ..........
15. Fundamental Investors, Inc ................... .
16. Group Securities, Inc. .........................

17. Investment Co. of America ....................
18. Investors Mutual, Inc

......................

19. Keystone Custodian Funds K-1 ............
20. Knickerbocker Fund ....

......................

21. Massachusetts Investors Trust ................
22. Massachusetts Life Fund ........................
23. National Investors Corp.........................
24. National Securities Series .

25.
26.
27.
28.

.............

The George Putnam Fund of Boston ....
Putnam Investors Fund, Inc .............
Selected American Shares, Inc ...........
Television-Electronics Fund, Inc .........

29. United Income Fund ......-................
30. Wellington Fund, Inc. ...........................

1950

1966

7.50
7.50
8.00
8.00
7.00
7.50
7.50
8.00
8.50
8.67
6.00
3.50
7.5 0
8.50
8.75
8.50
8.00
7.50
8.30
8.70
7.50
7.00
7.50
8.50
7.00
7.50
7.50
8.25
8.00
8.00

7.50
7.50
8.50
8.00
8.50
8.50
8.50
8.50
8.50
8.67
7.50
3.50
7 .5 0
8.50
8.75
8.50
8.50
8.00
8.30
8.70
8.50
8.50
7.50
8.50
8.50
8.50
7.50
8.25
8.50
8.00

Dealer
concession
1950

1966

6.00 6.00
6.00 6.00
6.00 7.00
6.00 6.00
4.00 6.00
5.00 6.50
5.00 6.50
6.00 7.00
6.00 6.00
6.00 6.00
4.50 6.38
2.62 ......
6 .0 0 6 .0 0
5.53 7.00
6.00 7.00
6.00 6.00
6.00 7.00
............
5.00 6.00
6.00 6.50
5.00 6.00
5.00 6.50
5.00 6.00
6.00 6.00
5.00 6.25
5.00 6.25
6.00 6.00
5.50 7.00
6.00 6.00
5.00 6.00

Jercent increase
inSales
Dealer
load concession

............
...... .....
6.3 16.7
.....
...
21.4 50.0
13.3 30.0
13.3 30.0
6.3 16.7
......
......
...... ......
25.0 41.8
......
......
------ .....
-----26.6
...... 16.7
......
.....
6.3 16.7
6.7 ......
...... 20.0
-----8.3
13.3 20.0
21.4 30.0
...... 20.0
............
21.4 25.0
13.3 25.0
...... ......
...... 27.3
6.3 .....
...... 20.0

Of course, the net effect of this self-inflating distribution mechanism is an
increase in overall cost to the purchaser, who receives nothing in return for his
sales load other than the salesman's appearance in his home or office. The
industry strenuously insists that the investor also receives the benefit of financial
management and portfolio diversification,65 but this analysis seems misguided
and unsound, for the investor pays one-half per cent of his net assets annually
for those features when the fund pays its advisory fee. 5 It would not be unfair
to conclude, as did the SEC in its 1966 report, that "[t]he sales
load -paid
6 59
is purely a payment for selling effort."
at the time of purchase
In addition to the sales load, the purchaser, as investor, bears other costs
of the distribution system. These "indirect costs" can, and formerly did, reach
sizeable proportion. For example, many funds bear the cost of printing sales
657
658

See text accompanying note 458 infra.
See generally text accompanying notes 1023-46 infra.

659

PUBLIC POLICY STATEMENT

215.
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material used by the salesmen in their solicitation of prospective purchasers."'
Formerly, brokerage commissions gained from transactions for the fund's portfolio
were also used to supplement the income of members of the distribution process. 6'
4. Recommendations for Change

-

Lowering the Sales Load

a. Introduction:Present Legislation
Disturbed by numerous indications that the shareholder bears inordinate costs
when investing in a mutual fund, the SEC has recommended to the Congress that
it consider means of reducing sales loads.662 Members of Congress responded to the
SEC recommendations by introducing SEC-proposed legislation aimed at achieving that result. 6 3 The industry quickly reacted with claims that its sales loads
are not unacceptable, both in view of benefits obtained and when compared to
other industries."6 " There has ensued a war of statistically-backed claims and
counterclaims which have done much to obscure the otherwise readily apparent
observation that the issue over sales loads may be confined to a narrow area
of public policy - whether there should or should not be competition in the
sale of mutual fund shares.
The focal point of battle has been section 22(d) of the Investment Company Act, the relevant portion of which provides:
No registered investment company shall sell any redeemable security
issued by it to any person except either to or through a principal underwriter for distribution or at a current public offering price described in
the prospectus and, if such class of security is being currently offered to
the public by or through an underwriter, no principal underwriter of such
security and no dealer shall sell any such security to any person except a
dealer, a principal underwriter or the issuer, except at a current public offering price described in the prospectus .... 665
The intent of this section is to prevent unsavory distribution operations and to
protect the net asset value of shares already held by other investors.666 Achieving these objectives requires sacrificing the normal pressures of competition which
act to keep prices down. On its face, section 22 (d) represents an exemption
from the antitrust laws. The underwriter may sell its shares at net asset value
(i.e., without the sales load) only to dealers. All sales to the public must be
made at the offering price established in the prospectus. No other price may be
660 SEC, Statement No. 2, 1967 House Hearings 111.
661 See notes 486-90 and accompanying text supra.
662 These recommendations are discussed at note 702 infra and accompanying text.
663 The amendatory legislation is discussed at notes 706-39 infra and accompanying text.
664 The two contentions are aspects of the fundamental argument by the industry that investment risks in mutual fund purchasing are a good deal lower than those obtainable even
in blue-chip securities. Accordingly, the industry argues the costs that the investor incurs
must be viewed in light of costs necessary to establish comparable investment risks. See
Testimony of John R. Haire, 1967 House Hearings 233-34. This contention is discussed at
notes 684-88 infra and accompanying text.
665 15 U.S.C. § 80a-22(d) '(1964). See generally Simpson & Hodes, supra note 603.
666 The problems of protecting net asset value before passage of the 1940 Act are discussed
at notes 319-25 supra and accompany text.
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established. Section 22(d) explicitly prohibits a dealer from lowering prices to
obtain more business. He must offer the shares on the same basis as all other
dealers. Section 22(d) differs radically from state fair-trade laws, because enforcement is carried out by the federal government, whereas enforcement of
6 62
state fair-trade laws is left to the individual manufacturer.
In short, no price
variation for the shares of a mutual fund may exist. Varying the prospectus price
is subject to federal sanction."'
Since Congress recognized that it had created a vacuum in which competition over the same product could not operate, and since it also realized that
such vacuums have historically placed economic burdens on the purchaser, it
endeavored to insure that prices of mutual fund shares be kept as low as economically feasible. The only way in which the price of a mutual fund share can
lawfully be adjusted is through adjustment of the sales load; therefore, Congress
provided in section 22(b) that an association registered under the Maloney Act
(i.e., the NASD) could prescribe rules "in order that the price at which such
security is offered or sold to the public shall not include an unconscionable or
grossly excessive sales load." '69 As part of its Rules of Fair Practice, the NASD
has enacted a policy on "spreads" (i.e., broker commissions) on sales of securities.6"' This policy, which sets a maximum limit of five per cent on over-thecounter transactions,67 does not, however, have any application to sales of
mutual fund shares. Since sales loads are listed in the prospectus, individual
brokers must adhere to those limits." In effect, then, the NASD has enacted
no rules to insure that sales loads are stabilized at a particular figure.
In addition to section 22(b), Congress provided in section 22(c) that the
SEC should have authority to make rules binding on all underwriters and
broker-dealers, irrespective of membership in the NASD, for the same end of
667

Section 22(d) is "unique." It is unlike State fair trade laws, which permit
resale price maintenance but leave the initiative for establishing and enforcing the
restrictions entirely with the manufacturer. Section 22(d) places the full force of
the federal government behind resale price maintenance in the investment company
field. If a retail dealer knowingly sells a mutual fund share for less than the price
stated in the prospectus, he is guilty of a willful violation of the Investment Company Act. SEC, Statement No. 1, 1967 House Hearings 48.
668 Section 49 of the 1940 Act provides for a fine of not more than $10,000 or imprisonment of not more than two years for willful violations of the Act's provisions. 15 U.S.C. §
80a-48 (1964).
669 15 U.S.C. § 80a-22(b) (1964).
670 NASD, Rules of Fair Practice, art. 111, § 4 provides:
In "over-the-counter" transactions, whether in "listed" or "unlisted" securities,
if a member buys for his own account from his customer, or sells for his own account
to his customer, he shall buy or sell at a price which is fair, taking into consideration
all relevant circumstances, including market conditions with respect to such security
at the time of the transaction, the expense involved, and the fact that he is entitled
to a profit; and if he acts as agent for his customer in any such transaction, he shall
not charge his customer more than a fair commission or service charge, taking into
consideration all relevant circumstances including market conditions with respect to
such security at the time of the transaction, the expense of executing the order and
the value of any service he may have rendered by reason of his experience in and
knowledge of such security and the market therefor.
NASD REPRINT 1 2154, at 2054.
671 This maximum markup limit, which can be adjusted depending on the circumstances
of the transaction, is commonly known as the "5% policy." Id. at 2055.
672 The NASD recognizes the explicit provisions of section 22(d) by noting that its "5%
policy" has no applicability to sales of mutual fund shares. Id. at 2058.
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prohibiting unconscionable sales loads. 7 Like the NASD, the SEC has made no
regulations declaring the level at which sales loads become unconscionable. The
assumption under which the SEC operates in this regard is that Congress has
itself stated what an unconscionable sales load is. In section 27(a) (1), the
Seventy-sixth Congress provided that loads on sales of contractual plans could
not exceed nine per cent of the offering price. 674 Consequently, the Commission
feels that "it would not be possible to establish that that standard of unconscionable or grossly excessive could be applied to the run-of-the-mill charge which
approximated the figure which the Congress itself fixed in section 27. '675
The accuracy of that doubt is questionable in view of the legislative history
of section 27.67. Although the SEC may properly fed that it should not attempt
suit unless all else fails and unless it has a fairly high chance of success in doing
so,677 investor protection of the type the SEC now seeks would probably be
closer to realization had the SEC attempted by judicial action to lower sales
loads. Such an approach would have enhanced the ability of the SEC to present
to members of Congress its recommendations on sales loads.
b. Proposals for Change
i. Analysis of the Reasons for Change
As matters now stand, it is impossible to state that competition for shares
of the same fund operates in the industry.6 7 Further, it is empirically unjustifiable to contend that mutual fund sales loads are competitive vis-a-vis each
other.679 In short, therefore, competition is not at work in the industry, and the
SEC has resolved to install either it or an adequate substitute and to insure
that sales loads are lowered to benefit the shareholder as purchaser.
60
Branding the SEC's argument as the "cheaper is better" philosophy, 8
the industry has reacted vociferously, if not always coherently. Not loathe to
extol its own virtues, it has, through representatives of the NASD and the In673

Section 22(c) provides
(c) After one year from the effective date of this chapter, the Commission may
make rules and regulations applicable to principal underwriters of, and dealers in,
the redeemable securities of any registered investment company, whether or not members of any registered securities association, to the same extent, covering the same
subject matter and for the accomplishment of the same ends as are prescribed in
subsections (a) and (b) of this section in respect of the rules which may be made by
a registered securities association governing its members; and any rules and regulations so made by the Commission, to the extent that they may be inconsistent with
the rules of any such association, shall so long as they remain in force supersede the
rules of the association and be binding upon its members as well as all other underwriters and dealers to whom they may be applicable. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-22 (c) (1964).
674 Investment Company Act of 1940 § 27(a) (1), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-27(a) (1) (1964).
675 Testimony of Chairman Manuel F. Cohen, 1967 House Hearings 722.
676 As appears below in the discussion of contractual plans, the nine per cent provision was
enacted to lower sales loads from a prevailing average level of nearly sixteen per cent. See
note 803 infra and accompanying text. Sales loads on mutual fund shares as of 1940 approximated six per cent. 1940 Senate Hearings 801. Nevertheless, even that level was thought by
at least one person - an SEC official - to be unacceptable. Id. at 800.
677 See note 501 supra and accompanying text.
678 It will be recalled that section 22(d) explicitly prohibits competition. See notes 665-68
supra and accompanying text.
679 The date indicated at text accompanying note 656 supra verifies this conclusion.
680 Testimony of H. Lawrence Bogert, 1967 House Hearings 286.
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vestment Company Institute, insisted that it is highly competitive.681 As proof
of its position, it has adduced comparisons with other industries. Though subtle,
the shift of emphasis to competition with external devices of investment con,veniently obscures the fact that such comparisons are meaningless. The financial
aspirations and condition of the typical mutual fund investor, the unique attributes of fund investing that attract most investors, and the existence of section
22 (d) make external comparisons pointless, for the fact remains that the mutual
fund industry is not internally competitive and other securities outlets are not
meaningful alternatives to the fund investor.
Nevertheless, the industry has proceeded to make these external comparisons,
perhaps prompted in part by the SEC's continued references to them.68 2 The
most frequent comparison is based on the means of acquisition of securities, that
is, direct (via exchange) or indirect (via fund). Customarily, this has entailed
detailed analyses of the costs of NYSE brokerage commissions versus the sales
load charged the investor.1 3 But the industry finds comparisons on that aspect
alone to be incomplete. It argues that the total costs of mutual fund purchasing
must be weighed against the costs of direct ownership of equities securities. The
best expression of that argument comes in a study conducted by the consulting
firm of Arthur D. Little, Inc. The Little firm insists that:
When comparisons are made between the costs of mutual funds and
the costs in investment alternatives, they will be valid only to the extent that:
(1) the comparisons made are of full or total costs to the investor
under each of the alternatives.
(2) the alternatives chosen must be in fact open to the investor; they
must be real alternatives.
(3) the alternatives must be equivalent in value.6 s4
The Study then notes that an important additional cost, the investment risk,
must be added to make such comparisons complete.8 5 Since the volatility8 6 in
mutual fund shares is extremely low, allowance must be made to equate risk of
direct ownership with risk of mutual fund ownership. According to the Little
Study, this would require allocating part of the initial direct investment to a riskfree investment device, e.g., savings account, consequently lowering the rate of return on that investment. The then comparable investment costs are to be expressed
as yearly charges "spread evenly over the time the investor holds his stock or
mutual funds .....""' From this comparison of annual investment costs, the
681 "[W]e welcome competition. We have competition and we think the more we get, the
better it will be for the industry and public." 1967 Senate Hearings 213.
682 It must be pointed out on the industry's behalf that the SEC initiated the thus-far unending chain of statistical comparisons by charging that "sales charges bear no reasonable
relationship to the cost of investing in other types of securities." PUBLIC POLICY STATEMENT
221. As will appear below, the industry was willing to prove that such a.reasonable relationship does exist provided the total "cost of investing" is compared. See notes 684-88 infra
and accompanying text.
683 See notes 107-09 and accompanying text supra.
684 LITTLE STUDY 1-3.
685 Id. at 11-3.
686 "Volatility is basically a linear measure relating the percentage changes over time in a
particular portfolio (e.g., a mutual fund) to the percentage changes in some standard market
index (e.g., the S & P index.)" Id.
687 Id.
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Little Study concluded that "there is no way for most investors to participate
directly in the ownership of listed securities and derive value equivalent to that
'
which mutual fund ownership provides except at higher cost."688
Fairness to the industry requires that attention be given to this conclusion.
Since it indicates that other investment devices are not comparable to fund
ownership, it demands that the SEC's allegations that sales loads are not related
to costs of other securities not be taken as an irrebuttable indictment of costs
of the funds' distribution process. However, by emphasizing the advantages of
fund ownership and demonstrating that many investors will find this perhaps
the only attractive means of investing in securities, it does indicate that further
examination of the sales load issue is warranted. Because the sales load level
is not determined by competition within the industry, and since the industry
is not directly affected by competition from external securities investment media,
it is suggested that examination of the sales load is warranted primarily in terms
of public policy - whether lack of competition is in itself justifiable.
As further proof of its competitive stature, the industry has introduced
statistics bearing on the degree of fund concentration now present in the industry." 9 By endeavoring to show a rise in the number of mutual funds and a
decrease in the proportionate size of the larger funds, the industry hopes to
prove it is competitive or at least that it is becoming more so. However, this
endeavor hits wide of the mark. Not only are such statistics of limited empirical
value; they also bear little relevance to the question of whether sales loads themselves are competitive. To assert that the investor is presented with an opportunity
to discriminate in his choice of fund on the basis of performance is not to assert
that he may do so on the basis of the costs of acquisition.
Perhaps the most effective argument the industry can make is one couched
in terms of public policy and addressed to the social ramifications of the proposed
legislation: since the present level of sales loads is necessary to provide salesmen
with incentive to sustain their selling efforts, it argues, a reduction in sales loads
would not only seriously jeopardize the existence of the funds and the security
of the economy but would deprive many salesmen of their right to earn a living.69 °
Thus the competing stances can be reduced to an issue of public policy.
For those in favor of the proposed legislation, the contention is that lack of competition is inimical to the common good; the lack of competition now present
in the distribution of mutual fund shares, for whatever reason it may have been
instituted,69' no longer is justifiable in terms of the public interest. For those
who oppose the legislation, it is contended that the present lack of competition
does serve the vital national interest of preventing a massive disruption of the
entire securities industry; and the legislation deprives salesmen of their opportunity to make a living.
The SEC argues that the industry's contentions are baseless. To justify its
688 Id. at 1-4.
689 Id. at II-10.
690 See 1967 House Hearings 516. Former Chairman Cohen has called this "the most invidious of the arguments put forward." Id. at 702.
691 For a discussion of the background of section 22(d), see text accompanying notes
740-59 infra.
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conclusion that fears of another economic catastrophe caused by lower salesmen's
commissions are without merit, the Commission points to the history of those
mutual funds which charge no sales loads for the acquisition of their shares. 92
The industry is understandably reluctant to make comparisons with acquisition
costs of no-loads. But it is anxious to compare itself with the more established
insurance industry, from which it has borrowed several of its features, not the
least of which is terminology. Perhaps the most exhaustive -and
most persuasive - comparison made between the funds and the insurance business exists
in the Little Study. In a convincing mathematical demonstration, the Study
proves that the typical sales charge on insurance premiums amounts to 7.7 per
cent."' However, while the Study's mathematics may be unassailable, it is
submitted that its logic is not. The favorable comparison it hopes to draw that "these costs are comparable to the dealer portion of the mutual fund sales
charge"69 - depends on the premise that life insurance purchasing is comparable to mutual fund investing. The validity of that premise has been hotly
debated. While it seems clearly invalid with respect to term insurance, there
are semblances of similarity between whole-life insurance and mutual funds.
However, the similarity is superficial; the purpose of the larger than necessary
payments on a whole-life insurance policy is to prevent insurance costs in later
years of the insured's life from becoming prohibitive. 95 And in terms of motive,
studies have indicated that most persons purchase insurance for protection in
the event of an untimely demise -not
to invest. 96
While the insurance analogy cannot be written off as trite, it cannot in
final view be said to present a useful index for comparison of competitive rates
in the mutual fund industry.69 Perhaps the most conclusive summary of the
estimation held by many that life insurance is not designed to compete with
mutual funds is the comparatively recent entry by insurance companies themselves into the mutual fund business by way of variable annuities and mutual
funds. 99
It was suggested at the outset of this analysis that competition cannot exist
692

See text accompanying notes 37-59 supra.
LITTLE STUDY 111-51.
694 Id.
695 E. HARWOOD & B. FPANCIS, LIFE INSURANCE FROM THE BUYER's POINT OF VIEW
11-13 (1939).
696 The SEC has noted:
Life insurance, except for term insurance policies, does contain a savings element
693

(represented by investment in debt securities), the operation of which is postponed
by the front-end load. This element, however, is secondary among the reasons why

people buy life insurance. Spontaneous responses to the question, "Which would you
say are the major reasons for carrying life insurance?" were: support for dependents
(67 percent); cleanup funds (38 percent); saving (18 percent); education '(7 percent); retirement income (6 percent); borrowing (6 percent); and mortgage repayment (1 percent). When shown a card listing each of these reasons, the uses of life
insurance which relate to its investment aspects were listed by larger proportions of
respondents. Combining responses to spontaneous and suggested reasons, the results
were: support for dependents '(86 percent); cleanup funds (83 percent); retirement
income (43 percent); saving (40 percent); education (40 percent); mortgage repayment (32 percent); and borrowing (30 percent). PUBLIC POLICY STATEMENT 246

n.193.
697 Moreover, regulation of insurance companies has been expressly legislated out of the
domain of federal authorities by the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1012 '(1964).
698 See notes 946-96 infra and accompanying text.
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two brokerof the positive mandate of section 22(d) -between
dealers for the business of an investor when the subject of their efforts is shares
in the same mutual fund.699 It would seem pointless to dispute the accuracy of
that conclusion. As for competition among the funds, the data introduced
earlier militate against a conclusion that sales load schedules of the various funds
provide meaningful alternatives to the investor."'0
-because

ii. Options Available for Change
The non-competitive sales load structure is one the SEC has determined to
be in need of substantial revision."' In its recommendations for such revision,
the Commission acknowledged that options were available to the legislature.
Full-scale competition could be effected by a repeal of section 22(d), so that
shares could be offered to the public at any price above the net asset value of
the shares, or the statutory equivalent of a price set by competition could be
' written into the legislation in lieu of abolition of section 22(d). 02 These were
the major alternative avenues of action as the SEC conceived the problem. In
its own recommendation it opted for the latter,0 3 suggesting that a flat rate of
five per cent be attached to sales charges,"' with residual power in the Commission to adjust that load to a higher figure in cases where such action would be
called for.70 '
Initially the SEC's proposals were accepted in toto and introduced in the
first session of the ninetieth Congress by Senator John Sparkman, Chairman of
699 Economist Paul Samuelson has noted: "Perfect competition is defined by the economist
as a technical term denoting the case where no farmer, businessman, or laborer has any personal influence on market price ..... " P. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS 38 (6th ed. 1964).
700 See text accompanying notes 653-56 supra.
701 Often overlooked in the controversy over appropriate sales loads is the funds' treatment of reinvested capital gains and dividends invested by their shareholders. A large percentage of mutual fund shareholders - all contractual planholders included - invest their

dividends and reinvest capital gains distributions in shares of the fund.
215.

PUBLIC POLICY STATE-

MENT

Some funds, not a majority, impose a sales load on invested dividends. Id. This procedure lacks any economic justification, for no sales activity is required to achieve dividend
investment. While the SEC has not expressly banned sales loads on reinvested capital gains, it
has made explicit its intention to do so, should the funds impose such a load. Therefore,
reinvested capital gains are not subject to loads. Id. at n.55.
In addition, contractual plan companies may not impose a sales load on either reinvested
capital gains or invested dividends, since the total load exacted would then exceed nine percent, the statutory maximum. Id. at n.56. Serious consideration has therefore been given to
abolition of loads on invested dividends. S. 34 includes this possibility in its treatment of sales
loads. ANALYSIS OF S. 34, at 8.
702 SEC, Statement No. 2, 1967 House Hearings 113-14.
703 The SEC asserts among its reasons for disfavoring the abolition of section 22(d) that
it would not help the smaller investor "who has never heard of the Wall Street Journal" nor
would it reach the totally integrated distribution systems. 1967 House Hearings 60. These
arguments seem unsound, for a salesman who foisted a higher sales-load fund on an investor
with lesser ability to bear that load would doubtlessly be open to an action under either the
antifraud or suitability provisions discussed supra at text accompanying notes 552-78. As for the
integrated distributors, continued maintenance, by concerted action, of the price above an
acceptable level would subject them to antitrust actions. Unilateral action would be limited
by the sales loads charged by other funds.
704 "Sales charge" is the technical term for the ratio of amount deducted as sales commissions to the net amount invested. Thus, the actual "sales load" under such a provision would
be 4.76 per cent of the gross amount invested.
705 S. 1659, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. § 12(c)(2) (1967). Section 27(b) of the 1940 Act
already authorizes the SEC to relax the load ceilings on sales of contractual plans by smaller
companies if it appears that they are operating at higher costs and exemption would be in the
public interest. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-27(b) (1964).
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the Senate Banking and Currency Committee, as S. 1659, "A Bill to amend the
Investment Company Act of 1940.... .""' However, subsequent action in the
Senate on S. 1659 resulted in the passage of an amended version, S. 3724. 0
Since the House failed to act on S. 3724. during that term, Senator Sparkman
on January 15, 1969, in the first session of the Ninety-first Congress, introduced
S. 34,708 whose provisions are identical to S. 3724."9 As noted, however, these
provisions are substantially different from the original proposals of S.165910
There exists yet another piece of legislation bearing on mutual funds in
general and the sales load problem in particular: Senator Thomas J. McIntyre
has introduced, also in the first session of the Ninety-first Congress, S.296, which
adopts the alternate choice noted by the SEC, the complete repeal of section
22(d).71
iii. S. 296 -Repeal of Section 22(d)
Since Senator McIntyre's proposal calls for the complete repeal of section
22(d)," 2 the question which that proposal must confront and answer is whether
a return to the practices of 1940 would occur were that section repealed. Further,
since section 22(d) operates in conjunction with NASD Rule of Fair Practice
26 to eliminate the pre-Act abuses,7 " any answer to this question must be
couched in terms of both a repeal of section 22(d) and the inapplicability, by
withdrawal of fund broker-dealers and underwriters from the NASD, of section
26 of the NASD Rules of Fair Practice.
While abolition of section 22 (d) may well take place,7 " the inapplicability
of Rule 26 is a good deal less likely to occur. Since NASD members may discriminate, on the basis of price, against non-members, 15 withdrawal from the
NASD could constitute a significant disadvantage to many mutual fund brokerdealers. However, for a relatively small percentage of NASD dealers, distribution of mutual funds constitutes nearly all of their transactions.71 6 For them with-

drawal would not work a serious hardship, provided they could persuade NASD
fund underwriters to withdraw as well. 17
706 S. 1659, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. '(1967).
707 S. 3724, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967). For a thorough analysis of the history of this
legislation, see North, A Brief History of Federal Investment Company Legislation, 44 NoTRE
DAME LAWYER 677 (1969).

708 S. 34, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
709 ANALYSIS OF S.34, at V.
710 Whereas S. 1659 contained the statutory maximum sales load, S.34 contains a section
that "provides that a registered securities association [the NASD] may by rule prohibit its

members from offering redeemable securities at a price which includes an 'excessive' sales
load . . . " Id. at 8.
711 S.296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 12(a) (1969).
712 Section 12 of S.296 states simply: "Section 22(d) of the Investment Company Act
of 1940 (15 U.S.C. 80a-22(d)) is repealed." S.296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 12(a) (1969).
713 NASD, Rules of Fair Practice, art. III, § 26, reprinted in NASD REPRINT 1 2176, at

2104.
714 Senator Sparkman has indicated that the Senate Banking and Currency Committee
intends to give careful consideration to repeal of section 22(d). ANALYSIS OF S.34, at vi.
715 See text accompanying note 510 supra.
716 In a sampling of NASD member firms, 31.9 per cent reported that mutual fund income
constituted ninety to one hundred per cent of their gross income. NASD, ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES FOR THE SECURITIES BuSINESS 12 (1967).
717 NASD Rule of Fair Practice 26 prohibits member underwriters from selling shares to
nonmembers except at public prices. Therefore, mutual fund underwriters would necessarily
have to withdraw from the NASD also for the scheme to work.
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Assuming arguendo that this development should occur, would the pre1940 practices, specifically the taking of short and long-positions, return? Shortposition taking, it will be recalled, consists of the broker-dealer's delay in placing
the customer's order so as to buy at the lower of two known prices and sell the
shares thus purchased to the customer at the higher price.1 8 Rule 26(f) (1)
presently controls this practice as regards NASD members. 19 However, even if
section 26 were inapplicable, short-position taking would now be impossible. The
SEC, pursuant to its grant of authority under section 22(c) of the 1940 Act,
has recently adopted Rule 22c-1, 2 ° requiring all broker-dealers, irrespective of
membership in the NASD, to place customer orders so that they will be priced
at the asset value next computed after the receipt of the order. Therefore, no
broker-dealer may now engage in taking short-positions.
As the SEC's 1940 report indicated, dealer accumulation of an inventory
of fund shares is essential to the taking of long-positions. 2 1 NASD Rule 26(f) (2)
presently prevents such an accumulation by forbidding underwriters to sell to
dealers any shares not already ordered by a dealer's customer. However, assuming the inapplicability of that provision, it would appear that the dealer would
be presented with an opportunity to accumulate his own inventory.
7 22 the respondent-registrant
In T. I. S. Management Corporation,
was
engaged in taking both short and long-positions, which, the SEC noted, necessarily "diminish the dollar amounts paid into the trust [fund], since, in effect,
investors pay the current prices, whereas the trust receives the lowest prices, the
registrant [broker-dealer] keeping the difference." 2 ' The context in which T. I.
S. Management arose concerned a stop-order proceeding directed against respondent, principal distributor of Trusteed Industry Shares, an unincorporated
investment trust of the fixed management type. For the purposes of the Securities Act of 1933, respondent was considered to be the "issuer" of the shares and
was therefore required to file a registration statement in accordance with the
Securities Act.7 4 One item of the respondent's registration statement required
the issuer-respondent to give a full breakdown of all the components of the sales
load assessed upon acquisition of Trusteed Industry Shares. Counsel for the Commission contended that included in that requirement was a duty of the respondent
to disclose, among other things, the profits made by taking both long and shortpositions. The Commission agreed that the failure to disclose profits from position-taking was material and caused the registration statement to be defective. 25
Although T. I. S. Management arose in a context distinguishable from the
typical broker-dealer position-taking discussed immediately above, the SEC's
1938 determination that the term "loading charge" included profits made from
position-taking is informative, for section 2(a) (34) of the 1940 Act defines
"sales load" as "the difference between the price of a security to the public and
718
719
720

721
722
723
724
725

See text accompanying note 320 supra.
See text accompanying notes 400-02 supra.
See text accompanying notes 403-05 supra.
Cf. INVESTMENT TRuSTS 856-57.
3 S.E.C. 174 (1938).
Id. at 177.
Securities Act of 1933 § 2(4), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(4) (1964).
3 S.E.C. at 180.
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that portion of the proceeds from its sale wMch is . . .invested or held for

investment by the issuer."726 (Emphasis added.) In light of the T. 1. S. decision,
that definition would appear to include position-taking as a part of the sales load.
In the event of abolition of section 22 (d) and inapplicability of the NASD
Rules, the apparent effect of this definition would nevertheless work to achieve
an end comparable to that achieved by those sanctions. The dealer would then
be selling shares to investors in direct competition with other dealers. A sales
load higher than that charged by his competitors would have the effect of causing customers to purchase through other dealers in order to benefit from a lower
price. Competition would therefore force the dealer to maintain profits from
position-taking at a minimal level, if at all. On the other hand, if numerous dealers attempted to make profits from position-taking, theirs would be the unenviable task of convincing the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice
that this practice did not constitute industry-wide price-fixing.727
Thus, while Senator McIntyre's proposal might at first blush appear to
pave the way for an untoward result,7 2 it in reality neither contemplates nor
causes such a consequence. Moreover, in repealing section 22(d) entirely, it
would revoke the long-standing exemption from the antitrust laws that the
industry has previously enjoyed. At a time when the SEC and the industry are
at an impasse, the introduction of the Antitrust Division into the operation of
the industry would indeed have unsettling effects.729
iv. S.34-Five Per Cent Maximum
S. 34, unlike Senator McIntyre's bill, does not advocate repeal of section
22(d) but amends it to empower the NASD to maintain sales loads below an
"excessive" level."' This provision differs from S. 1659 in terms of applying
authority, for the original bill would have set a maximum ceiling of five per cent
on sales charges and would have authorized the SEC to make changes where
proper 3' This initial approach has been jettisoned in S. 34 in favor of the
self-regulatory device of allowing the NASD to set its own rules as to sales
loads.3 2 Presumably this approach benefits from the lessons learned in the giveand-take sessions between the SEC and the NASD prior to passage of the 1940
726 Investment Company Act of 1940 § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a) (34) (1964).
727 The Attorney General is authorized by section 4 of the Sherman Act to institute
proceedings to enjoin antitrust violations. 15 U.S.C. § 4 (1964).
728 A possible alternative safeguard to prevent long-position taking, in the event of the
inapplicability of present provisions, is Rule 22c-1, discussed supra at notes 403-05 and
accompanying text. That Rule, adopted to prevent dilution and to eliminate results other
than dilution which arise from the sale or redemption of the securities of registered investment
companies and which are unfair to holders of outstanding securities of. the companies, might
reach this practice. Though the pertinent phrasing of the Rule---"after receipt of a tender
of such security for redemption or of an order to purchase or sell such security"-does not
indicate explicitly that the "tender" or "order" must be placed by a customer, it may be
implied from the release interpreting the Rule that the Commission's Division of Corporate
Regulation does think of it in those terms. See SEC staff, Investment Company Act Release
No. 5569 (December 27, 1968), [Current volume] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. fl 77,640, at 83,375.
729 In a survey conducted among West Coast businessmen, the Antitrust Division of the
Department of Justice was rated as least popular of the federal agencies, the SEC being most
popular. 113 CONG. REc. S16,386 (daily ed. Nov. 14, 1967).
730 S. 34, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 12(a) *(1969).
731 See note 250 supra.
732 If at the expiration of eighteen months, the NASD has not adopted such a rule, the
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Act.733 Since the NASD must first set the level and the SEC is then entitled to
alter or supplement it, the scheme avoids the inflexibility of statutory implementation. Further, it avoids another problem seen by the 1940 progenitors: the
fact that any sales load level once established would become the normal load
charged." 4 Fearing that the "maximum would become the minimum," the
SEC's personnel in 1940 hesitated to insert a maximum sales load prescription." 5
The present bill, S.34, avoids this problem.
If enacted, S.34 would give the NASD eighteen months to establish within
its own framework a rule for sales loads.7 3 As noted earlier, the NASD has
already established a maximum of five per cent on commissions to be charged
in over-the-counter transactions. 7 7 However, that policy does not apply "To
the sale of securities where a prospectus or offering circular is required to be
738
Of
delivered and the securities are sold at the specific public offering price.
course, every interstate offering of a security requires the transmittal of a prospectus to accompany the transactionj3 9 but the distinguishing feature of the
offering of mutual fund shares is the requirement of section 22(d) that the
"current public offering price' be maintained. The NASD's markup policy
has thus far been inapplicable, simply because the dealer has to sell at the
price prescribed by the underwriter-advisor in the prospectus. While S. 34
proposes to leave section 22(d) substantially unchanged, it would specifically
authorize the NASD to establish a similar markup policy for the sale of mutual
fund shares. Accordingly, the Five Per Cent Policy would appear to be a possible starting point for determining the proper sales load. Moreover, this figure
compares favorably with the proposed statutory maximum of five per cent
favored by the SEC and as originally implemented in S. 1659. Should future
developments warrant, the SEC could alter or revise the markup policy to more
realistically reflect changed economic circumstances.
This method of dealing with the sales load problem combines the most
advantageous aspects of all the positions advanced: it allows self-regulation
(always an acceptable goal in the American political context), provides flexibility, retains the previous distribution system, and insures that the interests of
the mutual fund owner as first a purchaser, and then an investor, are protected.
c. The Options in Light of Section 22(d)
As the Commission noted in its statement before both houses of Congress
during hearings on the proposed amendments, legislators are not writing on a
dean slate when they propose legislation affecting the sales load.741 Section 22 (d)
SEC is empowered to make rules pursuant to its authority under section 15(b) (10) of the
Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b) (10), for the same purpose. S. 34, 91st Cong.,
1st. Sess., § 12(a) (1969).
733 Cf. 1940 Senate Hearings 288.
734 Id. at 290.
735 Id.
736 See note 732 supra.
737 See notes 671-72 supra and accompanying text
738 NASD REPRINT 2058.
739 Securities Act of 1933 § 5(b) (2), 15 U.S.C. § 77(e) (b) (2) '(1964).
740 SEC, Statement No. 1, 1967 House Hearings 59.
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is merely one of seven provisions of section 22 of the In~restment Company Act
that affect the sales load. As will be seen below, it would appear that the thrust
of the entire section is exemplified in Congress's award to the NASD of power to
prescribe rules
for the purpose of eliminating or reducing so far as reasonably practicable
any dilution of the value of other outstanding securities of such company
or any other result of such purchase, redemption, or sale which is unfair to
holders of such other outstanding securities .... 741
The SEC frequently pointed out in the 1967 congressional hearings that sales
loads were not a primary source of concern in the 1940 hearings which led to the
Investment Company Act.7 42 This view is supported by the testimony of David
Schenker, SEC representative, to the effect that sales loads were considered a
technical item which could be left to competition. 4 Several other aspects of the
distribution system were of more pressing concern to the 1940 legislators; these
problems concerned inequities perpetrated on holders of outstanding mutual fund
securities and malfeasances by persons in the distribution process. Both in turn
were intimately connected with the pricing system then in effect. 44
As seen in Part III, the pre-1940 pricing practices worked harm on holders
of outstanding shares by diluting the-value of already computed increases in net
asset value. 4 s The previous examination also indicated that a dealer could make
additional profits by taking "short-positions" in the distribution of fund shares. 4 '
However, the NASD's twice-daily computation rule and recently adopted Rule
22c-1 now prevent those abuses. 47
Another broker-dealer malfeasance which led to the enactment of section 22
consisted of the broker-dealer's taking "long-positions" in the sale of fund shares.
A "long-position" was effected by buying shares as principal from the fund at a
low price and reselling them as principal on a subsequent date at a higher price. 4
The difference between the dealer's purchase price and the customer's purchase
price was retained by the dealer, along with his commission on the sale. Unlike
the short-position, the long-position required the dealer to assume some risk;
if the market turned down before the shares were resold to customers, the dealer
sustained a loss. However, broker-dealer familiarity with market indices minimized that possibility. 49
The effect of section 22 on this malpractice cannot be understood without
considering section 26 of the NASD Rules of Fair Practice. Subsection (f) (2)
of that section effectively prevents NASD members from taking long-positions by
requiring that no orders may be placed unless a customer has already ordered the
741

Investment Company Act of 1940 § 22 (a), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-22(a) (1964).

742' 1967 House Hearings 57.

743
744
shares,
745
746
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Statement of David Schenker, 1940 Senate Hearings 290.
For a description of the two-price system used to compute the value of mutual fund
see text accompanying notes 318-20 supra.
See notes 319-25 supra and accompanying text.
See note 320 supra and accompanying text.
See notes 398-405 supra and accompanying text.
See notes 321-24 supra and accompanying text.
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shares."' Subsection (j) (2) effectively stymies non-NASD members from taking
long-positions by requiring them to become record owners of the shares before
they can be redeemed by NASD members."' This places a good deal of risk on
the nonmember, for a market downturn in the time it takes the nonmember to
become record owner could be ruinous.752 The net effect of these provisions is to
forestall the development of what would resemble an over-the-counter market in
mutual fund shares. 53 This effect has the desired aims of preventing the perpetration of inequities on holders of outstanding mutual fund securities and foreclosing broker-dealer malfeasances that benefited neither existing shareholders
nor the mutual fund purchaser.
In sum, then, section 22 of the Investment Company Act must be read in
conjunction with section 26 of the NASD Rules of Fair Practice to ascertain the
general aim of Congress."5" That aim, as the NASD itself put it, was "to ensure
the orderly distribution of open-end investment company shares ... .""' A disorderly distribution process such as prevailed before 1940 clearly injured the
investor both as purchaser and as investor. But it was a concern primarily with
his status as investor that the Act manifested. The most effective manner of
dealing with problems associated with that status lay in the structuring of a distribution system which eliminated the two-price system and closed off entry to
independent dealers uncontrolled by NASD rules by making it uneconomical for
them to deal in mutual fund shares. Section 22 and the NASD rules passed
pursuant to it have largely succeeded in doing this.
Subsequent analyses have attempted to explain section 22(d) as an isolated
response that dealt primarily with a so-called "'bootleg market' . . . made by
dealers who traded in the shares of open-end investment companies without the
authority of the principal distributors for those companies.""75 In this market,
dealers not party to a sales agreement could obtain shares for redemption by
offering a higher price than net asset value, and could subsequently sell them at a
lower price than that charged by members of the selling group. Since the profit
on commissions was entirely theirs (i.e., the sales load went to the dealer alone),
the profit was still larger than that obtainable by way of dealer concession. 5 7 Theoretically, an analysis of section 22(d) based solely on the "bootleg market" could
be made. However, the more persuasive analysis lies in reading section 22(d)
as part of a total response-section 22 is a comprehensive attempt to eliminate
unscrupulous practices by broker-dealers and unfair consequences to holders of
outstanding mutual fund securities. The section structures the distributory sys-

750 Rules of Fair Practice art. III, § 26 (f) (2), reprinted in NASD REPRINT ff 2176, at
2106.
751 Id. § 26(j) (2), reprinted in NASD REPRINT 1 2176, at 2107.
752 A Proposed Amendment to the Rules of Fair Practice of National Association of
Securities Dealers, Inc., 9 S.E.C. 38, 44 (1941).
753 See, e.g., Investment Company Institute v. Camp, 274 F. Supp. 624, 629 '(D.D.C.
1967); SPECIAL STUDY IV 98.
754 NASD, MEMORANDUM RE: SECTION 22(d), at 5 (1958).
755 Id. at 4.
756 INVESTMENT TRUSTS III 865.
757 It is significant to note that the SEC in 1939 indicated that "[siuch operations actually
had the effect of initiating a small scale price war between retailers . . . ." Id.
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tern to make that goal attainable. It is not an attempt to place a ceiling over
sales loads. Competition was selected to perform that task. 5
However, it may be assumed that Congress and the SEC realized that internal competition, i.e., competition for the same shares based on a difference in
sales load, was effectively foreclosed by section 22(d). Assumedly, therefore,
they relied on external competition between funds for the investor's dollar to
stabilize sales loads at a publicly acceptable level. A previous examination of
external competition with respect to sales loads has indicated that that competition has simply failed to materialize. 759 The reason no doubt lies in the selfinflating distribution mechanism already examined.
Proponents of the various measures now pending have concluded that section 22(d) provides protection to the mutual fund owner as investor; it does
not effectively provide him with protection as a purchaser."" Rather, section
22(d) serves quite the contrary purpose: in effecting "retail (resale) price maintenance"- which is simply an exemption from the antitrust laws traveling under
a flattering alias - section 22 (d) effectively forestalls any competition that might
redound to the purchaser's advantage. The proponents have recommended,
therefore, that section 22 (d) be substantially revised or entirely eliminated in
order to extend to the purchaser the advantages of competition.
F. Periodic Payment Plans
1. Introduction
Mutual funds have always claimed that they provide benefits that the typical
fund investor could not acquire in any other way.76' Chief among these benefits
is participation in equities securities with all the financial advantages such participation entails. The funds are also quick to point out that their investors
receive the additional advantages of portfolio management and diversification far
below the cost of comparable services to individual investors. Of course, all these
beneficial aspects of mutual fund investing indicate that the funds are tailor-made
for the modest means investor, whose statistical profile closely approximates the
middle-class wage earner. 62 Since mutual fund investing is attractive to such a
large potential market, the funds' desire to reach as many members of that
stratum as possible is understandable.
Realizing that the investor from this class is best able to finance an investment
program from current income, those familiar with the investment company industry long ago hit upon the idea of offering the "average and small investor"7 '
the opportunity to purchase fund shares on a periodic basis. To develop such
opportunities, they borrowed from many other industries, primarily the consumer
goods and insurance businesses, and devised programs variously known as "con758 See note 743 supra and accompanying text.
759 See note 656 supra and accompanying text.
760 Cf. SEC, Statement No. 1, 1967 House Hearings 54.
761 See note 457 supra and accompanying text.
762 Compare U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. CENSUS OF POPULATION: 1960
REPORTS: OCCUPATION BY EARNINGS & EDUCATION 2 (1963) with WHARTON
273-77.
763 Roach, A Talk, PRESENTATION, Part II-A, at 1.
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tractual plans," "installment investment plans," "periodic payment plans," "accumulation plans" and the like. The chief characteristic of these plans is systematic
investing of relatively small amounts, ordinarily over a long period, usually ten
years, with a general investment goal of producing a source of capital at the
completion of the program.
As previously noted,"64 investors in such plans do not invest directly in
mutual fund shares; instead their money is channeled to the funds through a
separate organization, based on a "trust" indenture or similar agreement.765 As
evidence of his ownership, the planholder receives not shares but a "certificate
of ownership." He enjoys pro rata beneficial ownership of the shares, calculated
in "units" of ownership.7 6 The shares credited to the investor's account are held
by a "Custodian," which must be a qualified financial institution. 67
The underlying fund shares are securities, and the offering of the trust units
is also considered the offering of a security within the meaning of the Securities
Act of 1933; therefore both must be registered with the SEC. 6 Accordingly,
a prospectus for both the plan units and the underlying fund shares must also
accompany solicitations by salesmen. Moreover, organizations soliciting sales
of the plan must be registered in accordance with section 15 of the Exchange
Act.76 Prior to 1955, distribution of most plans was carried out through the
captive sales force of the underwriter-sponsor. Since that date, most plans have
been distributed through independent broker-dealers.7 0
From the investor's viewpoint, periodic investment plans represent an alternative investment vehicle to the more direct method of investing in shares of the
fund itself.7 7 For the salesman, the periodic plan constitutes an attractive segment of his customer merchandise, primarily because of the unique compensatory
features of such investment plans, which will now be considered.
2. The Front-end Load
The plan sponsors, most of whom have banded together in their own organization, the Association of Mutual Fund Plan Sponsors, Inc. [AMFPS], claim
that the features of periodic plans set their investment vehicle apart from other
investment company systems (e.g., mutual funds, face amount certificate companies, etc.) and make the periodic payment plan most attractive to the investor
with moderate income but little investible savings." 2 The features they point to
764 See notes 284-91 supra and accompanying text.
765 INSTALLMENT INVESTMENT PLANS STUDY 15.
766 Hence the term "unit investment trust" which describes such operations and which
is defined in the Investment Company Act as one form of investment company. Investment
Company Act of 1940 § 4(2), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-4(2) (1964).
767 Id. § 26, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-26 (1964).
768 All securities must have in effect a registration statement on file with the Commission
before they may lawfully be introduced into interstate commerce. Securities Act of 1933 § 5,
15 U.S.C. § 77e (1964).
769 15 U.S.C. § 78o(a)(1) prohibits broker-dealers from making use of interstate commerce to market any security unless the broker-dealer is registered with the Commission.
770 PUBLIC POLICY STATEMENT 224-25.
771 Shares of sixty funds were available, as of 1966, through contractual plan investing.
Id. at 225-26.
772 See generally Bellemore, The Suitability of Common Stocks for Today's Average
Investor, PRESENTATION, Part II-C, at 1.
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generally include lower initial amounts of money to begin investing (ease of
access), the manner in which sales loads are computed which operates to the
planholder's detriment unless he completes his plan (stimulus to savings), the
provision that a planholder may at any time withdraw up to ninety percent of
the amount he has invested and reinvest the same amount without paying a sales
load on the reinvestment (ninety per cent withdrawal rights), frequent communications to the planholders regarding their accounts and payments due (reminder
notices), and the opportunity to purchase group term insurance at nominal cost
to insure that the plan will be completed in the event of the investor's death
(completion insurance).""
Nearly all of these features may be duplicated in one form or another by
the underlying funds themselves, through a voluntary accumulation plan with
However, the characteristic of periodic plans that sets them
term insurance.'
off from their mutual fund relatives is the atypical manner in which the investor pays the sales load. Most mutual funds levy a sales load on sales of their
shares, but unlike the load structure applicable to the mutual funds themselves,
the normal periodic plan commission schedule calls for the investor to pay not
only the load on the units he initially buys, but also a substantial portion of the
load on shares he expects to buy in the future under the plan's contemplated
number of payments.
Statistics indicate that the most popular plan is the $25-per-month-for-tenyears plan, which requires a total investment of $3,000. 7 ' This compares with a
median purchase by all fund investors, in 1966, of $1,240Y.71 While the plan salesman's commission percentage is the same as that of other fund salesmen, the
very nature of the periodic payment plan would discourage the sale of these
plans were a level load charged the purchaser. For example, if the sales load
on a plan's sales was nine per cent, the statutory maximum, the salesman (assuming a level load and the $25 per month plan with an allocation of two per
cent of the sales load to the underwriter and three and one-half per cent each
to the salesman and the dealer) would be entitled to the rather unprincely sum
of $0.88 per month. Of course, over the length of the program, 120 months,
the salesman would receive $105 in commissions from the sale. However, the
practical problems inherent in such an arrangement have caused the salesmanconscious industry to devise a more attractive system of compensation, the frontend load, which rewards the salesman more quickly and surely than does the
level load. This scheme calls for the major portion of the sales loads to be paid
very early. Ordinarily this is achieved by diverting up to one-half of the first
year's payments to pay the sales load; usually by the fourth year sixty-four per
cent of the total load has been paid, while the plan itself is less than forty per cent

773 See AMFPS Staff, An Analysis of and Reply to Chapter XI of the Special Study,
Part IV.
774 As of 1966, 220 of 242 funds listed in one industry compilation offered voluntary
plans; twenty such plans were offered with completion insurance. PUBLIC POLICY STATEMENT
225, 231.
775 SPECIAL STUDY IV 263 '(Table XI-10).
776 See PUBLIC POLICY STATEMENT 206-07.
PRESENTATION,

NOTRE DAME LAWYER

[June, 1969]

completed.77 Payments in the remaining six years are subject to loads of only
four per cent. From the investor's viewpoint, this scheme does not require a total
load of more than nine per cent, but it benefits him less because fewer of his
assets are invested for him in the crucial early years of the plan. The sponsors
state with near religious fervor that the front-end load works for the investing
public's good in two ways. First, since it sets up an equitable and attractive
compensatory system for salesmen, the front-end load encourages salesmen to
reach and inform the vast untapped investing market of the economic advantages of periodic investing in mutual funds.77 Second, the front-end load serves
as a stimulus to investors to maintain the continuity of their plan. Since the
planholder has in effect prepaid the sales load on payments to be made much
later, he will obtain the benefits of the scheme only by completing all or substantially all of the scheduled payments." 8 He must therefore recoup those payments
by adhering to the schedule or else he forfeits their benefit. The validity of these
two arguments would seem to depend more on philosophical conceptions of the
nature of man than on mere reflection of economic benefits. 8 ° Be that as it may,
the front-end load is an essential part of periodic plan investing.7"'
3.

Statutory Impact on Periodic Payment Plans

The provisions of the Investment Company Act of 1940 pertaining to contractual plans reveal the spirit of regulation that pervaded Congress when the
Act was passed. The history of contractual plan investing, set out in one of six
supplemental reports compiled by the SEC in its study of investment trusts and
investment companies, indicates that congressional attention was, to say the least,
richly deserved.
In assessing the causes for the development of the installment plan purchase
of mutual funds, the SEC suggested in 1939 that the public had already had
some two decades of experience in installment purchases of consumer goods. 82
Furthermore, installment purchases of securities under employee stock ownership
plans contributed to public acceptance of investment purchases "on time."7 3
Yet, most relevant of all the causes was the recognition by enterprising businessmen of the possibility that such plans could
get persons with a small amount of money into the money-making end of
industry as distinguished from savings entirely; that persons who actually
acquired interests in sound companies would have an opportunity to make

777 For a discussion of objections to the operation of the front-end load, see notes 817-43
infra and accompanying text.
778 E.g., SPECIAL STUDY IV 136.
779

E.g., PRESENTATION, Part IV,

780

AMFPS has not found itself unequal to this challenge. See, e.g., Cook, The Special

781

The industry further adds:
As far as is known, there is no long-term plan of any kind that people can buy,
from the maternity benefits for life to funeral services for eternity, that does not
involve a "front-end" load, particularly if payments are permitted to lapse. Id. at 28.

at 144.
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some money as distinguished from pure [sic] saving it at a fixed rate of interest. That is the background of the thing.784 (Emphasis added.)

That there was a large potential market for such an investment medium
was beyond doubt; but the very makeup of the class of potential investors signalled problems for the "disclosure" rationale of the earlier adopted Securities Act
and Securities Exchange Act. Implicit in that rationale is the concept of arm'slength bargaining, and it might be readily expected that this class of investors would
lack the financial sophistication to secure the integrity of that rationale. Perhaps
it was this consideration that prompted the SEC, in 1939, to note that:
Although the installment investment plan is only a small part of the entire
investment company business [at the time only one-half per cent of the
assets 15] it is significant from the standpoint of the type of investor to which
these plans are sold-individuals
in the low-income brackets and the salaried
88
and wage-eaming class. 7
It is suggested that this consideration is one of vital importance, and is emphasized by the comparative growth of contractual plans, which as of 1966 represented 9.1 per cent of total mutual fund assets and twenty-five per cent of shareholders. 8
Installment plans mushroomed rapidly after their first appearance in 1930;
by 1936, more than forty such plans were in existence.78 8 However, pre-194 0
plans, though based on a trust as are installment plans today, differed from
modem plans in significant respects. Nearly all of today's installment plans
utilize shares of a particular mutual fund as the underlying security, whereas
only a minority of pre-1940 plans did so.79 A substantial number of them selected
shares of a fixed investment trust as the underlying security."9" In terms of value
of underlying securities, a smaller number invested directly in common stocks.7 9'
This last type, unlike the fund-based and fixed-trust-based types, required a managerial discretion to determine securities appropriate for investment by the plan;
the other two types were non-discretionary, however, since the underlying security
had already been established in the trust agreement. Despite this difference,
several pre-1940 plans charged planowner's fees for management advice, even
though it was not required. 92 Furthermore, in many cases, securities of the
underlying fund or fixed investment trust were offered to the installment planowner only at that security's public offering price, i.e., one that included a sales
load. 93 These features constituted serious abuses; in conjunction with certain
other abuses, they made the planholder's overall costs oppressive.
Charges assessed the pre-1940 planholder were numerous and expensive.
784
785
786
787
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789
790
791
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He of course had to pay a sales load on the units he purchased. The sales load
was paid through the front-end device and ordinarily was "exacted in the first
six or seven months of the 10-year period of the plan." ' In some plans, nearly
a quarter, he had to pay a "creation fee" or "initial fee" that some sponsors
established in addition to or in lieu of the sales load, depending on how the
sponsor obtained other fees."9 '
The sales load of the pre-1940 contractual plan was doubly burdensome
because the plan was an entity separate from the fund. The plan sponsor received the fund's shares at the public offering price, which included the sales load
on those shares; the plan units were in turn offered to the investor subject to
another sales load. As a consequence, the investor was bearing not one but two
sales loads. 9 '
A third charge assessed the investor was a management fee paid to the
plan's own advisor. The extent of the advisory duties in non-discretionary plans
were revealed in the testimony of an official of the pre-1940 era:
Q. In other words, the term "management fee" is really an erroneous
term. There is no management connected with it, is there? It is simply part
of the initial fee?
A. Well there is quite a lot of detail and records kept on each one of
the accounts.
Q. But there still wasn't any actual management of the underlying
property? 7 97
A. No.
Another charge planholders had to bear was a withdrawal fee, levied on
termination of the planholder's account, ostensibly to cover the cost of liquidation
98
and withdrawal, but which served handily as a deterrent to liquidation.
The investor also bore the cost of the trustee's charge, analogous to the contemporary Custodian's fee, which amounted generally to two and one-half per
cent of the total sum payable on the plan. 99 If the investor chose to buy group
term insurance available to assure completion of his plan in the event of his
death, he further bore the cost of the premiums. Although the premiums did
not add to the sponsor's profits (because they were paid to a separate insurance
company), they reduced the amount invested on the purchaser's behalf."' °
Any dividends to which the investor was entitled were also subject to
801
Other
charges, the major ones being the primary and secondary sales loads.
"miscellaneous tribute" such as brokerage, taxes, expenses pertaining to the
holder's fund, positions taken by the sponsor, and exchange fees increased the
overall burden of the investor. 0 2 The SEC calculated that the "average total
794 Id. at 33.
795 Id. at 35-36. It was suggested that this fee also served to discourage those investors
who lacked adequate resources to carry on the program. Id.
796 Id. at 40.
797 Id. at 38.
798 Id. at 37.
799 Id. at 43.
800 Id. at 43-44.
801 Id. at 45.
802 Id. at 54.
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load of all plans was 15.56% of the net amount to be invested if all required
payments were made."' 3 For companies that offered completion insurance,
charges for loads and insurance premiums totalled 23.77 per cent."0 ' Further,
the SEC indicated that the funds with greatest sales were those whose sales
loads (exclusive of insurance costs) were above the average total ranging from
seventeen to twenty per cent."0 ' Of course if the planholder made fewer than
the full number of plan payments, the sales load expressed as a proportion of
the net amount invested would soar to astronomical proportions. 08 As a practical
matter, if we assumed a pre-1940 plan scheduled for $10 monthly payments
over a ten-year period, we would find that little of the "investment" would actually be invested until the second or third year.
The abuses widely prevalent in the pre-1940 sale of contractual plans led
to section 27 of the Investhent Company Act, which deals solely with periodic
payment plans. It expressly limits contractual plan sales loads to nine per cent
of the amount to be invested 0 7 (whereas sales loads on mutual fund shares are
limited only by the vague "unconscionable or grossly excessive" standard 0 8 ),
and sales loads of periodic payment plans are defined to include the sales loads
both of the plan and the underlying security."' 9 To insure that the entire sales
load is not exacted from the investor immediately, section 27 (a) (3) requires
that not more than half the payments of the first twelve months or their equivalent
may be used for the sales load. 10 Additionally, unit investment trusts, the typical
legal structure of periodic payment plan companies, may not have boards of
directors. 1 Management fees are limited by another provision of section 27 to
a standard of reasonableness to be determined by the SEC. 12 The effect of this
provision has been to preclude the use of advisory fees by sponsors of non-discretionary plans.81 3 The 1940 Act also reflects a concern that plans are not
to be sold to persons unable to afford them, for minimum payments were set
at $10 monthly, with the minimum initial payment set at $20.814
By and large, the pertinent provisions of the 1940 Act have succeeded in
eliminating the abuses they were intended to correct. Yet there remain serious
803

Id. at 47.

804 Id.
805 Id. at 52-53.

806 The SEC estimated that the total loading charges for the period 1930-37 were more
than thirty per cent of the net amount invested during that period. Id. at 61.
807 15 U.S.C. § 80a-27(a) (1) "(1964).
808 As seen earlier, sections 22(b) and (c) of the 1940 Act authorize the NASD and the
SEC respectively to make regulations to insure that sales loads are not set at an "unconscionable or grossly excessive" level. Id. §§ 80a-22(b),(c).
809 Section 2(a) (34) of the 1940 Act provides:
In the case of a periodic payment plan certificate, "sales load" includes the sales load
on any investment company securities in which the payments made on such certificate
are invested, as well as the sales load on the certificate itself. Id. § 80a-(2) (a) (34).

810 Id.§ 80a-27(a) (3).
811 Id. § 80a-4(2).
812 Id.§ 80a-27(a) (6).
813 "No advisory fee is charged by the sponsor of the contractual plan company, but such

a fee is charged by the adviser to the underlying fund, and is, in effect, paid by the contractual
planholder." PUBLIC POLICY STATEMENT 226.
814 Investment Company Act of 1940 § 27(a) (4), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-27(a) (4) (1964). Perhaps it is by analogy to this provision that sponsoring companies nearly unanimously require the
introductory payment to be twice the normal monthly payment. As a result, the fifty per cent
sales load applies to a total of thirteen, not twelve, payments. PUBLIC POLICY STATEMENT 230.
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questions as to the necessity, structure, and overall efficacy of contractual plans.
It apparently was not the judgment of the Seventy-sixth Congress that consideration need be given to the question whether there should be unit investment trusts
to carry out the installment investing scheme. Its attention was focused on
the question how such a scheme was to be carried out. Nevertheless, the 1940
congressional answer to the latter question has made very relevant a present
congressional inquiry into the former as well.
There is little doubt that the "trust on a trust" system of the plan companies
was a prime target of the 1940 Act. The provision that made the nine per cent
sales load include both primary and secondary loads eliminated the odious features of paying a load on the certificate as well as on the underlying shares."1 5
It is submitted that this provision has more far-reaching effects, however. Since
the "trust on a trust" arrangement of the unit investment trust scheme was the
backbone of installment investing, it is suggested that the economic justification
for having a separate company - the unit investment trust - no longer obtains.
As the SEC report noted:
In reality, a participant in the installment plan was an investor in the
underlying shares of an investment trust or investment company. The
method by which the investor purchased these investment trusts or investment company shares was virtually the only change effected by the new
investment payment device6 16 (Emphasis added.)
When that "trust on a trust" loading device was eliminated by sections 27 and
2(a) (34), the installment investor moved one step closer to becoming in all
respects an investor in the underlying security. The unit trust, has, however, remained the principal medium of installment investing.
4. Objections to Front-end Loads
It is clear that the front-end load as a means of providing salesmen's commissions can never present the investor with the same advantages he would
obtain were he to pay a level load."' During the first years, the contractual plan
investor is deprived of dividends, capital gains, and voting rights equal to those
enjoyed by the purchaser who invests directly through a voluntary plan. Yet it
might be accepted for the sake of argument that the final difference between the
level load and the front-end load... is a necessary fact of life resulting from the
need for adequate compensation for salesmen without whom the investor would
never even have known of the possibility of investing his limited means.
The fundamental objection to the front-end load is suggested by the experience investors have had in their programs.81" Basically it is the contention
815
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See note 796 supra and accompanying text.
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This fact is dramatically demonstrated by a comparative graph which appears at

PUBLIC POLICY STATEMENT

236.

818 The ultimate difference between the two with respect to payments invested amounts
to 4.46 per cent. Id.
819 For a discussion of the investment experience of pre-Act planholders, see INSTALLMENT INVESTMENT PLANS STUDY 185.
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of the opponents of contractual plans that empirical data supports the conclusion

that most planholders do not complete their scheduled payments. Failure to make
all scheduled payments results in unfavorable consequences to the investor, for
the sales load will never average out to be the same as a level load and may

amount to a good deal higher, depending of how many fewer payments are made.
The extent of these consequences to pre-1940 investors can be determined from

the SEC's 1939 data, which indicated that approximately forty per cent of the
plans initiated between 1930 and 1935 were lapsed by 1935.820 Investors in eleven
companies suffered a total loss of thirty-five per cent of their investments. 821
Such outrageous figures prompted the especially stringent measures of sec-

tion 27 of the Investment Company Act of 1940. To a large extent those abuses
have been eliminated. Subsequent data indicates that fewer investors have since
redeemed their plans at a loss. 22 This is well for the industry, for its contention
that purchasing mutual fund shares through periodic plans benefits the averageincome investor would be meaningless in the face of data which indicate that
most investors would be better off had they never heard of such plans.
The fact that fewer programs result in losses today has not closed discussion
of the matter, however. Still at issue is the question whether a substantial portion
of periodic investors bear sales loads in excess of nine per cent by virtue of the
early redemption of their plans or their failure to make all scheduled payments.
As indicated above, various compilations of data relevant to investor performance
would suggest that they do. It is the conclusion of the SEC that many planholders do bear much higher effective loads, ranging from twenty to fifty per
cent of the total amount invested. 2 This conclusion has been controverted by
the industry, which finds it without merit.8 24 The extent of the impact of the
front-end load has, like other aspects of the sales load problem in general, been
reduced to an interpretation of several sets of statistics advanced by the interested
parties.
The first grouping appeared as an appendix to Special Study IV entitled
Survey of Mutual Fund Investor [Wharton Survey], which was prepared by the
Securities Research Unit of the Wharton School of Finance at the request of the
Special Study staff.82 Additional data was assembled by the Special Study staff
which corroborated the findings of the Wharton Survey. The AMFPS, dissatisfied
with the tenor and accuracy of this data,8 26 in 1964 submitted to the SEC its
own compilation of data relevant to the periodic investment scheme in general
and the front-end load in particular. 2
The Special Study sampled accounts opened in February, 1959, by the nine
820
821
822

823

Id. at 65.
Id.
See notes 840-43 infra and accompanying text.
PUBLIC POLICY STATEMENT

237, 240.

824 Letter from AMFPS to SEC dated October 11, 1963, reprinted in PRESENTATION,
Part I, at 24.
825 SPECIAL STUDY IV, Appendix XI-A, at 265. This Survey should not be confused with
the study of mutual funds popularly known as the Wharton Report, also prepared by the
Securities Research Unit of the Wharton School. WHARTON SCHOOL OF FINANCE AND COMMERcE, A STUDY OF MUTUAL FUNDS, H.R. REP. No. 2274, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962).
826 Letter from AMFPS to SEC dated October 11, 1963, reprinted in PRESENTATION,
Part I, at 6.
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largest contractual plan companies. It found in this sampled group that 35.6
per cent of those accounts had become "inactive" in the three and one-half year
period from February, 1959 to August, 1962. " ' In addition to the inactive accounts, two other categories were constructed: active and fully-paid.8 29 4.7
per cent of the contractual plans purchased in February, 1959 were prematurely
completed by August 31, 1962.8"' The remaining 58.4 per cent were classified
as "active." ' -' Within that category, a wide range of performance was evident,
indicating that not all of the holders of these accounts could be described as
"systematic investors. 832 The median account performance demonstrated that
payments had been made in "roughly three-fifths of the 42 months." '3 However,
this figure must be viewed in light of the fact that most investors made multiple
payments upon entering the plan.83"
In terms of effective sales loads, the Special Study found that 16.8 per cent
of the February, 1959 sample investors bore an effective sales load of fifty per
cent.838 This means that one of every six investors did not make payments beyond
the first year, when reductions in the sales load would apply. Therefore only half
of their payments were invested for them. Investors who had prematurely completed their payments bore an overall load of 8.5 per cent.83 6 Those who were
ahead of their payment schedules (28.1 per cent) comprised the group assessed
by the Special Study as having a "good chance" to bear an effective sales load
of 8.5 per cent.8 ' The 50.4 per cent of the investors in the range between the
two extremes bore sales loads ranging from twenty to almost fifty per cent for
6.9 per cent of the grouping, to fifteen to twenty per cent for two per cent of the
grouping, while no definite assessment could be made for those remaining.83 8
The AMFPS, unwilling to agree with the Special Study's estimation that
a three and one-half year period provided a statistically accurate picture, submitted a compilation of its own data in its Presentationto the SEC Relating to
Chapter XI of the Special Study of Securities Markets [Presentation].839 Its
statistics covered a "duration-of-the-plan" period for plans opened with four of
its largest companies in the ten or twelve year period prior to 1963.4
The thesis of the AMFPS was that in an overall evaluation, contractual plans
are profitable to their investors. The tenor of their statistics indicates that, unlike
pre-1940 contractual planowners today's contractual plan investors prosper from
828 SPECIAL STUDY IV 187-88. "Inactive" was defined to include two categories of accounts: those which had been redeemed (i.e., the investor had requested liquidation of the
account), and those on which no payments had been made for twelve consecutive months.
The former category included 14.8 per cent of inactive accounts, while the latter comprised
22.1 per cent. Id.
829 Id. at 187.
830 Id. at 188.
831 Id.
832 Id.
833 Id. at 190.
834 Id. In fact, eighty-seven per cent had made multiple payments, the average of which
was 5.9 installments, and the median, two installments. Id. at 190-91.
835 Id. at 191.
836 Id. at 192.
837 Id.
838 Id.
839 See note 574 supra.
840 PRESENTATION, Part V, Tables 1-4.
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their investments, with relatively few redemptions at a loss.8 4 ' The industry's
position assumes basically that an investor, even though he does not make all his
scheduled payments, will, as long as he makes a reasonable portion of them, be
bound to gain from his investment. The argument rests, of course, on a history
of capital appreciation in our securities markets."4 2 It rests as well on continued
growth of the underlying funds through sales of new shares. Industry data does
support the conclusion that fewer losses are incurred by today's planholder,4 5
but this conclusion is open to two objections.
One is the obvious economic argumentthat "In a long-term rising'market
the contractual plan usually won't turn out as well as a voluntary purchase
plan." '44 The more capital the investor has "at work," the larger will his long-term
appreciation be. The' second argument is one of policy. Its crux has been summed
up by the Special Study:
In any event, the rationale of justifying a front-end load on the longrange success of many contractual plan purchasers appears to miss a significant point. In the securities business generally, including the mutual fund
field specifically, the reasonableness of a commission rate or markup is
judged in relation to the amount invested, not the ultimate success or
failure of the investment. The contractual plan industry is unique in justifying its sales load by the ultimate average success of the investors involved. 45
In.its simplest terms, the controversy over the contractual plans is similar
to that raging over sales loads, both because it is but one part of a larger problem
and because it is likewise reducible to an issue of policy. This issue has two
aspects, each of which has been previously examined. The first aspect concerns
the oft-claimed, yet seldom verified, industry contention that salesmen. are necessary to maintain a steady capital inflow to prevent fund liquidation.846 The other
aspect relates to salesmen as salesmein, the industry arguing that the proposed
ban or severe restriction on front-end loads will deprive them of their opportunity
to earn a living. 4 This argument has been answered by its opponents in two
ways. First, there is no certainty that such a disastrous result would obtain. As
proof of this, the damning statistics of the Special Study are more than pertinent:
two-thirds of contractual plan salesmen earned less than $1,000 per year in the

841 PRESENTATION, Part V, at 159-75. The AMFPS maintains that although the information contained therein is dated, it still supports the AMFPS position. Letter from Albro C.
Fowler, Vice President-Treasurer of AMFPS, to James Webster, January 24, 1969, on file
with the Notre Dame Lawyer.
842 See generally Bellemore, supra note 772.
843 PRESENTATION, Part V, Tables 1-4. Nevertheless, the losses incurred by the holders of

the four plans were significant. According to the SEC's count, losses for the four plans were

nine, thirty-three, three and twenty-four per cent. PUBLIC POLICY; STATEMENT 243. Investors
in the four plans considered by the AMFPS who failed to make payments beyond the third
year constituted thirty-three per cent of United Funds', twenty-five per cent of First Investors',
thirty-five per cent of Financial Industrial Fund's and forty-three per cent of Hamilton Fund's
investors. Sales loads applicable to payments of thirty-six months or less ranged from fifty
to twenty per cent for the last three, and sixteen to thirty-eight in the first, United Funds.

See also id. at 240;
844

845

PRESENTATION, Part
PUBLIC POLICY STATEMENT 237.
SPECIAL STUDY IV 181.

V, Table 1.

846
847

See notes 633-45 supra and accompanying text.
See note 690 supra and accompanying text.
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securities business;.4 one-third of the contractual plans sold to investors sampled
by the Wharton Survey were sold to relatives or close friends of the salesman; 49
half of the contractual plan salesmen leave the business annually." ° Taken together, these statistics impugn the validity of the use of the front-end load to
provide sustained employment to a fairly stable selling force. Second, the pending
bills' proponents question whether it is in the continued public interest to allow
contractual plan salesmen to profit at the expense of their countrymen."' 1
There is one last piece of evidence critical to the front-end load problem an analysis of how the voluntary payment plans have fared. Since these plans
operate under a level load, they do not contain the built-in stimulus to savings
claimed by the contractuals. However, where voluntary accumulation plans are
sold with term insurance, the voluntary plans take on an identity similar to the
contractual plans. 52 Premiums are deducted from the monthly scheduled payments for fund shares; if the payment is not received within one month after it
falls due, the insurance lapses. Monthly reminder notices are mailed to the investor to minimize that possibility. Therefore, the investor is provided with
motivation to invest systematically. Recent data indicates that a stimulus does
indeed exist, for the consistency of some insured voluntary planholders has been
amazingly high. 5 3
Therefore, the front-end load is not the only means available to stimulate
savings, nor is it necessarily the most effective means of doing so. It may not be
justified by the fact that overall the investor does not lose anything on his
investment (a strange contention indeed), and it further appears that justification on the basis of the industry's need for salesmen is untenable. All in all, it
would appear that a close examination of the present status of contractual plan
investing is warranted; it would seem that very little stands in the way of abolition
or severe curtailment of the front-end load.
5. Proposals for Change
There are now pending before Congress two proposals to effectuate these
results. Both are provisions contained in S.29684 and S.34,855 which have been
examined earlier for their proposed enactments regarding sales loads. S. 296
presents the more stringent measures of the two: it proposes to abolish completely
the front-end load by requiring that no plan may be offered if "the amount of
sales load deducted from any one payment exceeds proportionately the amount
848 SPECIAL STUDY IV 121.
849 Id. at 339.
850 SPECIAL STUDY I 96-97.
851 The industry does not hesitate to point out that it does not receive investor complaints
about high sales loads, and points to this as one more instance of popular acceptance of the
sales loads now prevalent in the industry. 1967 House Hearings 54.
852 Group term insurance in the amount of the plan ordinarily is obtainable for a relatively
small fee, comparable to the Custodian's fee in contractual plans. Upon death of the insured
before all the scheduled payments are made, the term insurance completes the plan. Hence, the
name "completion insurance."
853 SPECIAL STUDY IV 198.
854 S. 296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 16 '(1969).
855 S. 34, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 16 (1969).
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deducted from any other payment .... "' In the opinion of some members of
Congress, this represents too harsh a step. Therefore the alternate proposal of
S. 34 allows the load deducted in the first four years of the plan to remain at
sixty-four per cent of the total load to be deducted."" However, it calls for
a reallocation of the application of the load level so that "not more than 20 per
centum of any 1 year's payment may be deducted for sales load .... ""8
This plan is reinforced by a further provision that all periodic payments in each
of the first four years must be equal. 59
This second proposal appears to be a compromise measure based on the
experience of the IDS complex. 60° The standard front-end load on periodic payment plans for accumulation of shares in Investors Stock Fund, Inc., is twenty
per cent for the first year, eighteen per cent for each of the next two, and seven
per cent for the fourth - or sixty-three per cent of the total sales load to be
deducted in the first four years.8"" The S. 34 measure seems designed to take
advantage of the IDS experience - one that impliedly indicates that a stable
selling force can be maintained at those load levels 62 - to bolster the congressional position that it has no intention of harming the funds themselves, or of
depriving any American wage-earner of his living. This apparently reasonable
position becomes extremely important in light of a recent statement by the newlyelected President of the Investment Company Institute, Robert Bogle, to the
effect that the industry finds primary objection only in proposed contractual
plan amendments."' Perhaps this measure comes as part of an effort to secure
harmonious acceptance by the industry in order to insure the hoped-for betterment of the securities market in general. Whatever the reasons for this compromise, it seemingly represents a generous concession to the contractual plan industry.
S. 34 does not attempt to lower the maximum sales load which may presently
be charged. No explanation of the reasoning behind this decision is given in the
Analysis of S. 34; a mere announcement that no change is intended constitutes
the extent of comment. 8 4 S. 296, on the other hand, proposes to abolish the

856 S. 296, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. § 16 (1969).
857 S. 34, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 16 (1969).
858 ANALYSIS OF S. 34, at 8.
859 S. 34, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 16 (1969).
860 Investors Diversified Services (IDS) is one of several fully integrated distribution
organizations. See text accompanying note 475 supra. Organized in 1894, IDS is a faceamount certificate company that manages in addition to its own assets, those of eight other
investment companies of the Investors Group: Investors Mutual Inc.; Investors Stock Fund,
Inc.; Investors Selective Fund, Inc.; Investors Variable Payment Fund, Inc.; Investors
Syndicate of America; Investors Accumulation Plan, Inc.; New Dimension Fund, Inc.;
Progressive Fund, Inc. Assets of the group in 1967 totalled over $7 billion, making IDS the
largest company of its kind in the world. IDS, A Quicx Loox AT A UNIQUE FINANCIAL
INSTITUTION
(1967). Its representatives distribute shares of these companies and also
distribute insurance policies of the IDS subsidiary, Investors Syndicate Life Insurance and
Annuity Company. Id.

861

IDS,

PROSPECTUS,

February 9, 1968, I.

862 IDS has approximately 4000 field representatives, whose projected average compensation for 1967 was $7,233 from the sale of all IDS products. Statement of Robert M. Loeffler,
1967 House Hearings 464-66.
863 The Wall Street Journal, Jan. 24, 1969, at 8, col. 2.
864 ANALYSIS oF S. 34, at 9.
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statutory maximum, allowing competition 8 6to
determine the sales load to be
5
charged on sales of periodic payment plans.
While there exist these differences over the sales load, the scope of each
bill's provisions relating to periodic payment plans extends to the marginal selling
operations now feeding, like parasites, off the contractual plan industry.86 The
sponsors of the legislation quite properly feel that streamlining the contractual
plan industry will not only put the installment investment scheme in proper perspective but will as well eliminate the other problems associated with contractual
plan investing.
6. Necessity of Unit Trusts
The very fact that plan sponsors perform no management functions and
merely purchase shares of underlying funds raises the question of whether they
and their "trust on a trust" organizations are necessary to meet the needs of
the wage-earning investor. That direct offering of such an installment package
by the funds themselves is more than economically feasible can be demonstrated
by reference to another form of installment purchasing made available to the
investor by the funds, the so-called "voluntary plan."' " Ordinarily, voluntary
plans require a higher initial payment (typically about $250) and usually require
somewhat higher payments than contractual plans. Unlike contractual plans,
they have no set goal or amount to be invested." 8 More importantly, voluntary
plans do not make use of the front-end load, but rather apply the standard level
load to investments made thereunder. Thus, there is no load-provided stimulus
to saving; hence, the emphasis on the voluntariness of future payments. Despite
these differences, the voluntary plan is sufficiently similar to show that the unit
trust scheme of installment investing is largely an economic anachronism.
The continued existence of contractual plans is traceable to more than mere
inertia and history, however. It is believed that the primary reason that funds
have not turned to offering periodic payment plans themselves lies in section
27(a) (5) of the Investment Company Act which states that a registered investment company which is also a management company may not sell periodic
payment plans if the "proceeds . .. or the securities in which such proceeds are
invested are subject to management fees ... exceeding such reasonable amount
as the Commission may prescribe, whether such fees are payable to such company or to investment advisers thereof ....
"69 (Emphasis added.) The rel865 S. 296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 16 (1969). Interestingly, the SEC had recommended
that sales loads on contractual plans be reduced to five per cent, since "[t]here is no reason
why contractual plan purchases should be especially costly to investors." PuBLIc POLICY
STATEMENT 247.
866 Former Chairman Cohen succinctly stated the Commission's position regarding the
compensatory system and the "umbrella" it provides to parasite operations:
It is hardly necessary or even desirable for the government to maintain a price
structure under which investors - particularly small investors subsidize an inefficient, over-sized distribution system that uses manpower lavishly and indiscriminately recruits hosts of salesmen. SEC, Statement No. 2 1967 House Hearings 112,
867 See notes 115-16 supra and accompanying text.
868 In many instances voluntary payment plans are sold as a means of obtaining automatic
reinvestment of dividends. SPECIAL STUDY IV 201.
869 15 U.S.C. § 80a-27(a)(5) (1964).
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evance of that provision lies in the standard of reasonableness which management fees of most mutual funds would be subjected to should the fund offer such
plans directly. As will be seen in Part VI, funds are now subjected to a "grossly
unreasonable" standard. The difference between the two is the subject of detailed analysis in Part VI and need not be repeated here. It should be sufficient
to note at this point that the funds have shown a marked disinterest in having a
standard of reasonableness applied to their advisory contracts. In short, it is
submitted that the unit trust scheme of installment investing has been retained
primarily to serve as a shield against application of the reasonableness standard
to advisory fees.
It should be noted that in the event neither of the proposed bills is enacted,
there exists a non-legislative approach to remedy the more egregious cases where
contractual plans have been foisted upon those unable to afford them. The
suitability rules "° should prove a fruitful means for preventing sale of contractual
plans to persons who dearly would prosper more from investment media where
the front-end load is not operative and where they would therefore benefit more
quickly and surely from their investments. This would be especially pertinent
where comparable media, such as voluntary plans, are not explained to the investor. More aggressive use of the suitability rule would certainly seem warranted
should Congress fail to provide a legislative means of dealing with the front-end
load.
V. Mutual Fund Encroachment by Related Institutional Investors
A. Banks and the Mutual Fund Industry
1. Introduction
The battles over mutual fund reform have been fought in strange arenas,
for the reformers' principal adversary, the industry itself, has been none too consistent in maintaining the integrity of its battlelines. Throughout the congressional
hearings on the mutual fund legislation of 1967, the industry insisted that the
abolition of retail price maintenance in favor of competition would wreck the
industry, the economy, and quite possibly the country."-' Yet at the same time
it was vehemently contending that competition already was at work in the in72
dustry
The strangeness of both endorsing and condemning' competition in nearly
the same breath was no new experience for spokesmen of the industry in 1967.
A year earlier, the industry inveighed against S. 270473 which would have provided
banks with channels of access to the investing public on terms substantially
similar to those the industry enjoyed.1 7 That bill, introduced by Senator Thomas
870 See notes 572-78 supra: and accompanying text.
871 See, e.g., Statement of Robert M. Gardiner, 1967 Senate Hearings 572.
872 See, e.g., NASD Memorandum Re the Importance of the Role of Section 22(d), 1967
Senate Hearings 603.
-873 S. 2704, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965).
874 As will appear below, one form of collective investment trust - the managing agency
account - constitutes operation of a mutual fund. See notes 897-901 infra and accompanying
text.
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J. McIntyre

on October 22, 1965,"' was aimed specifically at making provision
for the entry of banks into what amounted in substance to operation of mutual
funds.

As the bill's opponents saw the matter, the issue of allowing banking institutions to compete directly with mutual funds was divided into two questions:
Should the banks be allowed in principio to operate investment schemes that
closely parallel mutual funds? And, if they should be so allowed, which governmental agency should regulate them?"7 6 Although this approach may seem logical
enough, the tactical use the industry made of it earned them no overwhelming

support from the members of Congress. 7

2. Regulation of Managing Agency Accounts
The controversy which led to the proposed legislation arose over a conflict
among three federal agencies, the Comptroller of the Currency, the Federal Reserve Board and the SEC, as to which agency would have jurisdiction over the
already approved "managing agency accounts."
The Comptroller of the Currency, authorized under Public Law 87-722...
to assume control of certain activities of national banks, had already promulgated
part 9 of title 12 of the Code of Federal Regulations [Regulation 9],"'0 which
allows a national bank to assume as one of its "fiduciary powers" 80 the power to
act as a "managing agent" for "accounts" established with the bank.8 " A managing agency account functions like a mutual fund because the bank establishes a
pool of assets to which members of the public are invited to contribute (minimum
initial deposit of $10,000 required 8 2 ). The commingled funds deposited would
then be invested in common stocks, with the depositor (investor) sharing pro
rata in any increase in the value of the securities purchased.
875 111 CONG. R c. 28104-05 (1965) (remarks of Senator McIntyre).
876 Testimony of Robert W. Haack, President of NASD, Hearings on S. 2704 Before a
Subcommittee of the Committee on Banking and Currency,89th Cong., 2d Sess., 126-27 (1966)
[hereinafter cited as 1966 Senate Hearings].
877 The industry's argument that banks should not be allowed to operate such schemes and
alternately that if they should be allowed, they should be regulated by the SEC, earned them
this rebuke from Chairman of the Subcommittee Senator A. Willis Robertson of Virginia:
You come before us and endorse the restricted approach of the SEC, but say "if
we can knock it out, that is what we are going to do."
It seems to me that is not a very consistent position to take. With all due
deference, it seems to me that it weakens your position before this committee.
1966 Senate Hearings 129-130.
878 Act of September 9, 1962, 76 Stat. 668, 12 U.S.C. § 92(a) '(1964).
879 12 C.F.R. § 9.1 (1967).
880 12 U.S.C. § 24 (1964), which sets out the corporate powers of national banks, provides:
"The business of dealing in securities and stock by the [bank] shall be limited to purchasing
and selling such securities and stock without recourse, solely upon the order, and for the
account of, customers, and in no case for its own accounts ...
881 12 C.F.R. § 9.18 (a) provides:
Where not in contravention of local law, funds held by a national bank as
fiduciary may be invested collectively:
(3) In a common trust fund, maintained by the bank exclusively for the
collective investment and reinvestment of monies contributed thereto by the bank in
its capacity as managing agent under a managing agency agreement expressly providing that such monies are received by the bank in trust.
882 E.g., Brief of First National City Bank at 6, First National City Bank, SEC Release
No. 4538 '(March 9, 1966), reprinted in 1966 Senate Hearings 187, 202.
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This commingled managing agency account is one of three types of pooled
funds that banks are authorized to handle. The other two are the common trust

fund, which is comprised of assets held by a "bank in its capacity as executor,
administrator, guardian or trustee," ' and collective funds, which consist of
the assets of a trust qualified under section 401 of the Internal Revenue Code.
The latter include trusts for employee pension, welfare, profit-sharing and bonus
plans, and also plans established under the Smathers-Keogh Act (commonly
called H.R. 10 plans) for retirement benefits for self-employed individuals."8 4
The commingled account differs from the second and third types in significant
respects, however; the managing agency account had not been authorized prior
to 1962, whereas the other two had been authorized for some time prior thereto.8 5
Further, the trust accounts established under the second and third methods come
under the bank's aegis through rather formal channels, those associated with
traditional banking functions. On the other hand, the managing agency account

involves a form of active solicitation by the bank of the deposited assets. The
difference has been summarized by a prominent economist: "While a bank's
trust accounts hardly come to it from the skies, they do not, on the other hand,
normally involve the active daily battle for business characteristic of the work
of brokers and dealers." '
The implication is, of course, that the managing
agency trust form of the pooled or commingled investment trusts must do exactly
what the mutual fund must do to obtain sales of its shares: actively solicit investors.
The striking similarity of the managing agency account to the typical mutual
fund convinced the SEC that the managing agency fund was a form of invest-

ment company and therefore would be subject to SEC regulation under the
Investment Company Act.""1 With that decision, three federal regulatory agencies
became involved in regulation of banks and their managing agency accounts:
883 12 C.F.R. § 9.18 (a) (1) (1967).
884 1966 Senate Hearings 21. The term "collective funds" is used herein to refer specifically to this form of pooling of assets for investment. For an explanation of the operation of
H.R. 10 plans and its application to a model pension plan, see Note, Is H.R. 10, As Amended
and Properly Implemented, Still "A Lion Who Merely Squeaks"? 43 NOTRE DA.sn LAWYER
521 (1968).
885 Common trust funds were in existence prior to enactment of the Investment Company
Act of 1940 and were specifically exempted from its coverage by section 3(c) (3) of the Act.
15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)'(3) (1964). After 1955, banks were allowed by Regulation F of the
Federal Reserve Board to "use the commingled fund mechanism for the investment management of assets they administer under tax-qualified employee-pension, stock-bonus, and profitsharing plans." 1966 Senate Hearings 28. The H.R. 10 plans, however, were authorized only
in 1962. The SEC claimed jurisdiction over them under the Securities Act, since in its judgment H.R. 10 plans constituted public offerings of a security. 1966 Senate Hearings 33. However, securities issued by a bank are specifically exempted from the Securities Act by section
3(a) (2) of the 1933 Act which exempts "any security issued by . . . any national bank."
15 U.S.C. § 77c(a) (2) (1964). Therefore, an additional basis for the assertion of SEC
jurisdiction - a "something else" in the opinion of one official - was necessary:
That "something else" is an esoteric legal concept termed the ectoplasmic theory.
According to this theory it is argued that a collective investment fund is not, in fact,
an integral and organically associated function of a bank, but is instead a selfcontained entity having only an incidental relationship to a bank.
Applying this doctrine the purposes of the 1933 act may be served, for the
"security" is not issued by a bank but by a collective investment fund. Likewise
the 1940 act jurisdiction is upheld, for although the bank is not an investment
company, the "ectoplasmic fund" becomes one. 1966 Senate Hearings 34.
886 Statement of Eugene V. Rostow, 1966 Senate Hearings 80.
887 Id. at 33.
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the Comptroller, who was specifically authorized under statute; ss the Federal
Reserve Board [FRB] 8 9 ; and the SEC, under both the Securities Act of 1933
and the Investment Company Act of 1940.0 Understandably, such a situation
presented a threat of overlapping or conflicting regulations by federal agencies.
It was in this context that S. 2704 arose; s9' it was introduced to insure
uniform regulation of such funds by delegating control over the managing agency
account to the federal banking authorities (i.e., the Comptroller).892 However,
developments just prior to consideration of the bill by the Senate Subcommittee
on Financial Institutions removed a good deal of the uncertainty theretofore affecting the situation. First National City Bank of New York [FNCB], the first
national banking institution to attempt establishment of a managing- agency
account under Regulation 9, indicated to the Comptroller that it intended to
apply to the SEC for registration of its account and for exemptions from certain
provisions of the 1940 Act."' This approach, implicitly recognizing the authority
of each agency, met with the approval of the Comptroller. 94 Subsequently, on
March 9, 1966, one day after the initiation of the hearings on S. 2704, the SEC
released its decision, accepting the registration and granting all but one of the
requested exemptions. 9 " Since the way was cleared for a standard procedure
to be followed in setting up such accounts, the possibility for conflicting regulations was eliminated and S. 2704 became unnecessary.
In its testimony in opposition to the bill, the mutual fund industry contended
that the bill was both inappropriate (because it assigned control of what was
obviously an investment company to the banking authorities and not to the SEC)
and unnecessary in light of the accord reached between the SEC and the Comptroller.89 8 The industry contention that FNCB's scheme is an investment company
is of course correct, as a closer examination of the account reveals: investors would
have to make a minimum deposit of $10,000 to enter the fund; their ownership
would then be represented by units of participation in proportion to their contribution to the fund, the holder enjoying one vote per unit.89 Direction of the
account was to be assumed by a committee of seven, all but one to be members of
FNCB's Trust Department.9 8 Investment of assets deposited would then be
made in common stocks and securities convertible to common stocks, to be determined by the Bank which would act as investment advisor. 99 A fee of one-half
888

See text accompanying note 878 supra.

889 FRB jurisdiction did not extend to trust activities, however, and therefore is not
discussed further in this analysis.
890 See note 887 supra and accompanying text.
891 See Statement of Senator Thomas J. McIntyre, 1966 Senate Hearings 21.
892 Section 8(a) of the proposed legislation provided in part: "The Comptroller of the
Currency shall prescribe such regulations as he may deem appropriate to carry out the
provisions of this Act . . . ." S. 2704, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. § 8(a) (1965).
893 1966 Senate Hearings 74, 197. Application was filed on August 24, 1965. Brief of
First National City Bank, supra note 882, at 1.
894 Statement of the Comptroller of the Currency, The Wall Street journal, August 26,
1965, at 6, col. 2.
895 First National City Bank, SEC Investment Company Act Release No. 4538 (March 9,
1966), [1964-66 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 1177,332, at 82,585.
896 Statement of Joseph E. Welch, 1966 Senate Hearings 67, 73-74.
897 Brief of First National City Bank, supra note 882, at 6-7, 1966 Senate Hearings202-03.
898

Id.

899 Id. First National City Bank, SEC Release No. 4538 (March 9, 1966), [1964-66
Transfer Binder] CCH FED. Sac. L. REP. f 77,332, at 82,591.
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per cent for this investment advice would be charged each 'of the participants,
not the fund itself."' No sales load or equivalent thereof would be charged the
depositor upon initiation of his deposit." 1
Despite the obvious similarities of this type of account to a mutual fund,
the banking industry in its appearance in support of S. 2704 at first contended
that the account was not a mutual fund. 912 Primary among the reasons for this
belief was the fact that the account would attract a class of investor different
from the typical mutual fund shareholder.903 This conclusion was reached in
light of the very high initial payment and the fact that the account's portfolio
would be valued on a relatively infrequent basis (once monthly), thereby discouraging any but the long-term investor.
However, the FNCB decision to recognize SEC jurisdiction thereby accepted the status of its managing agency account as an investment company.
That the account was to be considered an investment company was not inherently destructive of the Bank's investment scheme; but certain provisions of
the Investment Company Act would have presented prohibitive obstacles to its
successful fruition. These provisions concerned primarily the director requirements imposed on the account by section 10 of the 1940 Act.
Section 10(c) expressly states that no registered investment company can
have a majority of its directors consisting of officers or directors of a bank." 4
Since FNCB had intended to utilize members of its Trust Department to serve
as directors, 0 ' it therefore requested an exemption from section 10(c). The
Commission, in examining the request, noted that the spirit of section 10(c)
controlled its application, and reasoned that since the account sought to be
registered could not hav6 existed prior to 1963, it was not included specifically
in the proscription of section 10(c)."' Nor, the SEC decision continued, did
the account offer numerous possibilities for conflicts of interest, e.g., investing
in bank loans to shore them up, since the banking institution would have to treat
the account in a fiduciary context, all aspects of which would be subject to inspection by the federal banking authorities.0 7 The Commission therefore granted
the exemption.
The Bank further requested an exemption from subsection (b) (3) of section
10, which prohibits an investment company from having as a director, officer,
or employee an affiliate of an investment advisor, unless a majority of its board
of directors are not affiliates of the advisor. 0 The provision was written originally
900 Brief of First National City Bank, supra note 882, at 4; 1966 Senate Hearings 45.
901 Brief of First National City Bank, supra note 882, at 7.
902 Statement of the American Bankers Association, 1966 Senate Hearings 57: "We are
not trying to be in the mutual fund business. Those are investment companies I think operating under the Investment Company Act of 1940. We are not that." Id.
903 Id. at 45-46.
904 Section 10(c) provides:
After the effective date of this subchapter no registered investment company
shall have a majority of its board of directors consisting of persons who are officers
or directors of any one bank ....
15 U.S.C. § 80a-10(c) (1964).
905 See note 898 supra and accompanying text.
906 First National City Bank, SEC Investment Company Act Release No. 4538 (March 9,
1966), [1964-66 Transfer Binder] COH FED. SEC. L. REP. 1 77,332, at 82,588-89.
907 Id. at 82,590.
908 15 U.S.C. § 80a-10(b) (3) '(1964).
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to prevent an investment banker from organizing an investment company to
exploit the companies whose securities constituted the fund's portfolio or to serve
as a dumping ground for securities the investment banker was underwriting. 9 '
Since FNCB is limited to underwriting debt securities of governmental authorities
and the account proposed to invest only in common stocks, the Commission felt
there was little chance for those abuses to occur.91 Accordingly, it granted the
requested exemption from section 10(b) (3).
City Bank also applied for an exemption from section 10(d) (2)."1 Under
subsection (d), a registered investment company may well have all but one of
its directors as affiliates of the investment advisor provided the fund meets certain
requirements.91 2 The Bank proposed to meet all but one - the requirement of
subsection (2) that the advisor be "engaged principally in the business of rendering investment supervisory services as defined in said subchapter II . . .. ,
Since the Bank was to act as the advisor, it would be unable to satisfy this provision. The Commission denied this requested exemption, noting that the Bank
had offered no evidence to indicate that the account could not function without
914
the exemption.
In sum, the FNCB account was accepted for registration substantially as
proposed. But the Commission's acceptance was not unanimous. Commissioner
(now Chairman) Budge, in an ominous dissent, indicated that FNCB had won
a battle but not the war: "The granting of the requested exemptions is contrary
to the clearly expressed policy of the Congress against bank domination of investment companies."91' 5 This objection has relevance to the first question the mutual
fund industry had raised regarding banks' entrance into mutual funds, that is,
whether they should be allowed to do so at all. Industry spokesmen had intimated in their appearance before the subcommittee that upon an unfavorable
disposition by the SEC they would attempt to block the banks' entry through
the courts.91
3. Judicial Scrutiny of the Managing Agency Accounts -

The Camp Decision

In 1967, true to its word, the Investment Company Institute, as representative of the mutual fund industry, applied to the District Court for the District of
Columbia for an injunction against the Comptroller of the Currency to restrain
909 First National City Bank, SEC Investment Company Act Release No. 4538 (March 9,
1966), [1964-66 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. I 77,332, at 82,591.
910 Id.
911 Id.
912 Those requirements are that the company be open-ended, that it charge no sales load,
that it limit fees on redemption to two per cent of net asset value, that it incur no promotional
or advertising costs, that the management fee be limited to less than one per cent of net asset
value, that all administrative expenses be borne by the advisor, that there be only one class of
stock, and that its investment advisor be engaged principally in the business of providing investment advice. Investment Company Act of 1940 § 10(d), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-10(d) (1964).
913 Id. § 80a-10(d)(2) (1964).
914 Further, a bank is excluded from the definition of investment advisor by the Investment
Advisers Act § 202, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(11) (1964).
915 First National City Bank, SEC Investment Company Act Release No. 4538 (March 9,
1966), [1964-66 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. RasP. 1177,332 at 82,593 '(dissenting
opinion).
916 Statement of Marc A. White, 1966 Senate Hearings 129.
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him from authorizing national banks to operate commingled agency accounts.91
It also sought a declaratory judgment adjudicating Regulation 9 to be invalid.91
The case, Investment Company Institute v. Camp,"9 arose through cross motions
for summary judgment, since the parties agreed that no factual issues were involved. Before proceeding to the substance of the action, the court first examined
the issue of standing interposed by the Comptroller, and ruled that the "plain' °
and theretiffs were the recipients by implication of congressional protection 92
fore were entitled to sue. The court then turned to the principal question whether the "Comptroller has the statutory authority to empower national commercial banks to create, organize and manage the commingled account." ''
Taking as its initial premise the statement that banks can exercise only those
powers expressly conferred on them by federal statute or necessarily accruing
to them by implication therefrom,9"' the court examined 12 U.S.C. § 92a(a),
which authorized the Comptroller to take over regulation of national banks, to
determine whether that statute authorized the Comptroller to sanction the
commingled account. That section provides:
The Comptroller of the Currency shall be authorized and empowered
to grant by special permit to national banks applying therefor, when not in
contravention of State or local law, the right to act as trustee, executor,
administrator, registrar of stocks and bonds, guardian of estates, assignee,
receiver, committee of estates of lunatics, or in any other fiduciary capacity
in which StAte banks, trust companies, or other corporations which come
into competition with national banks are permitted923to act under the laws
of the State in which the national bank is located.
The court considered the question thus presented by analysis of that statute to
be "whether or not the commingled account can be considered a fiduciary activity
as provided by the statute."92 (Emphasis added.) The court found a problem
in the technical relationship between the unit holder and the bank. It reasoned
that since the basis of the relationship was contractual, the resultant relation
was one of principal and agent, as the name of the scheme dearly implied.925
After examining the fiduciary duties of an agent, the court held that they were
similar to those imposed on a trustee but did not constitute a true fiduciary relationship as defined by the courts and treatise writers.92 6 It therefore concluded
that "the managing agency relationship does not fall within the traditional
fiduciary powers as delineated in 12 U.S.C. § 92a(a).,"gz
The Camp court then turned to the "competitive provision" of section
92a(a). This provision authorizes national banks to operate in the same manner
as other banks are allowed to operate by state laws. Since FNCB is located in the
917
918
919
920

Investment Company Institute v. Camp, 274 F. Supp. 624 (D.D.C. 1967).
Id. at 627.
274 F. Supp. 624 (D.D.C. 1967).
Id. at 636.

921
922
923

Id. at 638.
Id.
12 U.S.C. § 92a(a) (1964).

924

274 F. Supp. at 639.

925
926

Id.
Id. at 639-40.

927 Id.
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state of New York, the court proceeded to examine the relevant provisions of
that state's banking laws. Its search failed to produce any indications that the
New York statutes permitted such operations, however, so it concluded that the
commingled managing agency account is permitted neither by federal statutes
nor by provisions relevant to its operation under the saving "competitive pro' 92 8
vision.
That part of the court's analysis in Camp would have alone been sufficient to
grant the requested injunction. However, the decision proceeded to treat the
larger issue - whether national banks are positively prohibited from operating
commingled accounts by the mandate of some other federal statute. The court
found the controlling statute to be section 32 of the Glass-Steagall Act 29
which provides in substance that no officer, director, or employee of a corporation that issues securities may at the same time serve as an officer, director, or
employee of a national bank. The first issue raised by analysis of the statute is,
therefore, whether the units of participation issued by the account should be considered "securities." Although the Comptroller of the Currency attempted to
show that the units were not securities, the court found persuasive authority that
the account was indeed issuing securities, since "the test for a security is whether
the scheme involves an investment of money in a common enterprise with profits
930
to come solely from the efforts of others."
The mere fact that the account issued securities was not conclusive as to
the application of section 32, however. A second question raised under section 32
is whether the issuing company is an entity separate from the national bank. This
problem had already been treated by the FRB in a memorandum dealing with the
relation of section 32 to the commingled account.9"' As the Board had noted,
section 32 is applicable only if both questions are answered in the affirmative:
the issuing company must be distributing securities and it must be legally separate
from the national bank." 2
Under the FRB's analysis, appropriate considerations were "the limited
coverage of the statute [section 32] and its purposes in the light not only of past
principles followed by the Board, but also in the light of permissible banking
activity and the character of the present [FNCB] proposal."933 The limited reach
of section 32 was particularly significant to the Board's treatment of the question;
it noted that the proposed scheme would for the purposes of the Investment
Company Act certainly be considered a separate operation. However, it further
noted that the applicability of one federal statute does not automatically require
the application of another, particularly if the latter has a much more limited
scope."' The Board therefore determined that the account could not be con-

928 Id. at 641.
929 12 U.S.C. § 78 (1964).
930 274 F. Supp. at 642.
931 Memorandum of Federal Reserve Board, Legal Considerationsunder Section 32 of the
Banking Act of 1933 in Connection with the Proposed Commingled Investment Account of
First National City Bank of New York, 1966 Senate Hearings 581.
932 Id. at 583.
933 Id. at 584.
934 Id. at 585.
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sidered a separate entity, and consequently the provisions of section 32 would
not be violated by FNCB's operation of its investment scheme.
The Camp court was not impressed with this interpretation of the "prophylactic provisions of section 32."935 It felt that the dear and overriding intent
of Congress would be defeated if section 32 were given such a narrow interpretation. The court clearly remained unconvinced that all possibilities of incest
would be barred by the FRB's interpretation. Accordingly, it held that the
provisions of Regulation 9 authorizing commingled managing agency accounts
were illegal, insofar as they did not comply with section 32.936 At present, therefore, national banks may not operate accounts similar to the one proposed by
FNCB. The Camp decision is now on appeal, however, so it would be premature to indicate at this point that commingled accounts will not be authorized
in the future." 7
4. Proposed Legislation
There is a possibility that national banks may be allowed to operate agency
accounts sooner than through reversal of the Camp decision. In both the bills
now pending before the Senate (Senator Sparkman's S. 34938 and Senator McIntyre's S. 2961s") there are provisions which expressly state that no existing
statutory provision shall be deemed to prevent the operation of a commingled
managing agency account.94 It has been suggested that the inclusion of such
provisions serves not only the obvious purpose of clarifying the rather uncertain
relation of the accounts to the Glass-Steagall Act, but brings as well the support
of the powerful banking lobby squarely behind the bills.9 '
On the other hand, it may be expected, especially in light of a statement
made by the recently elected president of the Investment Company Institute,9 4 s
that industry opposition to the bills as they relate to banking schemes will not
15e lessened. 'The basis for this opposition is unclear. There is good reason to
believe that the proposed banking investment plans do not represent a formidable
threat to the mutual funds, since the rather large financial prerequisites to depositing in a commingled account are prohibitive to most. 4 3 However, the
935 274 F. Supp. at 647-48.
936 Id. at 648.
937 See INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE, 1968 ANNUAL REPORT 11.
938 S. 34, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. (1969).
939 S. 296, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. (1969).
940 Section 12(d) of S. 34 provides:
Section 22 of such Act (15 U.S.C. § 80a-22) is further amended by adding a
new subsection at the end thereof as follows:
(h) no provision of law shall be deemed to prohibit" (1) the creation or operation of a registered investment company or a collective trust

fund exempt from the definition of 'investment company' under section (3) (11) of this title,
which is maintained by a bank or banks in compliance with any applicable regulations of the
Comptroller of the Currency . .. ."
S. 34, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 12(d) (1969). Section 12(b) of S. 296 is identical. S. 296,
91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 12(b) (1969).
941 N.Y. Times, Nov. 17, 1967, at 71, col. 5.
942 See text accompanying note 863 supra.
943 Former Chairman Cohen noted during the 1967 House Hearings that eighty-three per
cent of all mutual fund investments were below $5,000 and ninety-three per cent were below
$10,000. 1967 House Hearings 155. This would appear to preclude use of the commingled
managing agency fund for nearly all mutual fund investors.
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fact that the banks charge no sales load may be taken as a further unfavorable
reflection on the high distribution costs in mutual fund selling, and the funds
might understandably be unwilling to have further comparisons made on that
score. What is quite possibly their primary motivation is the fear that the banks
may aggressively push for passage of the entire bill in order to obtain advantages of those provisions relating to banks. Such a move might well upset industry plans to effect a compromise on those aspects of the bill which relate to
the industry. Its apparent willingness to reach agreement on the sales load
issue944 and related topics may represent a desire to achieve more favorable terms
than are now contained in either of the pending bills.
At the time of this writing, banks are not allowed to organize commingled
agency accounts. It is very possible that this situation will be changed in the
near future, however, either by reversal of the Camp decision or by passage of
new legislation. The consequences of such action are not immediately predictable; certainly the advantages of pooled investing would be more available
to a greater number of people in a framework they might find more compatible
with their financial condition. Perhaps the most far-reaching consequences,
however, are those which are not directly related to the mutual fund controversy,
yet are awesome in comparison. They concern the advent of a new phenomenon:
the institutionalization of the securities markets. This problem is currently the
subject of an intensive SEC study which hopes to determine the proper place of
that movement in traditional securities practices.945
B. Insurers and the Mutual Fund Industry
1. Introduction
As one recent writer speaking about another potential rival of the funds
put it, "Consider the competition the insurers can offer existing mutual funds.9"
The "insurers" he refers to are the giants of the insurance business who are now
striving mightily to reach the investing dollar that had previously remained the
private preserve of the mutual funds. Their poaching has caused some alarm
to chieftains of the fund industry. 47 Perhaps their alarm is warranted, for in
terms of resources available to wage the war for the investor's dollar, the insurers' ability far outstrips the funds'. With 1967 year-end assets of $177.4 billion
(compared to $47.5 billion for the funds), full-time agents numbering 200,000
(compared to approximately 30,000 full-time mutual fund salesmen), and
policyholders totalling 130 million (compared to five million fund shareholders948 ), insurance companies would appear to hold a commanding edge in
their ability to reach the public.949
However, as even leaders in the insurance business have realized, these
economic figures are misleading. From 1948 to 1967, insurance companies' share
944 See text accompanying note 863 supra.
945 See note 141 supra and accompanying text.
946 Sheehan, Life Insurance's Almighty Leap into Equities, 78 FORTUNE, Oct. 1968, at 142,
144.
947 Id.
948 See note 9 supra.
949 Sheehan, supra note 946, at 143-44.
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of the savings dollar has declined from forty-seven to fourteen per cent.95 Though
overall assets of insurance companies remain large,9 5' the steady proportionate
loss has been alarming to the insurers. The conclusion they have drawn is that
the insurance companies no longer are able to reach the public as effectively as
they once did.95 2 The reason they ascribe to this inability reflects an attitudinal
change not only of the investing public but of the insurance industry itself each now believes that annual inflation is here to stay.95 ' This represents a complete reversal of the outlook held by earlier insurance executives who regarded
inflation as "nothing that a Republican Administration, with a sound fiscal
policy, couldn't cure."95 That outlook is no longer shared by the men who
presently hold command at the top of the industry. The newer executives, on
whom the scars of the Depression are not so deeply etched, may not regard inflation as inevitable, but they are convinced that as long as it persists, insurance
companies can and should devise means of existing with it.
It is important to note that inflation is presently harming insurance companies in two ways: (1) it reduces their ability to reach the inflation-conscious
investor who does not find the traditional insurance policy a suitable hedge
against inflation; and (2) most industry assets are now required to be invested
in non-equities securities.9 5 While equities securities' values rise with inflation,
the fixed returns on debt securities do not. For both reasons, therefore, insurance
companies have set out to get a "piece of the action." Accordingly, they have
adopted a two-pronged approach which they hope will directly improve their
appeal to the investor and indirectly alleviate their problems with fixed-return
investments. The two investment devices on which insurance companies have
centered their efforts are development of subsidiary mutual funds and development of a type of mutual fund, the variable annuity.
2. Insurers' Investment Devices
a. The Company-dominated Mutual Fund
To date, the larger insurance companies have not shown a deep interest in
simply acquiring the assets of an already extant fund by purchasing the fund's
investment advisor. Though there are isolated instances of such acquisitions, 56
the costs involved are prohibitive; moreover, certain legal consequences of an
unhappy nature may attach to such transactions.95 7 By and large, therefore,
the larger companies have endeavored to set up their own mutual funds or
establish variable annuities.
To be sure, some insurance companies have long been engaged in the mutual

950
951
952
953
954
955
956
957

Id. at 142.
Insurance company assets totaled $177.4 billion at the end of 1967. Id. at 143.
Id. at 142.
Id. at 146.
Id.
Id. at 146.
Id. at 143. See also PersonalInvesting, 78 FORTUN, Oct. 1968, at 207.
See text accompanying notes 1385-440 infra.
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fund business."' Primarily, these are smaller companies who simply offer shares
of already extant funds as either a sideline for their agents or as part of a complementary investment package. 5 9 However, the giants of the industry, Connecticut General Life, Travelers, Aetna, John Hancock, and The Prudential,
have chosen to operate independently and establish their own mutual funds,
shares of which are to be sold by those of their agents who qualify to sell securities. While it is no mean task to see to the qualification of this veritable army
of agents,96 the problems associated with that endeavor are not so pressing as
the initial legal obstacles in the path of establishing insurance company-dominated
mutual funds.
As the analysis in the banking institutions' section revealed, any device a
non-exempt institution might set up which called for the public to entrust certain
funds to the company for the purpose of "investing, reinvesting, or trading in
securities" 96' would constitute an investment company within the meaning of
the 1940 Act.962 The applicability of that Act to insurance company plans was
judicially questioned, however, since the Act specifically exempts insurance companies from its coverage.96 The insurers contended that their investment programs should be carried on without regard to the Act's provisions. 9 4 This dispute was later settled in favor of the Act's application."9 5 Consequently, insurance company-dominated mutual funds closely parallel the funds of the separate mutual fund industry. Ordinarily, the sponsoring insurance company contributes seed capital to comply with minimum capitalization requirements of
the Investment Company Act. 66 The insurer also creates an investment advisor
and a broker-dealer (both subsidiaries), the latter to act as underwriter. After
registration with the SEC, the fund's shares may be sold by any agents of the
company who have successfully completed the NASD or SEC examination and
any applicable state examination. 6 7
Thus far, performances by the various controlled funds have not "set the
world on fire," yet they have been sufficiently encouraging to convince their parent
companies that the future of the funds is bright. 6 8 Purely in theoretical terms,
the funds established by insurance companies are competitive with already extant
958 For example, Nationwide Life Insurance Co. of Columbus has offered shares of a mutual
fund since 1952. Sheehan, supra note 946, at 143.
959 Id.
960 It will be recalled that all salesmen must qualify to sell mutual fund shares by passing
either the NASD examination or the SECO test administered by the SEC, and, in addition,
perhaps, a state examination. See notes 580-86 supra and accompanying text. The insurers
have chosen the NASD examination, and thus far results have been impressive. Sheehan, supra
note 946, at 147, 180.
961 Investment Company Act of 1940 § 3(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(a)(1) (1964).
962 See text accompanying notes 897-901 supra.
963 See text accompanying notes 992-94 infra. Section 3(c) (3) of the Investment Company Act exempts an "insurance company" from its coverage. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3 (c) (3)
(1964).
964 This contention will be discussed below in connection with the variable annuity. See
text accompanying notes 972-99 infra.
965 See text accompanying note 980 infra.
966 Section 14 of the Investment Company Act forbids the public offering of securities
issued by a registered investment company unless "such company has a net worth of at least
$100,000." 15 U.S.C. § 80a-14 (1964).
967 See notes 579-86 supra and accompanying text.
968 Sheehan, supra note 946, at 147, 178.
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funds. Sales loads average about- 7.5 per cent, 9 compared to the industry
average of 8.5 per cent.97 0 While the salesman's share is smaller (2.5 per cent)
than the typical split in the industry (3.25 per cent), 9 " the funds run no risk of
losing the interest of the agent, since his affiliation is secured by his ability to sell
standard insurance products. Moreover, the market for the salesman's prospecting
is ready-made, since the established policyholders constitute a most lucrative
source of referrals.
b. The Variable Annuity
The other investment device insurance companies have turned to is the
variable annuity. More so than the mutual fund, the variable annuity, which
was the "forerunner . . .to the life-insurance companies' full-scale foray into

the mutual-fund business,"972 exemplifies the technical obstacles faced by the
insurance companies, whose desire to compete on more favorable terms for the
investment dollar led them into these investment programs.
Though it combines features of both the fixed-annuity familiar to the insurance business and the standard mutual fund, the variable annuity differs from
each in both its operation and intended market."" Typically, the variable annuity
functions in two phases. '74 During the "pay-in" period, the investor makes payments of a fixed amount over a given number of years. Those payments are
transmuted into "units" which represent a pro rata share in the underlying
securities which the insurance company, acting as investment advisor, has selected.
Later, during the "pay-out" period, the investor receives in cash the income
from a fixed number of units per month (determined by standard actuarial
principles). The actual cash amount received will vary as the value of the
97 5

underlying securities varies.

The investor may withdraw from the program at any time during the
"pay-in" period. However, at the beginning of the pay-out period, the investor
must choose to take a lump-sum payment equal to the value at maturity of all
units he has accumulated or, if he elects not to do so, he must choose one of
several alternative programs which provide for payments over a stated number
of years.97 These features make the variable annuity ideal, so the companies
969 Id. at 147.
970 See note 482 supra and accompanying text.
971 See note 483 supra and accompanying text.
972 Sheehan, supra note 946, at 147.
973 See generally Day, A Variable Annuity is Not a "Security," 32 NOTRE DAmE LAWYER
642 (1957).
974 The features of the variable annuity offered by the Prudential Insurance Co. have been
selected as illustrative. See The Prudential Insurance Company of America, 41 SE.C. 335
(1963).
975 Id. at 337-38.
976 This feature makes the pay-out period of the variable annuity non-redeemable. Since
section 22(e) of the Investment Company Act requires that the security be redeemable, each
variable annuity sponsor has had to obtain an individual exemption from the section 22(e).
See, e.g., id. The Commission, recognizing the actuarial necessity for non-redeemability during
the pay-out period of a variable annuity, has proposed to relax that requirement for all variable
annuities in proposed Rule 22e-1. See SEC, Investment Company Act Release No. 5586 (Jan.
24, 1969) [Current Vol.] CCH FED. Smc. L. REP. %77,649, at 83,403-04.
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claim, for retirement planning.9 77 It offers the investor the opportunity to "salt
away" his savings in the years he can afford to do so, and spares him the
unpleasant dilemma of living on a fixed income in an inflationary economy.
Whatever its claimed benefits, the variable annuity investing scheme, like
banking's commingled account, ran heavily afoul of the provisions of the investment Company Act. The applicability of that Act to the variable annuity was
at issue in the now classic case of SEC u. Variable Annuity Life Insurance Company of America."' Defendant [VALIC] contended that the variable annuity
merely constituted a new form of insurance coverage; since insurance companies
are expressly exempted from the coverage of federal securities statutes, it argued,
the company should also be exempted from the 1940 Act.17 9 The majority of the
Court refused to accept this contention, however."" While Justice Douglas, speaking for three other members of the Court, stated his unwillingness to stifle the
growth of the insurance business, he was constrained to note that the traditional
notion of insurance--a guarantee of some return-was not present in the variable
annuity. While the company guaranteed to pay the annuitant the value of his
shares, there was no guarantee that the shares would have any value. This JusJustice
tice Douglas called a guarantee "that has a ceiling but no floor."9
Brennan concurred in the result but felt compelled to express "additional reasons".
for his opinion." 2 Accordingly, the variable annuity was held subject to the
provisions of the 1940 Act.9" 3
In his oft-cited concurring opinion, Justice Brennan fleshed out the sparse
framework on which the majority opinion was laid.98 4 Although the facts of the
case were complex, he began, the issue of the case was simple: should the Securities Act of 1933 and the Investment Company Act of 1940 be applicable to the
variable annuity investing scheme?"8 8 They would have manifestly been applicable had there not been specific exclusions written in the separate Acts regarding "insurance policies"9 6 and "insurance companies." 987
The question then resolved itself into a determination of whether the
variable annuity fell into that "sort of investment form that Congress was then
[in 1933 and 1940] willing to leave exclusively to the State Insurance Commissioners."9
The Securities Act becomes applicable, Justice Brennan concluded,
"where the coin of the company's obligation is not money but is rather the
present condition of its portfolio."9 9 The 1940 Act's provisions become acutely
relevant, Justice Brennan further noted,
977 The Prudential Insurance Company of America, 41 S.E.C. 335, 339 (1963).
978 359 U.S. 65 (1959).
979 Id. at 67.
980 While this conclusion is not explicitly stated in the opinion written by Justice Douglas,
it is readily inferable from it and has been so treated as the authoritative conclusion. See The
Prudential Insurance Co. of America v. SEC, 326 F.2d 383 (3d Cir. 1964). See also Case
Note, 1963 DuKE L.J. 807.
981 359 U.S. at 72.
982 Id. at 73.
983 But see note 980 supra.
984 359 U.S. at 73 (concurring opinion).
985 Id.
986 Securities Act of 1933, § 3(a)'(8), 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a) (8) (1964).
987 Investment Company Act of 1940, § 3(c) (3), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c) (3) (1964).
988

359 U.S. at 76.

989

Id. at 78.
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to situations where the investor is committing his funds to the hands of
others on an equity basis, with the view that the funds will be invested in
securities and his fortunes will depend on the success of the investment. 990
Recognizing that the variable annuity contract contained some features of traditional annuity contracts, he nevertheless came to the final conclusion that, the
predominant elements consisted of the business of an investment company and
therefore decided that it was not the intent of the 1933 and 1940 statutes to
exempt them.9 9'
This conclusion was squarely backed in The PrudentialInsurance Company
of America v.SEC,992 where Prudential attempted "to distinguish VALIC on
the grounds that the company there involved was not, on the basis of the Court's
decision, primarily or predominantly engaged in the business of writing insur'
ance."993
This argument proved unavailing, as the Third Circuit affirmed the
Commission's determination that the company's variable annuity was subject to
the Investment Company Act.994
Following the adjudication of the 1940 Act's applicability, insurance company sponsors of the variable annuities experienced some difficulty in adjusting
their plans to the provisions of the Investment Company Act. These adjustments, which were the subject of a good deal of litigation,999 have been thoroughly
documented elsewhere.9 99 At present, variable annuities are looked upon as a
part of the "in-house" line of equities merchandise the registered insurance
agent has in his kit to offer the policyholder who seeks a means of hedging against
inflation in addition to the traditional life insurance policy which he probably
will continue to purchase.997
The variable annuity competes with established funds on less favorable terms
than does its half-brother, the insurance company-dominated mutual fund. All
payments made during the pay-in period are subject to a sales load that varies
(in the plan offered by VALIC) from eight to fifty-five per cent.998 Over the
thirty-year period the sales load would average out to 8.9 per cent. Furthermore, the assets held by the annuity are also subject to a .15 per cent monthly
administrative fee, or 1.8 per cent annually.9 99 This compares unfavorably with
the .5 per cent charged by advisors of established mutual funds. Moreover, the
990 Id. at 79.
991 Id. at 81.
992 326 F.2d 383 "(3d Cir. 1964).
993 Id. at 388.
994 Id.
995 E.g., SEC v. United Benefit Life Insurance Co., 359 F.2d 619 (D.C. Cir. 1966); The
Prudential Insurance Co. of America v. SEC., 326 F.2d 383 (3d Cir. 1964); The Prudential
Insurance Co. of America, 41 S.E.C. 335 (1963); The Variable Annuity Life Insurance Co.,
39 S.E.C. 680 (1960).
996 E.g., Dorsey, The Place of "Variable Annuities" in Law and Economics, 34 NOTRE
DAME LAWYER 489 '(1959); Mearns, The Commission, the Variable Annuity, and the Inconsiderate Sovereign, 45 VA. L. REv. 831 (1959); Comment, The Expanding Jurisdiction of the
Securities and Exchange Commission: Variable Annuities and Bank Collective Investment
Funds, 62 MICH. L. Rnv. 1398 (1964); Comment, Variable Annuities and Common Trust
Funds for Managing Agency Accounts, 39 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 701 (1964); Case Note,
1963 Duxa L.J. 807.
997 Sheehan, supra note 946, at 147.
998 Cf. SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Insurance Co. of America, 359 U.S. 65, 82 (1959)
(concurring opinion).
999 Id. at 83.
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long pay-in period exceeds by ten years the average holding time of a mutual
fund shareholder's investment in a fund.1000 This in part helps to explain the
lack of rapid growth of variable annuities. In addition the variable annuity's
complexities make it difficult for the typical agent to sell and the typical investor
to understand. The insurance companies do not look upon these problems as
insurmountable, however; they presently regard the annuity as an important
part of the overall enhanced ability of the insurance company to meet the needs
of the policyholder.
3. The Insurers as Institutional Investors
Insurance companies have not established either separate mutual funds or
variable annuities solely as a means of adding to their own assets.' 00 ' Of course,
the insurer does profit from the sales loads and administrative (advisory) fees
charged the investor and the fund or annuity pool respectively. However, neither
of these charges, taken alone or jointly, would seem sufficient to support the
ambitious revamping that such projects entail. A more persuasive reason is found
in the fact that the insurance giants are very anxious to make the insurance
agent's entire line of merchandise more compatible with the changed needs of
a new generation of investors. A desire to keep the policyholder "in the house"
would seem a plausible argument capable of exerting sufficient economic pressure to overcome the burdens of transition.
By far the most forceful rationale yet advanced to explain the energetic
expansion by the insurers into equities investing has been summed up by one
writer in this way:
Moreover, it is widely agreed that the involvement in mutual-fund
operations will logically lead life companies to take a more liberal view of
common stocks as a suitable investment for their regular portfolios - the
repositories of life-insurance reserves. The implications of this development
are the most intriguing of all. 002 (Emphasis added.)
The insurers hope to profit from this vicarious flirtation with the market by
convincing the proper authorities that more of the insurance companies' reserves
should themselves be directly invested in the market."'3
Such a step would
represent a gigantic stride forward. At present, insurance companies are severely
limited by state regulations as to the amount of their reserves which may be
invested in equities securities. A representative limitation is that imposed by the
state of New York: no insurance company may invest more than fifty per cent
of its surplus or five per cent of its reserves, whichever is smaller, in equities
securities.00 4 That limitation is, however, now being evaluated in light of a
proposal that would double the amount that could be invested, from five to ten
1000 The average holding period of fund shares is seventeen years. LiTTLE STUDY Part II,
at 7.
1001 Sheehan, supra note 946, at 180. See also 1967 House Hearings 251 (Tables B, C).
1002 Sheehan, supra note 946, at 145.
1003 Id.
1004 N.Y. INSUR. LAW § 81(13)'(c) (McKinney Supp. 1968).
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per cent of reserves, or up to one hundred per cent of surplus.00 5 The New
York action is typical of the reconsideration -being given by many states to the
future regulation of insurance c6mpany investing. Moreover, there are indications that the insurers will seek a further lessening of restrictions for large-scale
investments in equities, would doubtless provide the insurance industry with the
anti-inflationary device it needs to protect its assets.
VI. The Mutual Fund Management Structure
A. Services of the Investment Advisor
He who would explore the investment company forest may not escape a
direct confrontation with an "externalized management" and its progeny. A rare
breed of corporate structure indigenous to the investment company industry,
an externalized management involves a contractual relationship between an
investment company and a separate firm or corporation - called the "advisor"
-whereby
the latter undertakes, for a fee, to render certain managerial services
to the former.
1. Supervision of Investment Securities
The quintessence of the service is portfolio selection, supervision, and analysis, as well as arranging for execution of portfolio transactions. It is in his
capacity as investment counselor and portfolio manager that the advisor theoretically earns his keep, and it is by reference to the quality of his advice that
he most often chooses to justify his fees. In addition the advisor may, and usually
does, furnish a variety of administrative services, sometimes charging an additional fee or fees:
In selecting and supervising the investment portfolio, the company and its
advisor must operate within two basic sets of limitations. First, a recital of the
fund's "fundamental policies" is required by the Investment Company Act to
be in the registration statement.""0
These policies, which must include the
1005
1006

Sheehan, supra note 946, at 145.
Investment Company Act of 1940 § 8(b), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-8(b) (1964) provides in

part:
(b) Every registered investment company shall file with the Commission, within
such reasonable time after registration as the Commission shall fix by rules and
regulations, an original and such copies of a registration statement, in such form and
containing such of the following information and documents as the Commission shall
by rules and regulations prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest
or for the protection of investors:
(I1) a recital of the policy of the registrant in respect of each of the following types of activities, such recital consisting in each case of a statement whether
the registrant reserves freedom of action to engage in activities of such type,
and if such freedom of action is reserved, a statement briefly indicating, insofar
as is practicable, the extent to which the registrant intends to engage therein:
(A) the .classification and subclassifications, as defined in sections 80a-4 and
80a-5 of this title, within which the registrant proposes to operate; (B) borrowing money; (C) the issuance of senior securities; (D) engaging in the business
of underwriting securities issued by other persons; (E) concentrating investments in a particular industry or group of industries; (F) the purchase and sale
of real estate and commodities, or either of them; (G) making loans to other
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essential elements of the investment company's financial framework, may not

be altered without shareholder authorization.""or The second set of limitations
is contained in the company's prospectus, which may set out in greater detail
the investment guidelines that give the fund its unique character."'0 0

Thus there

is typically a statement of the fund's investment objectives: current income,
capital appreciation, or some combination of the two. Also typical is a broad
statement of the investment policy envisioned to attain these goals: whether the
fund will concentrate in high or low risk securities; common stocks, preferred
stocks, or bonds; specialized or widely diversified industries, special situations,

etc. Within the ambit of these limitations, however, there is wide latitude for
managerial discretion in selection and liquidation of portfolio securities. To
assist him in his prognostications of market trends or the prospects of a single
issue, the advisor may have at his disposal the sagacity and augury of the fund's

"advisory board." The 1940 Act makes provision for such an arrangement and
defines the "advisory board" as a panel separate from the board of directors and
separate from management or executive personnel "which . . . has advisory

functions as to investments but has no power to determine that any security...
shall be purchased or sold ....

,1009

In addition to the advice of an advisory board and management's own
research through the common media of business, financial, and governmental
publications, many fund managers rely heavily on impressions of specific companies derived from field visits. Thus the advisory function may entail considerable firsthand investigation of portfolio companies or companies whose securities are being considered for acquisition. The Wharton Report found that twentyeight per cent of the advisors reporting on this matter stated that they visited all or
virtually all portfolio companies annually; another twenty-five per cent declared
they made such visits "frequently"; while only twelve per cent said that they
do not make such visits at all."" The Wharton Report also found a significant
persons; and (H) portfolio turn-over (including a statement showing the aggregate dollar amount of purchases and sales of portfolio securities, other than
Government securities, in each of the last three full fiscal years preceding the
filing of such registration statement) ;
(2) a recital of the policy of the registrant in respect of matters, not enumerated in paragraph (1) of this subsection, which the registrant deems matters
of fundamental policy and elects to treat as such....
See Green v. Brown, 398 F.2d 1006 (2d Cir. 1968), rev'g 276 F. Supp. 753 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
See also notes 347-52 supra and accompanying text.
1007 Investment Company Act of 1940 § 13, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-13 '(1964).
1008 Any transgression of limits contained in the prospectus is, of course, actionable. Securities Act of 1933 § 12, 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1964). See also Lutz v. Boas, 39 Del. Ch. 585, -,
171 A.2d 381, 393 (1961); Managed Funds, Inc., 39 S.E.C. 313 (1959), rev'd sub nom.
Brouk v. Managed Funds, Inc., 286 F.2d 901 (8th Cir. 1961), vacated as moot per curiam,
369 U.S. 424 (1962) (see note 1288 infra).
1009 Investment Company Act of 1940 § 2(a) (1), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a) (1) (1964).
The composition of the advisory board is regulated by the Act. Id. § 10(g), 15 U.S.C. §
80a-10(g) (1964). It must contain the same minimum percentage of non-affiliated members
as required for the board of directors under section 10 of the Act.
1010 WHARTON REPORT 423-24.
According to one medium-sized company, "The information sought is along the
following lines:
"1. Earnings outlook for the current quarter, half year, year, and subsequent year or
years, if possible.
"2. Prospects regarding dividend retention, increase, decrease, stock dividends, or
stock splits.
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correlation between visitation policy and the size of the fund under management.
Not surprisingly, the more pecunious managers of the larger funds are the more
frequent visitors, while managers of smaller funds are often unable to indulge
in the luxury of the "martini method" of securities evaluation." 1'
The advisor may also receive investment advice and information (sometimes
superior or more timely than that otherwise obtainable) from researchers and
investment analysts affiliated with brokerage firms. In return for his information
(and for his efforts in selling the investment company's shares), the broker is
generally compensated through disposable brokerage: reciprocal business or
(formerly) give-ups.0 12 A well-publicized illustration of this "timely" information
"3. The likelihood of any new financing, and, if so, what type.
"4. The possibilities of major plant increases, additions, or new plant construction.
"5. Possibilities regarding corporate acquisitions, mergers, etc.
"6. Inquiries as to the development of any important new products.
"7. The approximate amount of money expended for research and advertising.
"8. The likelihood of any major management changes." Id. at 424 n.30.
The practical impact of the advisor-portfolio company relationship is apparent from
the following exchange:
[Mr. Keith] Perhaps the case in point would be that of Motorola . .. where it
is my understanding that speaking to a group of investment analysts for mutual funds,
a corporate official announced what [sic] there was a drop in corporate earnings and
that afternoon the boys went back from their lunch and decided with each other to
take this perishable opportunity that they had and the price of Motorola dropped I
believe about 36 points very quickly....
Mr. Loasa. You are essentially correct. 1967 House Hearings 420.
1011 WHARTON REPORT 423-24.
1012 Reciprocal business, grossly oversimplified, is the practice of executing investment
company portfolio transactions through the broker to be rewarded. Where a large number of
brokers in several securities markets are involved, the technique is obviously cumbersome and
unsatisfactory. Hence, the give-up.
The customer-directed give-up is not much more sophisticated than reciprocal business.
A large portfolio transaction is placed with a favorite broker on condition that he "give-up"
a portion of his brokerage commission to other brokers selected by the customer. Because of
the large size of investment company brokerage transactions and the inflexible commission rate
minima on the exchanges, a broker may be quite willing to' give up over half his commission
to other brokers who had no part in the execution. If the receiving broker or firm is not a
member of the same exchange, he may receive compensation in the form of a "service give-up"
- theoretically sales promotional or training materials, but actually a monthly check. The
receiving broker may also be rewarded by means of a nefarious device known as "interpositioning," whereby a broker-dealer is inserted between the fund and the primary executing broker
in order to generate a mark-up for the inserted broker.
The give-up provides a crude form of volume discount, and when used to benefit the
fund by opening channels of information, pricing services, etc., represents some accommodation to the fixed commission anomaly. The give-up, however, is also used to additionally
compensate broker-dealers for their efforts in selling the fund's shares. To the fund shareholders, who ultimately bear the cost of brokerage, the give-up may thus represent no savings
at all, but rather a waste of disposable brokerage. In fact, through the mechanism of the
exchange anti-rebate rules, minimum fee structure, reciprocal business, and give-ups, existing
fund shareholders were effectively subsidizing the underwriting function, which is presumably supported by the sales load. The conflict of interest problem here is apparent. Since his
fee is based on fund net assets, the advisor stands much to gain by encouraging and rewarding the sale of fund shares. Hence it is in the advisor's interest to maximize give-ups and
reciprocal business by "churning" a fund's portfolio and by trading on an exchange even
when a third market is available and more economical in a given security. Moreover, the
advisor may own or be affiliated with his own brokerage firm, thus recapturing give-ups and
brokerage, occasionally reducing his management fee accordingly but often retaining the disposable brokerage at the expense of the fund. In the colorful terms of Abe Pomerantz:
[E]ven in those instances where the brokerage is ostensibly farmed out to thirdparty brokers, the insiders have their hands on the commission by way . . . of reciprocals and giveups and other ways of commandeering the commission to serve the
interest of the underwriter or the advisor ....
1967 Senate Hearings 690.
Give-ups have been abolished on the New York Stock Exchange, and a nominal volume
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phenomenon centers on the escapades of Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc., and some of its high rolling friends. 1 Merrill Lynch, which received
large brokerage commissions and give-ups from several mutual fund managers,
notably Investors Management Company, Inc., Van Strum & Towne, Inc., The
Dreyfus Corporation, and one closed-end company, Madison Fund, Inc., was
the prospective managing underwriter for a $75 million convertible subordinated
debenture issue by Douglas Aircraft Company. On June 7, 1966, Douglas had
issued a news release showing its first five months' earnings to be about eightyfive cents per share. In the course of its investigation of Douglas, however, Merdiscount assimilated into the commission rate structure. See Letters of R. Haack to Manuel

Cohen and exchange members, Nov 19, 1968 and Nov. 22, 1968, [Current Volume] CCH FED.

SEC. L. REP. U 77,631; letter from Robert Haack to Manuel F. Cohen, Aug. 8, 1968, [Current
Volume] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
77,585. The president of the NYSE, in understandable
apprehension of reforms to come, has admonished members not to subvert the abolition by
resorting to institutional inter-broker give-ups and reciprocity. Letter of R. Haack to exchange
members, Nov. 22, 1968, [Current Volume] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 1 77,631, at 83,364-65.
Clearly the only satisfactory solution would be elimination of minimum commission rates altogether.
See SEC Exchange Act Release No. 8324 (May 28, 1968), [Current Volume] CCH FED.
SEC. L. REP.
77,557 '(SEC order for public hearing to inquire into minimum commission
rate structure, including letter from Chairman Cohen of the SEC to R. Haack, President of
NYSE); SEC Exchange Act Release No. 8328 (June 5, 1968), [Current Volume] CCH FED.
SEC. L. REP. U77,563 (procedures for hearings on minimum rate structure); New York Stock
Exchange Special Membership Bulletin, June 7, 1968, [Current Volume] CCH FED. SEC. L.
REP.
77,564 (exchange counsel looking for legal justification for minimum commission rates
informs members that pressure is on from SEC and discusses generally position of NYSE);
NASD Press Release, July 18, 1968, [Current Volume] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. U 77,576
(NASD capitulates); Statement of R. Haack before the SEC, Aug. 19, 1968, [Current Volume] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 1177,590 (president of NYSE defends minimum commission
rates); Statement of R. Saul before the SEC, Aug. 26, 1968, [Current Volume] CCH FED.
SEC. L. REP. [ 77,591 (president of American Stock Exchange predicts disaster if minimum
commission abolished); Letter from Robert Haack to Manuel F. Cohen, Aug. 8, 1968, [Current Volume] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. fI 77,585 (NYSE adopts policy of appeasement, volunteers nominal volume discount and discontinuance of customer-directed give-ups); Letters
from Manuel F. Cohen and Irving M. Pollack to R. Haack, Aug. 30, 1968 and September 4,
1968, [Current Volume] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. g 77,599 (accepting NYSE concessions as
interim measure and admonishing as to necessity of enforcement); New York Stock Exchange

Member Firm Educational Circular No. 242, Aug. 30, 1968, [Current Volume] CCH FED.
SEC. L. REP.

77,600 (NYSE clarifies ban on give-ups, including service give-ups); Statement of R. Walbert before SEC, Sept. 17, 1968 [Current Volume] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. U
77,605 (NASD foresees cataclysm if minimum commissions abolished); Letters of R. Haack to
Manuel Cohen and exchange members, Nov. 19, 1968 and Nov. 22, 1968, [Current Volume]
CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
77,631 (NYSE abolishes give-ups by constitutional amendment,
hoping, by the concession, to assuage the SEC; NYSE warns members not to circumvent new
rules lest attention be centered again on commission rates). See generally WHARTON REPORT
527-39, 473-75; SPECIAL STUDY IV 213-35; PUBLIC POLICY STATEMENT 162-88; OPPICIAL
PROCEEDINGS, THE FIRST ANNUAL INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR CONFERENCE 233-45 (1968);
Note, Use of Brokerage Commissions to Promote Mutual Fund Sales: Time to Give Up the
"Give Up," 68 COLUM. L. REV. 334 (1968); 1967 DUKE L.J. 1059.
The trigger for the statements and correspondence was the SEC's proposed rule 10b-10,
designed to assure that give-ups on investment company transactions benefit the shareholders
rather than the managers. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8239 (Jan. 26, 1968),
[Current Volume] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. U 77,523. The Department of Justice immediately
took its cue and argued forcefully that the forces of competition should, as far as possible,
be permitted to operate in the area of brokerage commissions. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT
O JUSTICE, COMMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE BEFORE THE SEC
(April 1, 1968). Recently the Department of Justice has expanded and more vigorously
pressed its views, urging in a very able and thorough memorandum that the SEC act to eliminate minimum commission rates except where necessary. The specter of the Antitrust Division is not masked. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, MEMORANDUM OF THE UNITED
STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE ON THE FIXED

(Jan. 17, 1969).

MINIMUM
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STRUCTURE

1013 Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release
No. 8459 (Nov. 25, 1968), [Current Volume] CCH FED. SEC. L.'REP. U 77,629.
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rill Lynch had obtained certain non-public information from management:
(1) Douglas was about to report earnings for the first six months of far less
'than eighty-five cents; (2) Douglas now anticipated little or 'no profit for the
entire 1966 fiscal year; and (3) Douglas had substantially reduced its earnings
estimates for fiscal 1967.°'4 Before this inside' information became public, it was
quietly and confidentially passed along to the investment company managers
and certain other select clients of Merrill Lynch, who not so discreetly proceeded
to dump 190,000 shares of Douglas common on the market."15 On June 22,
1966, Douglas common had opened at 90I2; it closed the following day at
78Y. After Douglas had issued a press release showing six months' earnings
of only twelve cents per share, the price immediately plummeted further to 69,
declining to 61Y4 by the end of that week.' 18 To aggravate matters, Merrill
Lynch was executing purchases in Douglas for its non-favored customers at the
same time that it was disclosing the inside information and executing sales for
the elite."
Not one to deny that a Merrill Lynch man "is called on to wear a

variety of hats,' 0' 8 the august firm was obviously caught wearing one too many.
Merrill Lynch's experience will no doubt serve as a warning to other investment
houses tempted to simultaneously play the twin roles of confidant and tipster.

2. Administrative Services
In addition to investment counselling, the advisor may furnish a number
'6f administrative and clerical services,01 9 including the preparation, printing,
1014

Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., SEC Administrative Proceedings File

No. 3-1680 (Aug. 26, 1968), [Current Volume] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. % 77,596, at 83,27374 (allegations of Division of Trading and Markets).

1015 Id.

1016 Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, -Inc., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No.
8459 (Nov. 25, 1968), [Current Volume] CCH FED. SEC. L. Pap.
77,629, at 83,349 n.7.
1017 Id. at 83,349.
1018 SPECIAL STUDY I 93.
1019 Indeed, some advisory corporations provide nothing but administrative services, actually subcontracting for investment' advice elsewhere.
For example, First Investors Management Co., under a management contract with First
Investors Fund for Growth, Inc., receives a management fee of .75 per cent on the first $300
million of the fund's average net assets, .625 per cent on the next $200 million, and .5 per
cent on the excess. FIRST INVESTORS FUND FOR GROWTH, INC., PROSPECTUS, June 19, 1968,

at 5. Actual investment advice, however, is provided pursuant to a subcontract with Naess
& Thomas calling for a relatively low fee of 1/12 per cent on the first $100 million in assets,
1/15 per cent on the excess. Id. First Investors Management also serves First Investors
Fund, Inc., under a contract callingfor a generous management fee of one per cent on the
first $5 million, and .5 per cent on the excess of the fund's assets. FIRST INVESTORS, FUND,
INC., PROSPECTUS, April 26, 1968, revised June 19, 1968, at 6. Again, actual investment
advice is furnished by Naess & Thomas for a fee of 1/12 per cent on the first $100 million,
1/15 per cent on the excess. Id. at 6-7. (Net assets of Fund for Growth stood at $23.9 million
as of December 31, 1968, while net assets of Fund
stood at $39.9 million. INVESTMENT COMPANIES 1968 (L. Wessmann ed., Supp. Dec. 31, , 1968).)
Similarly, Security Equity Fund, Inc. and Security Investment Fund each operate under
management contracts with Security Management Co. calling for a fee of .5 per cent of net
assets annually. Management subcontracts the actual investment advisory function to Fred
Alger & Co., which is compensated at a rate of 1/8 per cent of net assets. SECURTY EQUITY
FUND, INC., PROSPECTUS, Jan.

29, 1969, at 5;

SECURITY INVESTMENT FUND, PROSPECTUS,

Mar. 28, 1968, amended Dec. 27, 1968, at 5. Fred Alger, the subadvisor, claims that he "runs
the fund," which, if true, makes the advisory corporation a legal sham which merely siphons off
the excess profits. See 1967 House Hearings 505-06.
The One Hundred Fund, Inc. and the One Hundred and One Fund, Inc. are managed
by The Hundred Management Corporation, which, in turn, has farmed out the advisory task
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and distribution of prospectuses, shareholder reports, and proxy materials; the
convocation of director and shareholder meetings; the issuance, transfer, and cancellation of shares; and the distribution to shareholders of income and capital
gains dividends. The advisor may also make arrangements for brokerage services, custodial care of the fund's portfolio securities, and receipt of various
communications from portfolio companies. Where an investment company recomputes net assets and adjusts bid and ask prices frequently - as mutual funds
do - the advisor may provide this service as well.0 20 Even the investment company's office space is generally furnished by the advisor.' 2' As the SEC properly
points out, the continuous offering and redemption of mutual fund shares makes
several of these items especially important elements of the advisor's service." 22
B. Management Fee Structure
1. Advisory Fees
While most funds continue to pay an advisory fee calculated as a fixed
percentage of the fund's net assets, there appears to be a small but rapidly accelerating movement towards a "performance" based computation, which makes
at least a portion of the advisor's compensation contingent upon some measure
to First Trust Corporation. In the case of One Hundred Fund, management receives a fee
of 3/8 per cent of average net assets plus a performance bonus. Twenty per cent of management's compensation is paid over to First Trust. THE ONE HUNDRED FUND, INC., PROSPECTUS, Jan. 2, 1969, at 8-9. The management fee for One Hundred and One is .7 per cent,
and again First Trust is allocated twenty per cent. THE ONE HUNDRED AND ONE FUND, INC.,
PROSPECTUS, Jan. 9, 1969, at 7-8.
Perhaps the most striking example is to be found in the management of Aberdeen Fund.
Aberdeen is technically under the auspices of Aberdeen Management Corporation [AMC],
formerly controlled by a brewery. MooDY'S 1968 BANK & FINANCE MANUAL 1065. The management contract calls for compensation to AMC of the traditional .5 per cent, ABERDEEN
FUND, PROSPECTUS, May 2, 1968, revised Oct. 15, 1968, at 2, although AMC subcontracts
the actual advisory function to Steadman Securities Corporation [SSC] for a .1 per cent fee.
Id. at 3. In 1968, control of AMC was sold to SSC for an undisclosed amount of cash,
MooDY's BANK & FINANCE (CURRENT) 1885 (May 3, 1968), so that SSC presently owns
50 per cent of AMC's stock, including all of AMC's voting securities. ABERDEEN FUND, PROSPECTUS, May 2, 1968, revised Oct. 15, 1968, at 4. This creates the somewhat anomalous
situation in which the "subadvisor" owns and controls the "principal advisor," dramatically
illustrating the fact that the principal advisor here is nothing more than a corporate facade.
(SSC affiliates dominate AMC's complement of officers and directors. Id. at 5.) Under these
circumstances, the principal advisor serves no function other than to provide a source of income and prospective capital gains to its minority shareholders.
One of the "unaffiliated" directors on the board of a fund which was the object of an
advisor-subadvisor arrangement was once confronted with the suggestion that the middleman
served no useful function but merely increased the fund's cost of management by capturing
for himself a portion of the advisory fee. The director replied that he was "not at all [a] suspicious soul," that the thought had "never occurred" to him. and that the realization that
the advisor was surplusage came as "a terrible shock and disillusionment." 114 CONG. REc.
S9496 (daily ed. July 26, 1968). Even with the matter brought to his attention, that director
remarked, "I have to be awfully careful that I don't question people's motives." Id.
None of these arrangements seem to have resulted in pronounced economy, as the average expense ratio for the mentioned funds is .86 per cent. NUVEEN CORP., MUTUAL FUNDS
PANORAMA (1968). If a mutual fund is sometimes thought of as a mere "shell" through which
an established counselling firm may offer its services, then in these cases it is the management company which is the corporate "shell" through which promoters and executives are able
to capitalize on a fund's growth. The utility of this arrangement to anyone save a small group
of management stockholders is obscure.
1020 PUBLIC POLICY STATEMENT 86-87, 91.
1021 Id. at 46; WHARTON REPORT 476-77, 476 n.35.
1022 PUBLIC POLICY STATEMENT 86.
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of the quality of his advice. Perhaps the industry has become so enamoured of
the glamorous go-go that it has developed a performance fixation, or perhaps
management simply feels that it can more easily justify its handsome fees when
these are related to performance; but whatever the reason, it appears that the performance fee is becoming an increasingly popular device. 1 2 3 In 1960, the
Wharton Report found that only five funds paid advisory fees based on a percentage of income, and only one fund related its management fee to a market
index of performance. 24 Today there are at least forty-three funds with
management fees in some way dependent upon performance- 2 5 Of these, thirtyfour fee provisions are related to some market index, while nine are based solely
on some measure of the fund's performance itself, without reference to the performance of any index. Of the thirty-four related to an index, the most popular
index is the Dow Jones Industrial Average (thirty stocks) which is used in fourteen cases. Other indices in use include Standard and Poor's 500 Stock Composite Index (thirteen funds); the New York Stock Exchange Composite Index
(all stocks listed on the Exchange) (four funds); the highest of Dow Jones
Industrial, Standard and Poor's 500, and the NYSE Composite (two funds);
and the National Quotation Bureau Over-the-Counter Industrial Average (thirtyfive stocks) (one fund). Significantly, no fund determines its fees by relating
its performance to an index of funds.
In thirty-three of the thirty-four cases using some market index, the contract
calls for a basic advisory fee calculated in the traditional manner as a percentage
of net assets. Fully twenty-one of these "base" rates, before the addition of any
performance bonus, are one-half per cent or higher. Not only are the base rates
generous at the outset, but they also fail to reflect in any manner the economies
of size - only eight of the base rates employ any form of sliding scale, however
modest. 026 The performance fees related to an index are lopsided in another
respect, namely, that while all thirty-four afford the managers additional compensation for outperforming the index, only eighteen impose any penalty for underperformance. Furthermore, only seven of these require a penalty for underperformance which is commensurate with the bonus for outperforming the index."" 7
The upper limits of compensation under the index-related formulae are similarly
weighted to the advisor's advantage. Three contracts have no ceiling at all
on the advisor's compensation while the rest authorize ceilings as high as six
per cent of net assets.
Legislation introduced in the Ninety-first Congress would require that any
1023 However, this type of compensation is not an entirely new innovation. Of 105 investment companies with management contracts during the period 1927-35, seventeen provided
compensation to the manager based on a percentage of earnings, with the percentage ranging
as high as twenty-five per cent. INVESTMENT TauSTS III 1922 & n.245.
Cf. DeRenzis v. Levy, 37 U.S.L.W. 2560 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 1969).
1024 WHARTON REPORT 480.
1025 See Appendix A infra.
1026 Certainly one of the most astonishing comments voiced on this subject is that of
Allan Conwill: "If the fund measures up to that objective [i.e., performs well], I do not think
it is mandatory to take advantage of the economies of size." Statement of Allan F. Conwill,
University of Pennsylvania Law School Conference on Mutual Funds, 115 U. PA. L. REv.

659, 764 (1967).

1027 As Mr. Pomerantz has commented, "I would think, if you are going to have a system
of rewards, the connotation is that the system, to use a harsh word, have punishments, or the
opposite of rewards, whatever it is - demerits." Id. at 767.
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performance fee include penalties proportionate to possible bonuses, °28 thus
proscribing the arrangements of many companies listed in Appendix A. A one
year period for adjustment would be allowed." 29
As noted, some funds calculate their management fee on a performance
basis which is independent of any market index and independent of the performance results of other funds. Appendix A shows that this type of fee generally depends on net realized capital gains of the fund, and is employed by
eight funds. (A ninth fund bases its fee on dividend income alone.) There are,
however, basic deficiencies in this method of determining performance fees. The
most obvious, of course, is that a manager may simply ride the tide of a rising
market, and even though he performs well below the market averages, he will
still receive bonus compensation. Conversely, even the best manager in a rapidly
declining market, in spite of the fact that he may have upheld the value of
the fund's shares far more effectively than managers of other funds, may be
penalized or receive no additional compensation if not able to show positive gains.
As already indicated, a performance fee could be based on an index of
other funds having similar investment objectives,0 " although none of the funds
represented in Appendix A do so. The principal difficulties with this approach
are that advisors who outperformed the market might be penalized if other
advisors excelled, while a fund could do poorly but its advisor be rewarded with
a bonus if other managers did even worse."0 "' The former consideration would
1028 S. 34, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. § 25 (1969); S. 296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 25 (1969).
In the course of amending sections 203(b) and 205 of the Investment Advisers Act, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 80b-3(b), 80b-5 (1964), to eliminate an exemption granted to advisors whose only clients
are investment companies, bills in the Ninetieth Congress would have outlawed performance
fees based on a share of capital gains or capital appreciation of the fund. S. 1659, 90th Cong.,
1st Sess. §§ 25, 26 (1967); H.R. 9510, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 25, 26 (1967); H.R. 9511,
90th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 25, 26 (1967). The change was first introduced in 1968, S. 3724,
90th Cong., 2d Sess. § 25 (1968), with the blessing of the Commission. 1967 House Hearings 79.
1029 S. 34, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 29 (1969); S. 296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 29 (1969).
1030 This index would relate the performance of one manager to that of many funds.
Something of the same philosophy - although not, strictly speaking, involving a performance
fee - can be seen in arrangements which relate the performance of several managers to a
single fund. The cornerstone of both systems is competition between managers. The most
recent annual report of the SEC informs us that two registrant funds propose to employ multiple advisors. For the fund which is already offering shares to the public, the assets are
allocated by a "principal manager" to several independent portfolio managers so that each
of the independents manages a portion of the fund's entire portfolio. "New money received
from the continuous offering of the fund's shares," we are told, "will be allocated, on the basis
of respective investment performances, among those portfolio managers who have outperformed the Dow-Jones Industrial Average during the preceding four quarters." 34 SEC
ANN. REP. 130 (1968). (It appears that the fund which the SEC spoke of is Competitive
Capital Fund, Inc., which uses five independent portfolio managers. COMPETITIVE CAPITAL
FUND, INC., PROSPECTUs, Nov. 1, 1968, at 3-4.) Although the fees paid to the independent
managers are relatively modest, the total cost of this aggressive arrangement is likely to be
high due to the overriding fee paid to the "principal manager." 34. SEC ANN. REP. 130
(1968).
The pension plans of Illinois Bell Telephone, Eastman Kodak Co., and General Motors
afford other examples of competing multiple managers. See FORTUNE, Nov. 1967, at 145.
1031 Another difficulty is the near impossibility of classifying funds to achieve uniformity
within each class as to size, investment objective, trading and concentration policy, etc. See,
e.g., FUNDScOPE, February 1969, at 54.
Professor Herman notes that:
The variation in performance by time periods and by type of fund is so complicated
that I would think this would really present immense difficulties. You could have very
drastic fluctuations in compensation that, really, I don't think would be based on
anything very sound. Statement of Dr. Edward S. Herman, University of Pennsylvania Law School Conference on Mutual Funds, supra note 1026, at 765.
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make this method intolerable to advisors, while the latter is contrary to the
interests of fund shareholders. Some illustrations are appropriate.
Of seventy aggressive-growth [go-go] funds in 1968, fifty-five outperformed
the Dow-Jones Industrial Average. Nevertheless, forty-two of the seventy failed
to outperform the average for the group. If bonus fees were based on outperforming the group average, it is apparent that twenty-seven managers who did
better than the market generally-but not better than the average would be penalized or receive no additional compensation.""o 2 Whether advisors would accede
to such an arrangement is atleast problematical. An even more egregious example
can be cited. Examining eleven growth funds specializing in insurance securities, we find that during 1968 every fund in the group outperformed the DowJones Industrial Average. Nevertheless, seven of the eleven performed below
the group average and would be ineligible for the contingent bonus because of
the exceptional performance of a few." 3
On the other side of the question, the performance fee based on an index
of funds may produce a curious result in that management could receive additional compensation though performing more poorly than a random portfolio.
For example, in 1962 the adjusted net asset value of sixty-six growth funds
declined an average of 18.3 per cent.03 4 In that same year, Standard and Poor's
500 Stock Index declined only 11.8 per cent unadjusted.0 3 " Thus, although fiftyeight of the funds performed well below even the unadjusted index, thirty-six
outperformed the group average and would have been eligible for bonus com10 3
pensation. 6
As noted, most performance fees are based on a general market index,0 3"
the most popular of which is the Dow-Jones Industrial Average.0 3 " This is at
least partly explainable by the composition of the hypothetical portfolio which
determines the index. The thirty stocks in the average, numbering among their
complement such issues as International Nickel, Standard Oil of New Jersey,
General Motors, and American Telephone & Telegraph, 3" have properly been
called "the bluest of the blue chips."' 1°0 Standard & Poor's 500 [S&P], on the
other hand, is a far more broadly based index, embracing 425 industrials, fifty
utilities, and twenty-five rails, while the New York Stock Exchange Composite1032

FUNDSCOPE, supra note 1031, at 46.

-1034

INVESTMENT COMPANIES 1968, at 114, 116 (L. Wessmann ed. 1968).
Id, at 411.
Id. at 114, 116.
See Appendix A infra. Cf. Statement of James J. Lorie, 1967 House Hearings 411-21.
See Appendix A infra. Since Dow-Jones is a simple arithmetic average of prices,
[t]he influence of each issue upon the average is thus proportional to the magnitude
of its price per share. As an illustration, in June, 1937, Standard Oil of New Jersey
was selling at 65, Allied Chemical at 215. In the Dow-Jones averages the former
received a weight of less than one-third the latter. Yet the market value of the common stock of the former was $1,680 millions and of the latter $476 millions. COWLES,

1033 Id.

1.035
1036
1037
1038

COMMISSION FOR RESEARCH IN ECONOMICS, COMMON-STOCK INDEXES 35 (1939).

1039 Other stocks in the average are Eastman Kodak; Chrysler; Sears, Roebuck; Procter
& Gamble; Texaco; General Foods; International Harvester; United Aircraft; Anaconda;
du Pont; Westinghouse Electric; Swift & Co.; Goodyear Tire; F. W. Woolworth; OwensIllinois; American Tobacco; Standard Oil of California; General Electric; Johns-Manville;
Aluminum Co.; American Can; International Paper; Allied Chemical; Union Carbide;
Bethlehem Steel; U.S. Steel. INVESTMENT COMPANIES 1968, at 53 (L. Wessmann ed. 1968).

1040

Statement of Paul Samuelson, 1967 Senate Hearings 369.
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Index [NYSECI] is the most plebeian of all, averaging all stocks on the exchange.
During 1966, not exactly a banner year for common stocks, S&P declined 13.1
per cent, NYSECI declined 12.6 per cent, while Dow-Jones plummeted fully
18.9 per cent. The following year saw a 20.1 per cent gain in S&P, a 23.1 per
cent gain in the NYSECI, but only a 15.2 per cent increase in Dow-Jones." 4'
This discrepancy continued through 1968 with S&P exhibiting an increase of
7.7 per cent and the NYSECI 9.4 per cent, while Dow-Jones was up only 4.3
per cent. 42 It would seem, then, that the Dow-Jones Industrial Average has
become the poorest "performer" among the major indices," 43 making it correpondingly more attractive to managers whose compensation depends on outperforming the index by the maximum margin.
Regardless of the index used, any performance fee based on a market average
has the inherent infirmity of disregarding risk. As Professor Wallich observed,
when comparing fund performance with an index or an average of other funds,
proper measurement requires that risk be taken into account. Different
funds deliberately seek different degrees of risk. They are thus not comparable in terms of their capital gains and current income alone.
Risk is usually measured by the variability of a portfolio, i.e. by the
dispersion or range of its rate of return, taking capital gains and current
income together. When risk is so measured, it turns out that indeed the
mutual funds that accept higher risk have on average a higher rate of
return. But it is also shown that an average of randomly selected portfolios
will usually have a higher rate of return for a given risk, or a lower risk
for a given rate of return, than mutual funds. 0 44
Even Mr. Jaretzki, long an industry champion, recognizes the risk factor when
he states that the performance fee is "a rather dangerous method of compen1 4
sation. I think it encourages speculation.' "
Under these circumstances, it is apparent that the advisors, in general,
have the benefit of a very one-sided agreement. The facts support this observation. As Appendix B indicates, three performance fee funds had assets in excess
of $100 million at June 30, 1968. Managers of these funds garnered fees amounting to .63 per cent, .73 per cent, and 1.24 per cent of the funds' assets. This is
certainly handsome booty.
Beginning with a comparatively high base fee, accepting the benefits of
superior performance while assuming little or no risk of loss from inferior performance, and seldom if ever sharing the economies of scale to any degree, these
1041

INVESTMENT COMPANIES

1968, at 411 (L. Wessmann ed. 1968).

1042 N.Y. Times, Jan. 1, 1969, at 31, col. 8.
1043 Professor Samuelson refers to Dow-Jones as a "tired" index, far less valid as a market
indicator than the newer, more comprehensive indices. 1967 Senate Hearings 370. The professor also points out that fund managers, once embarrassed by their inability to outperform
Dow-Jones, vociferously protested any comparisons between the funds and the index. Id. at
369. Now that outperforming the blue chips is as simple as selecting a random portfolio, however, these same men are anxious to compare their performance records with the Dow-Jones
Industrials. Id. at 371.
1044 1967 House Hearings 583; 1967 Senate Hearings 1061 (statement of Henry C.
Wallich).
1045 Statement of Alfred Jaretzki, University of Pennsylvania Law School Conference on
Mutual Funds, supra note 1026, at 765. See also 1967 Senate Hearings 368.
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performance fees are, in the main, fine examples of the "heads I win, tails you
lose" arrangements roundly condemned in 1940."48
2. Operating Expenses Defrayed by Advisory Fee
Of course, the investment advisor is paid a fee primarily for the expertise
he provides in the supervision of the fund's portfolio, but the same advisory fee
may cover a potpourri of administrative services as well. However, the Wharton
Report underscored the "considerable variation in industry practice as regards
the allocation of administrative duties and expenses.'.. 4 Administrative services
most often furnished by the advisor and fully or partially defrayed by the basic
advisory fee include salaries and compensation of fund officers, office space for
the fund, clerical and bookkeeping services, and determination of bid and ask
prices. Services least often covered by the basic fee include custodial accommodations, stock transfer and dividend disbursement, audits, and reports to shareholders. The following table' 4 s lists the administrative expenses covered by the
advisory fees paid by a sample of one hundred funds. With minor variations in
sequence, the data is in accord with the findings of the Wharton Report.0 4
Nonadvisory expenses covered by the advisory fees of 100 mutual funds

Number of funds
Expense Expense
Expense
fully
Expense b
partially
not
covered covered
covered
88
1
11
Salaries and compensation of officers
Occupancy and office rental
85
2
13
Clerical and bookkeeping
81
4
15
Determination of offering and redemption prices 71
1
28
Accounting services
65
1
34
Stationery, supplies, and printing
54
8
38
40
4
Registration and filing fees
56
Salaries and compensation of directorsc
32
0
68
Legal fees
25
4
71
Reports to shareholders
25
2
73
16
2
82
Auditing services
Stock transfer and dividend disbursing fee
10
2
88
4
2
94
Custodian fee
a Selected, after eliminating funds with the same adviser, from externally managed mutual
funds that filed annual reports with the Commission prior to Jan. 1, 1966, on form N-IR
adopted on Jan. 25, 1965. See Investment Company Act Release No. 4151 (Jan. 25, 1965).
b Excludes expenses which were not covered by the basic advisory fee.
Includes only directors who are unaffiliated with the adviser or principal underwriter.

1046

See S. REP. No. 1775, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 22 (1940).

1047 WHARTON REPoRT 476. The Report further notes that "the act of 1940 does not
require a precise statement of services to be rendered in exchange for the precisely defined

compensation, and in a number of cases the contractual obligations of the adviser are vague."

Id. at 476 n.33. See Acampora v. Birkland, 220 F. Supp. 527, 541-42, 544-47 (D. Colo. 1963).
It should be observed that pending legislation would require the management contract
to describe precisely and separately the amounts to be paid for advisory services and for all

other services. S. 34, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 8(a) (1969); S. 296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. §
8(a) (1969).
1048 PuBLic PoLIay STATEMENT 91.
1049 WHARTON REPORT 477.
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It should be observed that the expenses least often covered by the basic fee are
among the most substantial non-advisory cost incurred by a fund. Specifically,
only twelve advisors, in an SEC study of one hundred funds, bore any part of the
cost for transfer and disbursing, and only six paid for custodianship of fund
securities- services almost invariably furnished by a commercial bank or trust
company. In 1964, the cost of these services among the twenty largest externally
managed funds ranged from $101,936 for Chemical Fund, Inc., to $828,154
for Wellington Fund, Inc."50 This amounted to approximately 7.5 per cent
of Chemical's total expenses and 13.4 per cent of Wellington's.0 5
For some funds, especially in the larger complexes, the services rendered
for the advisory fee may be more comprehensive. The IDS advisory contract,
for example, requires that the advisor assume all normal operating expenses of
certain of the funds in the complex.. 5 2 .The funds in the Waddell & Reed, Inc.,
United Funds group have a similar arrangement, while the composite MAT fee.0 ..
paid by Insurance Securities, Inc., also covers all normal operating expenses of
0 4"
the funds."
Where all normal fund operating expenses are not covered by th6 basic
advisory fee, two devices are common: the first is an "administrative fee," and
the second (often combined with the first) is a "contractual limitation."
3. Operating Expenses Defrayed by Administrative Fee
The administrative fee is a separate charge levied against the fund by the
advisor (or, in some cases, by the trustee or principal underwriter), and like the
basic advisory fee it is usually based on a percentage of average net assets.' 55
This fee, not surprisingly, is intended to compensate the recipient for administrative services furnished to the fund,05 0 and may take several forms.
The first form, intended to cover all normal fund administrative expenses,
is illustrated by the "recurring fee" charged to the Keystone Custodian Funds.
The ten funds are organized as trusts with Keystone Custodian Funds, Inc.,
named as trustee."r For investment advice, the trustee receives an annual fee of
one-half per cent on the first $150 million of combined net assets and a scaleddown percentage on the balance. The "recurring fee" is also computed on the
1050 PUBLIC POLICY STATEMENT 91-92, 91 n.34.
1051 See INVESTMENT COMPANIES 1968, at 163, 276 (L. Wessmann ed. 1968).
1052 MOODY'S 1968 BANK & FINANCE MANUAL 1091-96; 1967 Senate Hearings 756;
1967 House Hearings 467.
1053 MAT is an acronym for "management, administrative, and trusteeship" fee. PUBLIC
POLICY STATEMENT

89. See id. at 89 n.26.

1054 Id. at 92.
1055 Id.
1056 To some of the directors who are asked to review and approve an administrative
fee, this may come as a surprise. A director of a fund which pays such a charge, was asked
whether the purpose of the fee had ever been explained to him. He replied that he could not
recall. 114 CONG. REc. 9496 (daily ed. July 26, 1968). When another director of the same
fund was queried as to why he thought the charge should be levied, he answered "I don't
know." "Q. Have you ever raised any questions about it? A. No. Q. Have you known that
it was unusual? A. [No. Q. You have no idea of what the continuing fee is used for? A.
No." Id.
1057 The trustee is not an investment advisor within the technical meaning of the Act.
Investment Company Act of 1940 § 2(a) (19) (A), 15 U.S.C. § 80(a)-2(a) (19) (A) (196+).
See note 1239 infra.
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basis of combined assets, but at a rate of one-quarter per cent on the first $500
million and a sliding scale thereafter.""5 The individual trusts bear the cost of
the fee pro rata.
A second' type of administrative fee arrangement, covering only a portion
of fund expenses, is illustrated by the trust agreement of the National Securities
Series. The funds are registered as a single investment company trusteed by the
Bank of New York and issuing seven series of shares. Under the trust indenture,
the Bank of New York provides custodial, dividend disbursing, and transfer
services, for which it receives a fee of one-quarter per cent of the first $60
million in assets. 5" On assets in excess of $60 million a progressively lower percentage applies.0 0" The company also pays a separate advisory fee to its investment advisor and sponsor, National Securities & Research Corporation.'
While
the administrative fee in this case covers only those services specifically enumerated
2
in the trust agreement, these are the fund's principal adminstritive burdens.'
Axe-Houghton Funds A and B each pay a traditional advisory fee to their
investment advisor, B. W. Axe & Co. In addition, both funds pay an administrative fee to the principal underwriter, Axe Securities Corporation, at a rate of
.2 per cent on the first $50 inillion in assets and thereafter on a sliding scale."" 5
While this case demonstrates the administrative fee paid to a separate underwriter, it should be observed that the fee does not, cover the most important elements of expense - custodial fees, stock transfer fees, and dividend disbursing
0 64
expenses.

4. Contractual Limitations
The second device used to defray administrative expenses excluded from
the basic advisory fee is the contractual limitation. This is nothing more sophisticated than a provision in the advisory contract calling for the advisor to absorb
the fund's operating expenses to the extent that these exceed a specified limit.
In its simplest form, the device is well exemplified by Equity Fund, Inc. The
fund pays an advisory fee to its investment advisor, Pacific Northwest Management & Research Company, at a rate of one-half per cent on its first $250 million
in assets and on a sliding scale thereafter. If, howeveraggregate expenses of the
fund exceed one per cent of the fund's average net assets, the advisor must
absorb the excess."'0
The contractual limitation device may be coupled with the administrative
fee quite simply. The Axe-Houghton Stock Fund, Inc. does precisely this. The
Stock Fund pays its investment advisor, E. W. Axe & Co., the traditional
1058 INVESTMENT COMPANIES 1968, at 221 *(L. Wessmann ed. 1968).
1059 NATIONAL SECURITIES SERIES, PROSPECTUS, July 29, 1968, amended Jan., 13, 1969,
at 13-14.

1060

Id. at 14.

1061 The fee is computed at one-half per cent on the first $410 million, and .375 per cent
on the excess net assets annually. Id. at 12.
1062 See text accompanying note 1050 supra.
1063 INVESTMENT COMPANIES 1968, at 148 (L. Wessmann ed. 1968).
1064 These are borne independently by the fund and paid to the custodian and transfer
agent, First National City Bank of New York. Id.
1065 MOODY'S 1968 BANK & FINANCE MANUAL 1114. Cf. WUARTON REPoRT'478.
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one-half per cent advisory fee, and also pays a .2 per'cent administrative fee to
its principal underwriter. The administrative fee, however, does not cover fees
of the custodian and transfer agent - Fiduciary Trust Company of New York
and The Corporation Trust Company, respectively. At this point the contractual
limitation may become effective so that if the fund's total expenses exceed one
10 66
per cent of net assets, the difference is reimbursed to the fund by the advisor.
The contractual limitation may also be combined with a performance fee arrangement, as in the case of Republic Technology Fund, Inc., Oppenheimer
Fund, Inc., Fletcher Fund, Inc., Enterprise Fund, Inc., and
Fund, Inc., Ivest
0 67
several others.
C. Analysis of Management Fees
1. The Economies of Scale
Only an investment advisor with his back to the wall would be disposed
to dispute the substantial economies of scale which inhere in the fund management process. The Wharton Report, through a meticulous analysis of operating
ratios among corporate-form advisors, demonstrated dearly that operating ratios
decline steadily as total assets under management increase. Moreover, where the
advisor's business is confined to investment company management, the decline
16
below.
is even more rapid, as is apparent from the table
Operating ratios of corporate investment advisers, by size of total
assets managed, 1960-61
[In per cent]
Operating ratios a for
advisers having Investment
Investment
company and
company
Total assets managed (in millions)
other clients
clients only
161.5
135.5
$1 and under $10
88.5
81.5
$10 and under $50
90.9
68.3
$50 and under $150
87.0
59.0
$150 and under $300
83.4
36.7
$300 and under $600
71.2
48.8
$600 and over
a Total operating expenses as a per cent of total income.

The findings of the Wharton Report in this regard should not have surprised
many. During the 1940 Senate hearings on S. 3580, Merrill Griswold, then
Chairman of the Board of Massachusetts Investors Trust, uttered what has become classic idiom:
It is now almost axiomatic in the trust business that operating costs
decline proportionately as the size of a trust increases. The experience of
1066

INVESTMENT COMPANIES

1067

See Appendix A infra.

1068

WHARTON REPORT

503.

1968, at 148 (L. Wessmann ed. 1968).
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shareholders of Massachusetts Investors Trust clearly proves this. With
assets of $13,000,000 in 1932, operating costs were $11.02 per $1,000 of net
assets. By 1939, when the trust had grown to $121,000,000, operating costs
per $1,000 of assets had been reduced to $4.41, a decrease of 60 per cent
from the 1932 figure.
This advantage of size from the shareholder's standpoint is also clearly
evident from a study we have made of 22 representative open-end companies with assets ranging from about $2,000,000 to about $50,000,000.
[W]hether a company is a one-million-dollar company, a ten-milliondollar company, or a hundred-million-dollar company, it has to maintain
an office, pay rent, pay for long distance telephone calls, retain experts,
clerks, stenographers, all the numerous expenses that go with it; and those
expenses do not go up proportionately. We maintain what we consider to
be a very good research department. We have a number of men who receive good salaries, and a large staff. If our trust were half as large, if we
were to do the same kind of an investment job, we could not fire one single
one of those people.
It is our belief that further growth in the assets of Massachusetts Investors Trust would bring about still further reduction in proportionate
costs of operation, with resulting benefit to all shareholders. 10 69
History has confirmed Mr. Griswold's predictions in every particular. From
the figures cited in his testimony, MIT's expense ratio for 1932 was about 1.1
per cent; by 1939 that had declined to .44 per cent. In 1957, MIT's total net
assets had increased to over $976 million while its expense ratio had been more
than halved again, to .21 per cent." 7" As of June 30, 1968, MIT had over
$2.3 billion in assets, with a further reduction in expense ratio to .19 per cent." 71
It should be noted that this is an expense ratio, and hence accounts for more than
simply the cost of portfolio management.
In its Public Policy Statement,"7 2 in its statement before the Senate Committee, 1 7 3 and again before the House Subcommittee,"" the SEC cited the record
of The Dreyfus Corporation to dramatically underscore the economies of scale
inherent in the fund advisory business:
The Dreyfus Corp. is investment adviser to The Dreyfus Fund, which grew
from net assets of $171 million at year end 1960 to $1.1 billion at September
30, 1965.["°0 51The advisory fees received by The Dreyfus Corp. almost tripled,
increasing from about $1.2 million in 1961 to $3.4 million in 1964. During
the same period operating expenses allocable to the advisory fees rose at a
much slower rate. Those expenses increased from $469,000 in 1961 to
$846,000 in 1964. Thus, the operating ratio of The Dreyfus Corp. declined
from 39 percent in 1961 to 25 percent in 1964. For the
first 9 months of
0 76
1965, its operating ratio declined further to 21 percent.
1069
1070
1071
1072
1073
1074
1075
1076

Testimony of Merrill Griswold 1940 Senate Hearings 498.
INVESTMENT COMPANIES 1968, at 229 (L. Wessmann ed. 1968).
NUVEEN CORP., MUTUAL FUNDS PANORAMA (1968).
PUBLIC POLICY STATEMENT 95-96.
1967 Senate Hearings 132 (without naming the company).
1967 House Hearings 35 (without naming the company).
$2.4 billion at June 30, 1968. NUVEEN CORP., MUTUAL FUNDS PANORAMA (1968).
PUBLIC POLICY STATEMENT 95-96.
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The Commission admits that such pronounced examples are not necessarily
data on other advisors clearly indicates
typical, but counters that the available
1 0 77
"significant" economies of scale.
There is one fund complex which provides us with laboratory conditions
for determining the actual cost of fund management. This complex, commonly
known as the "Broad Street Group," consists of six corporations:
(1) Tri-Continental Corporation, a closed-end investment company;,078
(2)
Broad Street Investing Corporation, an open-end invest-

ment company;°1079
(3) National Investors Corporation, an open-end investment
company ;1080
(4) Whitehall Fund, Inc., an open-end investment company; 0 8 '
(5)
Union Service Distributor, Inc., which acts as wholesale distributor of the three open-end funds;.0 .2 and
(6)
Union Service Corporation, which acts as investment advisor
to all the investment companies in the complex, and which provides
investment research, economic analysis and supervision of portfolio
acquisitions and liquidations.0 8
Union Service Corporation [Union] is jointly owned by the four investment
companies in the complex. Union's function is to provide investment management as well as certain administrative services, including accounting, bookkeeping
and budgetary services, office space, and preparation of shareholder reports and
proxy materials.0 4 Each investment company pays separately for its own officers' and executives' salaries, stock transfer, custodial, dividend and capital gains
disbursing, legal and auditing services, taxes, the cost of printing and mailing
shareholder communications, and holding of shareholder meetings.'08 s Since the
most substantial of these are the costs least often covered by the advisory fee for
other funds, the services provided by Union are comparable to those typically
080
furnished by an external investment advisor under the basic advisory fee.

1077 Id. at 96.
1078 Tri-Continental Corporation merged in 1967 with Tri-Continental Financial Corporation, formerly its wholly owned subsidiary, which, in turn, was whole owner of its own
subsidiary, Broad Street Sales Corporation. Since the merger, of course, Broad Street Sales
Corporation is a wholly owned subsidiary of Tri-Continental Corporation. Compare 1967
House Hearings 686 with MooDY's 1968 BANK & FINANCE MANUAL 1037.
1079 A common stock fund, Broad Street Investing's objective is income with growth.
BROAD STREET INVESTING CORPORATION, 1968 ANNUAL REPORT 4 (page proof ed. 1969).
1080 Also a common stock fund, National Investors strives for long term growth. NATIONAL
INVESTORS CORPORATION, 1968 ANNUAL REPORT 4 (page proof ed. 1969).
1081 Whitehall is a balanced fund. WHITEHALL FUND, INC., 1968 ANNUAL REPORT 4
(page proof ed. 1969).
1082 Union Service replaced Broad Street Sales Corporation as distributor on November 30,
1968. Id. at 17.
1083 Union Data Service Center, Inc., a wholly owned subsidiary of Union Service
Corporation, was organized to provide data processing and all functions formerly performed
for the funds by agent banks, except custodianship. Like Union Service, Union Data operates
at cost. Id. at 6, 18.
1084 Id. at 18.
1085 Id. at 15; BROAD STREET INVESTING CORPORATION, 1968 ANNUAL REPORT 19 (page
proof ed. 1969); NATIONAL INVESTORS CORPORATION, 1968 ANNUAL REPORT 19 (page proof

ed. 1969);
1086

TRI-CONTINENTAL CORPORATION,

1968

See text accompanying note 1049 supra.

ANNUAL REPORT

27 (1969).
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The unique feature of this arrangement, however, is that Union provides

these services at cost."5 7 Each fund simply pays Union a sum which represents

its pro rata share of Union's total expenses. Thus we have an excellently controlled situation in which to segregate the actual cost of the management function. 0oss

Year
1968

1967
1966
1965
1964
1963
1962
1961
1960
1959
1958
1957
1956
1955
1954
1953

01 9
Expenses of Broad Street Group0
Average
Management Management
Total
Net Assets
Expense a Expense Ratio b Expense
'(Thousands) (Thousands)
(%)
(Thousands)
1,877
.10
3,503
1,837,971
1,596,016
1,620
.10
3,064
1,460,807
1,602
.11
2,564
1,411,438
1,543
.11
2,358
1,254,184
1,432
.11
2,263
1,378
.13
1,085,623
2,261
1,029,330
1,302
.13
2,092
1,208
.13
939,492
1,948
770,980
1,182
.15
1,856
681,008
1,633
552,144
1,497

474,047
451,979
388,590
301,144
253,357

1,415
1,207
1,085
997
912

Expense

Ratio

(%)
.19
.19
.17
.17
.18
.21
.20
.21

.24
.24
.27
.30
.27
.28
.33
.38

a Equals total expenses of Union for year indicated.
b Management expense as per cent of average net assets.

1087 Since Union furnishes its services at cost, it is not an investment advisor within the
language of the Act. Investment Company Act of 1940 § 2(a)(19)(B)(iii), 15 U.S.C. §
80a-2(a) (19) (B) (iii) (1964).
1088 Although Union operates on a non-profit basis, its executives, managers, and staff
members certainly do not. Union employs 120 people to operate the four investment companies. TRi-CONTINENTAL CORPORATION, 1968 ANNUAL REPORT 34 (1969). -, 1089 Sources: 1967 House Hearings 686; MooDY's 1968 BANK & FINANCE MANUAL 1038,
1040-42; TRI-CONTINENTAL CORPORATION, 1968 ANNUAL REPORT 26-27 (1969); BROAD
STREET INVESTING CORPORATION, 1968 ANNUAL REPORT 19-20 (page proof ed. 1969);
WHITEHALL FUND, INC., 1968 ANNUAL REPORT 15-16 (page proof ed. 1969); NATIONAL
INVESTORS CORPORATION, 1968 ANNUAL REPORT 19-20 (page proof ed. 1969); NATIONAL
INVESTORS COR'ORATION, PROSPECTUS, May 1, 1968, at 3.
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Exmnrr I
4 0

Group Expense Ratio (hundredths per cent)

25

20-

15
Group Management Expense Ratio
(hundredths per cent)

10t

1953 '54 '55 '56 '57 '58 '59 '60 '61 '62 '63 '64 '65 '66 '67 '68
Year

[Vol. 44:732]

SU'RVE'Y

Exhibit I graphically displays the trends recognizable in the data of the
above table. While average net assets of the funds increased by 151 per cent
between 1960 and 1968, the total dollar cost of management furnished by Union
increased only fifty-nine per cent. The relative stability of management cost
combines with soaring net assets to produce a direct index of the economies of
scale. On the graph and table this is illustrated by the declining "management
expense ratio."
2. Effect of Economies of Scale on Management Fee Rate
The example of the Broad Street Group indicates the actual cost involved
in furnishing typical advisory services in a fully operational complex. It is interesting to compare these figures with advisory fees paid by other funds. To
provide a basis for comparison, Appendix B is constructed to show an "advisory
fee rate" expressed as a per cent for eighty-seven externally managed funds with
assets over $100 million. The "advisory fee rate" is the ratio of advisory fees
paid to average net assets for the fiscal year, and is thus directly comparable to
the "management expense ratio" used in the analysis of the Broad Street Group.
The advisory fee rate has the virtue of reducing sometimes complex formulae
for the computation of individual fees to a simple percentage of net assets." 9"
Since the Broad Street group embraces a relatively large pool of assets under
common management, we should begin the comparison by examining the largest
funds in Appendix B. Among the twenty largest externally managed 9 funds,
advisory fee rates range from a high of .63 per cent to a low of .23 per cent.
This range has a mean of .43 per cent, a median of .40 per cent, and an average
of .40 per cent. Contrasting these with the .10 per cent management expense
ratio of the Broad Street Group, we note that the externally managed funds
spend nearly four times as much for management. Continuing the comparison,
the entire range of fee rates shown in Appendix B has a mean of .47 per cent, a
median of .50 per cent, and an average of .47 per cent. This type of comparison
leads one to suspect that the economies of scale among externally managed funds
and fund complexes have not inured to the benefit of anyone save the advisor.
The definitive study of this phenomenon is still the Wharton Report. That
report showed that in 1960, nearly eighty per cent of advisory fees charged to
mutual funds were computed on a flat rate basis, making no allowance for the
size of assets under management. At the same time, investment advisors applied
a fee rate scaled by asset size or directly negotiated to over seventy-five per cent
of their non-fund clients. 9 " Furthermore, the Wharton Report was not able
to justify the differences in fee rates charged to fund and non-fund clients on the
basis of the advisor's cost. Despite vociferous objection from the industry that

1090

For this reason it is called, in the Wharton Report, the "effective fee rate." For more

detailed description of Wharton's method of computation, see WHrARTON REPORT 484.

1091 This excludes Massachusetts Investors Trust, Massachusetts Investors Growth Stock
Fund, Inc., and National Investors Corporation, which are internally managed funds not
listed in Appendix B.
1092 WHARTON RPORT 480-81.
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it is more expensive for an advisor to handle a large fund account than to service
a non-fund account,0 93 the Report concluded from the facts that the opposite
is true:
[Flor each size class of investment advisers (classified by size of total
assets managed) the total operating expense ratios are sharply higher in
those cases where income is received from both investment company and
noninvestment company clients, than in cases where the adviser is managing
investment company assets only.... [W]ithin each of these asset size classes
the total operating expense ratios increase fairly consistently with increases
in the percentage of the total advisory income received from noninvestment
company clients.10 94
This pronounced tendency of operating ratios to correlate positively with an
advisor's concentration in non-fund business points up the fact that fund management is, comparatively at least, a most lucrative enterprise. Recognizing that a
definite absence of arm's length bargaining could be implied from these findings," 95 the report was at pains to meticulously test and retest its conclusion that
fee rates charged to the funds were not responsive to increased asset size." 9"
It was still true at the time of the Wharton Report that "[t]he effective
fee rates charged open-end companies tended to cluster heavily about the traditional rate of .5 per cent per annum of average net assets,"'0 97 a condition generally unchanged from that prevalent in 1940.'"' The advisory fee rates shown
in Appendix B bear witness to this monumental inertia, for the median of those
rates is still .50 per cent, or nearly five times the management expense ratio of
the Broad Street Group.
3. Industry Defense of Fee Structure
Investment advisors indefatigably insist that theirs is a fiercely competitive
profession. When compelled to defend his fee an advisor may display a Pavlovian reflex, the word competition spewing from his lips:
Mr. ALGE1. We [advisors] view it [the fund share] as a product which
we are just trying to Mr. KErrH. Yes.
Mr. ALGER. I mean that is the way we view it.
Mr. KEirH. The SEC does not think this is healthy.
Mr. ALGER. Well, there is such tremendous competition. How can
something be unhealthy which is so tremendously competitive? ...
I mean you can only describe it in competitive terms....

1093

See Id. at 492.

1094

Id. at 495.

1095 Id. at 481 n.39.
1096 Id. at 484-91.
1097

1098

Id. at 28.

"The usual fee is one-half of 1 percent annually of the asset value of the fund."

Testimony of Mahlon E. Traylor, 1940 Senate Hearings 453. See also INVESTMENT TRUSTS

III 1922 (prior to 1935).
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I mean no one is making an awful lot of money..

." .Imean management companies real
is the fact of it.1099

are not very profitable. That

These contentions do not merely invite inquiry, they fairly implore investigation. From the standpoint of practical economics, strong competition among
advisors for a fund's advisory contract is highly unlikely. This is partly due to
the extreme dependence of a fund on it present advisor-underwriter. As we have
already seen, the advisor generally supplies most, if not all, of the fund's officers
and usually pays their salaries as well. He may control the fund's underwriting
mechanism, without which it would cease to grow. He likewise provides the
fund's clerical staff, bookkeeping personnel, and accounting services. In most
cases the fund depends on its advisor for its very office space."" . The dependence
of the fund on its advisor is so complete, and its control by the advisor so nearly
absolute, that the Wharton Report was disposed to characterize the difference
between them as "strictly legal."" 0 ' This reliance leaves little room for arm's
length negotiation of the advisory contract, since the fund is not in an economic
position to strike out on its own in search of a new advisor."0 2 Given the completely captive client, and the knowledge that other funds are securely locked
in their own advisors' desk drawers, there is little incentive for an advisor to
1099
1100

Testimony of Fred M. Alger, 1967 House Hearings 506-07.
The court in Acampora v. Birkiand, 220 F. Supp. 527 (D. Colo. 1963) observed:
The closeness of the relationship between Fund and Management is to be
especially noted. Fund grew up under Management's sponsorship. Through the
years they have shared office facilities and have oftentimes shared employees as well
as officers, directors and managers. Id. at 534.
Other courts have recognized and remarked upon the closeness of this relationship and
the position of extreme dependence occupied by the fund:
The links between Mutual [a fund] and IDS [its advisor] are very close. Mutual
was actually organized by IDS as evidenced by the following statement at page 20
of the prospectus: "Investors organized and is principal underwriter and investment
manager of Investors Mutual, Inc." The two companies share the same principal
office in Minneapolis, Minnesota. The entire business of Mutual is conducted exclusively by IDS. There is a considerable interlock between their directors and
officers (prospectus, pp. 18-19). The prospectus (front cover and p. 2) describes
Mutual as being "affiliated" with IDS. With respect to the sale or distribution of
the stock of Mutual, "its shares have been distributed exclusively by" IDS, pursuant
to distribution agreements between the two companies. Applications for shares of
Mutual are solicited by representatives of IDS and are submitted to Mutual in
Minneapolis for acceptance or rejection (ibid.). Ackert v. Ausman, 29 Misc. 2d
962, 964, 218 N.Y.S.2d 822, 824 (Sup. Ct. 1961), aff'd mem., 20 App. Div. 850,
247 N.Y.S.2d 999 (1964).
1101 WHARTON REPORT 463.
1102 A theme very often repeated in the 1967 Senate Hearings and 1967 House Hearings is
that any refusal to accept the management contract as dictated by the incumbent advisor
would be disastrous for the fund. Thus, the unaffiliated directors and the shareholders, even
assuming that some are so inclined, are left to steer between a Scylla and Charybdis if they are
dissatisfied with the management's terms. They may choose an onerous contract on the one
hand or corporate chaos on the other, for to reject a proposed contract is to eviscerate the
fund. There is no middle course. It is submitted that the law should not countenance such
an inequitable and completely unchecked stranglehold. See, e.g., statement of Donald E.
Schwartz, 1967 House Hearings 818-19:
Shareholders of a fund are asked, by means of a proxy statement to approve of the
appointment of an advisor at a specified fee or to disapprove. They are left with no
alternatives in between. They cannot renegotiate the fee imposed by the advisor.
The mutual fund shareholder is not in the same position as a shareholder in other
corporations in this matter. Elsewhere, he may feel free to reject a submitted transaction without fear of disrupting the corporation. If the mutual fund shareholders
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narrow his profit margin in order to attract other investment company clients
and even less incentive for him to lower the price to his captive fund.
That advisors do not, in fact, seek to lure other funds is conceded by the
industry. If directly confronted and unable to avoid the issue, the advisor's
tendency is to simply equivocate on the content of the word competition. For
example, the following dialogue took place:
Mr. Moss....
Do they [fund directors] cover offers from other managers?
Mr. LOEFFLER. They have had no occasion to do [so], sir.
Mr. Moss. Can you cite me any instance in any fund where that
has happened?
Mr. LOEFFLER.... Generally speaking, sir, it does not happen, and I
do not mean to contend, and would not suggest, that the unaffiliated directors of the funds ... should sit down and say, "We can get a better deal
from another management company ....Therefore, we shift over here."
Mr. Moss. They do not really know, do they, because they do not
invite any competing offersMr. LOEFFLER. It is all published, sir.
Mr. Moss (continuing). Or proposals?
Mr. LOEFFLER. This information is all published.
Mr. Moss. Do they entertain any proposals?
Do you go out and submit proposals to other funds?
Mr. LOEFFLER. To other funds?
Mr. Moss. To undertake management activities for them?
Mr. LOEFFLER. No, sir.
Mr. Moss. You do not.
Mr. LOEFFLER. We have never considered this.
Mr. Moss. Do you know of anyone else who does?
In other words, we are going to use terms here. I think if we are
going to talk about competition, let's bring it down toMr. LOEFFLER. That would be one form of competition and I am
not contending that that formMr. Moss. I am using it more or less in the orthodox sense. Do you
actually compete in that market for that particular account? ...

Now it is in a different sense that you use the word "competition" here,
is it not?
110
Mr. LOEFFLER. It is a different form of competition.., yes, sir. 3
The competition to which the industry refers is a rivalry for investor favor,
and the focus is on sales. "What we compete for essentially is the investor dollar
of the customer, the ultimate customer."'1 04 This approach views the investment
company as a mere legal technicality -a
set of finely drafted papers to be
placed in an advisor's desk drawer for safekeeping - the only function of which
is to provide a mechanism whereby the advisor may market a product: the

1103
1104

reject an investment advisory contract, the fund is left with no management at all.
Most important, of course, in an uncontested election, it is common knowledge that
he who controls the proxy machinery can obtain the approval of anything he seeks;
at least, there is no record of any experience to the contrary. That important legal
consequences as to the meaning of the vote should flow from this exercise is the
sheerest of legal casuistry.
1967 House Hearings 479-80.
Id. at 480.
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"mutual fund share." On this view, management profit is considered an element
of the ultimate price of the product - a cost borne directly and individually by
the consumer. Since there are myriad funds among which the purchaser may
choose, so the argument goes, management compensation is effectively regulated
by the economic forces of the marketplace.
4. Validity of Industry Position
The validity of the industry's contention, overlooking for the moment the
legal infirmity of the theory upon which it is based, depends first on the consumer's awareness of management costs. Generally, it might be expected that
prospectus disclosure of the management fee would be sufficient to allow the
competitive pressures of the marketplace to operate, thus leading to management compensation limited by economic forces. There are several reasons why
this mechanism does not effectively function in the sale of investment company
shares.
First, the unique distribution system described in Part IV, whereby shares
are aggressively marketed by commissioned salesmen, couples with the relatively
unsophisticated characteristics of the typical purchaser of this investment medium
to effectively minimize the investor's awareness. of management cost. Professor
Herman explained the salesman's de-emphasis of management costs this way:
"The salesman could hardly stress differences in management fee rate (under
1%) without raising questions about differences in the much higher sales charge
(8% or more)."""
Among the internally managed funds and those externally managed complexes with extraordinarily low management costs, however, there is some effort
to apprise the investor of fee rates. Among the funds in the Broad Street Group,
for example, Tri-Continental, Broad Street Investing, and National Investors are
careful to explain in their prospectuses'.. and annual reports 0 7 the management
economies they realize through Union Service Corporation, and these funds
invite cost comparisons with other investment companies. Giving due credit to
these funds,'
which occupy an atypical niche, does not seriously detract from
the validity of the general rule that there is seldom any concerted effort to draw
attention to the management fee.
Secondly, for the few shareholders who are even cognizant of the advisory
fee, the charge is likely to seem relatively inconsequential when compared to the
sales load. Assuming a sales load of eight per cent and a flat management fee
rate of one-half per cent, the costs on a $5,000 investment are respectively $400
1105
814.

1106
1107

Statement of Edward S. Herman, 1967 Senate Hearings 729; 1967 House Hearings

E.g.,
E.g.,

NATIONAL INVESTORS CORPORATION, PROSPECTUS, May 1, 1968, at 3.
BROAD STREET INVESTING CORPORATION, 1968 ANNUAL REPORT 10 (page

proof

ed. 1969).
1108 The credit can be overemphasized. It is probably still true that in spite of their
willingness to spotlight management economies, the internally managed funds and those with
otherwise low expense ratios do not succeed in actually alerting their investors to differences
in operational costs. The Special Study found that seventy to eighty per cent of fund investors
were totally ignorant of the expenses of their fund, and that investors in funds with extraordinarily low expense ratios were equally oblivious of the facts. SPECILL STUDY IV 344.
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and $23 in the first year."10 9 The investor is, quite naturally, more concerned
with the $400 load which he bears immediately and directly than with the $23
management cost which he bears only indirectly as an expense of the entire fund.
The $23 is probably seldom noticed, for it is only reflected as a reduced dividend
or a depletion in capital at the end of the year. The relatively minor initial
impact of the advisory fee on the individual shareholder tends to dilute further
the argument that competition for investor favor has significant impact on fee
rates.
Thirdly, the formulae used to determine the advisory fee may be so complex as to discourage investigation by the fund's investors. Such formulae may
embrace breakpoints, recapture of brokerage, expense ratio limitations, some form
of performance adjustments, administrative fees, or any imaginable combination
of these. In addition, the services furnished by the advisor in consideration of
his fee will vary widely from fund to fund, making comparisons the more difficult
for an investor.
The industry itself recognizes this problem, and in a letter from NASD it
is stated:
We recognize the statutory mandate and the practical need for the
full and accurate disclosure that is presently published in the prospectus of
each investment company. Viewed objectively, however, that disclosure is,
in many instances, couched in such technical terminology as to obscure for
the average reader the important differences between funds and some of
the factors that he should consider in making his investment decision. In
many cases, no doubt, the prospectus is so formidable as not to encourage
the interest and attention of the customer 1 10
5. Statutory Regulation
a. Introduction
The lack of competition and arm's-length bargaining in the negotiation of
an advisory contract is attributable to more than simple practical considerations.
There lies at the root of the problem a fundamental legal deficiency, and this
is our main concern.
The Wharton Report emphasized a fact which every advisor knows - that
there is a minimum size of assets which must be under management if the advisor
is to make a profit."" Thus a fledgling fund may be a money loser for some
time before it reaches a profitable size. If the fund-advisor relationship is unstable for some reason, the advisor will have less expectation of recouping his
initial losses, and hence less incentive to organize and promote a fund. Since the
fund, as it grows beyond critical size, may well become a very profitable client,
the advisor has a vested interest in insuring maximum possible stability in the
1109 The management cost is calculated at one-half per cent of $4,600, the amount
actually invested after deduction of the sales load. The example makes no allowance for
appreciation of the investment company's portfolio, nor does it adjust for reinvested distributions, factors which would revise the management cost slightly upward.
1110 Letter from R. M. Gardiner to Hastings Keith, Nov. 7, 1967, reprinted in 1967
House Hearings 378.

1111

WHARTON REPORT

503.
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relationship. This he is able to do by installing himself and his affiliates on the
fund's board of directors and by dubbing himself and his friends officers of the
fund.
There are limits, however, on the closeness of this affiliation (alternatively
yclept "business incest" 1

2

), and those limits are directly imposed by the Invest-

ment Company Act. S. 3580 would have mandated that no more than a
minority.. 3 of an investment company's board of directors or advisory board
could be composed of the company's managers,, investment advisors, brokers,
underwriters, or their affiliates."' H.R. 10065, the bill which ultimately became
law," 5 however, reflected an obvious compromise with the industry,"' since
it permitted the advisor, his affiliates, and the fund's managers to occupy a
majority (up to sixty7 per cent) of the seats on the company's advisory board and
board of directors."1

This situation, in which the advisor or members of the management organization staff a fund and sit on its board of directors, generates a very obvious conflitt of interest in the fixing of management compensation. On the one hand,
there is a. personal interest in the advisor and his associates to maximize the
profits of the advisor, while on the other hand there is a fiduciary duty owing
to the shareholders of the fund to obtain management services on the most
favorable terms. Moreover, in some instances the conflict may escalate beyond
self-interest to embrace conflicting fiduciary duties owed to two sets of public
shareholders. This would be the case where the advisor is a publicly owned
corporation "' 8 and there is an interlock between the fund's board of directors
1112 Note, The Mutual Fund and Its Management Company: An Analysis of Business
Incest, 71 YALE L.J. 137 (1961); Statement of Abraham Pomerantz, University of Pennsylvania Law School Conference on Mutual Funds, supra note 1026:. "[O~f all dualities and
of all conflicts on this scene, nothing--but nothing-approaches the open end mutual fund
[sic] for incestuous relationships." Id. at 739.
1113 S. 3580, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. § 10(a) (1940). The bill would also have prohibited
majority interlocks between an investment company and any other company,-including another
investment company. Thus, an advisor with more than one fund would have been prohibited
from using the same men on more than one board to satisfy the unaffiliated director requirement. Id. For a discussion of the reasons for S. 3580's failure to become law, see North, A
Brief History of Federal Investment Company Legislation, 44 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 677
(1969).
1114 The original definition of "affiliated person," S. 3580, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. § 45(18)
(1940), is similar to that presently contained in the Act. See note 1141 infra.
1115 86 CoNG. REc. 9819 (1940) (passed House); 86 CONG. REC. 10071 (1940) '(passed
Senate); 86 CONG. REc. 10949 (1940) (signed by the President, Aug. 22, 1940).
1116 The compromise took place off the record. Initially Mr. Schenker noted that the
interlock provision of S. 3580 was itself the product of a compromise:
There is nothing here that prevents a minority interlock; and I thought after we
discussed this with the industry we had made a very substantial concession, because
Senator, we feel, as many people in the industry feel, that even to have one interlocking director creates problems. 1940 Senate Hearings 879 (speaking of broker
interlock).
The industry, however, was not yet appeased; and Arthur Bunker, speaking on behalf of a
committee of investment companies, advocated that a sixty per cent interlock be permitted.
1940 Senate Hearings 1055. Bunker's demand was made on Friday, April 26, as the last
testimony preceding an adjournment of the hearings. During the hiatus the industry and the
SEC negotiated on many facets of the legislation. ultimately arriving at an armistice. 1940
Senate Hearings 1105-07 '(testimony of Robert Healy). Schenker made the formal announcement of the SEC's concession, which gave Bunker and his allies their sixty per cent. 1940
Senate Hearings 1113.
1117 H.R. REP. No. 2639, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 14 (1940).
1118 Of principal corporate-form advisors, the stock of Anchor Corporation is held by
2,924 shareholders; Channing Financial Corporation by 2,614; The Dreyfus Corporation by
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and the advisor's. Clearly, the common directors in this situation are under pressure to serve two masters111 with irreconcilable interests.
The Investment Company Act attempts to deal with this problem
in a crude sort of way - by defining certain functions of the unaffiliated
directors. Section 15(c) of the Act requires that a majority of the directors who are not parties to the contract or affiliates of any party to the
contract must initially approve the terms of the agreement and must further
approve any renewal unless ratification is supplied by a majority vote of the
fund's shareholders." 2 Whether this provision is adequate to protect shareholders
against over-reaching by the advisor and whether the injection of unaffiliated
directors has actually produced an arm's-length bargaining element in contract
negotiations is the fundamental question.
b. Investment Advisor Control of Fund
As previously noted, the advisor usually organizes and promotes the investment company in the first instance."" The Wharton Report observed that,
"[t]ypically, a charter to do business is obtained, officers and directors are selected,
and an investment advisory or management contract is entered into by the promoter-management group, before any securities are sold."" 22 Or, if the reader
prefers the somewhat more colorful language of Mr. Pomerantz:
Now, this is about the birds and the bees of the American corporate
scenee ....
The fund is conceived by a bunch of people whom we call advisers or
6,554 (Dec. 31, 1966); Insurance & Securities Inc. by 11,000 (June 30, 1965); Investors
Diversified Services, Inc. by 12,796 (including Alleghany Corporation); Keystone Custodian
Funds, Inc. by 2,138; National Securities & Research Corporation by 2,984; Supervised
Investors Services, Inc. by 886 (Dec. 11, 1967); Vance, Sanders & Co. by 4,500; Waddell &
Reed, Inc. by 2,678; Wellington Management Co. by 3,400. MooDY'S 1968 BANK & FiNANCE
MANUAL 876, 917, 951, 1013, 1057, 1067, 1085, 1102, 1117, 1120, 1135 (stockholders as of
Dec. 31, 1967, except as indicated).
While these figures hardly reveal the advisors to be corporate leviathans, neither are they
exclusively closely held. Some, at least, represent a substantial public participation.
Legally, of course, it does not matter how widely the advisory corporation's shares are
diffused. The advisor's directors owe the same fiduciary duties to the stockholders in the
closely held corporation that they owe to stockholders in the publicly owned corporation. The
difference is only pertinent to the public policy involved, for in the one case a public interest
is opposed to the interest of a small group and more nearly approaches direct self-dealing,
while in the other case the interests of two public groups are at odds. Hence, whatever
difference there may be reposes only in the conscience of the common director, not in the law.
1119 "No man can serve two masters; for either he will hate the one and love the other,
or else he will stand by the one and despise the other." Matthew 6:24.
This statement was apparently too temperate for Justice Brandeis, who wrote:
The practice of interlocking directorates is the root of many evils. It offends
laws human and divine. . . . Applied to corporations which deal with each other, it
tends to disloyalty and to violation of the fundamental law . . . . [I]ttends to
inefficiency; for it removes incentive and destroys soundness of judgment. It is
undemocratic . . . substituting the pull of privilege for the push of manhood. L.
BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT 51 (1914).
1120 Investment Company Act of 1940 § 15(c), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15(c) (1964).
1121 See text accompanying note 80, supra. "As a business enterprise the typical fund is
unique from the moment of its inception, the circumstances of its formation to some extent
foreshadowing its essential character and its difference from other types of companies."
Lobell, The Mutual Fund: A Structural Analysis, 47 VA. L. REV. 181, 184 (1961). We would
dispute the word essential.

1122
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managers.... This group gives birth to the fund. The fund is manned by
the advisers. If I may carry on this figure of speech, the umbilical
cord is
1 3
never cut after birth, as would be true in ordinary biological life.

1

Thus the advisor has virtually absolute control of the investment company's
initial management. Moreover, one of the principal perquisites of management
is control of the corporate proxy mechanism, and by this means the advisor and
his bedfellows are invariably able to retain their stranglehold on the fund,
obtaining at will pro forma shareholder ratification of management contracts and
1 24
election of hand-picked directors
The effectiveness of management's control of the proxy is well illustrated
by the Wharton Report's analysis of 107 mutual fund elections in 1958:
Having occupied the strategic positions within the organization at its
inception, the management group is able to preserve its control over the
investment company as an almost automatic consequence of management
control over the proxy machinery. Personal attendance of shareholders at
annual meetings of open-end companies has been unusually small, and
shareholder voting at annual elections has been almost invariably carried
out by means of proxies turned over to the management proxy committee. 1 ' 5
Percentage of voted shares voted by the management proxy committee,
for 107 companies, by size of open-end company assets, 1957
[Dollar amounts in millions]
Open-end company assets
10 and under
50 and under
300
50

1 and under
10
Percentage of

Total
300 and over

shares voted

0

99 to
90 to
80 to
70 to
Below

30
8
2
0
0

75.0
20.0
5.0
0
0

24
4
0
0
0

85.7
14.3
0
0
0

32
0
0
0
0

100.0
0
0
0
0

6
0
0
1
0

85.7
0
0
14.3
0

92
12
2
1
0

86.0
11.2
1.9
.9
0

40

100.0

28

100.0

32

100.0

7

100.0

107

100.0

100
98.9
89.9
79.9
70

Total

*

.,

.-.

, .

.

,

As may be seen in the above table,'1 12 management's proxy committee voted
ninety per cent or more of all votes at the meeting in 97.2 per cent of all cases.
In no case did the proxy committee control less than seventy-five per cent of
the votes. Thus, we are told on eminent authority, "[1]egally, the proxy is an
agent for the shareholder. .. .Factually, he is a dummy for the management,
and is expected to do as he is told."'" The effectiveness of the proxy extends
1123 Statement of Abraham Pomerantz, University of Pennsylvania Law School Conference
on Mutual Funds, supra note 1026, at 739.
1124 Even Mr. Jaretzki concedes that "the power to submit proposals to stockholders is
the power to determine the issue submitted." Jaretzki, Duties and Responsibilities of Directors
of Mutual Funds, 29 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 777, 792 (1964).
1125 WHARTON REPORT 68.
1126 Id. at 69.
1127 A. BERLE & G. MEANS, THE MODERN Com,oLAxoN AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 245
(1933).
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beyond the election of directors to embrace approval of management and underwriting contracts, an exercise in empty form with disproportionate legal consequences. Thus the advisor is able to control shareholder approval of his own
dictated terms with such unfailing regularity that stockholder disapproval of an
advisory agreement "has never happened.""5 2
The strength of management's control by proxy is dependent, of course, on
shareholder acquiescence. As we have seen, fund shares are usually widely distributed among a myriad of small, relatively unsophisticated investors. Arguably, this factor combines with the redeemability of fund securities to further
explain the shareholders' supine posture." 29 It is, however, doubtful whether
redeemability can be used to explain any extraordinary passivity on the part of
fund shareholders, for similar mechanisms are found at work in other contexts.
The redeemability factor is obviously inapplicable to the closed-end companies,
whose shares must be traded on the market, yet there is no evidence that management control of closed-ends is any less tenacious than management control in the
mutual funds. Moreover, stock of a closed-end as well as stock of an ordinary
corporation is usually freely marketable, at least when listed on an exchange; and
this outlet for minority shareholder dissatisfaction may be quite as effective as
the redemption feature in the open-end case."" 0 Further, for the mutual fund
shareholder to redeem and then reinvest in the shares of another fund under
different management will typically involve a second sales load as well as realized
capital gains" - considerations which tend to impeach the redemption rationale
as an explanation of stockholder passivity.
Whatever the reason, rarely must additional chairs be brought into the
advisor's office in order to hold a meeting of thousands of shareholders." 2
Naturally this permits perpetuation of the advisor-affiliated board, which in turn
results in a striking family resemblance between officers and executives of the
1128 1967 House Hearings 678. A theme which is repeated ad nauseam by wooden soldiers
of the status quo and which is integrally bound up with the "shell theory" of mutual funds, see
notes 1248-58 infra and accompanying text, maintains that the purchaser of a fund share is
consciously purchasing the services of a particular management group. "The consumer in
purchasing his shares in a mutual fund is purchasing its management-by name. To mention
but a few of the best known, he is purchasing Fidelity, or Wellington, or Tsai .... ." 114
CONG. REc. S9409 (daily ed. July 25, 1968) (remarks of Senator Bennett) (emphasis added).
Thus, we are expected to believe, shareholder ratification of management contracts ought
to be "routine," for the fee is disclosed to the investor and "he is aware" of it when he makes
his initial purchase and when asked to specifically approve the contract which provides it.
Id. There is no such awareness. See note 1108 supra. Moreover, "technical terminology" of
the prospectus is not, as implied by the NASD, the only villain. See text accompanying note
1110, supra. Certainly the name of a fund's advisor is not couched in "technical terminology,"
and in spite of the fact that Senator Bennett and others assume that a fund shareholder
purchases stock in the belief that he is buying the advisor "by name," the court in Taussig
v. Wellington Fund, Inc. was "surprised when two of defendants' expert witnesses, particularly
knowledgeable in the investment company field, could not name Wellington Fund's investment
adviser. No greater knowledge can be imputed to the investing public." Taussig v. Wellington
Fund, Inc., 187 F. Supp. 179, 214 (D. Del. 1960) (emphasis added).
1129 WHARTON REPORT 64.
1130 In the case of an exceptionally large shareholding this may not be universally true.
While a large block of fund shares may be easily redeemed, a shallow market may prohibit
a profitable execution of a sizable transaction in the stock of a non-fund corporation. To
this extent, the holder of a large block of stock in a non-fund corporation may have more
incentive to participate actively when dissatisfied with management, for his alternative may
be to depress a limited market, if, indeed, he can find a market at all.
1131 Cf. Saminsky v. Abbott, 40 Del. Ch. 528, , 185 A.2d 765, 771-72 (Ch. 1961).
1132 WHARTON REPORT at 64 n.57.
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fund on the one hand, and the advisor's consociates on the other. In the great
majority of cases, affiliates of the advisor compose a majority of the fund's official
and executive personnel. 11 3 In the classic, if somewhat euphemistic, understate-

ment of Mr. Jaretzki:
As the officers and personnel of the fund- are normally persons from within
the advisory organization, it follows that the investment adviser in such
cases will be making recommendations to persons from its own organization
acting also as officers or directors of the fund."13 4

c. Role of Unaffi iated Directors
This concentration of control in the incumbent, advisor-oriented management has important consequences in our consideration of the technically "unaffiliated" directors. As Judge Moore observed in Brown v. Bullock,"' "Directors are usually selected by and known to management; they are not self-appointed
strangers."'" 3" That they are not. In fact, the unaffiliated directors, nominated 3 ..
and elected through the proxy machinery by the incumbents, are "frequently"
relatives, close personal friends, or business associates of the affiliates." 8 Thus
the affiliated directors are able to satisfy the requirements of the Investment
Company Act by arranging for a friendly board whose "unaffiliated" members
are independent only in a very artificial sense."3 "
1133 Id. at 67-68.
1134 Jaretzki, supra note 1124, at 780-81.
1135 294 F.2d 415 (2d Cir. 1961).
1136 Id. at 424. Unaffiliated directors have testified that they were selected for board
positions on such grounds as a wife's college association with the investment advisor, or
personal acquaintance through an introduction by the director's father-in-law. 114 CONG.
Rlc. S9494 (daily ed. July 26, 1968). One director gave the following narration of his
appointment:
(The investment advisor) called me. (He) is a cousin of mine. and I have
known him, of course, for a few years and he called me and told me that they were
organizing a fund which was to invest in some special situations to be a growth fund
for those who were particularly interested in capital advancement rather than income,
and wanted to know if I would help them out by being on the Board.
And I told (the advisor) that I didn't know the first thing about the funds or
really investments at all, that I didn't see what I could contribute to the Board.
And he said, well, I could be of some help to them because I had just the
general background that they wanted to get a varied Board put together and I could
be of some help to them.
I said, "What you really want to do is use my name."
And he said, "Well, if you want to put it that way, I suppose that is it." Id. at
$9494-95.

Another director was asked what he thought he could contribute to the board, since he
conceded a complete ignorance of securities markets. He replied that he certainly could not
add any investment acumen, but he "could at least give [the advisor] a friendly director ...
Id. at 9495.
1137 "IThe board nominates the board, so they would be in effect continuously selfappointing." Testimony of Robert Loeffler, 1967 House Hearings 486.
The fact of nomination has been considered by the courts where there is a question of
domination or control. Cf. Guth v. Loft, Inc., 23 Del. Ch. 255, 274, 5 A.2d 503, 512 (Sup.
Ct. 1939).
1138 WHARTON REPORT 465. This element may properly bear on the issue of control,
which is one way to establish "affiliation." Cf. George Washington Memorial Park Ass'n v.
Memorial Dev. Co., 139 N.J. Eq. 280, 283-84, 51 A.2d 221, 223 (Ch. 1947); Chicago Corp.,
28 S.E.C. 463, 465-69 (1948).
1139 WHARTON REPORT 465-66. At least the industry may claim that it gave some warning
that this would occur. When it was proposed in 1940 to require a certain percentage of
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Two concepts, central to any discussion of the role of the unaffiliated directors, are contained in the Investment Company Act's definitions of "affiliated
person" and "control." A person is "affiliated" with another person. 40 if:
(A) he owns, controls, or holds with power to vote, five per cent
or more of the voting securities of the other person;
(B) five per cent or more of his outstanding voting securities are
so controlled by the other person;
(C) he directly or indirectly controls, is controlled by, or is under
common control with the other person;
(D) he is an officer, director, partner, or employee of the other
person;
(E) he is an investment advisor or member of the advisory board
of the other person (when the other person is an investment company
with a board of directors); and
(F) he is the depositor of the other person and the other person is
an investment company which does not have a board of directors.""'
On its face this definition seems simple enough, but there does appear to be one
problem. The difficulty centers around clause (E) and involves the question
whether this clause is to be read as exclusive or non-exclusive.
If clause (E) is read as non-exclusive, so that persons other than the investment advisor may be considered affiliates of an investment company, the
requirements of section 15(c) (1) of the Act will be impossible to satisfy."42
unaffiliated directors, one company responded to the effect that the industry would simply
pack its boards with stooges:
We believe restrictions on outside affiliations would, in most cases, result at best
in the election of some directors who would be more or less uninformed and subservient to the others, in whom the effective control of the management would lie
...
. Letter from Francis Amory and E. R. Kittredge to Robert Wagner, May 2,
1940, reprinted in 1940 Senate Hearings 1096-97.
1140 "Person" is defined to include either a natural person or any form of business association. Investment Company Act of 1940 § 2(a) (27), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a) (27) (1964).
1141 Investment Company Act of 1940 § 2(a)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(3) (1964)
provides:
"Affiliated person" of another person means (A) any person directly or indirectly
owning, controlling, or holding with power to vote, 5 per centum or more of the
outstanding voting securities of such other person; (B) any person 5 per centum
or more of whose outstanding voting securities are directly or indirectly owned,
-controlled, or held with power to vote, by such other person; (C) any person
directly or indirectly controlling, controlled by, or under common control with,
such other person; (D) any officer, director, partner, copartner, or employee of such
other person; (E) if such other person is an investment company, any investment
adviser thereof or any member of an advisory board thereof; and (F) if such other
person is an unincorporated investment company not having a board of directors, the
depositor thereof.
1142 Investment Company Act of 1940 § 15(c), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15(c) (1964) provides:
In addition to the requirements of subsection (a) and (b) of this section it
shall be unlawful for any registered investment company having a board of directors
to enter into, renew, or perform any contract or agreement, written or oral, except a
written agreement which was in effect prior to March 15, 1940, whereby a person
undertakes regularly to serve or act as investment adviser of or principal underwriter for such company, unless the terms of such contract or agreement and any
renewal thereof have been approved '(1) by a majority of the directors who are not
parties to such contract or agreement or affiliated persons of any such party, or
(2) by the vote of a majority of the outstanding voting securities of such company.
If an advisory contract is involved, neither affiliates of the advisor nor affiliates of the
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This is so because section 2(a) (3) (D)
the investment company is an affiliated
hence ineligible to approve contracts in
If, on the other hand, clause (E)

will then dictate that every director of
person of the investment company and
accordance with section 15 (c).
is given an exclusive reading, then the

investment advisor and only the investment advisor 1 4 3 may be considered an

affiliated person of the investment company. 14 Clearly, this is not possible
without emasculating the rest of section 2(a) (3). There is no case which considers director affiliation for purposes of section 15 (c) and which directly holds
a person, not an advisor, ineligible to approve a contract by reason of his affiliation with the investment company. Nevertheless, it is abundantly clear that a
person other than an advisor may be an affiliate of the investment company for
purposes of other sections of the Act. For example, an insurance company was
held to be affiliated with an investment company on the ground that the investment company owned 5.09 per cent of the insurance company's outstanding
voting securities." 45
It would appear, then, that a non-exclusive reading of clause (E) would be
impossible to reconcile with section 15(c), while an exclusive reading of clause
(E) would seriously impair the operation of other sections of the Act, especially
section 17. The judicial solution to this problem has been to ignore it."4 The
non-exclusive rendering is accepted for all purposes except where section 15 (c)
is drawn into the question. When that happens, a director's affiliation with the
investment company under section 2(a) (3) (D) is disregarded as inapplicable
and his vote is counted unless he is affiliated with the investment advisor (or, in
the case of an underwriting contract, the principal underwriter)."'
Another situation which demands a non-exclusive reading of clause (E)
investment company should be classified as eligible to approve the contract under the literal
terms of this section.
1143 This disregards members of any advisory board.
1144 On this reading of clause (E), directors of an advisory corporation are not necessarily
affiliates of the investment company even though they may also sit on the investment company's
board. This is so because these men do not fall within the definition of "investment adviser"
contained in section 2(a) (9) of the Act. Nevertheless, as affiliates of the advisor, which they
are by reason of section 2(a) (3) (D), they are still ineligible to approve contracts pursuant to
section 15(c).
, 1
1145 Aetna Life Ins. Co., SEC Investment Company Act Release No. 4082 (Nov. 19, 1964),
[1964-66 Transfer Binder] CGH FED. SEC. L. REP.
77,159, at 82,204. See also Securities
Corp. Gen., 15 S.E.C. 714 (1944).
1146 Though the judiciary has not resolved the matter, it will not persist if the fund reform
bills are passed. Legislation pending in the present Congress will remedy what appears to
have been imperfect draftsmanship. While the proposed bills retain unchanged the definition
of "affiliated person," they rephrase section 15(c) to speak in terms of an expanded concept,
"interested person." S. 34, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 8(c) '(1969); S. 296, 91st Cong., 1st
Sess. § 8(c) (1969). The definition of "interested person" includes all cases of affiliation
under the existing section 2(a)(3) except that a specific exclusion is made so that directors
of an investment company may not, ipso facto, be considered "interested persons." S. 34, 91st
Cong., Ist Sess. § 2(3) (1969) ; S. 296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(3) (1969).
1147 "Section 15 (c) of the Act provides that the investment adviser's contract . . . must
be approved annually by a majority of the board of directors of the investment company who
are not affiliated with the investment adviser." Institutional Investors Mut. Fund, Inc., 35
S.E.C. 72, 76 (1953). In Acampora v. Birkland, 220 F. Supp. 527 (D. Colo. 1963), a
director-officer of an investment company was permitted to cast an "unaffiliated" vote for
purposes of section 15(c). The court said that he, Bromfield, "was not an affiliated person
within the meaning of Section 2(a) (3) (D)," thus apparently giving clause (E) an exclusive reading. The vote was counted "[s]ince Bromfield was . . . non-affiliated" with the
advisor. Id. at 544.
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involves the concept of "control,"" 4 8 for only if clause (E) is non-exclusive
would it be possible to find a person affiliated with an investment company by
reason of clause (C). Just such a finding was reached by the SEC in Equity
Fund Incorporated."49 In that case, two investment companies, neither of which
owned any stock of the other, had "substantially the same officers and directors,
same investment adviser and principal underwriter," and were therefore held
to be "under common control."' 5 This, of course, made each an affiliate of
the other." 5
For our purposes, the pertinent question of control will require a determination whether a particular director may be counted as unaffiliated with the investment advisor or underwriter in order to satisfy sections 10 and 15(c) of the
Act." 52 Section 2(a) (3) (C) declares that a person is affiliated with another
if he directly or indirectly controls, is controlled by, or is under common control
with the other person. Thus a director may be considered an affiliate of the
fund's advisor or underwriter if his relationship to the advisor is such that "control" can be established."" 3 The clear intent of this provision is to assure that
the unaffiliated directors are more than mere pawns of the men whose contracts
they review and approve.
Establishing control of a natural person under the Act, however, is no mean
accomplishment. The major impediments result from certain presumptions
incorporated in the Act's definition of control:
Any person who owns beneficially, either directly or through one or
more controlled companies, more than 25 per centum of the voting securities of a company shall be presumed to control such company. Any person
who does not so own more than 25 per centum of the voting securities of
any company shall be presumed not to control such company. A natural
person shall be presumed not to be a controlled person within the meaning
of this subchapter. Any such presumption may be rebutted by evidence, but
except as 'hereinafter provided, shall continue until a determination to
the contrary made by the Commission by order either on its own motion or
on application by an interested person." 154 (Emphasis added.)
The presumption against control of a natural person weighed heavily
in the opinion of the court in Acampora v. Birkland."55 The case involved
a determination of the status of several directors whom the plaintiff considered
to be under the control of a fund's advisor-underwriter [Management] and
hence affiliated with Management. The directors in question had various relationships with Management, including stock interest in Management, interests
1148 "Control" is defined in Investment Company Act of 1940 § 2(a) (9), 15 U.S.C. §
80a-2(a)(9) (1964).
1149 15 S.E.C. 288 (1944).
1150 Id. at 288-89.
1151 Id. at 289.
1152 See text accompanying notes 378-86 supra. Cf. Acampora v. Birkland, 220 F. Supp.
527, 544 (D. Colo. 1963).
1153 Acampora emphasizes that "a factual relationship whereby there is actual control"
will be sufficient to establish affiliation. Acampora v. Birkland, 220 F. Supp. 527, 542 (D.
Colo. 1963). "[The term 'control' . . . means the act or fact of control ...... Id. at 543.
1154 Investment Company Act of 1940 § 2(a) (9), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2 (a) (9) '(1964).
1155 220 F. Supp. 527 (D. Colo. 1963).
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in businesses which contracted with both Management and the fund, interests
in a brokerage firm which received give-ups or other brokerage commissions
generated by Management's supervision of the fund's portfolio, and a general
friendliness with Management's president."" In refusing to hold these men
affiliates of Management, the court cited a leading case wherein the Commission
commented that "[t]he burden of overturning the presumption against control
of a natural person is not one that will be lightly assumed or easily carried to
Acampora is significant in the level of proof it demands to rebut the presumption. Though the plaintiff had shown many of the board members to
have benefited financially from their confraternity with Management, the court
required "actual domination and operation. Mere influence," it said, "would
fall short of this level of proof."1 8" Moreover, the court demanded causative
evidence - evidence which would prove that the director-Management relationship actually resulted in directorial decisions that were not considered independently." 9 If Acampora stands as the law on the question of control of
natural persons, the Act's definition of "control" has been severely crippled.
Acampora was not a factually strong case on the issue of control. The
director with a stock interest in Management held only .4 per cent of Management's securities, and by the time of suit had divested himself of half of it. On
the other hand, his personal stake in the fund was quite large, amounting to
$130,000. The director who received give-ups and insurance business had a
similarly attenuated interest in Management. The brokerage in question totaled
only $3,000 over a five-year period, while insurance commissions ranged from
$2,000 to $4,000 annually. This director also had a personal stake in the fund,
as did his family and his company's profit-sharing plan. The third director was
associated with sundry brokerage houses which received fees on fund transactions, but the fees were not exceptionally high and the testimony was undisputed
that brokerage had been allocated to his firms for good business reasons. There
was little or no evidence tending to impugn the independence of the remaining
directors' 1 0
Despite its weakness on the facts, Acampora has set precedent. When the

1156 Id. at 536-37, 543.
1157 Fundamental Investors, Inc., 41 S.E.C. 285, 294 (1962).

1158 Acampora v. Birkdand, 220 F. Supp. 527, 543 '(D. Colo. '1963).
1159 Id. See also Coran v. Thorpe, 42 Del. Ch. 67, -,
203 A.2d 620, 623 (Ch. 1964).
Whether the exercise of actual influence is necessary under the Act is doubtful. By analogy to the situation in which control of a corporation is involved, it would seem that "causative evidence" should not be required. In the corporate situation it is settled that "[a]
controlling influence need not be actually exercised; the latent power to exercise it is sufficient under the Act." Investors Mut., Inc., SEC Investment Company Act Release No. 4595
(May 11, 1966), [1964-66 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 1177,348, at 82,635
(footnotes omitted). The SEC has agreed in Transit Inv. Corp., 23 S.E.C. 415 (1946).
The question at issue is whether, in the light of the circumstances discussed
above, Horan has "the power to exercise a controlling influence over the management or policies" . . . . Clearly the "power to exercise a controlling influence" means
something less than actual control . . . and includes the latent power to exercise a
controlling influence as well as the active exercise of such power. Id. at 420 (footnotes omitted). See also M. A. Hanna Co., 10 S.E.C. 581, 589 (1941).
1160 Acampora v. Birkland, 220 F. Supp. 527, 536-37 '(D. Colo. 1963).
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Delaware Chancery Court was presented with a similar, if somewhat stronger,
case, Coran v. Thorpe,".. the issue was resolved on authority of Acampora. In
Coran, plaintiff charged that certain directors of a fund were affiliates of the
fund's advisor and underwriter, thus rendering composition of the board unlawful
under section 10 of the Act. To show affiliation, he relied on section 2(a) (3) (C)
of the Act and attempted to prove that these men were controlled by the advisorunderwriter.162 The alleged control in this case took the form of pecuniary
benefits accruing to the challenged directors through their several connections
with certain brokerage houses and research corporations which had formerly
served as advisors or sub-advisors, or presently served as brokers.""3
The court considered the presumption of non-control of a natural person
and declared that the factual issue of control turned upon "an individual's state
of mind."" 6 The burden of rebutting the presumption is not sustained, according to the holding in Coran, if only a strong economic relationship is shown." "5
The case, then, fairly sanctions a personal financial interest on the part of the
unaffiliated directors, for if "control" is impotent to cover the situation, there
will be no "affiliation" within the meaning of the Act. To this extent, the Act
has seriously diluted common-law principles of conflicting interests.
The statutory presumption of non-control was also considered in Rome v.
Archer," 6 but the court in that case apparently felt that it might not be free
to decide the factual question prior to a determination by the SEC in an adminis-

1161 42 Del. Ch. 67, 203 A.2d 620 (Ch. 1964).
1162 It appears, however, that the fund, Atomic, Physics and Science Fund, Inc., contracted from 1952 to 1956 with the NYSE firm of Auchincoss, Parker & Redpath for
advisory and management services. During this time, the fund also paid Nuclear Development
Corporation of America a .16 per cent fee for technical advice.
From July 1, 1956 to April 1, 1959, the fund contracted with Atomic Development Management Corporation for management services and also contracted with the Auchincloss firm
for investment advice. Technical advice, still being furnished by Nuclear Development Corporation of America, was paid for jointly by these two companies. Subsequent to April 1,
1959, Atomic Development Management Corporation acted as manager and advisor, subcontracting for technical advice from Nuclear Development Corporation of America until
October 1962. Ultimately the fund's underwriter, which had begun as a partnership and
was later incorporated, merged with Atomic Development Management Corporation in 1960.
The directors in question included a partner in the Auchincloss firm, one Sullivan, who
presumably shared in the profits of that firm. Auchincloss had received "very substantial"
advisory fees during its tenure as the fund's advisor, and at all times received "substantial
brokerage commissions on the purchase and sale of Fund's portfolio securities." Id. at -,
203 A.2d at 622. A second director, Buxton, "was a salaried employee of Auchincoss and
Sullivan's subordinate." Id. Hence these two were affiliates of the advisor during the years
prior to 1959 by reason of section 2(a) (3) (D) of the Act.
A third director, Fleming, was a partner in a brokerage firm which did business with the
fund. No further connection is evident between Fleming and the advisor-underwriter.
A fourth director, Menke, was an officer and principal shareholder of Nuclear Development Corporation of America, which had furnished technical advice. Depending on the
nature of the advice his company had furnished (see Investment Company Act of 1940 §
2(a)(19), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(19) (1964)), he too might have been an affiliate
of the
fund's advisor prior to 1962.
The fifth director, Merritt, was an employee of a subcontractor of Nuclear Development
Corporation of America. His employer, Longyear Company, provided technical advice which
was passed along to the fund's primary advisor. Id. at -, 203 A.2d at 621-22.
1163 Id. at -,
203 A.2d at 622.
1164 Id. at -, 203 A.2d at 623.
1165 Id.
1166 41 Del. Ch. 404, 197 A.2d 49 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
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trative proceeding.1"" This, of course, is entirely incorrect." 8
Part of the difficulty with section 2(a) (9) is attributable to the fact that
it is not geared to control of natural persons. The first paragraph of the section
seems to contemplate nothing beyond control of a business organization. The
presumptions in the second paragraph relating to ownership of voting securities
supply valuable criteria in determining the issue of control of a business association, 6 9 but the presumption with respect to a natural person, on the other
hand, appears to have been inserted into the section as the result of a legislative
compromise" 70 and presents "more difficult problems of concept and proof."""'
The net result of the presumption against control of a natural person and
the generally toothless definition of affiliated persons has been to permit some
m 72 One distinrather closely associated people to sit as unaffiliated directors.
guished attorney remarked that he had, in two instances, encountered "unaffiliated" directors who were sons of the advisor's principal stockholder.""
Mr. Pomerantz is fond of relating his experiences with unaffiliated directors:
I have had fourteen investment company cases and fourteen sets of
depositions and/or cross-examinations of the independent directors, and in
not one single case did any unaffiliated director ever respond "Yes" to this
type of question: When your fund grew from $100 million to $600 million,
did you ever give any thought to making a comparison between your half
of one per cent fees and somebody els&s fees?
No.
Did you ever once suggest that when the fund got to be over a billion
dollars ... perhaps a reduction from one-half per cent to seven-sixteenths
of one per cent, or any other minute fraction?
Answer: No - and I mean the uniform answer.
*. . TMhe realities are . . . that you can't count on the unaffiliated
director. ....[1174]

1167

Id. at

-,

197 A.2d at 54.

1168 Fundamental Investors, Inc., 41 S.E.C. 285, 295-301 (1962). The position of the
SEC has been accepted by the courts. Coran v. Thorpe, 42 Del. Oh. 67, -,
203 A.2d 620,
623 (Ch. 1964).
1169 See, e.g., United Chemicals, Inc., 23 S.E.C. 456 (1946); Chicago Corp., 28 S.E.C.
463 (1948).
1170 For an excellent discussion of the provision, see Fundamental Investors, Inc., 41
S.E.C. 285 (1962).
1171 Id. at 291. The courts have recognized that this provision seems to be out of place.
Acampora v. Birkland, 220 F. Supp. 527, 543 (D. Colo. 1963); Coran v. Thorpe, 42 Del. Ch.
67, -,
203 A.2d 620, 623 (Oh. 1964).
1172 See notes 1136-39 supra and accompanying text.
1173 Compare Statement of Abraham Pomerantz, University of Pennsylvania Law School
Conference on Mutual Funds, supra note 1026, at 739 with FORTUNB, Feb. 1968, at 159.
Pending legislation, like proposals in the Ninetieth Congress, would eliminate this type
of unaffiliated director and go far toward insuring some measure of real independence. S.34
and S. 296 (identical in this respect) introduce the concept "interested person" to strengthen
the provisions of sections 10, 15, and 32(a) of the Act. The definition of "interested person"
includes "affiliated persons" (as presently defined) of an investment company or its advisor
or its principal underwriter; members of the immediate family of these affiliated persons; any
security holder (very broadly defined to embrace both legal and equitable interests in securities) of the advisor or underwriter '(or controlling person of the advisor or underwriter);
any registered broker-dealer and his affiliates; and legal counsel for the investment company
or advisor or underwriter and partners or employees of counsel. (For purposes of section 10
of the Act, an investment company's counsel on retainer and other members of his firm are
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I have one case now . . . where the adviser also gets one-half of one
per cent, and the fund has over a ,lillion dollars in assets. The adviser
also gets brokerage commissions . . . of over $1 million a year, and keeps
them; gets a load of the usual 8/ per cent and its net income before taxes
on all those sources is $11/2 million a year.
Now, wouldn't you imagine . . . that somewhere along the way some

fellow would raise his little hand and meekly suggest that in the light of
the vast growth of the fund and the accompanying fact that expenses don't
go up proportionately with the rise in the assets of the fund - that some
little, meek voice would just suggest that maybe there ought to be a consideration117
-just,
please, a reconsideration whether those fees ought to be
5
reduced?
6. Judicial Control of Fee Structure
If rubber-stamp unaffiliated directors and the virtually unbridled power of
the proxy have been a source of comfort and security for advisors, they have
been anything but endearing to the SEC. Unfortunately for the advisors, a few
litigious minority shareholders have also been among the malcontents.

considered "employees" of the investment company and hence ineligible to satisfy the forty
per cent requirement. 17 C.F.R. § 271.214 (1968).)
"Interested person" would also include persons who have a material business or professional relationship with (1) the investment company, (2) another investment company with
the same advisor or principal underwriter, (3) controlling persons of the advisor or underwriter, or (4) the chief executive of the investment company, advisor, or underwriter. This
"business or professional relationship" provision, however, applies only pursuant to an order
of the SEC, which would not be retroactive and would not take effect for sixty days. S. 34,
91st Cong., Ist Sess. § 2(3) (1969); S. 296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(3) (1969).
The requirement for an administrative determination of status was not a part of the
original proposals in the Ninetieth Congress, but was introduced with S. 3724. S. 3724, 90th
Cong., 2d Sess. § 2(3) (1968). When S. 3724 was reported out of committee, certain valuable legislative history was included in the committee's report which would be of significant
assistance in interpreting the requirements of the provision. S. REP. No. 1351, 90th Cong.,
2d Sess. 31-32 (1968). See ANALYSIS OF S. 34, at 20. If either of the pending bills should
be enacted, care should be taken that the legislative history includes these guidelines.
1174 The exception to the rule is perhaps Investors Diversified Services, which acts as management of several funds. Conscientious scrutiny and consideration of management compensation by unaffiliated member of the funds' boards has resulted in several reductions and a
continuous awareness of fee levels. 1967 Senate Hearings 757-58; 1967 House Hearings 46769, 478-79, 481. Some of this "awareness" may have been pricked by Mr. Pomerantz's lawsuits, two of which involved IDS funds. Glicken v. Bradford, 35 F.R.D. 144 (S.D.N.Y.
1964); Ackert v. Ausman, 198 F. Supp. 538 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), mandamus denied, Ackert v.
Pelt Bryan, 299 F.2d 65 (2d Cir. 1962), motion to remand granted, Ackert v. Ausman, 217
F. Supp. 934 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); Ackert v. Ausman, 29 Misc. 962, 218 N.Y.S.2d 822 (Sup.
Ct. 1961), aff'd mem., 20 App. Div.2d 850, 247 N.Y.S.2d 999 (1964); Ruskay v. Reed 225
F. Supp. 581 (S.D.N.Y. 1963). But cf. testimony of Robert Loeffler, 1967 House Hearings
487-88; testimony of Francis Williams, 1967 Senate Hearings 201.
1175 University of Pennsylvania Law School Conference on Mutual Funds, supra note
1026, at 753-54; compare id. with 1967 Senate Hearings 699-700.
The SEC cites the testimony of an unaffiliated director in the case of Saxe v. Brady, 40
Del. Ch. 474, 184 A.2d 602 (Ch. 1962):
Q. How long has someone wanted to reduce the [fee] scale on the Board and
how long has the management company been saying no?
A. Nobody on the Board has ever made a serious campaign ....
Q. Will you specify when these directors, or director, for the first time requested
that a sliding scale be put in?
A. Nobody has requested it.. . . Nobody has suggested it, put it forward aggressively at all. ..
[The director] thought that "inquiries as to whether satisfactory services could
be obtained from some other investment manager besides [the one being used] would
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a. The ShareholderRatificationDoctrine and the Standardof Waste
The brooding omnipresence in any modem discussion of this area is the
celebrated decision of Chancellor Seitz in Saxe v. Brady.17 6 The case involved
Fundamental Investors, Inc., a corporate Delaware mutual fund registered under
the 1940 Act. The Fund operated under an advisory contract with Investors
Management Company, Inc. [IMC], which in turn was a wholly-owned sub1 17 Fund paid an adsidiary of Hugh W. Long, Inc., the Fund's underwriter.
visory fee of one-half per cent of its average daily net assets to IC in obedience
to an unequivocal mandate of Fund's shareholders, 99.3 per cent of whom had
initially approved the advisory contract in 1954""7 and 99.1 per cent of whom
ratified it again in 19601171 In the interim the contract had apparently been

approved annually by the Fund's board of directors, including a majority of the
non-affiliates.""80
By nature a derivative action, the suit was fied by the plaintiffs in 1960
against IMC, H. W. Long, Inc., and the Fund's directors, charging that the
advisory fees paid to IMC were so excessive as to constitute "waste and spolia-

have been highly improper." He was also asked if he had ever suggested to the
adviser that the fee was unreasonable:
A. Oh, no. I have never heard such a suggestion made at a meeting of the
board by myself or anyone else.
Q. Have you ever heard such a suggestion made outside a meeting of the
board?
A. Not until this complaint was served in this trial.
Q. The thought had never crossed your mind. Is that correct?
A. It doesn't exist now, for that matter. 1967 House Hearings 46-47 (footnotes

omitted). See 114 CONG. REc. S9426-27 (daily ed. July 25, 1968) (remarks of Senator McIntyre); 114 CONG. REc. S9496 (daily ed. July 26, 1968).
When former Chairman Cohen was asked, "Have the unaffiliated directors ever upset the
regular directors' applecart?" his answer was direct: "I have never heard of it in my 25-odd
years in association with these funds." 1967 Senate Hearings 81. This is not terribly surprising in view of the passivity of the unaffiliated directors in considering and ultimately approving
the advisor's contracts. "Few of the independent directors," we are told,
[investigate] the advisory fee before voting to approve the advisory contract. Representative of the interviews with independent directors on this point was the following:
"Q. Did you ever make an investigation check into (the investment adviser) to
see the type of services that were being provided for (the advisory fee)?
"A. Did I make an investigation?

"Q. Yes.
"A. No.
"Q. Did you ever go into the office and find out who was working for '(the
adviser) and rendering this advice they were supposed to render?
"A. I did not.
Another independent director was asked to explain what was considered by the
directors in renewing the advisory contract:
f"A.Well, I think (naming the person who was president both of the fund and
of the fund's adviser) would say, 'Well we have to renew our contract ... again. Is
the contract satisfactory?' And usually there weren't any remarks, and he said,
'Well, anybody have any objections?' If there was some discussion then a motion
would be made to renew the contract and that's the way it's handled." 114 CONG.
REc. S9495 (daily ed. July 26, 1968).
1176 40 Del. Ch. 474, 184 A.2d 602 (Ch. 1962).
1177 Id. at -,
184 A.2d at 604.
1178 Id.
1179 Id. at-,
184 A.2d at 605.
1180 See Id.
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tion of the Fund's assets."""' Plaintiffs also alleged that "the so-called 'nonaffiliated' directors were in fact dominated by the interested directors, or, if they
were not so dominated, they failed affirmatively to protect Fund's pecuniary
interest by passively renewing the annual contract."" 2 The Chancellor was
willing to assume the truth of this latter assertion in order that he might emphasize
the role of shareholder ratification in setting the standard against which the fee
must be measured."3
Absent informed shareholder ratification, transactions between corporations
with interlocking directorates are subject to certain equitable limitations regardless of the number of interlocking directors, the extent of their interests, or the
participation or lack of participation by common board members. If the contract or transaction is unfair, or if entered into in bad faith, it will be voidable
at the instance of the injured party. This proposition does not depend on principles of fraud, nor is it altered by the abstention of the interested directors." 4
The rule constitutes, as it were, the lowest common denominator in the law of
intercorporate dealings. But, "[w]hen the stockholders ratify a transaction," the
court opined in Saxe,
the interested parties are relieved of the burden of proving the fairness of
the transaction. The burden then falls on the objecting stockholders to
convince the court that no person of ordinary, sound business judgment
would be expected to entertain the view that the consideration was a fair
exchange for the value which was given. Gottlieb v. Heyden Chemical
Corporation, 33 Del. Ch. 177, 91 A.2d 57; Kaufman v. Schoenberg, 33
Del. Ch. 211, 91 A.2d 786.1115
Thus, under Delaware law, shareholder ratification is said to have two effects:
(1) the threshold for equitable intervention is raised from "unfairness" to "waste
of corporate assets,"""'
and (2) the interested directors are relieved of the
burden of proving fairness, the onus shifting to the stockholder to show
87
waste."
Since the Chancellor was not convinced that the fees paid to IMC under
the contract were so excessive as to constitute waste, the-complaint was dismissed."-" In reaching this conclusion the court observed that the rate used to
calculate the fee was "neither extraordinary nor uncommon" even among the
larger funds." 9 Moreover, the shareholder ratification of previous fees paid at
1181
1182
1183

Id. at-,
Id. at
Id. at

1184

3 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS

-,
-

184 A.2d at 604.
184 A.2d at 605.
. 184 A.2d at 605, 616.

§ 961

(penn.

ed. rev. repl. 1965) and authorities there collected.
1185 Saxe v. Brady, 40 Del. Ch. 474, , 184 A.2d 602, 610 (Ch. 1962).
1186

As the court put it, "[w]hether a waste of assets is present here is . . . the . . . issue

for decision." Id. at , 184 A.2d at 605. Thus the Chancellor's use of the term legally
excessive throughout the opinion refers directly to the standard of waste: "[T]he central
issue to be decided is whether the fees paid to IMC under the advisory contract were 'legally
excessive' or not. . . . Plaintiffs do not contend that there is any other ground for liability."

Id.

1187 But see notes 1264-65 infra and accompanying text.
1188 Saxe v. Brady, 40 Del. Ch. 474, , 184 A.2d 602, 617 (Ch. 1962).
1189 Id. at -,
184 A.2d at 611. The Chancellor noted that plaintiffs' evidence showed
"a tendency for the rate among the larger funds to be less than a flat Y2 of 1%." Since,
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this rate and the shareholder authorization to continue paying fees at this rate
were taken as "some indication that under all the circumstances the rate paid
to IMC was a commercially realistic one. 119 And again the judge was careful
to note, quite correctly, that a fee based on a percentage of assets "provides an
incentive for the manager to increase the size of the Fund." Thus, "[w]here the
rate of payment has remained unchanged, one must recognize both a legitimate
expectation on the part of the managers and reasonable notice to the stockholders
that payments are likely to increase."""'
As to the actual dollar amounts paid by the Fund and the economies of
scale reflected in IMC's profits, the Chancellor was again unwilling to characterize the fee as wasteful. Advisory fees payable under the formulae of certain other
large funds were considered and found to be somewhat lower by comparison
than that received by IMG. Although the difference was about sixty per cent,
this was not, in the opinion of the court, "clearly excessive" on its face." 2 Neither
were the profits of IMG so great as to evidence a waste of Fund's assets, for the
Chancellor observed that "it [is not] unusual to find service companies making
large profits with relatively small costs. If the fund-management company format
is to be legally questioned, such inquiry must come from some other place."" 9 '
(Emphasis added.)
It has been suggested that the Saxes might have won their lawsuit - even
under the waste standard made applicable in Delaware by shareholder ratification -had
the case been more expertly presented and more thoroughly pre-

however, a few of the largest funds paid the one half per cent rate, the court was unwilling
to "assume that each of these comparable funds paying Y2 of. 1% is thereby wasting its
assets." Nor was the court willing to ."conclude from the mere fact that others of these
funds are paying less, that any increase in their payments for advisory services would necessarily constitute waste." Id.
1190 Id. at , 184 A.2d at 612. There is some loose dicta at this point in the opinion.
Having found that the rate of compensation (based on a percentage of assets) was not per se
"wasteful" or "legally excessive," the Chancellor concludes that "the rate paid to IMC must
favor a finding of reasonableness." Id. (emphasis added). Of course, the standard actually
applied was not "reasonableness" in the conventional sense, but "waste" or "legal excessiveness." At one point in the opinion the test is said to be whether compensation is "unconscionable." Id. at -, 184 A.2d at 610. And again, the court observed that "the profits
are certainly approaching the point where they are outstripping any reasonable relationship
to expenses and effort even in a legal sense." Id. at -,
184 A.2d at 616 (emphasis added).
Hence it is clear that any talk of "reasonableness" in the opinion is misplaced.
1191 Id. at , 184 A.2d at 612. Unless the court contemplated an applicable estoppel
by contract, it is entirely unclear what effect that "notice to stockholders" could possibly
have on the issue of excessiveness. See notes 1257-59 infra and accompanying text.
1192 Saxe v. Brady, 40 Del. Ch. 474, , 184 A.2d 602, 613 (Ch. 1962).
1193 Id. at , 184 A.2d at 616. There was some controversy as to the proper method
of making certain expense allocations so that IMC's profit on Fund's account could be accurately isolated. The court made all assumptions in the plaintiff's favor for purposes of this
last argument. Id.
The italicized sentence in the above quotation betrays a certain uneasiness in the Chancellor's woolsack. At another point in the opinion he says:
It is also inherent in the "percentage-of-assets" approach that at some point the
relationship between admittedly reasonable expenses and net profits can become so
disproportionate as to be shocking by any pertinent standard. Id. at , 184 A.2d
at 615 (emphasis added).
And again: "[Tihe profits are certainly approaching the point where they are outstripping
any reasonable relationship to expenses and effort even in a legal sense." Id. at , 184
A.2d at 616 (emphasis added).
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pared.1 94 In addition to the language already noted," 95 there are certain other
indications in the opinion that additional data might have tipped the balance.
Specifically, the Chancellor evidenced a willingness, even a desire, to compare
the profitability of the IMC contract to the operations of other advisory companies:
One approach to resolving this difficult question would be to compare
IMC's net profits from the Fund contract for 1959 with the profits earned
by other management companies on a contract with a single fund. Unfortunately, the net profits of other management companies arising from the
management of particular funds are not part of this record, if indeed they
exist as a matter of public information. Consequently, one cannot indulge
in what would be an important comparison.
Or, one might compute IMC's ratio of expenses... to profits... and
compare that ratio with those of similar management companies. Once
again,
however, the record unfortunately does not permit such a compari119
son.

Furthermore, even under the waste test it would seem that a one-half per
cent rate should be "legally excessive" if the fund involved were significantly
larger than the $600 million fund in Saxe."97 This would presume, of course,
that services furnished for the advisory fee are within the normal range."9 " As
the Chancellor recognized:
A court is confronted with inherent difficulties in determining whether payments for services are "reasonable" or "excessive." The value of services is
obviously a matter of judgment on the part of the person who must pay
for them. Thus, courts are often shielded by presumptions which wisely
cause them to defer to decisions of directors or stockholders. Nevertheless,
it is clear both in law and in fact that compensation payments may grow
so large that they are unconscionable. See Meiselman v. Eberstadt (Del.

Ch.), 170 A.2d 720; Lieberman v. Becker (Del. Supreme Ct.), 155 A.2d
596.-' 9' (Emphasis added.)
On this view, the advisory fee paid by Dreyfus Fund, Inc. to The Dreyfus
Corporation might well be considered wasteful. The fee is calculated as oneeighth per cent of quarterly average net assets, or approximately one-half per
1194 Eisenberg & Lehr, An Aspect of the Emerging "Federal CorporationLaw": Directorial
Responsibility Under the Investment Company Act of 1940, 20 RUTGERS L. Rv. 181, 206
(1966):
The court was not offered comparisons of fees for similar services to other types of
advisory clients, nor was the non-competitive nature of the fee structure in the
fund industry demonstrated to the court. Further, no evidence comparing the
profitability of the management company in question with that of other management
companies was offered to the court.
1195 See note 1193 supra.
1196 Saxe v. Brady, 40 Del. Ch. 474, - , 184 A.2d 602, 615 '(Ch.1962).
1197 See note 1193 supra.
1198 At yet another point in the opinion the Chancellor states:
Next, it must be emphasized that the very nature of the compensation arrangement
(percentage of asset value) lends itself to the payment of sums having no necessarily
reasonable relationship to the "value" of . . . services . . .tested by compensation
standards usually applied in the business community. Saxe v. Brady, 40 Del. Oh. 474,
184 A.2d 602, 615 (Ch. 1962).
1199 Id. at -,
184 A.2d at 610.
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cent of average net assets annually.1 20 There is a contractual limitation on the
fund's expense ratio of one per cent, 20 1 but the limit has not even been approached in the last ten years. 202 The fee does not cover transfer and dividend
disbursing fees, legal fees, auditing expenses, some directors' fees, costs of custodianship, brokerage, stockholder reports and meetings. 2 3 Net assets of Dreyfus
Fund stood at $2.3 billion in 1967,1204 increasing to $2.6 billion as of December
31, 1968.205 If economies of scale' indicated that a one-half per cent levy on
a $600 million fund, as in Saxe, was rapidly approaching wastefulness "by any
pertinent standard," then the same rate applied to a fund
300 per cent larger
20 7
may well have crossed the great divide to excessiveness.
The decision in Saxe was partly based on a previous decision by the same
court in the case of Meiselman v. Eberstadt.2 °s In that case, a shareholder of
Chemical Fund, Inc. charged that the advisory contract between Chemical and
its advisor, F. Eberstadt & Co., Inc., resulted in excessive compensation to the
director-shareholders of the advisory corporation. These men also served as
affiliated directors on the board of Chemical.2
The suit did not embrace a
charge that the fee paid to the advisor was otherwise excessive, but sought to
show that it resulted "in unreasonable compensation to those directors of the
Fund who 'own' the stock of the [advisory] Company."'121 The court, however,
rejected plaintiff's theory that total compensation to these men must be limited
to "the average annual compensation for similar positions in the mutual fund
field... apportion[ed] ... on the basis of the testimonial estimates by the executives as to the amount of time.-devoted to Fund business."' 21 In reaching this
result, Meiselman had helped to formulate the standard of waste by refusing to
be governed by industry averages. 2 2
Moreover, Meiselman was an exceptionally weak case on its facts. 21

3

The

unaffiliated directors had approved the contract annually, and plaintiff admitted
that he could not show that these men were dominated by the affiliates. The
contract itself provided a relatively liberal sliding scale'
- the product of a
1200 DREYFUS FUND, INC., PROSPECTUS, March 5, 1968, at 7.
1201 Id
1202 INVESTMENT COMPANIES 1968, at 181 (L. Wessmann ed. 1968).
1203 DREYFUS FUND, INC., PROSPECTUS, March 5, 1968, at 12. These unincluded expenses totaled more than $1 million in 1967. Id.
1204 INVESTMENT COMPANIES 1968, at 181 (L. Wessmann ed. 1968).
1205 INVESTMENT COMPANIES 1968 (L. Wessmann ed., Supp. Dec. 31, 1968).
1206 For an exposition of this factor in the Dreyfus case, see note 1076 supra and accompanying text.
1207 Cf. 51 GEO. L.J. 624, 626 (1963).
1208 39 Del. Ch. 563, 170 A.2d 720 (Ch. 1961).
1209 Three firms were involved: Chemical Fund, Inc.; F. Eberstadt & Co., Inc., Chemical's
advisor-underwriter; and F. Eberstadt & Co., an investment banking partnership whose
members own all the stock of the advisory corporation. The affiliated directors of Chemical
Fund were, naturally, partners of the banking firm and shareholders of the advisory corporation. Id. at -,
170 A.2d at 721.
1210 Id.
1211 Id. at , 170 A.2d at 722.
On motion at the close of evidence the complaint was dismissed as to the unaffiliated
directors since on the evidence presented "there was no possible liability on their part." Id.
at , 170 A.2d at 721.
1212 Compare id. at , 170 A.2d 721-23 with Saxe v. Brady, 40 Del. Ch. 474, -,
184 A.2d 602, 610 '(Ch. 1962).
1213 See Eisenberg & Lehr, supra note 1194, at 209.
1214 The assets of the fund approximated $300 million. Meiselman v. Eberstadt, 39 Del.
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voluntary reduction made in 1956 at the instance of the affiliated directors.'15
When the alleged "excess" was divided up among the affiliated directors'2 16 it
was hardly "shocking," and what handsome compensation was involved was
rendered "more palatable" by the excellent performance of the fund.' 17 Fur218
thermore, the contract had been ratified by the shareholders themselves.1
Given this situation, no standard short of waste would, under Chancellor Seitz's
9
misconception of Delaware 2law,'
support an allegation that the directors had
20
breached a fiduciary duty.
Although the Chancellor in Meiselman found the alleged excesses less than
"shocking," he recognized "that there must be some limitation on the payment
to persons discharging such services,"' 2 2 and further cautioned that compensation arrangements are, at least in the first instance, "the responsibility of the
non-affiliated directors or stockholders of Fund. It cannot be assumed," he continued, "that they will not discharge their responsibility to make appropriate
222
reviews of the reasonableness of the arrangements from every point of view."'

Ch. 563, , 170 A.2d 720, 721 (Ch. 1961). The fee schedule called for one half per cent
average daily net assets up to $75 million, .375 per cent between $75 million and $125 million,
and .25 per cent on the excess. Id. The effectiveness of the sliding scale in this case can be
seen from the fact that in 1956, when the scale was first used, Chemical had net assets of
$134 million. In that year it paid advisory fees totalling .44 per cent of its net assets. In
1960, the last year involved in the lawsuit, Chemical's net assets had risen to $269.7 million,
while advisory fees then amounted to .35 per cent of net assets. PUBLIC POLICY STATEMENT
133. Chemical, as of December 31, 1967, had net assets of $530.6 million. For the year 1967
it paid advisory fees of $1.43 million, computed on a sliding fee scale only slightly different
from that described above. (Under the new scale, there is a further reduction to .20 per cent
of average net assets on amounts in excess of $375 million.) Advisory fees as a percentage of
net assets had thus declined further to .27 per cent. MooDy's 1968 BANKt & FINANCE MANUAL
866. As can be seen from Appendix B, this is a relatively low figure.
The Chancellor seems to have been aware of the modest fee rate: "[I]t appears that the
basic charges appearing in the management agreements for the pertinent years are lower than
the average in the mutual fund field." Meiselman v. Eberstadt, 39 Del. Ch. 563, , 170
A.2d 720, 723 (Ch. 1961).
1215 Meiselman v. Eberstadt, 39 Del. Ch. 563, , 170 A.2d 720, 723 (Oh. 1961).
1216 Id.
1217 Id. The court was careful to note that the performance argument was not strictly
relevant, and referred to it as "gilding on the lily." Id.
1218 Id.
1219 Cf. note 1265 infra.
1220 It seems that the court is applying some sort of shifting standard, the precise level
of which is unclear. The Chancellor phrased it thus:
There was much said to the effect that fiduciaries cannot pay themselves more
than the average pay in the industry for similar services. Fiduciaries, of course,
may not pay themselves excessive compensation, but here must be added the fact
that the non-affiliated majority directors, whom plaintiff tacitly admitted he could
not prove were dominated by defendants, approved the compensation arrangement
yearly with knowledge of the [advisory] Company's audit. Moreover, the stockholders approved the basic compensation agreement ....
I conclude that plaintiff has failed to prove that the compensation paid for
investment advisory service is legally excessive . . . . Meiselman v. Eberstadt,
39 Del. Ch. 563, , 170 A.2d 720, 723 (Ch. 1961).
From this language it is impossible to determine the operative fact, i.e., whether the standard
for intervention is raised because of the vote of the unaffiliated directors, because of stockholder ratification, or whether both facts are simply treated as evidence that the contract
measures up to some independent standard of fairness. Perhaps the only clue in the case as
to the level of excessiveness required is that the court found "no shocking disparity" between
the amounts paid by Fund and the industry norm. This leaves very little from which to
generalize; and perhaps all that can be said for Meiselman is that it does not dictate recovery
merely because compensation exceeds by some small amount an industry average.
1221 Id. at 170 A.2d 720, 722.
1222 Id. at
, 170 A.2d 720, 723.
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This language foreshadowed the stronger admonition in Saxe:
Since the management contract must be re-evaluated by the board of the
Fund at fixed periods, ideally a truly independent and active board would
be expected to be alert to the factors I have mentioned.[1223] In other words,
it is not to be assumed that an independent board would wait until the
fees paid under the management contract warranted a finding of waste
before attempting to negotiate a better deal.... [T]he profits are certainly
approaching the point where they are outstripping any reasonable relationship to expenses and effort even in a legal sense. And this is so even after
making due allowance for incentive and benefit presumably conferred. This
is not to say that no payment is justified after a fund reaches a particular
size. It is only to say that the business community might reasonably expect
that at some point those representing the fund would see that the management fee was adjusted to reflect the diminution in the cost factor. 22 4 (Emphasis added.)
Several questions of directorial fiduciary duty were considered in the 1963
case of Acampora v. Birkland;1 22 1 one is pertinent to the present discussion. The
plaintiff-shareholder in Acampora brought a derivative action against Financial
Industrial Fund, Inc., Financial Industrial Fund Management Corporation
[Management], Financial Programs, Inc. [Programs], and the officers and directors of all three corporations. 226
The initial complaint had alleged, inter alia, that the advisory fee paid1 22to7
Management, a traditional one-half per cent of average net assets annually,
was per se excessive.1 22 Plaintiff, however, abandoned this approach in light of
the Saxe decision, and took another tack. If the one-half per cent rate is not wasteful in the ordinary case, he reasoned, it may become so where fewer than average
services are received in return. 29 The court would have none of it. First, it
noted, the waste test as applied in Saxe depended on a finding of shocking or
unconscionable fees,1 2 0 and did not rest on industry averages. Secondly, while
evidence was offered "to show that the mutual funds generally get much more
for their one-half of one per cent,"' 231 the court rejected this test "because it is
impossible to consider in depth the internal workings of the various other corporations. This would mean the trial of numerous wholly collateral matters
under conditions of handicap."' 232 Thirdly, the business judgment rule ap1223 See notes 1193, 1198 supra.
1224 Saxe v. Brady, 40 Del. Oh. 474, , 184 A.2d 602, 616-17 (Ch. 1962).
1225 220 F. Supp. 527 (D. Colo. 1963).
1226 Id. at 531. Management was the sponsor, advisor, and underwriter of Fund's shares.
Programs was initially organized by Management to serve as the Fund's underwriter, was at

all times controlled by Management, but by the time of the suit had been merged into

Management. Id.
1227 From 1935 to 1940 Management had served as Fund's underwriter. During this
period Fund was under a separate contract with Richard M. Scott, Jr., who served as invest-

ment advisor in return for the one half per cent fee. On the first of June, 1940, Fund entered

into a new contract with Management whereby Management undertook to provide all ad-

ministrative services for Fund and also undertook to subcontract for independent investment
advice. Under this contract Management received the one half per cent fee. Id. at 533.

1228 Id. at 547-48.
1229 Id. at 548.

1230 Id., quoting Saxe v. Brady, 40 Del. Ch. 474, , 184 A.2d 602, 610 (Ch. 1962).
1231 Acampora v. Birkland, 220 F. Supp. 527, 548 (D. Colo. 1963).

1232 Id. at 549.
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plied in Saxe... was adopted by the court as a basis for refusing to Weigh the value
of the services Fund received. 241 While Saxe admitted that such an evaluation
was fraught with "inherent difficulties," Acampora was disposed to assert that
"it is impossible to evaluate the service rendered."'123 (Emphasis added.)
Just as Saxe had contained evidence of judicial dissatisfaction with the
prevailing scheme of management compensation, 1 23 the Acampora court, in an
effusion of obiter dicta, vented similar misgivings:
Certainly, the one-half of one per cent. approach leaves a great deal
to be desired .... Such a guaranteed fee fails to take into account success
or failure of the advisory effort. Still another bad feature is that its probable increase is disproportionate to the value of the services rendered.
[Nevertheless] the fact that a more equitable scheme could be worked out,
or that this writer sees potential abuses in
the method, does not furnish a
22
basis for an adjudication of excessiveness.

1

On the issue of excessiveness, the plaintiffs in the above cases were uniformly
1233

The Chancellor in Saxe had said:
The value of services is obviously a matter of judgment on the part of the person
who must pay for them. Thus, courts are often shielded by presumptions which wisely
cause them to defer to decisions of directors or stockholders. Saxe v. Brady, 40
Del. Ch. 474, , 184 A.2d 602, 610 (Oh. 1962).
Whether fees are, in fact, the product of unencumbered business judgment is, of course,
doubtful. In view of the historic inertia the fees have displayed, the prevalence of management control of the fund, its board of directors, its proxy machinery, and the veritable
judicial immunity afforded by state law, the validity of the "business judgment" argument in
this context is highly suspect. For the amount of "business judgment" actually exercised by
the unaffiliated directors, see notes 1175 supra and 1360 infra. Just as there is no justification
for application of the business judgment rule where directors are personally interested in their
own decisions, see note 1234 infra, so there should be no application of the rule where
directors do not actually direct. In both situations the law should recognize that there is no
conscientious consideration of the good of the corporation.
1234 This application of the "business judgment rule," 3 W. FLETCHER, supra note 1184, §
1039, in a case of interlocking directorates evidences a very dangerous trend that may be
developing in the law. The basic flaw in this development, of course, is that while shareholders may assume the risk of faulty business judgment on the part of directors, the "business
judgment rule" should never be used to supplant the directors' undivided duty of loyalty.
Geddes v. Anaconda Copper Mining Co., 254 U.S. 590 (1921); Shlensky v. South Parkway
Bldg. Corp., 19 Ill. 2d 268, 166 N.E.2d 793 (1960); 3 W. FLETCHER, supra note 1184, §
1039 at 626 n.35. Directors' first regard must be for the welfare of the corporation and its
shareholders; they may not enrich themselves at the expense of the corporation. See, e.g.,
Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295 (1939); Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 349 U.S. 952 (1955); Remillard Brick Co. v. Remillard-Dandini Co., 109 Cal.
App. 2d 405, 241 P.2d 66 (Dist. Ct. App. 1952); Shlensky v. South Parkway Bldg. Corp.,
19 Ill.2d 268, 166 N.E.2d 793 (1960).
The erosion of the basic duty of fairness and good faith in cases of contracts between interlocked corporations has reached a dangerous level in Warshaw v. Calhoun, Del. Ch. ,
221 A.2d 487 (Sup. Ct. 1966). This case openly applied the "business judgment rule" to a
situation involving board interlock, citing as its authority Moskowitz v. Bantrell, 41 Del. Ch.
177, 190 A.2d 749 (Sup. Ct. 1963). Moskowitz, however, did not involve interlocking directorates at all, and leaves Warshaw without precedent. (But ef. Cheff v. Mathes, 41 Del. Ch.
494, 199 A.2d 548 (Sup. Ct. 1964); Case v. New York Cent. R.R., 15 N.Y.2d 150, 204
N.E.2d 643, 256 N.Y.S.2d 607 (1965).)
If Warshaw and the other cases cited evidence a development in Delaware law, albeit
poorly reasoned, litigating mutual fund shareholders will be among those to suffer most. The
extension of "business judgment" to a situation so fraught with conflicts of interest seriously
undercuts the common law of directorial fiduciary duty. See 45 N.C.L. REy. 755 (1967).
1235 Acampora v. Birkland, 220 F. Supp. 527, 549 (D. Colo. 1963).
1236 See notes 1193, 1198 supra.
1237 Acampora v. Birkland, 220 F. Supp. 527, 548-49 (D. Colo. 1963). Moreover, the
court volunteered its opinion that the fee was "high," but felt that this alone was insufficient
to make it wasteful under the Saxe test. Id. at 549.
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unable to survive preliminary motions. All was not lost, however, for there was
one case which squarely held that a court may intervene when management fees
have grown beyond justification. That case was Saminsky v. Abbott, 1238 decided
in 1961 by the same Delaware chancellor who had heard Saxe and Meiselman.
Saminsky involved trustee's fees exacted by Keystone Custodian Funds, Inc.,
a Delaware corporation which acted as trustee for ten separate common-law
trusts, each registered as a separate mutual fund. Keystone provided its own
investment advice, but since it was a bona fide trustee it could not be classified
as an investment advisor under the 1940 Act. 23 9 Under the trust agreements,
Keystone retained all the perquisites of independent management 2 40 and
charged for its services both a management fee and a "recurring charge."''"
Plaintiff sued Keystone and its directors, alleging that the trustee's fees were so
large as to amount to a "spoliation or waste' 242 of the funds' assets. The action
was rested on "general equitable principles," both sides
conceding that the Invest2 43
ment Company Act did not govern the question.
The "general equitable principle" invoked was, of course, that a waste of
corporate assets may not be ratified by any number of directors, no matter how
independent or prudent, nor by any number of shareholders. 244 The court
reached back to the doctrine of Rogers v. Hill24 . to support its thesis that a
method of compensation unobjectionable per se may ultimately result in such
excessive payments that a court of equity might intervene.
The Rogers case itself was a legal landmark, not only for its direct and
pervasive impact on the practices of the business community, but also for the
incredible scandal which surrounded the decision of the Second Circuit.240
Plaintiff Rogers challenged a stock option plan, embodied in a bylaw of the
American Tobacco Company, which afforded generous bonuses, based on a
percentage of the corporation's profits, to the company's president and certain
other managing officers. Rogers acquired his, stock in American Tobacco in
1916; the bylaw had been adopted in 1912. The United States Supreme Court
held that compensation based on such a percentage formula was not, ipso facto,
actionable, but recognized that the payments may have reached wasteful pro1238 40 Del. Ch. 528, 185 A.2d 765 (Ch. 1961), settlement approved, 41 Del. Ch. 320,
194 A.2d 549 (Ch. 1963), aff'd sub nom. Kleinman v. Saminsky, 41 Del. Ch. 572, 200
A.2d 572 (Sup. Ct.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 900 (1964).
1239 Investment Company Act of 1940 § 2(a) (19), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a) (19) (1964).
Because a trustee is not an investment advisor, Keystone is not subject to even the
minimal safeguards of section 15 of the Act. The original legislative proposals in the Ninetieth
Congress, S. 1659, H.R. 9510 'and H.R. 9511, would have amended section 2(a) (19) of the
Act to withdraw the preferential treatment accorded Keystone. S. 1659, 90th Cong., Ist Sess.
§ 2(4) (1967); H.R. 9510 90th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(4) (1967); H.R. 9511, 90th Cong.,
1st Sess. § 2(4) (1967).
Legislation presently before Congress would permit the Keystone arrangement to continue
unchanged. That legislation, however, would also impose a "reasonableness" limit on all
management compensation, including Keystone's. The pending legislation seems acceptable.
1240 Saminsky v. Abbott, 40 Del. Ch. 528, , 185 A.2d 765, 768 (Ch. 1961).
1241 Id. at
185 A.2d at 767. See notes 1057-58 supra and accompanying text.
1242
1243

Id. at
Id. at

,
-

185 A.2d at 770.
185 A.2d at 768.

1244 E.g., Rogers v. Hill, 289 U.S. 582, 591 (1933); Keenan v. Eshleman, 23 Del. Ch.
234, -,
2 A.2d 904, 909 (Sup. Ct. 1938).
1245 289 U.S. 582 (1933).
1246 The fascinating history surrounding judge Martin T. Manton and his decision in
the case is recounted in J. BORRIN, THE COaRUPT JUDGE 25-93 (1962).
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portions as the company prospered. The significant language for present purposes is the following:
[T]he payments under the by-law 'have by reason of increase of profits
become so large as to warrant investigation in equity in the interest of the
company. Much weight is to be given to the action of the stockholders,
and the by-law is supported by the presumption of regularity and continuity. But the rule prescribed by it cannot, against the protest of a shareholder, be used to justify payments of sums as salaries so large as in substance and effect to amount to spoliation or waste of corporate property....
"If a bonus payment has no relation to the value of services for which it
is given, it is in reality a gift in part and the majority stockholders have no
power to give away corporate property against the protest of the minority."' 247 (Emphasis added.)

The defendants in Saminsky relied heavily on two aspects of the "shell theory"
of investment companies - aspects which we shall call the "fragmentation argument" and the "disclosure argument." Simply stated, the shell theory identifies
the investment company with its external manager (trustee in Saminsky),
viewing the investment company itself as nothing more than a legalistic detail,
a vehicle through which a product is offered to the public. That produc 24 ' is
the investment company's security, embodying as it does the managerial service
of the advisor. 249 The ineluctable implication of the shell theory is that all negotiations of management compensation are properly between the investor and the
advisor, so that once having purchased the "product" with knowledge of the fees
management will exact, the investor is no longer in a position to complain. From
a fund manager's point of view, it is not difficult to accept this notion, since the
practice is such as to make any distinction between a fund and its management
"strictly legal.' 2 50
The shell theory is legally untenable and certainly one of the most dangerous
prevarications the industry has had the audacity to advance. To adopt it is to
deny that directors of an investment company have any responsibility to their
stockholders. The shell theory was expressly rejected by the United States District
Court for the District of Delaware in Taussig u. Wellington Fund, Inc., 2 ' but
1247 Rogers v. Hill, 289 U.S. 582, 591-92 (1933).
1248 Managers are fond of referring to stock in an investment corporation as their own
personal "product." One such reference was made in the somewhat startling assertion: "I
mean it is a product. If we just did away with the vote for the shareholder, there really
would be no problem." Testimony of Fred Alger, 1967 House Hearings 505 (emphasis added).
From a management point of view, it is difficult to quarrel with the last sentence.
In the course of the argument in Taussig v. Wellington Fund, Inc., 187 F. Supp. 179
(D. Del. 1960), aff'd, 313 F.2d 472 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 806 (1963), defendants
similarly referred to a fund's stock as a marketable "product" of the advisor. Id. at 198.
1249 Cf. note 1128 supra.
1250 "To [advisors] the fund itself has little or no independent significance for it is essentially the brand name under which a particular adviser sells its services to the public." PUBLIC
POLICY STATEMENT 76.
1251 187 F. Supp. 179 '(D. Del. 1960). To the rhetorical question propounded by defendants, "One may ask 'What is the reason for the existence of Wellington Fund if it engages in
no activities and is a mere conduit or shell?'" the Taussig court made extended answer,
relevant excerpts of which are:
Wellington Fund is not the corporate shell defendants would have this Court
find. Wellington Fund is an $858 million corporation and has over 262,000 stockholders. There are 13 persons on the Board of Directors, seven of whom are not
permitted by law to have any affiliation with either the managing or sponsoring
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commentators such as Professor Lobell continued to insist that "a mutual fund is
a cluster of individual service arrangements.... 1252 It is quite true, as Professor Shipman observed, that
The Investment Company Act specifically rejects the shell theory. This
lies at the heart of the management fee dispute. The Investment Company
Act looks at the investment company as a separate legal entity, and the
directors of the investment company have clear continuing fiduciary duties
to the fund and its shareholders ...
[Tihe first thing to do is to bury the shell theory. 22 3 (Footnotes omitted.)
companies. Wellington Fund was formed pursuant to the corporate laws of the
State of Delaware, which [demand that the board of directors manage the affairs of
the corporation].
The by-laws of Wellington Fund [vest the corporate powers in the board of
directors].
The Investment Company Act of 1940 declares that,
"[The advisor serves only under contract.]"
"[The contract depends for its continuance on the judgment and approval of
the board of directors.]"
"[The contract may be terminated at the pleasure of the board of directors.]"
"[Underwriting contracts are similarly placed within the discretion of the board
of directors.]"
Defendants recognize the Board of Directors are required to, and in fact, do
function in a significant manner ....
Defendants describe the workings of an investment company as,
"[a collection of individual advisory accounts]."
The defendants have chosen to conduct their affairs via the corporate form.
Sound policy reasons dictate, no exception be made in the instant litigation which
would permit defendants to function outside the carefully delimited boundaries of
corporate law. ... The Court is thus asked to forsake 262,000 investors with holdings of $858 million in favor of a corporation controlled by one person . .. -who is
also president and director of Wellington Fund. Id. at 195-97 (footnotes omitted).
1252 Lobell, The Mutual Fund: A Structural Analysis, 47 VA. L. Rav. 181, 185 (1961).
Professor Lobell was shocked at the idea that fund directors had continuing fiduciary responsibilities to their shareholders. "[D]isclosure and competition for investors' patronage
should be the forces to adjust inequities in fee structure." Id. at 202 (footnotes omitted).
Review of a fund's policy by its own board of directors, in his view, "sets a range of obligations seriously at variance with current understanding and practice," and if this be true, as
it surely is, Lobell has condemned the very industry and directors he seeks to defend. Id. at
195. That a fund should be anything other than a "captive" of its advisor is, to Lobell, unthinkable. Id. at 199 n.55. This was bad enough, but Lobell went on to publish a very
unfortunate law review article a few months later which would have the fund directors
do little more than watch the advisor to see that he performed his contract. Again the house
of cards is built on disclosure: "It would seem beyond doubt that no shareholder of a fund has
standing to complain of any of these disclosed and accepted elements of the fund predating
his purchase and unchanged . . . since his acquisition of the shares." Lobell, Rights and
Responsibilities in the Mutual Fund, 70 YALE L.J. 1258, 1268-69 (1961). See also Jaretzki,
Duties and Responsibilities of Directors of Mutual Funds, 29 LAw & CONTEMP. PeoB. 777
(1964); Jaretzki, The Investment Company Act: Problems Relating to Investment Advisory

Contracts, 45 VA. L. Rv. 1023 (1959) (recognizing the problem of escalating fees, and
purportedly suggesting that directorial responsibility be clarified to meet the problem, Mr.
Jaretzki actually falls back on disclosure and shareholder approval, id. at 1037).
The Wharton Report had exposed the fact of management control. WHARTON REPORT 67.
Lobell and others have attempted to derive from the bare fact its own legal justification.
1253 Statement of Morgan Shipman, University of Pennsylvania Law School Conference
on Mutual Funds, supra note 1026, at 748.

An oft-repeated industry objection to proposals which would demand "reasonableness" in
management contracts is that the cost of management to the individual fund shareholder is
a bargain, even at present levels, which he could not duplicate in an individual advisory
account or bank common trust. E.g., statement of Robert Loefler, 1967 House Hearings
469. Indeed, one fund manager is so impressed with this "bargain" rationale that he flatly
asserts, "[m]anagement fees are too low." Statement of Charles Steadman, 1967 House Hear-
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The two arguments used by the defendants in Saminsky, fragmentation and
disclosure, are sprits of the shell theory. The former implies that each investor
in a trust (investment company) has separately contracted with the trustee

(advisor). Hence, in considering the reasonableness of managerial fees, charges
to the individual investors should be considered seriatim.2 4 Since the cost to
the individual is quite low compared to the cost of an individual management
account with an independent investment advisor, so the argument runs, the investor should not be heard to complain. 255 Quite properly, the Saminsky court
would have none of this. The investors in one of the Keystone trusts should not
be considered to have settled myriad separate trusts, for to do so is to ignore the
collective character of the trust as a single, unified investment company." 56 1257
The disclosure argument, on the other hand, rests on estoppel by contract.
If each investor has contracted individually with the manager (or, in our case,
settled a separate trust), then he may not object to the fees he has voluntarily
obligated himself to pay so long as these were fully disclosed to him when he
ings 401. This argument, in large measure, is based on a "shell theory" conception of the
mutual fund.
It should be observed, however, that a comparison to an individual advisory account is
misplaced. If a person is sufficiently prosperous, and has a large amount of money to invest,
he may retain independent investment management and receive highly personalized, individual
advice tailored to his specific needs or preferences. The investor in a mutual fund, however,
foregoes the luxury of personalized advice in order that he may invest a more modest amount
and receive institutionalized investment advice. The fund shareholder has a legitimate expectation that by pooling his investment with the investments of many others, he will be able to
obtain management at reasonable cost. It is, after all, the fund which contracts for investment
management of a single large portfolio. When the fund is overcharged for management services, the shareholders may justifiably complain that they are being fleeced, notwithstanding
that as individuals they might not be able to obtain comparable service at less cost. Clearly
the industry argument quite ignores the fiduciary status which fund directors and managers
bear to the shareholders. Certainly these men do not discharge their duties by simply asserting that a shareholder could do no better on his own.
1254 The SEC, on several occasions, addressed itself to this argument with an anecdotal
reductio:
Of course, even the most outrageously exorbitant fees or charges can be made to
seem "reasonable" if their impact is divided among a sufficiently large group. Would
it be unreasonable on this basis, for instance, for each American to pay the President
of the United States one cent per year for his efforts in administering our country's
affairs? Based on a population of almost 200 million, this would amount to almost
$2,000,000 a year. Would it be unreasonable for each American to contribute a
nickel ($10 million a year) or a dime ($20 million a year)? The industry cannot
detract from the significance of advisory fee rates by resorting to the device of allocating the $140,000,000 collected as advisory fees among several million investors. The
division of the total advisory fees levied on investors in mutual funds into minute
fragments does not in any way reduce these fees or affect the judgment that they are
too high. Neither Congress nor the courts have recognized such a transparent device
in determining whether or not fees or charges are unreasonable. 1967 Senate Hearings 137. See also 1967 Senate Hearings 19; 1967 House Hearings 41-42, 105.
1255 Saminsky v. Abbott, 40 Del. Ch. 528, -,
185 A.2d 765, 769 (Ch. 1961), settlement approved, 41 Del. Ch. 320, 194 A.2d 549 (Ch. 1963), aff'd sub nom. Kleinman v.
Saminsky, 41 Del. Ch. 572, 200 A.2d 572 (Sup. Ct.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 900 (1964). See
note 1253 supra.
1256 To demonstrate the unified nature of each trust (investment company), the court
pointed out that each trust is created by a single trust agreement to which Keystone and all
the investors are parties. Further, a trust agreement may only be amended or modified by a
majority vote of the investors, and each investor participates equally in all the assets of the
entire trust. Id. at -,
185 A.2d at 770. This reasoning applies with all the more force to
an investment company which is a single corporation.
1257 Id. at -,
185 A.2d at 769.
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accepted the offer. " " The court would have none of this either. Referring again
to the Rogers case, the Chancellor observed that stockholder Rogers was, in
legal contemplation, also aware of the compensation arrangement when he purchased his shares; 2. 9 that there was no reason to treat a business trust differently
from a business corporation; 26 ° and that the redeemability of a trust certificate
should not distinguish the case.' 26' On the premise that what is good enough for
the Supreme Court is good enough for the Delaware Chancery, the judge concluded that equitable intervention under the Rogers doctrine was permissible and
denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment.
The effect of shareholder ratification in these cases has been to raise the
threshold for equitable intervention from "fairness" to "waste" of assets. Indeed,
the court in Saxe presumed not only a partially interlocked board, but a totally
interested directorate 262 in order to dramatically point up what it considered
the legal effects of ratification. While it is indisputable that stockholder ratification may cut off the rights of minority shareholders to object to certain otherwise
voidable transactions, it is equally clear that ratification will not save a contract
which involves a breach of trust.1 2 s The question, then, is whether the ratification
rules have been improperly applied to perform absolution on breaches of fiduciary
duty. It has been forcibly, and, it is submitted, convincingly argued that a shift
in the applicable standard from "fairness" to "waste," as well as a shift in the
265
burden of proof 264 in the fund cases reflects an entirely unsound rule of law.
1258 Defendants asserted that every investor was made aware of the fact that management
(the trustee) was compensated on a percentage of assets formula. Further, since information
on the size of the fund and its fees was readily available and periodically reported to the investors, they were "put on notice that the amount earned by Keystone would increase ..
rd. at -,
185 A.2d at 770.
1259
In the Rogers case all the shareholders by purchasing their shares agreed to be
bound by the by-laws passed in accordance with the corporate charter. Plaintiff in
that case acquired his shares after the adoption of the by-law. Thus, in law he was
deemed to have had full knowledge of the existing by-law. Yet the Supreme Court
held that the subsequent growth of payments to the point where they no longer bore
any reasonable relation to the services rendered justified equitable intervention.
Plaintiffs in the instant case are similarly situated with respect to the terms of the
trust agreements. Thus, the same result would seem to be appropriate here. Id. at
185 A.2d at 771.
-,
1260 Id.
1261 Id. at -,
185 A.2d at 770-72; see text accompanying notes 1129-30 supra.
1262 This assumption, according to the minority view, renders the contract voidable at the
instance of either party, without regard to the fairness of the transaction or the presence of
complete good faith. Fletcher calls this the better view. 3 W. FLETCHE3R, supra note 1184, §
961, at 475 n.87. The majority view permits the contract of majority interlocked boards to
stand, provided the contract is entirely fair and entered into in good faith. E.g., Corsicana
Nat. Bank v. Johnson, 251 U.S. 68 (1919); Schlensky v. South Parkway Bldg. Corp.. 19
Ill.2d 268, 166 N.E.2d 793 (1960). See generally 3 W. FLETCHER, supra note 1184, § 962,,
and copious authority there collected.
1263 3 W. FLETCHER, supra note 1184, § 982.
1264 In Geddes v. Anaconda Copper Mining Co., 254 U.S. 590 (1921), the Supreme
Court said:
The relation of directors to corporations is of such a fiduciary nature thattransactions between boards having common members are regarded as jealously by
the law as are personal dealings between a director and his corporation, and where
the fairness of such transactions is challenged the burden is upon those who would
maintain them to show their entire fairness and where a sale is involved the full
adequacy of the consideration. Especially is this true where a common director is
dominating in influence or in character. This court has been consistently emphatic
in the application of this rule, which, it has declared, is founded in soundest morality, and we now add in the soundest business policy. Twin-Lick Oil Co. v. Marbury,
91 U.S. 587, 588; Thomas v. Brownville, Ft. Kearney & Pacific R.R. Co., 109 U.S.
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Whatever the soundness of the rule, this much is clear: under developing
state law fund managers and directors may effectively insulate themselves from
any requirement of fairness by obtaining mechanical majority ratification of
their contracts. 26. In view of the concentration of control in the fund's management, the lack of protection offered by shareholder voting rights where proxies
may be mechanically obtained from widely dispersed and unsophisticated stockholders, the inherent conflicts of interest which accompany externalized management, and the relative ease with which burdensome terms may be camouflaged
in adhesive advisory contracts, the ratification development should not be
countenanced.
b. "Gross Abuse of Trust"-

The FederalStandard

Largely because of the ratification rule, it was clear that litigating fund
shareholders were waging a losing battle. The Saminsky case, like so many
26
others, ... was ultimately settled. ' In the course of his opinion approving the
522; Wardell v. Railroad Co., 103 U.S. 651, 658; Corsicana National Bank v.
Johnson, 251 U.S. 68, 90. Id. at 599 (emphasis added).
The Geddes rule as to burden of proof prevails in most jurisdictions and is amply supported
by imposing authority from the Supreme Court on down. It would be of little use to reexamine the impressive line of case law which preceded and has followed Geddes on this
point. See the extensive collection of excellent cases in 3 W. FLETCHER, supra note 1184, §
974.
As to the shift in burden of proof, see Note, The Nonratification Rule and the Demand
Requirement: The Case for Limited Judicial Review, 63 COL. L. REv. 1086, 1099-1103
(1963), where the Heyden rule, relied upon by the Saxe court, is meticulously analyzed and
found to be wanting in many respects. The commentator concludes:
The Heyden doctrine has been used as conclusive precedent for shifting the burden
of proof in cases involving . . . compensation of a mutual fund investment adviser
under a service contract.
That the Heyden doctrine is inconsistent with the nonratification rule purportedly embraced by the Delaware . . . courts is evident; if shareholders are powerless to
absolve directors who commit alleged frauds, they should be similarly powerless to
perform absolution by shackling a minority shareholder with an almost insurmountable burden of proof at trial. Further, the doctrine amounts to more than a rule of
evidence; it constitutes a reappraisal of what conduct may be ratified. Theoretically,
any disparity between what a corporation receives and what it gives amounts to a
Heyden test, as applied by the Delaware
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settlement, Chancellor Seitz volunteered dicta which have pervaded the cases
attacking management fees: 12 9
As to the objectors' contention that the "excessive return" reflects lack
of competitive forces in the field, I can only say that the legal format involved is not illegal and if there is to be "regulation" of this so-called "builtin" control, it must come from the legislative branch unless it results in the
violation of some positive principle of law, such as that applicable to a waste
of assets. These observations are equally applicable to the contention that
the allegedly
excessive profits flow from a breach of duty by a self-dealing
1 270
trustee.

The sentiment which is apparent here clearly reflects a judicial reluctance
to interfere with a fund-external management format sanctioned by the Investment Company Act. There is some validity to this view, but there is also
Kleinman v. Saminsky, 41 Del. Ch.572, 200 A.2d 572 (Sup. Ct.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 900

(1964). The terms of the settlement were not shocking in their generosity. Id. at -,
194
A.2d at 550. Objectors to the settlement asserted that the scaled down fees were still excessive, pointing out that the trustee, even with the sliding scale, would still realize a return on
its own net worth of 190 per cent. Id. at -, 194 A.2d at 552. Thus the scale-down only
cost the advisor slightly over ten per cent in his rate of return. While 190 per cent is a rather
handsome return on investment, the Chancellor noted that it is not unusual or necessarily
unreasonable that service corporations experience high rates of return. Id. The Wharton Report gives the rather obvious explanation that investment advice is not a capital-intensive line
of activity, and that rates of return can therefore be somewhat deceptive. WHARTON REPORT
517.
1269 In Saxe v. Brady, 40 Del. Ch. 474, 184 A.2d 602 '(Ch. 1962), the Chancellor had
used strikingly similar language to make the same point: "If the fund-management company
format is to be legally questioned, such inquiry must come from some other place." Id. at -,
184 A.2d at 616.
Chancellor Seitz had no monopoly on this notion. In the settlement of a suit involving
the management of Axe-Houghton Fund B, Inc., a zealot named George Hillman, was bent
on pursuing the lawsuit to its consummation. In Hillman's opinion there were "great evils
pervading the investment company industry," which he was unwilling to see swept under the
judicial rug by means of a settlement. Kerner v. Crossman, 211 F. Supp. 397, 401 (S.D.N.Y.
1962). He considered the terms of the settlement oppressive and contended "that it is no answer that [the fees provided in the settlement] may be in line with similar fees charged by
other open-end investment funds because .. . the whole scale of such fees is outrageous." Id.
at 401. The court, however, adopted Chancellor Seitz's view, rejecting Hillman's objection as
an attack "on the industry as a whole and the way it conducts its business." Id. This sort
of sweeping indictment, it felt, was beyond its proper sphere and should be left to Congress
or the SEC. Id. at 401-02.
In another context the judge in Taussig v. Wellington Fund, Inc., 187 F. Supp. 179 (D.
Del. 1960), demonstrated the same reluctance: "The Court is mindful that seemingly many
practices prevail in this industry that in other areas are legally and economically intolerable.
It would, however, be unwise at this time to sit in judgment of the entire industry ....
" Id
at 197 (emphasis added).
Judge Ryan, in upholding a settlement of litigation involving Investors Diversified Services, answered objectors in similar language:
[A]bsent any finding of positive malfeasance such as violation of fiduciary duty
or of statutory standards, it is quite conceivable that a Court or a jury would find
that what plaintiffs were really challenging was the Fund System as a whole of which
defendants were but a part rather than any wrongdoing on the part of defendants.
Glicken v. Bradford, 35 F.R.D. 144, 159 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
1270 Saminsky v. Abbott, 41 Del. Ch. 320, -,
194 A.2d 549, 552 (Ch. 1963). How the
court is able to conclude that "a breach of duty by a self-dealing trustee" is not a "violation
of some positive principle of law" is completely incomprehensible. Nevertheless, it is this
sort of thinking which has liberated fund managers to do as they please, provided only that
they refrain from openly plundering.
When Judge Friendly was asked, "Do you feel that the usual pattern of stockholder protection exists in this industry as in other industries?" his reply was emphatic: "I don't think
it exists in this industry. It might be an interesting philosophical speculation as to how far
it really exists in some others, but I don't think it exists in this from what I have seen
of it." 1967 House Hearings 616.
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inherent in the cases an oversight of other applicable federal law in the Investment
Company Act. Itis extremely important to observe that, when considering the
level of management compensation, cases such as Saxe, Acampora, and Saminsky
proceeded on purely state law bases. When a suit, rested on the Investment
Company Act, was brought in Delaware and submitted to a court for approval
of its settlement, the court presumed that the federal claim would not affect the
applicable standards. The case was Rome v. Archer, 27 ' a derivative suit involving
the Wellington Fund, its directors, advisor, and principal underwriter. Like
Saxe, Rome was concerned with improper director action in overcompensating the
fund's advisor. 72 Unlike Saxe, causes of action based on the Investment Company Act were presented in Rome, with objectors to the settlement relying on
Brown v. Bullock.'27 The court, however, cited Saxe to the effect that a onehalf per cent fee was judicially unassailable as a matter of common law and
disposed of Brown by asserting that it "merely held that the fiduciary duties
of investment company directors have a basis in the investment Company Act
as well as in the Common Law."' 27 4 Perhaps the point was insufficiently
developed by the objectors or inartfully presented, but the resulting dictum just
quoted certainly seems erroneous. It will be seen that the Investment Company Act contains a standard of conduct somewhat lower than desirable, but
nevertheless capable of avoiding the unfortunate ratification rule which has
shackled the common law.
Whatever may have been the state of the law prior to 1961, it should have
been pellucidly clear to the Rome court that the Investment Company Act
establishes a federal standard of director responsibility. 2 75 Moreover, that federal
1271 41 Del. Ch.404, 197 A.2d 49 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
1272 From the standpoint of the facts, Rome was not an exceptionally strong case on this
point. The effective fee rate paid to the advisor was only .27 per cent of net assets. In an
industry which has traditionally called for one-half per cent fees, the rate in Rome was
, 197 A.2d at 54. See Appendix B infra.
conspicuous by its modesty. Id. at 1273 194 F. Supp. 207 '(S.D.N.Y.), af'd, 294 F.2d 415 (2d Cir. 1961).
197 A.2d 49, 55 (Sup. Ct. 1964). The court
1274 Rome v. Archer, 41 Del. Ch.404, -,
also maintained that "since the Federal Act sets no maximum fee schedule, the same considerations found relevant in Saxe would probably also be relevant in litigation considering the
Investment Company Act of 1940." Id.
The observation that the Act sets no maximum fee schedule was correctly characterized
by the Brown court as "beside the point." Brown v. Bullock, 194 F. Supp. 207, 229 (S.D.N.Y.
1961). For Judge Herlands, the absence of mechanical statutory limits could not be read to
dilute the standard of care required of investment company directors under section 37 of the
Act. (It might also be noted that in at least one insignificant instance the Act does impose
a maximum fee, i.e., one per cent. Investment Company Act of 1940 § 10(d) (6), 15 U.S.C.
80a-10(d) (6) (1964).)
1275 In Aldred Inv. Trust v. SEC, 151 F.2d 254 (lst Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 326 U.S.
795 (1946), an action brought by the SEC under section 36, the court turned to the classic
case of Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295 (1939), for a statement of the fiduciary duties appropriate as a source of law under the section:
He who is in such a fiduciary position cannot serve himself first and his cestuis
second. He cannot manipulate the affairs of his corporation to their detriment and
in disregard of the standards of common decency and honesty. He cannot by the
intervention of a corporate entity violate the ancient precept against serving two
masters. . . . He cannot utilize his inside information and his strategic position for
his own preferment. . . . He cannot use his power for his personal advantage and
to the detriment of the stockholders and creditors no matter how absolute in terms
that power may be and no matter how meticulous he is to satisfy technical requirements. For that power is at all times subject to the equitable limitation that it may
not be exercised for the aggrandizement, preference, or advantage of the fiduciary
to the exclusion or detriment of the cestuis. Id. at 311.
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standard should be a potent weapon in attacking the more egregious excesses in
management compensation. Though the case of Brown v. Bullock was ultimately reduced to a "naked question of pleading,"' 2 .6 the opinion of Judge Herlands in the district court carefully considered the propriety of applying federal
standards of directorial conduct in the negotiation of management compensation.
Brown was a representative and derivative action brought by shareholders
of Dividend Shares, Inc. [Fund], against the nine directors of the Fund and the
Fund's external manager, Calvin Bullock, Ltd. [Management], which served as
investment advisor and principal underwriter of Fund's shares.27 " Plaintiffs in
the action charged, inter alia, that Management completely dominated and controlled Fund's business and its board of directors; that the contract between
Management and Fund was dictated by Management and "acquiesced in" by
Fund's directors as a result of "the arbitrary action, collusion, gross negligence
or reckless disregard of duty of the individual defendants and the Management
Company"; that individual defendant-directors of the Fund "abdicated their
functions" by making "no effort to ascertain whether" some organization other
than Management could be employed to supply the same services "on terms more
advantageous to the Fund" and that they made no effort to persuade or bargain
at arm's length with Management to lower its fees; 27 s that the advisory contract
approved by the directors provided for fees that "were and are excessive and
out of proportion to the value of the services performed, as the defendants
[directors] knew or should have known";12. that the payment of management
fees under these circumstances constituted (1) "conversion?' of the Fund's assets
in violation of section 37 of the Act, 280 (2) "[g]ross abuse of trust, gross misconduct, willful misfeasance, bad faith, gross negligence or reckless disregard of
official and contractual duties" in violation of section 36,"2sl and (3) a breach
In his concurring opinion in Aldred, Judge Peters of the Second Circuit had set the stage for
the Supreme Court:
In view of the declaration of policy set forth in the Act in question it appears
that the term "gross abuse of trust," as used therein, covers a course of conduct by
the officers and controlling stockholders of an investment company in violation of the
standards of conduct generally applied to fiduciaries, such as would exist if they
were acting with other than disinterested motives. Aldred Inv. Trust v. SEC, supra,
at 261.
1276 Brief for Appellees at 1, Brown v. Bullock, 294 F.2d 415 (2d Cir. 1961).
1277 Brown v. Bullock, 194 F. Supp. 207, 210-11 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
1278 Id. at 212.
1279 Id. at 213.
1280 Investment Company Act of 1940 § 37, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-36 (1964), provides:
Whoever steals, unlawfully abstracts, unlawfully and willfully converts to his own
use or to the use of another, or embezzles any of the moneys, funds, securities,
credits, property, or assets of any registered investment company shall be deemed
guilty of a crime, and upon conviction thereof shall be subject to the penalties provided in section 80a-48 of this title. A judgment of conviction or acquittal on the
merits under the laws of any State shall be a bar to any prosecution under this section
for the same act or acts.
1281 Investment Company Act of 1940 § 36, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35 (1964), provides:
The Commission is authorized to bring an action in the proper district court of
the United States or United States court of any Territory or other place subject to
the jurisdiction of the United States, alleging that a person serving or acting in one
or more of the following capacities has been guilty, after August 22, 1940, and within
five years of the commencement of the action, of gross misconduct or gross abuse of
trust in respect of any registered investment company for which such person so serves
or acts:
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of the directors' "fiduciary duties to the Fund," a "gift, waste and a spoliation
of the assets of the Fund" in violation of state law !...
The court agreed that the charge was cognizable in a federal forum, even
though neither section 36 nor section 37 expressly authorizes a private suit for
enforcement. Judge Herlands began by spotlighting section 1 of the Act, espedally paragraphs 1 (a) (5) and 1 (b) (2) which respectively refer to the inherent
difficulties of multiform state regulation and the adverse effects on the national
interest "when investment companies are . . . operated . . . in the interest of
directors, officers, investment advisers . . . rather than in the interest of all
classes of such companies' security holders."' 2 " With this overriding policy firmly
in mind, the court turned to the case law to show that a private right of action
could be inferred "to enforce any liability or duty created by"' 1 4 the Act, citing
authority of Cogan v. Johnston,""s Schwartz v. Eaton,""8 and Taussig v. Wellington Fund, Inc." 7 Analogous cases in related areas of security regulation were
(1) as officer, director, member of an advisory board, investment adviser, or
depositor; or
(2) as principal underwriter, if such registered company is an open-end company, unit investment trust, or face-amount certificate company.
If the Commission's allegations of such gross misconduct or gross abuse of trust
are established, the court shall enjoin such person from acting in such capacity or
capacities either permanently or for such period of time as it in its discretion shall
deem appropriate.
1282 Brown v. Bullock, 194 F. Supp. 207, 211-13, 228 (S.D.N.Y. 1961). Defendants
admitted that the complaint adequately alleged "common law charges of waste and breach of
fiduciary duty." Id. at 219. If, therefore, the federal claims were properly within the subjectmatter jurisdiction of the court, it would also be able to adjudicate the common law claims
which fell within the rules of pendent jurisdiction. Id. at 220 (citing cases). See also C.
WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 19 (1963).
1283 Investment Company Act of 1940 § 1(b) (2), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-1(b) (2) (1964). See
Breswick & Co. v. United States, 134 F. Supp. 132 (S.D.N.Y. 1955), rev'd on other grounds
sub nom. Alleghany Corp. v. Breswick & Co., 353 U.S. 151 (1957): "One of the purposes
of the Investment Company Act is thus to protect investors in investment companies against
the managing of those companies in the interests of persons other than the investors." Id. at
138.
1284 Brown v. Bullock, 194 F. Supp. 207, 220 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
1285 162 F. Supp. 907 (S.D.N.Y. 1958). Cogan was a derivative and representative suit
based on sections 7 and 36 of the Investment Company Act and seeking an injunction and the
appointment of a receiver. The federal court took jurisdiction under section 44 of the Act
and noted that an individual plaintiff may properly sue to enforce his rights protected by the
Act. Id. at 909.
Cogan also considered the section 36 allegation, but the investment company involved was
unregistered. Hence the court concluded that the plaintiff could not "as an individual, sue
under this section on the basis of alleged abuse of trust by an officer or director of an unregistered investment company . . . ." Id. But see Nielson, Neglected Alternatives for Investor
Self-Help: The Unregistered Investment Company and the Federal Corporate Law, 44 NOTRE
DAME LAWYER 707-10 (1969).
1286 264 F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1959). This case cited Cogan and held that section 44 conferred jurisdiction in a derivative suit based on violations of section 7 of the Act.
1287 187 F. Supp. 179 (D. Del. 1960), aff'd, 313 F.2d 472 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 374 U.S.
806 (1963). Taussig held that a private litigant asserting a cause of action for violation of
section 35 of the Act had presented a federal question for purposes of jurisdiction. Since the
reasoning and authority of Taussig was adopted and heavily relied upon in Brown, it is appropriate to set forth the salient feature of Judge Wright's opinion here:
Violation of a federal statute may accord a private litigant a remedy by implication notwithstanding the absence of specific statutory authority conferring upon the
injured the right to redress statutory wrongs, for the common law will supply a
remedy where the statute is silent. [Citing Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946);
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 286.) The intention to create civil liability is presumed
unless a contrary legislative intent is to be inferred from the whole purview of the
Act. Id. at 217 (footnotes omitted).
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similarly used to conclusively demonstrate the propriety of an implied right of
civil action even in the absence of an express statutory grant.1288
For present purposes, the important aspect of the implied right of private
action is the recognition that "[i]n certain major respects, the 1940 Act operates
as a [federal] corporation law for investment companies."' 289 In making this
statement the Brown court adopted the view taken in Aldred Investment Trust v.
SEC that "§ 1 (b) of the Act . . .in effect codifies the fiduciary obligations
placed upon officers and directors of investment companies." 29 It would follow,
as the Brown court concluded, that "[r]egardless of their foundation in the corn1288 Brown v. Bullock, 194 F. Supp. 207, 224-32 (S.D.N.Y. 1961). Among the more
important statements of the court are the following:
Implied rights of action are not contingent upon statutory language which
affirmatively indicates that they are intended. On the contrary, they are implied
unless the legislation evidences a contrary intention ...
Under the 1933 Act, which contains a specific civil recovery provision, a private
cause of action has been implied for violations of the broader anti-fraud provisions
of the statute, despite a narrower clause that expressly exempted the particular bonds
from the misrepresentation provision. Thiele v. Shields, D.C.S.D.N.Y. 1955, 131
F. Supp. 416, 419. Id. at 224.
The principle of implied liability was applied directly in Fischman v. Raytheon

Mfg. Co., 2 Cir., 1951, 188 F.2d 783, involving a stockholders' action under section
10(b) of the 1934 Act, which forbids the use of fraudulent devices in connection with
the purchase and sale of securities. No remedy is expressly granted by that provision
to the person aggrieved.
Another leading case is Baird v. Franklin, 2 Cir., 1944, 141 F.2d 238, certiorari
denied 1944, 323 U.S. 737, 65 S.Ct. 38, 89 L.Ed. 591, interpreting section 6(b) of the
1934 Act which, as judicially construed, makes it the duty of every stock exchange
to expel or discipline members for unethical conduct. No private right of action is
provided for violation of this duty. In Baird v. Franklin, 2 Cir., 141 F.2d 238, at
page 245, sustaining a private right of action, it was said:
"The fact that the statute provides no machinery or procedure by which
the individual right of action can proceed is immaterial. It is well established
that members of a class for whose protection a statutory duty is created may sue
for injuries resulting from its breach and that the common law will supply a
remedy if the statute gives none. (Citing cases.)" Id. at 224-25.
"[We think a denial of a private right of action to those for whose ultimate
protection the legislation is intended leaves legislation highly publicized as in the
public interest in fact sadly wanting, and even delusive, to that end" . . . .Id.

at 226 [quoting Goldstein v. Groesbeck, 142 F.2d 442, 427 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 323 U.S. 737 (1944)].
The implication herein of a private civil remedy under section 37 of the 1940
Act (and under other sections, as will hereinafter be shown) is only a specific application to securities legislation of a general principle recognized and expounded in
such cases as Fitzgerald v. Pan American World Airways, 2 Cir., 1956, 229 F.2d 499,
501; Spirt v. Bechtel, 2 Cir., 1956, 232 F.2d 241, 243 [Judge Swan's opinion] at
pages 248-251 [Judge Lumbard's concurring opinion], at pages 251-252 et seq. [Judge
1961). Frank's dissenting opinion]. Brown v. Bullock, 194 F. Supp. 207, 229 (S.D.N.Y.

See generally Loomis & Eisenberg, The SEC as Amicus Curiae in Shareholder Litigation

-

A Reply, 52 A.B.A.J. 749 (1966).

The reply is to a preposterous article by Carl Shipley,

Shipley, The SECs Amicus Curiae Aid to Plaintiffs in Mutual Fund Litigation, 52 A.BPA.J.

337 (1966). Shipley relies on the now discredited case of Brouk v. Managed Funds, Inc., 286
F.2d 901 (8th Cir. 1961), vacated as moot per curiam, 369 U.S. 424 (1962). Brouk has been
overruled by implication in its own circuit. Greater Iowa Corp. v. McLendon, 378 F.2d 783
'(8th Cir. 1967).
The Eighth Circuit's Brouk rule had caused no mean amount of procedural footwork. See
Ruskay v. Reed, 225 F. Supp. 581 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); Ackert v. Ausman, 198 F. Supp. 538
(S.D.N.Y. 1961), aff'd sub nom. Ackert v. Pelt Bryan, 299 F.2d 65 (2d Cir. 1962), remanded,
Ackert v. Ausman, 217 F. Supp. 934 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
1289 Brown v. Bullock, 194 F. Supp. 207, 232-33 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
1290 Aldred Inv. Trust v. SEC, 151 F.2d 254, 260 (1st Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 326 U.S.
795 (1946).
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mon law, these fidudary obligations are granted a federal basis resting in the
Act .... "29 (Emphasis added.)
Specific duties under federal law may be derived from particular sections
of the 1940 Act. 92 For example, the Brown court carefully considered section
15 and properly concluded that it imposed a duty on directors to carefully and
independently scrutinize contracts presented for their approval or annual extension. Whatever corresponding duty may be imposed by state common or
statutory law, this much at least was required by the federal law in the interest of
stockholder protection. Hence, a complaint which charged collusive or pro
forma director approval under section 15 charged an actionable violation of
federal law. 29 ' Section 36, said the court, is likewise a repository of federal
law, 2 4 and was not inserted into the Act merely to enforce "exclusively Statecreated duties as prescribed and defined in multitudinous State corporation laws
and their interpretive decisions. 29 While other sections of the Act proscribed
certain conduct in some detail, the complexity of the industry and the subtlety of
the abuses to which it is particularly vulnerable required that the Act contain
a "residuary" clause capable of dealing with those violations of stockholder trust
1291
1292

Brown v. Bullock, 194 F. Supp. 207, 234 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
Section 17 is an illustration used by the court:
The Act contains specific prohibitions against certain transactions and imposes
specific disabilities upon directors, all aimed at the more blatant abuses and breaches
of trust. Thus, to prevent the wrongs inherent in "self-dealing," "sitting on both
sides of the table" or "unloading or dumping" of securities upon the investment company, section 17 of the Act prohibits any transaction either as principal or agent by
any affiliated person and the investment company, except to act as a securities broker
at the usual commissions.
The intent to impose this fiduciary duty is evident from the fact that this disability to consummate these types of transactions transcends the common law which merely subjects the transaction to scrutiny as to fairness. Id. at 238 n.1.
1293 Id. at 235-37.
The grant of these defined powers, as specified by the Act, carries with it the
imposition of corresponding duties. The power to extend the investment advisory
contract necessarily carries with it the duty to determine whether or not the extension is desirable and in the best interest of the company. The power to terminate
the investment advisory contract necessarily carries with it the duty to keep alert for
reasons which might make termination necessary or desirable; and, in the presence
of such reasons, to exercise the right of termination. The objectives of the Act would
be nullified if the directors were free to extend mechanically the contract without
honestly exercising their best judgment. The objectives of the Act would be equally
frustrated if the directors were free to close their eyes to any developments making
the termination of the contract advisable.
By giving the directors the right to extend and to terminate the contract, the
Act necessarily -also imposes upon the directors the fiduciary duty to use these powers
intelligently, diligently and solely for the interests of the company and its stockholders. These specific fiduciary duties are created by the Act. Their violation subjects the directors to liability, which can be enforced in the federal courts under
section 44 of the Act.
The reasoning of the Baird case applies to section 15 of the 1940 Act. If all
that section 15 meant was that the directors must give their annual token approval
to the extension of the advisory contract, there would have been no purpose for its
inclusion in the Act. The purpose of section 15 was to protect investment companies
and their shareholders from selfish mismanagement. This objective can be realized
only if section 15 is construed as imposing upon the directors the duty to use diligence and honest judgment in extending the advisory contract from year to year and
in giving constant consideration to the possibility of its termination. Id. at 235-36
(emphasis added). See Brown v. Bullock, 294 F.2d 415, 421 (2d Cir. 1961).
1294 That section 36 gives rise to a private right of action was also held in SEC v. Quing
N. Wong, 42 F.R.D. 599 (D.P.R. 1967).
1295 Brown v. Bullock, 194 F. Supp. 207, 238 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).

[Vol. 44:732]

SURVEY

not easily anticipated and specifically treated in some other section. That residuary
clause was section 36.129
Since section 36 articulates a federal standard of fiduciary duty, and since
directors and advisors are within its purview, the section would seem to be a
logical weapon for plaintiffs attacking excessive management compensation. While
the standard of duty applicable under section 36 may leave something to be
desired, there should be no doubt that the standard is higher than "waste" and
will be unaffected by purportedshareholderratification."9 The gist of an action
such as Brown v. Bullock, in the final analysis, is that an investment company
is being operated in the interest of the advisor rather than the shareholders a breach of that fiduciary duty "codified" in section 1 (b) - and hence there
is a proper subject for action under section 36."9'
To simply show that section 36 and the other sections of the Act imposq
certain fiduciary obligations which may be enforced privately in a federal court
and which are applicable to a management compensation case is to show very
little. The more important question must be: How high are these standards and
when will conduct of directors or advisors be unlawful? The legislative history
of the section, as thoroughly discussed in Brown,"99 gives two clues.
First, "gross abuse of trust" embodies a statutory fiduciary duty which falls
somewhat short of the fiduciary duty of a trustee. This would appear to be
obvious from the use of the adjective gross, and is further supported by the
testimony of David Schenker, counsel to the SEC's Investment Trust study:
When we came to draft [the] provision . .. it presented a great many
problems, because if you try to impose a trustee obligation on these managers,
maybe that obligation is much too strict....
So we took the broader approach and said that if he was guilty30 0of gross misconduct or gross abuse of
trust, then he was guilty of a crime.
In view of the criminal sanction which originally accompanied "gross abuse of
trust," there may have been reason to set the standard of duty below trusteeship.
If so, those reasons no longer obtain, and with the introduction of more flexible
remedies for breaches of section 36, 03the imposition of a genuine trust relation1296

The argument that section 36 provides merely a method of enforcement of duties

specified in other sections of the Act and does not contain substantive standards of director
responsibility itself, was answered forcefully by Judge Herlands:

This argument, if accepted, would emasculate section 36 and make it a super-

fluity, inasmuch as section 42(e) grants the Commission the broadest power to institute proceedings for injunctive relief against any person who has engaged or is about
to engage in any act or practice constituting a violation of any provision of the Act.
Such enjoined person would be disqualified to act as a director by operation of sec1297

tion 9 of the Act. Id. at 239 n.1.

See Eisenberg & Lehr, supra note 1194, at 216-17 and authority collected. See also
note 1266 supra and accompanying text.

1298 Mr. Jaretzki may be disposed to dispute this: "I said that an investment advisor was

not in a fiduciary capacity as to the amount of his fee, not that it has no fiduciary duty. It
has a fiduciary duty not to charge excessive fees." Mr. Pomerantz, understandably puzzled,
replied, "That dichotomy escapes me." University of Pennsylvania Law School Conference on
Mutual Funds, supra note 1026, at 753.
1299 Brown v. Bullock, 194 F. Supp. 207, 240-45 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
1300 1940 Senate Hearings 262. The prototype of section 36 was criminal. S. 3580, 76th
Cong., 3d Sess. § 17(e) (1940).
1301 See note 1320 infra.
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ship might be one of the most salutary reforms that could be suggested for the
investment company industry short of compulsory internalization of management. However this may be, one thing is clear - section 36 as presently constituted articulates a standard of duty which has as its upper limit the common
law duty of strict trusteeship.
On the other hand, the section 36 standard of duty would certainly be above
the nadir of "conversion," which retained its criminal character when the present
section 37 was carved out of the orginal section 17(e).132 "Conversion" within
the meaning of section 37 is "[t]he willful misapplication of corporate funds
by fiduciaries," and it may be established by evidentiary circumstances surrounding the payment of management fees "such as. .. collusion [or] the relationship
of the size of payments to the value of the services . . . rendered.""s0 (Emphasis
added.) This, of course, is precisely the standard of corporate waste as defined
in the state law cases.""0 4 Hence the minimum duty owed under section 36 lies
somewhere above the standard of waste. Already there is a standard somewhat
less permissive than the outright looting required after a common law ratification.
Furthermore, it is probable that section 36 presents a shifting standard of
duty, and if this is true, the standard of duty for some individuals will be even
further removed from that point at which section 37 is breached. As has been
pointed out, the minimum standard of duty under section 36 is situated somewhere above the standards of section 37, and section 36 itself embraces all directors, affiliated and unaffiliated, as well as an investment company's advisor,
advisory board, and officers. Arguably, section 36 imposes upon the unaffiliated
directors a higher standard of duty than is required of the affiliated directors
or the advisor. Such a reading of section 36 relies upon the authority and reasoning of the federal court which decided Escott v. BarChris Construction Corporation.

1 0

5

BarChris itself dealt with the standard of duty applicable to the establishment of a "due diligence" defense to section 11 actions under the Securities Act
of 1933.36 Several directors were involved, some of long standing in the corporation with intimate knowledge of the financial condition of the enterprise and
others who were simply "outsiders." Each undertook to show his own "due
1302 The legislative history indicates that there may be a considerable gap between the
minimum standard of duty under section 36 and the point at which section 37 is violated. See
generally Brown v. Bullock, 194 F. Supp. 207, 240-42 (S.D.N.Y. 1961). Especially noteworthy
is the fact that the court considered larceny, embezzlement, and willful conversion - the proscriptions of section 37 - to be "[ihe worst forms of [gross] misconduct or [gross] abuse."
Id. at 242. If section 37 was designed to sanction more heavily the most egregious examples
of section 36 violations, this would imply that certain lesser instances of "gross abuse" would
remain for sanction under section 36, some of which activities would be comparatively far
from the larceny or conversion level of conduct.
This conclusion is further supported by an examination of section 42(e) of the Act. That
section, in substance, provides for enforcement of the various provisions of the Act through
injunctions sought by the Commission. Unless section 36 proscribes conduct which is not specifically outlawed in some other section of the Act, it would be pure surplusage, for the
mechanism of section 9(a) will combine with the mechanism of section 42(e) to accomplish
automatic director disqualification.
1303 Id. at 229.
1304 E.g., Rogers v. Hill, 289 U.S. 582, 591 (1933). See also Gallin v. National City
Bank, 152 Misc. 679, -,
273 N.Y.S. 87, 113-19 (Sup. Ct. 1934).
1305 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
1306 Securities Act of 1933 § 11, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1964).
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diligence" in investigating the non-expertised portions of a registration statement
While section 11(c) sets the standards for a reasonable investigation as "that
required of a prudent man in the management of his own property,...... the court
held that some directors would be held to a higher standard of duty than others.
It is important to note that it is the standard of duty which shifts, not the standard of conduct required to fulfill that duty. Hence the "prudent man" rule
applies with equal force to all the directors, though the duty owed by some
will exceed the duty owed by others. In particular, referring to one director who
had participated in the preparation of the registration statement and who was
otherwise knowledgeable in the corporation's finances, the BarChris court said
"more was required of him in the way of reasonable investigation than could
fairly be expected of a director who had no connection with this work."' 0 This
analysis placed the heavier burden on the "inside' directors and the underwriter
in BarChris. With respect to the underwriters, Judge McLean noted that
30
"the positions of the underwriter and the company's officers are adverse,"'
pointing up the duty of the underwriter to delve deeply and independently into
the corporation's fiscal condition. This language is strikingly similar to that of
Judge Doyle in Acampora:
These non-affiliated directors have a demanding mission and that is the protection of the assets of Fund and the shareholders. Their position in relation to Management is adversary in character, and if they are properly
to fulfill their mission they are obliged to scrutinize the acts and doings of
the advisor with great care.1 310 (Emphasis added.)

In the investment company context, and by a parity of reasoning, the unaffiliated directors should be held to a higher standard of fiduciary duty under
section 36 than are the affiliated directors or the advisor himself. In BarChris
the public could properly look to the more knowledgable professionals to assure
accurate preparation of the registration statement, while in the investment company, with its complement of interested managers, the public's expectation of
1307 Id. § 11(c).
1308 Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643, 690 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). See Comment, Securities Regulation, 44 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 122, 139 (1968), quoting H. RxP. No.
85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1933):
The degree of diligence demanded of the different defendants varied, as the
House Committee . . . felt it should, "with the importance of their place in the
scheme of distributions and with the degree of protection the public has a right to
expect." (Footnotes omitted.)
The language of the Supreme Court seems to be in accord and to have particular relevance to the unaffiliated directors in the mutual fund context:
[The obligation of the director] if he becomes a party to a contract with the company, to candor and fair dealing, is increased in the precise degree that his represen-"
tative character has given him power and control derived from the confidence reposed
in him by the stockholders who appointed him their agent. If he should be a sole
director, or one of a smaller number vested with certain powers, this obligation would
be still stronger, and his acts subject to more severe scrutiny, and their validity determined by more rigid principles of morality, and freedom from motives of selfishness.
Twin-Lick Oil Company v. Marbury, 91 U.S. 587, 590 (1876) (emphasis added). While
Marbury speaks of self-dealing, the principle which it enunciates should have extended application, so that the duty required of a fiduciary is directly proportional to the trust reposed
in him.
1309 Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643, 696 "(S.D.N.Y. 1968).
1310 Acampora v. Birkland, 220 F. Supp. 527, 550 (D. Colo. 1963).
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protection is properly identified with the role of the unaffiliated director. If this
was sufficient to shift the duty of reasonable investigation upward in the BarChris
case, it should also be sufficient to revise upward the duty of the non-affiliate
under section 36
c. The Evolving Duty -

The Banking Industry Analogy

Thus far it has been suggested that the section 36 standard of duty may be
breached by any director before the point of "waste" or "conversion" is reached,
and that in the case of the unaffiliated directors the section 36 standard should
be even higher. Already it is clear that management contract cases which would
fail on the "waste" standard may, as the circumstances approach "waste" or
"conversion," be won if based on directorial breach of section 36 duty, and
especially is this true if the attack is centered on the unaffiliated directors.
Standards of duty under section 36 for both the affiliated and unaffiliated
directors as well as the advisor may be even higher than suspected. Investment
companies solicit and handle the savings of myriad small investors,.. 1 holding
themselves out as competent to manage and protect other people's money. In
this respect an investment company has much in common with commercial" 12
or savings"' 3. banks, and it is submitted that investment company directors should
be held to the same standards of duty as are applicable in these other institutions.
One commentator has observed that "banks are generally considered to be quasipublic institutions, and hence their directors may be subjected to a somewhat
higher degree of responsibility than directors of most other types of corpora14
tions.""'
Two cases have adopted this view and held the directors of an investment
1311 There were strong overtones of congressional concern for the protection of small investors' savings:
In the opinion of the committee, the Securities and Exchange Commission, and
the industry itself, this legislation is needed to protect small investors from breaches
of trust upon the part of unscrupulous managements and to provide such investors
with a regulated institution for the investment of their savings. H... REP. No. 2639,
76th Cong., 3d Sess. 10 (1940).
1312 "The stockholder-management relationship in a Mutual Fund is akin to that of the
directors of a bank with the depositors or stockholders. In each case there is a use of funds
belonging to others . . . ." Nielson, Fiduciary Standards of Conduct Under The Investment
Company Act, in CONFERENCE ON MUTUAL FUNDS 154 (S. Hodes, P. Geerlings & M. Simpson
eds. 1966).
1313 Directors of a savings bank, organized without capital stock, are often said to be
strict trustees for depositors. Hun v. Cary, 82 N.Y. 65 (1880) is the leading case on this
point, and is still excellent law. 3 W. FLETCHER, supra note 1184, § 845. While it is not being
suggested that mutual fund directors are held to the standards of common law trustees under
section 36, it is submitted that the body of trust law should be a primary source in ascertaining the precise standards applicable under that section. Aside from the "financial" nature of
the business, there are functional similarities between a mutual fund and a common law
trust which dictate this result. Note, Rights and Obligations in the Mutual Fund: A Source of
Law, 20 VAND. L. REV. 1120, 1135-38 (1967).
1314 Wilson, Responsibilities of a Bank Director, Bus. LAWYER, April 1955, at 45.
Undoubtedly, a director of a bank is held to a stricter accountability than the
director of an ordinary business corporation. A director of a bank is entrusted with
the funds of depositors, and the stockholders look to him for protection from . . .
personal liability. 3 W. FLETCHER, supra note 1184, § 1035.
See also Litwin v. Allen, 25 N.Y.S.2d 667 (Sup. Ct. 1940); 3 W. FLETCHER, supra note 1184,
§ 1038; cases collected in R. BAKER & W. CAREY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS
417-18 (3d ed. 1959).
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company to the same standard of duty imposed on directors of a bank. In
Goodwin v. Simpson...5 the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts said:
Inasmuch as the corporation was engaged in a business in which it
solicited the handling and investment of the money of others, the fiduciary
obligations of its officers are not different from those of corresponding of3 16
ficers of a banking institution.1
Similarly, in the case of O'Connor v. First National Investors' Corporation"..
it was noted:
It is contended that the cases hereinbefore cited, which we think are
controlling of the instant case, involved the liability of bank directors and
the principles therein laid down do not apply to the case at bar. To this
proposition we cannot agree. As previously said, the degree of care required
of the directors of a corporation must depend upon the character of the
corporation and the circumstances of each particular case. When we compare the business of this corporation with that of a bank, it seems to us
that at least as much care should be required of the directors in the instant
case as on the part of the directors of a bank .... 1ss
Both of these cases were decided in the pre-Act era of the thirties, but there
is no reason to believe that the Act should have undermined the basic principles
they stand for. Whatever may have been the standard for civil liability, the
original draft of the Act, S. 3580, merely proposed a more permissive standard
for criminal purposes. There is no indication in the legislative history that the
Act was intended to dilute the civil remedies available for directorial negligence.
It should still be true that investment company directors ought be held to the
civil standard of bank directors under state law, and that this should serve as a
source of law from which the duties imposed by section 36 can be ascertained.
One commentator has dissented from this view, insisting that the higher
standards of fiduciary duty should not be applied to investment company directors, but his treatment is superficial and his authority quite weak." "9
1315 292 Mass. 148, 197 N.E. 628 (1935).
, 197 N.E. at 630.
1316 Id. at 1317 163 Va. 908, 177 S.E. 852 (1935).
, 177 S.E. at 860.
1318 Id. at 1319 The commentator is Jaretzki, who, in a footnote, contended:
It has been said that a more stringent rule is applicable to directors of banks
and trust companies . . . but even if this is so, there is no logical basis for extending
this more rigorous standard to investment company directors. Investment companies
are organized as ordinary business corporations or business trusts, not under such
special statutory provisions as those which pertain to other types of financial institutions, and, as the Massachusetts court has stated, they involve none of the special
incidents peculiar to banks. Spiegel v. Beacon Participations, Inc., 297 Mass. 398,
410-11, 8 N.E.2d 895, 904 (1937) . . . ; Acampora v. Birkland, 220 F. Supp. 527,
550 (D. Colo. 1963) . . . . In so far as the Investment Company Act is concerned,
the only references to liabilities of directors of mutual funds are contained in § 36,

relating to "gross misconduct, or gross abuse of trust," and § 17(h), which prohibits
indemnification or exculpation for "wilful misfeasance, bad faith, gross negligence, or

reckless disregard of the duties involved in the conduct of his office." jaretzki,
LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 777,
780 n.10 (1964).
The authority of Spiegel is unpersuasive, resting as it does on a single dubious sentence in
that opinion: "It [the defendant corporation) involved none of the special incidents attaching
, 8
to banking corporations." Spiegel v. Beacon Participations, Inc., 297 Mass. 398, -

Duties and Responsibilities of Directors of Mutual Funds, 29
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The impact of Goodwin and O'Connor does not, of course, obviate the
necessity of proving "gross" negligence in order to establish a violation of section
36.1320 Rather, it is to recognize that "gross negligence" in the management of
an investment company may involve abuses less flagrant than gross negligence in

N.E.2d 895, 904 (1937).
This is a strange observation. Further, Jaretzki's citation of
Acampora is similarly unimpressive. That case merely stated that the, applicable standard
is "gross negligence," a proposition which, in the context of section 36, does not invite
dispute. Acampora, however, goes slightly further than Jaretzki indicates, for the court was
quick to add
that occupancy of the position of director of a mutual fund is not all fringe benefits,
so to speak. These non-affiliated directors have a demanding mission and that is
the protection of the assets of Fund and the shareholders. . . . [T]hey are obligated
to scrutinize the acts and doings of the adviser with great care. Acampora v.
Birkland, 220 F. Supp. 527, 550 (D. Colo. 1963).
As to Jaretzki's "law of incorporation" approach, two highly respected commentators have
observed:
Mr. Jaretzki's distinction between corporations organized under general corporation laws and those organized under "special statutory provisions" is also unpersuasive. First, the very reasons why banks, trust companies, and other financial
institutions are treated separately under the law is that their assets are of a highly
liquid nature-cash and securities-and the creditors or customers (or depositors)
they deal with are generally not financially sophisticated. All of these factors are
present with respect to the operations of a mutual fund. From this standpoint, it
is irrelevant that mutual funds may be organized as "ordinary business corporations
or business trusts." Second, the mere fact that banks and certain other financial
institutions are organized under "special statutory provisions" only indicates that
Congress (in the case of national banks) and the state legislatures (in the case of
state banks and many other financial companies) were vitally concerned with
protecting the interests of the public from those charged with the custody and
supervision of their money and property. Similarly, mutual funds are also very much
subject to "special statutory provisions." While they are initially organized under
state law, mutual funds could not function as such unless registered under the Act.
Furthermore, their shares must be registered under the Securities Act. An enterprise
could not properly be regarded as "organized" as a mutual fund in the absence of
compliance with these special statutory provisions.
The passage of the Investment Company Act in 1940 and its legislative history
clearly demonstrate that investment companies are not to be treated as ordinary
business corporations, but . . . require special federal regulation and treatment.
Eisenberg & Lehr, supra note 1194, at 191-92.
1320 Proposed amendments to the Investment Company Act would have the very salutary
effect of doing precisely this. In substance, the amendments would delete from section 36
the words gross and guilty (vestiges of the section's nativity as a criminal provision), and
would also authorize more flexible remedies than the injunction now mandatory in case of a
violation. Any appropriate remedy would be permitted.
The two bills now pending before Congress that would have this effect are S. 34 and
S. 296. There is, however, a slight difference between them which should be noted. S. 34
authorizes relief against any breach or prospective breach of fiduciary duty "involving personal
misconduct." S. 34, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 20 (1969). S. 296, identical in this respect to
S. 1659, H.R. 9510 and H.R. 9511, contains no such qualification. Speaking of this limitation,
the committee report on S. 3724, a bill identical to S. 34, said:
[Y]our committee does not intend to limit the Commission under this section to
situations where an actual intent to violate the law can be shown or to acts of
affirmative misconduct. In appropriate cases, nonfeasance of duty or abdication of
responsibility would constitute a breach of fiduciary duty involving personal misconduct. S. REP. No. 1351, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 34 (1968). Compare id. with
ANALYSIS OF S. 34, at 22.
The qualification does not appear to alter in any way the conduct that would be actionable
under section 36 so long as a natural person is involved. Its only raison d'gtre is apparently
to assure that section 36 is applied only to individuals, thus exempting companies which act
as advisors or underwriters. This is an unnecessary loophole. Since advisors are fiduciaries,
whether they are corporate or otherwise, and since they are entirely capable of breaching
their duties through the agency of their officers (e.g., churning a fund's portfolio or appropriating for their own treasuries opportunities which belong to the fund), there would seem to
be no justification for the exemption. In this respect S. 296 is the superior bill.
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the management of an ordinary business corporation. In the leading case of

Hun v. Cary,'121 Judge Earle addressed the issue:
It is impossible to give the measure of culpable negligence for all
cases, as the degree of care required depends upon the subjects to which it
is to be applied .... What would be slight neglect in the care of a quantity

of iron might be gross neglect in the care of a jewel. What would be slight
neglect in the care exercised in the affairs of a turnpike corporation, or
even of a manufacturing corporation, might be gross neglect in the care
exercised in the management of a savings bank intrusted with the savings
of a multitude of poor people .... 1322

Although the court used terms which referred to a shifting standard of care,
it is clear that the real shift was a shift in the standard of duty, for at a later point
Judge Earle observed that "[G]ross negligence . . .has been defined to mean
3 23
the absence of ordinary care and diligence adequate to the particularcase."'
(Emphasis added.)
It would appear, then, that section 36 holds considerable potential for
checks on management compensation. The legislative history, the precedent of
BarChris and the reasoning of O'Connor and Goodwin all demonstrate that a
breach of section 36, especially on the part of the unaffiliated directors, may occur
well before there is a waste of corporate assets. The SEC itself seems quite
aware of this potential. In its amicus brief to the court of appeals in Brown v.
Bullock, the Commission stated:
Directors, of course, owe a duty not only to refrain from profiteering
from the corporation, but also to save the corporation from loss. Indeed,
directors of banks, trust companies and other "companies which solicit the
handling and investment of the funds of others" are held to "a higher
degree of wisdom, prudence and good judgment than directors of ordinary
business corporation [sic]. 1"

24

(Footnotes omitted.)

At another point in that brief, the SEC points out "that while the Act does not
undertake to regulate management fees, it does not follow that there cannot be
1321 82 N.Y. 65 (1880).
1322 Id. at 71.
1323 Id. at 72.
1324 Brief for SEC as Amicus Curiae at 33, Brown v. Bullock, 294 F.2d 415 (2d Cir.
1961). The Commission's brief here quotes H. BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS § 63a, at 161
(rev. ed. 1946). The ellipsis, however, should be explained. The full quotation from
Ballantine reads:
Directors of savings banks, trust companies, life insurance companies and companies
which solicit the handling and investment of the funds of others, are by some
courts declared responsible for a higher degree of wisdom, prudence and good
judgment than directors in ordinary business corporations. It is doubtful, however,
whether more is actually required than giving reasonable attention to the business,
making proper inquiries upon the matter in hand, and exercising an honest judgment
upon the information available, unless improvidence goes to the point of wilful or
negligent waste.
Apparently attorneys for the SEC thought that their argument would be diluted by the
inclusion of the full quotation, and a superficial reading might lead to this conclusion. On
closer inspection, however, the negligence standard advocated by Professor Ballantine is not
inimical to the SEC's thesis, since the man of ordinary prudence would be expected to meet
a higher standard of duty in the management of a financial institution than in the management of other affairs. Ballantine, in short, speaks of a constant standard of care-the reasonable man-but applies it to a situation demanding a higher standard of duty.
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a gross abuse of trust with respect to fees."' 32 In its Public Policy Statement,
the Commission acknowledged that "the duty of investment company managers
to deal fairly with companies they serve is a basic fiduciary obligation" 26 (emphasis added); that "section 1 (b), the preamble to the Act, 'in effect codifies
the fiduciary obligations placed upon officers and directors of investment companies' 1327; that section 1(b) (2) recognizes the impact on the national interest " 'when investment companies are.. . operated... in the interest of directors, officers, investment advisors' """; and that "section 36 should be broadly
construed so as to effectuate the remedial purposes of the Act."'" 29 Having
advocated in Brown that the absence of express management compensation controls should not dilute the standards of section 36, the Commission in its 1966
Statement laments the fact that the Act "places no express limits on the amount
of such compensation," which, the SEC maintains, renders section 36 "unclear
and inappropriate"'" 3 " as a legal tool in the supervision of directorial duty with
respect to management fees. There appears to be a measure of ambivalence in
the Commission's position(s). This the Commission seeks to dismiss by saying:
[T]he very harshness of the sanction provided for in that section [36] impairs its usefulness in modifying advisory fee rates commonly charged in
the industry.... Pending consideration by the Commission and Congress
of more appropriate means for achieving more adequate controls over investment company management compensation, the Commission has been
reluctant to stigmatize advisers[1331l with charges of "gross abuse of
trust" .

. ..1

This has been an unfortunate position. First, the advisory organization is
not the only fiduciary subject to a section 36 injunction; the provision by its
very terms is equally applicable to individual directors or officers of the fund.
Second, it is difficult to reconcile the Commission's characterization of the section
36 remedy as unduly "harsh" with the Commission's original view that any
"gross abuse of trust" should invoke a criminal sanction. 3 Third, and perhaps
1325 Brief for SEC as Amicus Curiae at 42 n.61, Brown v. Bullock, 294 F.2d 415 (2d Cir.
1961).
1326 PUBLIC POLICY STATEMENT 142.
1327 Id., quoting Aldred Inv. Trust v. SEC, 151 F.2d 254, 260 (1st Cir. 1945), cert.
denied, 326 U.S. 795 '(1946).

1328

PUBLIC POLICY STATEMENT

142 n.191.

1329 Id. at 143.
1330 Id. at 142-43.
1331 The Commission's motives are possibly not so altruistic as all this. More likely the
SEC's "reluctance" is at least partly attributable to a pair of judicial rebuffs, the sting of which
has not fully subsided. SEC v. Insurance Sec., Inc., 146 F. Supp. 778 (N.D. Cal. 1956),
afJ'd, 254 F.2d 642 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 823 (1958); SEC v. Midwest Technical Dev. Corp., [1961-64 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. % 91,252 (D. Minn.
1963). For a more detailed treatment of the Insurance Securities case, see text accompanying

notes 1402 et seq. infra.

1332 PUBLIC POLICY STATEMENT 143.
1333 As Mr. Schenker put it: "[W]e took the broader approach and said that if [a person]
was guilty of gross misconduct or gross abuse of trust, then he was guilty of a crime." 1940
Senate Hearings 262.
Whatever may be the ultimate reason for the Commission's reluctance to invoke section
36 except in the most heinous cases, there is evidence of a judicial hesitancy to impose the
rigid sanction of that provision. In SEC v.Midwest Technical Des. Corp., [1961-64 Transfer
Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 1 91,252 (D. Minn. 1963), a case involving improper investments in portfolio companies by directors of a closed-end, the court opined:
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most important, the Commission's failure to attempt any regulation of management compensation may have played a key role in the defeat of legislation recommended to the Ninetieth Congress. Had the SEC brought a section 36 action
for excessive fees and failed, its argument that section 36 "impairs rather than
strengthens the fiduciary obligation of investment company managers to refrain
from compensating themselves unfairly" 33 ' might have been more convincing.
7. Proposed Legislation
a. SEC Recommendations
Shareholder ratification of management contracts, which incumbents are
able to obtain almost pro forma, will, under retrogressing state law, require
the minority shareholder to show a waste of corporate assets - a burden tantamount to prosecuting a criminal conversion under section 37 of the Act. Clearly,
this standard is far too permissive, condoning, as it does, management's ability
to exclusively reap the gains from economies of scale. And while section 36
articulates a standard somewhat less stringent than this, even that section may
permit the payment of unreasonably large management fees. Plainly, in light
of the developing law, legislative action is imperative if there is to be any meaningful limitation on the ability of investment company fiduciaries to compensate
themselves.
To this end, the SEC recommended in its 1966 Statement 35 that the Investment Company Act be amended:
(1) to require that advisory fees be "reasonable" in light of all
relevant considerations;
(2)
to vitiate any effect of shareholder or non-affiliate director
ratification on the applicability of the reasonableness standard;
(3)
to permit the SEC to bring an action to enforce this standard or to intervene in a private action to enforce it.
Presently pending before Congress are two similar bills, S. 34 and S. 296,
designed to implement the Commission's recommendations 3 36 and to attenuate
some of the related conflicts of interest inherent in management compensation.
The central provision of the bills, for present purposes, provides a mechanism
for obtaining judicial scrutiny of the reasonableness of management compensaHowever, an adjudication of gross abuse of trust must be based on evidence that a
director is so untrustworthy that he should not be permitted to act in that capacity
for any other company. The Court would not be justified in painting these directors
with a broad brush of malfeasance and stigmatize them with a finding of gross misconduct and gross abuse of trust. Id. at 94,146.
Regardless of the correctness of the court's interpretation of section 36 and the ultimate
desirability of a strict sanction, the inflexibility of the mandatory remedy does seem to impair
the usefulness of the provision because of judicial reluctance.
1334 PUBLIC POLICY STATEMENT 143.

1335

Id. at 143-47.

1336 See North, A Brief History of Federal Investment Company Legislation, 44 NoaR
DAME LAWYER 677, 692-96 (1969).
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tion." 7 While the reasonableness standard is not altered by the act of directorial
' 38
approval, the judgment of the directors must be given "substantial weight,"
while shareholder ratification is to be given "such consideration as is . . . appropriate under all the circumstances.': 3 3 1 If both the shareholders and a majority

of the disinterested directors approve management compensation, however, there
is a rebuttable presumption of reasonableness." 4
The amendment on its face seems innocuous enough; in fact it could be
an extremely potent check on excessive management fees, as the industry recognizes. Objection has been both vociferous and voluminous, if not especially
persuasive.
First, it is said that the amendment would be a litigation breeder, encouraging strike suits and continuously requiring management to undertake costly legal
1337

S. 34, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 8 (1969); S. 296 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 8 (1969); see
OF S. 34, at 37-39.
1338 There was considerable concern in the industry that no weight would be attached to
the determination of the directors. E.g., testimony of J. Welch on behalf of the Investment
Company Institute, 1967 Senate Hearings 197.
1339 Under the existing law of section 15(c), shareholder ratification may be substituted
for the consideration and approval of unaffiliated directors, a practice which Professor Folk has
characterized as "a convenient northwest passage around the existing statutory requirement of
approval by . . . [the] non-affiliated directors." 1967 Senate Hearings 1006; 1967 House Hearings 806. The pending legislation would preclude this use of the proxy and require independent
scrutiny of management contracts by the disinterested directors. S. 34, 91st Cong., 1st Sess.
§ 8(c) (1969); S. 296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 8(c) (1969).
1340 S. 1659 and its companion bills in the House required that any party seeking a court
determination of unreasonableness sustain the burden of proof on the issue. S. 1659, 90th
Cong., 1st Sess. § 8(d) (1967); H.R. 9510, H.R. 9511, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. § 8(d) (1967).
This language does not appear in S. 3724 or the presently pending legislation, but the requirement would remain the same. S. RaP. No. 1351, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1968); ANALYSIS
OF S. 34, at 7.
One authority is outspoken in his opinion that the burden should be upon the fiduciary
to prove reasonableness. He argues that, (1) the advisor has access to the facts, which are
matters internal to the advisory organization and bear on economies of scale, total brokerage
and fees received, etc. The information is contained in the books of the advisor, to which the
fund shareholder does not have access or inspection rights. The evidentiary burden on the
plaintiff, it is concluded, would be extremely onerous and "would all but nullify the effect
of the federal reasonableness standard." (2) The law should always place the burden of
justification on the self-dealing fiduciary in order to provide an additional prophylaxis and
an incentive to integrity. Statement of E. L. Folk, 1967 Senate Hearings 1003-04; 1967 House
Hearings 803-04.
Former Commissioner Cohen replied that:
The Commission recognizes that H.R. 9510 would not go as far as many courts
have gone in enforcing the fiduciary obligations of those who manage other people's
money and it would not object to a change in the Bill to implement Professor Folk's
suggestion. 1967 House Hearings 738.
There may be considerable merit to Professor Folk's argument, but its flaws should also be
noted. First, the Federal Rules already permit liberal discovery under rule 34, and under the
pending bills the federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction in section 15(d) actions. (In fairness to Professor Folk, it should be noted that the original bills on which he testified did not
embody this feature.) Secondly, the distinction between the "risk of non-persuasion" and the
"burden of going forward with the evidence" should be observed. While the risk of nonpersuasion would remain on the plaintiff in a section 15(d) action, the fact that relevant
evidence is in the possession of the defendants would often require the defendants to go
forward with the evidence. United States v. Hayes, 369 F.2d 671 (9th Cir. 1966); Fleming
v. Harrison, 162 F.2d 789 (8th Cir. 1947); Zeeman v. United States, 275 F. Supp. 235
(S.D.N.Y. 1967), modified, 395 F.2d 861 (2d Cir. 1968); Gomes v. Eastern Gas & Fuel
Associates, 127 F. Supp. 435 (D. Mass. 1954); Midwest Transfer Co. v. Preferred Accident
Ins. Co., 342 Ill. App. 231, 96 N.E.2d 228 (Ct. App. 1951). This rule, however, is neither
universal nor unqualified. E.g., Tortora v. General Motors Corp., 373 Mich. 563, 130 N.W.2d
21 (1964). Thirdly, Professor Folk's suggestion is vulnerable to a "strike suit" argument, far
more so, at least, than the pending bills.
ANALYSIS
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defenses. 341 Closely allied to this allegation is the contention that a reasonableness requirement enforceable in the courts would be tantamount to governmental
"rate regulation" since the
SEC could, as a practical matter, force fee reductions
3 42
at will by threat of suit.
There is very little substance to these objections. As to strike suits, it should
be recognized that private litigation may be of two genera: justified lawsuits and
groundless lawsuits. The justified lawsuits, be they derivative or representative,
serve a useful legal function in the policing of complex modem corporations. As
the Supreme Court observed in an oft-cited passage, "[p]rivate enforcement...
provides a necessary supplement to Commission action,"'3 4 3 especially in view
of the limited resources in time and money at the Commission's disposal. 44 More
important, it is no valid objection to say that private litigants will seek to protect
the rights secured to them by law. 4" Further, the proposed bills are careful to
allow a full year's indulgence before suit may be brought under the new section
15(d),'3 46 and any fund manager who is justifiably apprehensive may be well
advised to bring his fees within reasonable limits 4" before the expiration of that
grace period. Such a move should, if anything, reduce the possibility of a lawsuit. 48 Further, by requiring that a shareholder first make written demand
on the SEC, and then permitting him to sue only if the Commission refuses or

1341 See, e.g., 1967 House Hearings 526.
1342 See, e.g., 1967 House Hearings 241-42, 261, 530; 1967 Senate Hearings 197.
1343 J. 1. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964). See also Surowitz v. Hilton
Hotels, Inc., 383 U.S. 363 (1966), rev'g 342 F.2d 596 (7th Cir. 1965), where the Court
said: "[D]erivative suits have played a rather important role in protecting shareholders of
corporations from the designing schemes and wiles of insiders who are willing to betray their
company's interests in order to enrich themselves." Id. at 371. To the same effect, see Brown
v. Bullock, 194 F. Supp. 207 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), where the court noted:
A private action by those aggrieved by the misconduct would furnish . . . pragmatically, an additional enforcement sanction....
The possibility of multitudinous strike suits under the Act and the consequent
expansion of federal jurisdiction is a spectre conjured up by defendants. The results
of this court's holding will not be as horrendous as defendants would have it appear.
If the fear of personal liability to the company or stockholders for gross misconduct
or gross abuse of trust induces potential wrongdoers to walk in the paths of rectitude,
the very availability of a private remedy will have served a desirable enforcement
function. Id. at 245-46.
1344 Former Chairman Cohen pointed up the continued validity of this position:
We also believe it is important to retain the concept of a private right of
action. . . . Administrative agencies, and the SEC is among them, are busy with
different things at different times. There are limitations on its manpower. There are
some cases which demand its attention, or there may be other cases that for one
reason or another the Commission is unwilling to initiate. And, therefore, a private
person should not be deprived of a Federal remedy under the standard to be
established by Congress. 1967 House Hearings 145.
1345
[T]he industry is also worried about the small investor suing. We don't think
that the courthouse door should be closed to him or that bars such as the standards
of corporate waste should be erected in his path. In fact, the sum and substance of
their argument is they don't want anybody reviewing the situation. Id. at 689-90.
1346 S. 34, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 29 (1969) ; S. 296 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 29 (1969).
1347
[Managers] would be well advised to reduce advisory fees at least to the level
marked out by settlements . . . under existing law. Funds that had not done this,
particularly the large ones, would be the prime targets for private actions. Statement of Henry Friendly, 1967 Senate Hearings 1017. See also 1967 House Hearings 613-14.
1348 Such a reduction was considered favorably by the court in Meiselman v. Eberstadt,
39 Del. Ch. 563, , 170 A.2d 720, 723 (Ch. 1961).
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fails to act1 3 within
six months, the danger of groundless suits is considerably
49
diminished.
As to the allegation that the proposals would practically vest rate-making
power in the SEC, there appears to be no basis in fact or law for the charge.
Certainly the Commission will have a public duty to discharge its trust when
a fee is, in fact, beyond the pale of reasonable toleration. 15 0 But this is not to
say that the Commission's judgment will be substituted for the business judgment
of directors or that the Commission will attempt iron-handed rate fixing by
resorting to the threat of litigation. Unlike H.R. 9510, H.R. 9511, and S. 1659,
the pending bills explicitly require that (1) any determination of reasonableness
by uninterested directors must be given "substantial weight" in a court's deliberation, and (2) if the investment company's board of directors determines in the
exercise of "due care" that a fee is reasonable, no recovery may be had. "Due
care" is defined in the bills as "the standard of care required of a prudent person
35
in the management of his own property or affairs.'21 1
In requiring this measure of diligence from investment company directors,
these amendments are breaking no new legal ground. In the words of Justice
Cardozo: "The . . . director of a corporation, should [take] the same care of
352
its property that men of average prudence take of their own property.'
Especially is this true in monetary or investment corporations. As was said in
the leading case of Hun v. Cary:
When one deposits money in a savings bank, or takes stock in a corporation,

thus divesting himself of the immediate control of his property, he expects,
and has the right to expect, that the trustees or directors, who are chosen
to take his place in the management and control of his property, will exercise
ordinary care and prudence in the trusts committed to them - the same
degree of care and prudence that men prompted by self-interest generally
exercise in their own affairs1353 (Emphasis added.)
1349

S. 34, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 8(d) (1969); S. 296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 8(d)

(1969). The committee report on S. 3724, a bill identical to the pending bills in this
particular, states that "[als a practical matter, this provision should have the effect of deterring
the initiation of frivolous actions." S. REP. No. 1351, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1968). The
requirement for shareholder demand on the SEC was not contained in the original bills in
the Ninetieth Congress.
Parenthetically, it is worth observing that the original 1940 bill, S. 3580, contained a
section 33 which would have given the courts the benefit of an advisory report from the SEC
in civil cases proceeding to settlement. S. 3580, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. § 33 (1940). This
measure was designed to cope with some of the problems of "strike suit" litigation by assuring
fair settlements. Testimony of Robert Healy, 1940 Senate Hearings 937-39. The provision
did not survive except as a means of furnishing research data to the Commission. Investment
Company Act of 1940 § 33, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-32 (1964). See 1940 Senate Hearings 1120.
1350 Former Chairman Cohen, testifying before the Senate committee, said: "We will
have authority [to act where management compensation is excessive], and therefore when
we have authority, we have an obligation to do our duty." 1967 Senate Hearings 64.
1351 S. 34, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 8(d) (1969); S. 296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 8(d)
(1969).
1352 General Rubber Co. v. Benedict, 215 N.Y. 18, 23, 109 N.E. 96, 97 '(1915), followed
in Clayton v. Farish, 191 Misc. 136, 73 N.Y.S.2d 727 (Sup. Ct. 1947). See also San Leandro

Canning Co. v. Perillo, 84 Cal. App. 627, 258 P. 666 (Dist. Ct. App. 1927); Nechis v.
Gramatan Gardens, Inc., 35 Misc. 2d 949, 231 N.Y.S.2d 383 (Sup. Ct. 1962); Gilbert v.
Burnside,

-

Misc. 2d -

, 197 N.Y.S.2d 623 (Sup. Ct. 1959), rev'd on other grounds,

13 App. Div. 2d 982, 216 N.Y.S.2d 430 (1961), aff'd, 11 N.Y.2d 960, 229 N.Y.S.2d 10, 183
N.E.2d 325 (1962). There is admittedly a conflict among the courts on this point. 3 W.
FLETCHER, supra note 1184, § 1036.
1353 82 N.Y. 65, 71 '(1880).
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Or, in the words of Chief Justice Parker of the New York Court of Appeals, "the
law is settled in this state that directors of monetary corporations are held to the
same degree of care that men of ordinary prudence exercise in regard to their
' 4
own affairs."" 5
Nor is the proposed standard of care an entirely new innovation even in
the investment company field., Precisely these same men- directors, underwriters, and often the advisor as well 1 355 - are already held to this very standard
of care with respect to civil liabilities arising from materially misleading registra35 6
tion statements.
Far from substituting the business judgment of the Commission or the
courts13 7 for that of the directors, the proposed amendment would hold inviolate
the determination of the board acting with due care."3 8' Moreover, the proposed
bills facilitate the task of the directors by assuring that they are furnished the
information essential to the discharge of their duties. Specifically, the bills would
require that advisory contracts "precisely and separately" describe compensation
to be paid for investment advice on the one hand and non-advisory services on
the other."35" Furthermore, the bills would place upon the advisor the duty to
furnish information relevant to a board consideration of fee levels, and would
place upon the investment company directors a corresponding duty to request
1354 Hanna v. Lyon, 179 N.Y. 108, 71 N.E. 778 (Ct. App. 1904). Accord, e.g., Burckhart
v. Northern Nat'l- Bank, 38 F.2d 568 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 281 U.S. 764 (1930);
Kavanaugh v. Gould, 223 N.Y. 103, 119 N.E. 237 (Ct. App. 1918); Cassidy v. Uhlmann,
170 N.Y. 505, 63 N.E. 554 (Ct. App. 1902); Winter v. Anderson, 242 App. Div. 430, 275
N.Y.S. 373 (1934); Gallin v. National City Bank, 155 Misc. 880, 281 N.Y.S. 795 (Sup. Ct.
1935); Goodwin v. Simpson, 292 Mass. 148, 197 N.E. 628 (Super. Ct. 1935); Trembert v.
Mott, 271 Mich. 683, 261 N.W. 109 (1935).
1355 Where the advisor is an individual sitting on the board of directors of the investment
company, liability under the Securities Act is automatic by reason of the directorship. Where
the advisor is a corporation, members of whose own board are interlocked with the board
of the investment company, or members of which act as principal officers of the investment
company, liability 'of the advisory corporation will depend on its position of control.
Securities Act of 1933 § 15, 15 U.S.C. § 77o (1964). Control for this purpose is defined in
17 C.F.R. § 230.405 (1968), and is a question of fact to be determined upon the circumstances of the case. Stadia Oil & Uranium Co. v. Wheelis, 251 F.2d 269 (10th Cir. 1957).
1356 Securities Act of 1933 § 11(c), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(c) (1964).
1357 The industry objected to the 1967 bills on the ground that by leaving the determination of reasonableness to the courts, 'the judge would be, in effect, a "'superdirector' charged
with substituting his own judgment for the business judgment of the directors .. . ." Statement
of John Haire on behalf of the Investment Company Institute, 1967 House Hearings 242.
The committee report on S. 3724, however, was careful to point out that "[tihe section is in
no way intended to shift the responsibility for managing a corporate enterprise in the best
interests of its shareholders from the directors of a corporation to the judiciary." S. REP. No.
1351, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1968). See ANALYSIS OF S.34, at 7.
1358 The pending bills, in this respect, recognize the directorial function more explicitly
than did bills such as S.1659. Cf. SENATE COMAi.ON BANKING AND CURRENCY, 90TH CONG.,
IST SEss., ANALYSIS OF S.

1659, at 11 (Comm. Print 1967). Under section 8(d) of S.1659,

H.R 9510, and H.R. 9511, a directorial determination of reasonableness would probably
have had some effect:
[I]fthe directors really exercise a business judgment, if they do more than act
as rubber stamps, if some of them change their views as to their responsibilities and
do more than go through the rituals and feel that they do have an obligation to
inquire and to seek justification, and they make a conscientious effort to arrive at a
reasonable fee, taldng into account all relevant factors, . . . and not merely rely
on what the fellow down the street has been charging last year, I am certain, as
I know all of you who have had any experience with the courts, whether as lawyers
or as clients, must be, that the court would give appropriate weight to their judgment. Testimony of Manuel Cohen, 1967 House Hearings 689.
1359 S. 34, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 8(a) 1969; S. 296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 8(a) (1969).
The 1967 bills, S. 1659, H.R. 9510, and H.R. 9511 contained the same requirement.
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and evaluate such information.: 6 ° This certainly seems to be a salutary requirement in view of the advisor's control of pertinent records and data, and
the very inclusion of such measures serves to emphasize that the bills place the
primary responsibility for reasonableness within the informed judgment of investment company directors, not the SEC.
Finally, it may not be presumed that the Commission will abuse its power
to litigate. The testimony of former Chairman Cohen reflects an honest, if
restrained, indignation at the industry's aspersion of the SEC's integrity:
It is in effect contended that we will engage in a sort of ratemaking by blackmail. I hope you will understand that I rather resent the suggestion. There
is a suggestion made explicitly or sometimes implicitly that we will do
something that we will of course not do. We will not require our opinions
or the opinions of our staff about fees to be set forth in registration statements or prospectuses. We will not, we never have and we have been
regulators and policemen for some 30-odd years now. We will not threaten
suits unless we conclude that a suit is necessary to accomplish a statutory
purpose, and that we have a case which we reasonably believe will persuade a Federal judge.
.. .[T]his Commission has never, and never will in my opinion, engage

in this sort of blackmail which has been suggested." 16

The industry's second major objection to the proposal is that the standard
of reasonableness is vague and unworkable." 62 The original 1967 proposals contained statutory guidelines as to the factors which were relevant in arriving at
a determination of reasonableness. These included the nature and extent of the
1360 S. 34, 9 1st Cong., 1st Sess. § 8(c) (1969); S. 296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 8(c)
(1969). The 1967 bills were identical in this requirement.
Placing a duty on directors to evaluate the information furnished is not an exercise in
legalistic superfluity. One unaffiliated director, when approached by the advisor and asked
to serve on a fund board, was told "Of course, as a director, you really won't have too much
to do, because I [the advisor] will take care of the S.E.C .....
" 114 CONG. REc. S9495
(daily ed. July 26, 1968). That same director went on to testify, "[T]hen [the advisor] said
that he understood the S.E.C. and what was necessary, and whatever registration was necessary, and that the company would be registered under the S.E.C., and as such would have to
make regular reports to the S.E.C." Id. By this time the director was doubtless convinced
that his responsibilities as a member of the board were purely formal, but he also admitted
that "the thing which made [him] a believer" occurred when the advisor further said "You
have quite a few shares in there, and if you are one of the directors, you can find out what is
going on." Id.
It further appears that some unaffiliated directors are even ignorant of their fund's performance record:
In one fund, whose ten-year performance record was among the poorest of any of
the mutual funds, two of its independent directors claimed that it always "won" in
comparisons with other similar funds and that its performance looked good in relation to that of other funds. Another director of the same fund "not only recommended that the (advisory fee) contract be formally approved but also that the
(adviser) be commended for the excellent investment results during the past year,
the high quality of its services and the promise this arrangement offers for the
future." Id.
Such men, one might infer, could be less than completely effective as "watchdogs,"
especially when they are not given the data necessary to enlighten themselves. When asked
whether the board had ever been furnished any financial data in its consideration of the
advisory contract, one director twice repeated his clipped response: "Never." Id. at S9495-96.
1361 1967 House Hearings 689. Judge Friendly testified, "I think we can also be confident
that the SEC will not bring unjustified actions." Id. at 614.
1362 See, e.g., 1967 Senate Hearings 252, 259, 298-99, 835, 863.
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services rendered under the management contract, the quality of the services,
the extent to which economies of scale were reflected in management fees, the
value of all other benefits accruing to the manager (e.g., brokerage), and the
catch-all, "other appropriate and material factors.""' 3 The pending legislation
has altered this format somewhat, and now lists the following factors as pertinent:
(a) the total compensation received from the investment company, (b) the
nature and extent of the services rendered, and (c) all other relevant and material
factors."" 4 Notably absent is a statutory mandate to consider the economies of
scale, performance, and prevailing rates for investment advice in non-fund industries.""' The change in statutory language, while it may make the bills more
palatable to certain representatives of the industry, is purely verbal and should
have no effect on the ultimate interpretation of the reasonableness requirement.
The mandate to consider "such other factors as are relevant and material" should
clearly embrace economies of scale, performance,""6 and analogous rates in other
industries. The committee report on S. 3724, a bill identical to S. 34 now pending, provides valuable legislative history to support this conclusion:
The committee did not attempt by statute to specify all the factors affecting
the reasonableness of advisory contracts. A determination of reasonableness
must depend upon a wide variety of different factors, and it is difficult to
specify all or the most relevant of these factors outside the context of a
specific case. The committee's action is not intended to suggest that the
factors enumerated in S. 1659 as recommended by the Commission would

not be relevant in a particular case but only to emphasize the responsibility
1363 S.1659, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. § 8(d) (1967); H.R. 9510 and H.R. 9511, 90th Cong.,
1st Sess. § 8(d) (1967).
1364 S. 34, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 8(d) (1969); S. 296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 8(d)
(1969).
1365 See PUBLIC POLICY STATEMENT 145.
1366 The literature on fund performance, or lack of it, is voluminous and will not be
catalogued here. Industry representatives, delighting in multi-colored charts and graphs,
tirelessly expound the advantages of fund investing. E.g., 1967 Senate Hearings 281-93.
Critics point out that the funds, on balance, do no better than a portfolio of common stocks
selected by lofting darts at the Wall Street Journal. (The famous experiment of Senator
McIntyre is reported in 1967 Senate Hearings 803-07. A replica of the original dart, rendered

in sterling and mounted on marble, graces the Senator's mantel.) Professor Wallich, perhaps
the most outspoken of the critics, adamantly maintains "that the true value of investment
advice is on average virtually zero," which conclusion he bases on "the random walk hypothesis" of market analysis.

1967 Senate Hearings 1060-63.

See 1967 House Hearings 582-85,

589-90, 592-93. See also testimony of Paul Samuelson, 1967 Senate Hearings 452-53; Edelstein, People Aren't Random, TuE INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, Dec. 1967, at 41, reporting the
results of a comparison between 1000 computer-selected, random portfolios and the performance of various classes of funds. Having found that the computer in random mode did as
well as the professional advisors, the rest of the article attempts to explain away the obviously
unanticipated results.
However the performance controversy is resolved-and there is no reason to suppose it will
ever be resolved as long as investment managers exist and publish-the smoke it generates
should not be permitted to obscure the fundamental legal issues. The pending legislation, like
the legislative proposals defeated in the Ninetieth Congress, seeks to remedy certain deficiencies in
the developing law of fiduciary duty as it relates to investment companies. The desirability of
an enforceable requirement that fees be reasonable, or that directors and officers observe minimum standards of faithfulness, is a legal, not an economic issue. If an advisor wishes to
defend his fee by reference to his performance, he should "tell it to the judge," and the bills
are careful to permit this.
It is very unfortunate that the industry was able to fog the legal questions in legislative
hearings during the Ninetieth Congress by extensive debate on "performance." If this factor
contributed to the defeat of legislation in 1967, it is regrettable and care should be taken to
prevent a recurrence of history.
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of the courts to determine the reasonableness of advisory fees and other
management compensation in the light of all relevant factors. Thus, in
passing on the reasonableness of the management fee, the court will consider all services rendered to the fund or its shareholders and payments
received by the management company and its affiliates whether in its
capacity as investment adviser, principal underwriter, or otherwise.'13 6

(Emphasis added.)
As to the vagueness which inheres in the word reasonable, it has been said
in another context that " 'an attempt to give a specific meaning to the word
"reasonable" is trying to count what is not number, and measure what is not
space.' "1368 However this may be, the common law has dealt comfortably with
the term for centuries. Whole bodies of jurisprudence have been built around its
usage in various contexts, as for example, "reasonable doubt," "reasonable value,"
"reasonable care," "reasonable cause," "reasonable notice," "reasonable time,"
and "reasonable rate of return." With respect to attorneys' fees, where a multitude of factors may affect a judgment as to reasonableness, the common law
has responded with a large body of precedent. Statutes, insurance policies, leases,
and contracts very often require a determination of a "reasonable attorney's fee,"
and the courts have not despaired. "69 A law professor, speaking of the reasonableness test for management fees, observed:
Despite some attack upon the supposed vagueness of the "reasonableness" standard, the test is as precise as it is possible in an area requiring
fact determinations in particular cases .... Thus, the general standard is
the only conceivable one which could do justice to all situations covered
by it.1370

Perhaps the most pertinent testimony, however, was that of Judge Friendly, who
1367 S. REP. No. 1351, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 5, 13 (1968).
1368 Altshuler v. Coburn, 38 Neb. 881, -,
57 N.W. 836, 838 (1894).
1369 Among the factors which a court must juggle in fixing a "reasonable" attorney's fee
are the difficulty or novelty of the questions, the time devoted to the matter, the value of
opportunity lost for other employment, the attorney's professional ability and reputation, the
amount in controversy, the benefits received by the client and relative success of the action,
the client's ability to pay, custom in the jurisdiction, current price trends and the cost of
living, as well as the attorney's overhead. See the voluminous collection of authority in Annot.,
143 A.L.R. 672 (1943); Annot., 56 A.L.R. 2d 13 (1957).
The important role of the judiciary in relation to legal fees paid in the course of corporate
litigation was underscored in a most amusing exchange during the 1967 legislative hearings.
Thinking he was on the offensive, Congressman Keith managed to impale himself on the
"reasonable" attorney's fee:
Mr. KEITH. Back in February, I think it was . . . there was an attorney up
there who bragged about the fact that he received a $500,000 fee in connection with
some case that he had presented.
Mr. JENNINGS. Mr. Pomerantz?
Mr. KEITH. Yes....
Mr. JENNINGS. Well, you know that
Mr. KEITH. I mean certainly that would seem to me to be extraordinary compensation to get, if you followed your philosophy ....
Mr. JENNINGS. Well. in connection with fees Mr. KEITH. Do you believe a court would have held that fee was reasonable?
Mr. JENNINGS. Well, not only that. The court passed upon that fee.
Mr. KEITH. It did really? [!]
Mr. JENNINGS. In all derivative suit litigation, the court has to approve the
reasonableness of the fee, based upon the recovery and based upon the services ....
1967 House Hearings 644. See also 1967 Senate Hearings 698.
1370 Testimony of Ernest Folk, 1967 Senate Hearings 1003; 1967 House Hearings 803.
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made it pellucidly clear that a reasonableness standard is well within the comprehension and ability of the courts to administer. His remarks merit extended
quotation:
I perceive no reason why the courts could not effectively administer section
15 (d) if Congress should decide that it wants us to do so.
The question whether charges or other business practices are reasonable is not a new question for courts at all. Long before the Interstate Commerce Commission, the first Federal regulatory commission, was created in
1887, courts were deciding about overcharges by railroads and other carriers ....

In addition to that jurisdiction over public utility rates, courts frequently have to pass on questions of business reasonableness when a corporate acquisition or merger is attacked as unfair to one party or the other.'
Still another instance where courts have to deal with the question of reasonable value comes from the Constitution itself. I refer, of course, to the provisions of the fifth amendment that private property shall not be taken for
public use without just compensation. And the problems that we sometimes encounter in fixing a fair price for a large condemnation, particularly where the property is not of the kind that is freely bought and sold,
seem to me at least as hard as the task that is here proposed.
Another very well known area where courts pass on the reasonableness
of business practices without aid of any previous administrative determination is in suits by the United States or by private plaintiffs relating to acts
that are alleged to constitute unreasonable restraints of trade.
There are many instances in which courts now have to decide, and
for a long time have had to decide, what constitutes reasonable compensation for personal services. One instance is their role in passing on the
fairness of arrangements between a fiduciary and his beneficiaries, a standard
of fairness that might 'well apply to this very problem but for the effect
that has been given to the ratification of management contracts by stockholders or unaffiliated directors.
Another instance is where a contract for personal services cannot be
carried out according to its terms .. .and the court then has to step in
and determine the fair value of what has been done.
I should also point out what may be the most relevant of all, namely,
that the courts already have responsibilities as to the size of the fees of
investment advisers. There is a common law liability of directors for waste,
and while a plaintiff who seeks to prevail on that score may have to show
that the fee is not merely unreasonable but unreasonably unreasonable, a
court still has the job of comparing what has been done with what has
been received, just as it would have under section 15 (d).1111
Perhaps the only cogent objection to the "vagueness" of the standard
arises from the multiplicity of courts which might be called upon to enforce it.
As voiced by Mr. Haire, "[g]ranting this power over corporate affairs to thousands of different judges across the country would produce such uncertainty and
inconsistency as to frustrate future planning by mutual fund managements.
1371 Testimony of Henry Friendly, 1967 House Hearings 609-10.
Hearings 1014-15.

See also 1967 Senate
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"1372 Under the original bills of the Ninetieth Congress, this argument had
at least a semblance of plausibility, for state and federal courts would have had
concurrent jurisdiction over section 15 (d) suits. The pending amendments, however, have obviated the problem to a large extent by providing exclusive federal
jurisdiction in all section 15(d) actions." 73 This fairly assures a measure of
uniformity within the circuits, with the Supreme Court able to resolve any
conflicts among appellate courts." 74
In addition, in the pending legislation, the SEC is given an unqualified
right to intervene in a private action under section 15 (d)." 75 This, coupled with
the Commission's option to bring suit sua sponte or on demand of a shareholder,
should also contribute to uniformity in the standards of reasonableness. Certainly
the Commission's participation would be an invaluable aid to the courts in arriving at consistent and workable guidelines. 76 If one of the proposed bills is
enacted, the Commission should vigorously exercise its prerogative and assume an
active role in section 15(d) litigation.

b. Industry Recommendations
The industry's alternatives to a reasonableness rule are thinly veiled attempts
to further insulate themselves from judicial inquiry. The Investment Company
Institute [ICI] recommended amending the Act to:
1372 1967 House Hearings 242.
1373 S. 34, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 8(d) (1969); S. 296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 8(d)
(1969).
1374 There is a possible development in the law which would upset this reasoning. Mr.
Pomerantz, in one of his myriad suits, was, astonishingly, able to convince a federal district
court that plaintiffs in a derivative suit under the Investment Company Act had a seventh
amendment right to trial by jury. Ross v. Bernhard, 275 F. Supp. 569 (S.D.N.Y. 1967),
rev'd, 403 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. granted, 37 U.S.L.W. 3354 (U.S. March 24, 1969)
(No. 992). The court of appeals has reversed this remarkable reading of the seventh amendment, one judge dissenting, but the Supreme Court's granting of certiorari leaves the final
determination of the question as yet uncertain. For our purposes, the impact of the case is on
the uniformity that can be expected in application of the reasonableness standard. It would
seem that this standard, while certainly not beyond the comprehension of a jury, would prove
to involve often sophisticated issues of corporate finance. Should Mr. Pomerantz prevail in
the Supreme Court, he may well expect favorable treatment at the hands of a jury on a claim
founded on section 37 of the Investment Company Act, but the consequences of such a reversal
in the law might render the proposed reasonableness standard subject to the objection that it
would be impossible of uniform application if committed to the vagaries of financially unsophisticated juries. Only once in the trial court and once in the court of appeals was reference made to the ability of a jury to cope with the complexities of a derivative suit. Ross v.
Bernhard, 275 F. Supp. 569, 570 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), rev'd, 403 F.2d 909, 915 (2d Cir. 1968)
(Smith, j. dissenting). Both references are addressed to the simplicity of the instant case,
opining that it is not beyond the ken of the lay jury, but no consideration is given to the more
involved Investment Company Act cases or, for that matter, the many other forms of intricate
derivative suits traditionally tried to the equity judge.
1375 S. 34, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 22 (1969); S. 296, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. § 22 (1969).
The same prerogative was accorded the Commission by the original bills in the Ninetieth Congress. S. 1659, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. § 23 (1967); H.R. 9510 and H.R. 9511, 90th Cong.,
1st Sess. § 23 (1967).
1376 The value of SEC guidance in the complex and somewhat esoteric field of securities
regulation has not been unappreciated by the courts. Blau v. Mission Corp., 212 F.2d 77
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 1016 (1954).
In previous decisions . . . we have been aided by detailed expositions of relevant
factors by the Securities and Exchange Commission as amicus curiae, and we regret
the lack of their aid in this case. Accordingly we proceed with due caution in venturing upon uncharted seas. Id. at 81.
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(1) define a new term, "interested person";
(2) require a majority of disinterested persons on a fund's board
of directors;
(3) require that disinterested persons nominated for positions on
the fund's board of directors be approved by the board, including a
majority of the existing disinterested directors;
(4) change "affiliated" to "interested" in section 15(c) of the Act;
and
(5) assure that existing law on the subject of management compensation not be abrogatedby the amendments.177 (Emphasis added.)
When this "compromise" was, predictably, rejected by the SEC, the Investment Company Institute submitted a second. That proposal would amend
section 15(a) by adding a new paragraph to require that the advisory contract,
(5) as to the compensation payable to the investment adviser,
[be] approved as reasonable in the exercise of business judgment by a
majority of those directors ...who are not interested persons ....
In any action alleging failure to comply with paragraph (5) of this
subsection no person shall be liable unless the court shall find from clear
and convincing evidence that the approval by directors required by said
paragraph (5) was a clear abuse of business judgment. Such actions may be
brought only by the company or a security holder thereof on its behalf and
only in an appropriate District Court of the United States .... No judgment shall be granted against any person other than the recipient of such
compensation unless such other person is found by the court to have acted
in bad faith. 3 75 (Emphasis added.)
Realizing that these proposals were rather transparently toothless, Investors
Diversified Services 3 79 fabricated an alternative which would amend the Act as
follows:
(1) Require that the chief executive officer of the Fund be unaffiliated
with the adviser or underwriter.
(2) At least 80% of all Fund directors to be unaffiliated with the
adviser or underwriter.
(3) The insertion of a provision to insure truly independent directors
along the following lines:
"No person affiliated with, in control of, or affiliated with any person
in control of any adviser or underwriter for any registered investment company, shall ... influence the selection of any unaffiliated director ... and
...shall be ineligible to vote upon the election of any director who is required to be unaffiliated."' a8 0
1377 1967 Senate Hearings 98-99.
1378 Id. at 101. See also 1967 House Hearings 526-37, 623.
1379 The submitted statement was nominally that of the various funds under IDS management, yet the proposals are certainly not antipathetic to the interests of IDS. A single suggestion, contained in item H, is included in the statement as if to suggest that the views
expressed are actually independent of IDS influence. Since that suggestion, however, would
impose only a paper liability on IDS (it is admitted that IDS already does what would be

required) its intended effect is much diluted. 1967 House Hearings 787-88. See 1967 Senate
Hearings 1182-83.
1380

1967 House Hearings 785. See 1967 Senate Hearings 1180.
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The first of these three industry alternatives is the most infirm of all. It has
already been seen that, regardless of their inclinations, fund directors are powerless to bargain effectively over management fees. The extreme dependence of a
fund on its incumbent advisor precludes this. Moreover, it is already current
industry practice to include a majority of unaffiliated directors on a fund's
board,""' and yet the problem of inequitable compensation persists. As one
industry representative admitted, "these outside directors hardly conceive themselves as having a special and personal responsibility to negotiate the terms of a
' 2
management contract at arm's length."13
Under these circumstances, it is
inconceivable that increasing the legal requirement for unaffiliated directors from
forty to fifty per cent would have any effect. Obviously the IDS proposal suffers
the same defects. 83
The Investment Company Institute's second proposal may, on its face, seem
somewhat more demanding than the first, since it requires a finding that the fee
is reasonable. In fact, this alternative is illusory. Not only is it subject to the
same basic infirmity as the first proposal, but in addition it would all but render
advisory contracts judicially unassailable. By requiring that a plaintiff prove
"by clear and convincing evidence" that directorial approval constituted "a clear
abuse of business judgment," the proposal would demand the impossible. This
importation of the business judgment rule has no place in a situation already
fraught with conflicts of interest,""84 and the ICI version of the rule would
absolutely immunize any scheme of management compensation short of open
thievery. Moreover, the ICI alternative would limit the enforceability of even
this totally unrealistic standard by depriving the SEC of access to the judiciary.
D. Sale of Management Control
Professor Paul Samuelson, in testimony before the Senate Banking and
Currency Committee in 1967, described an early encounter with funds and
observed:
I decided that there was only one place to make money in the mutual fund
business - as there is only one place for a temperate man to be in a saloon,
behind the bar and not in front of the bar.
And I invested in ... [a] management company .... 1385
To be sure, the profitability of the managerial function and the perquisites of its stranglehold on the investment companies it advises naturally makes
the advisor's securities, be they publicly or closely held, a rather attractive investment' When actual control of the advisory company is on the auction block,
it may command astronomical prices. As the SEC points out, "the price obtainable for the assets or stock of the adviser-underwriter depends on the ability
1381 WHARTON REPORT 464.
1382 1967 Senate Hearings 867. See 1967 House Hearings 569.
1383 The requirement in the IDS proposal that the fund's chief executive officer be unaffiliated with the advisor of underwriter can add nothing. Perhaps the use of italics was
intended to import substance to the provision.
1384 See note 1234 supra.
1385 1967 Senate Hearings 353. He did exceedingly well. Id.
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of the seller to transfer to
a prospective buyer the benefits derived from its rela36
tionship with the fund."'
In "one of the greatest personal coups ever pulled off on Wall Street," the
celebrated Gerald Tsai, Jr., converted himself "from a mere salaried manager
into a capitalist worth around $30 million" 387 through just such a sale. Tsai,
formerly a manager of Fidelity Capital Fund, had built a fast reputation as a
high-performance manager through extensive public exposure. In 1965 he left
Fidelity to found Manhattan Fund and its advisor, Tsai Management & Research
[TMR]. Tsai, of course, owned ninety per cent of TMR's stock. On the
strength of Tsai's public image, investors flocked to Manhattan Fund and TMR's
advisory fees soared. By May of 1968, TMR was collecting management fees
of $2.5 million (and had taken on three other mutual funds and a closed-end
company as clients). At this point Tsai decided to sell his ninety per cent interest
in TMR to C.N.A. Financial Corporation, an insurance holding company whose
stock is publicly traded over-the-counter. The original deal gave Tsai 650,000
shares of C.N.A. in exchange for his TMR stock, C.N.A. then trading at around
30. By the time C.N.A. shareholders ratified the deal on August 16, 1968, C.N.A.
was up to mid-40's, for a total value to Tsai of nearly $30 million. The book
value of TMR's stock at the time is unavailable since the corporation was closely
held, but Tsai's initial investment in the advisory company was in the neighborhood of $450,000. Assuming TMR's net worth to have been around one-half
million dollars, Tsai had reaped over $29 million for the sale of accession to
388
control.

If, at the time Tsai formed TMR and executed the management contracts
with the funds, he had a provable present intention to cash in his chips by selling
control of TMR at the first opportunity, an interesting question arises. This
intention, being a matter of fact, could give rise to liability if not disclosed in
prospectuses and registration statements under the Securities Act and if its omission would make other matters in the prospectuses or statements misleading.,. 8 .
While analysis of this precise question is beyond the scope of this Survey, other
problems connected with sale of management control are not.
Some of the gross abuses that early accompanied "trafficking" in advisory
contracts and the advisor's stock included, inter alia, acquiring control of an
1386

PUBLIC POLICY STATEMENT 149.
FORTUNE, Oct. 1968, at 207.
1388 Id. The performance of Manhattan Fund through this changeover has not been
spectacular. Using per share net asset value change, adjusted for capital gains (reinvested)
and income dividends (added), we have the following: (1) For calendar 1967, Manhattan
shows +39.4 per cent. FUNDScOPE, Feb. 1969, at 90. '(2) For calendar 1968, Manhattan
shows -9.6
per cent. Id. (Wiesenberger gives this last figure as -6.9
per cent, INVESTMENT COMPANIES 1968 (L. Wessmann ed., Supp. Dec. 31, 1968), but Fundscope again
shows-9.6 per cent at another point. FuNDscoPE, Feb. 1969, at 41.) Its 1968 performance
stigmatizes Manhattan as the poorest of 'the "performance" funds canvassed in Fundscope.
Id. at 46. Of all funds reported in Fundscope, only a single "growth and income" fund,
Teachers Association, did worse. Id. at 45.
Two months after the deal with Tsai was drawn, TMR began operating a new fund, the
T.M.R. Appreciation Fund, Inc. That fund showed a non-performance of -2.76
per cent
through the end of August, 1968. FORTUNE, Oct. 1968, at 207.
There is always a danger, which the law should be vigilant to minimize, that a seller
confronted with an attractive profit may be tempted to overlook the managerial competence
of his purchasers.
1389 Securities Act of 1933 §§ 11-12, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k-771 (1964).

1387
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investment company for resale at a handsome profit, for purposes of dumping
worthless securities, for imposition of oppressive advisory contracts, or for outright looting. 39 ° Perhaps the most celebrated transfer of control case decided
at common law was Insuranshares Corporation v. Northern Fiscal Corporation, 91 where control of an investment company was sold at a premium of about
190 per cent over the market value, and sixty per cent over the book value, of
the shares sold. 92 The purchasers promptly plundered the portfolio, and the
company sued to recover its loss.
Defendants insisted that nothing more than a sale of stock was involved,
any transfer of control being simply an unavoidable concomitant. But the court
observed the premium that the purchasers were willing to pay393 and immediately recognized that this was a payment for succession to control, the transfer
of stock being the mechanism used to eliminate the sellers' interest in the investment company, lest they object to the imminent looting.3 94 In the course of his
opinion, Judge Kirkpatrick articulated the absolute minimum standard to govern
such sale of dominion:
Those who control a corporation, either through majority stock ownership, ownership of large blocks of stock less than a majority, ofllceholding,
management contracts, or otherwise, owe some duty to the corporation in
respect of the transfer of control to outsiders. The law has long ago reached
the point where it is recognized that such persons may not be wholly
oblivious of the interests of everyone but themselves, even in the act of
parting with control ....
[S]tating the duty in minimum terms . .. it may
be said that the owners of control are under a duty not to transfer it to outsiders if the circumstances surrounding the transfer are such as to awaken
suspicion and put a prudent man on his guard -unless a reasonably adequate investigation discloses such facts as would convince a reasonable person that no fraud is intended or likely to result. 3 95 (Emphasis added.)
Insuranshareswas not decided under the Investment Company Act, although
the Act contains provisions designed to curb the "trafficking" in control. 398
Section 15 (a) (4) of the Act provides that an assignment of the advisory con1390 See generally INVESTMENT TRUSTS III 1020-31, 1278-96, 1641-64, 1918-36, 2765-66.
1391 35 F. Supp. 22 (E.D. Pa. 1940). Insuranshares Corporation had been the subject of
considerable discussion in the Investment Trust Study and the 1940 congressional hearings
due to the several changes in control and attendant abuses it had weathered. 1940 Senate
Hearings 53, 71, 73-75, 229, 971; INVESTMENT TRUSTS II 95; INVESTMENT TRUSTS III
438-1201 passim.
1392 Insuranshares Corp. v. Northern Fiscal Corp., 35 F. Supp. 22, 24 (E.D. Pa. 1940).
The stock transferred represented a minority, but was a controlling interest nonetheless. Id. at
28. "[T]he majority, who had bought for investment," the court noted, "could be counted on
to remain inert." Id. at 24.
1393 The sale was actually financed by the investment company itself, for the purchasers
had borrowed the purchase price from third parties, promising to pledge with them as security
portions of the portfolio as soon as control was won. The creditors would then liquidate the
pledged securities from time to time, applying a portion of the proceeds to payment of the
debt and remitting the balance to the investment company. Id. at 25-26. This "bootstrap"
financing of the takeover was a common technique. See, e.g., Gerdes v. Reynolds, 28 N.Y.S.2d
622 (Sup. Ct. 1941).
1394 Insuranshares Corp. v. Northern Fiscal Corp., 35 F. Supp. 22, 24 (B.D. Pa. 1940).
1395 Id. at 25; accord, Gerdes v. Reynolds, 28 N.Y.S.2d 622, 632, 649, 653-54, 658 (Sup.
Ct. 1941).
1396 See SEC Investment Company Act Release No. 354 (May 11, 1942), [1941-44 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP.
75,281 (1942).
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tract terminates it, ..7 while section 2(a) (4) defines assignment to include "any,
direct or indirect transfer... of a contract.., or of a controllinglls o J block of
the [advisor's] outstanding voting securities."" 9 Reinstatement of the contract
1397 Investment Company Act of 1940 § 15(a) (4), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15(a) (4) (1964).
For some administrative applications and explanations of the Act's termination provisions, see,
e.g., Investors Diversified Services, Inc., 30 S.E.C. 273 (1949); Management Associates, 9
S.E.C. 645 (1941); T.I.S. Management Corp.. 10 S.E.C. 695 (1941).
1398 "Control" is defined in the Act and entails certain presumptions:
"Control" means the power to exercise a controlling influence over the management
or with
policies
a company, unless such power is solely the result of an official
position
suchof company.
Any person who owns beneficially, either directly or through one or more controlled companies, more than 25 percentum of the voting securities of a company
shall be presumed to control such company. Any person who does not so own more
than 25 per centum of the voting securities of any company shall be presumed not
to control such company. . . .Any such presumption may be rebutted by evidence,
but except as hereinafter provided, shall continue until a determination to the contrary made by the Commission by order either on its own motion or on application
by an interested person .... Investment Company Act of 1940 § 2(a) (9), 15 U.S.C.
§ 80a-2(a) (9) (1964).
1399 Investment Company Act of 1940 § 2(a) (4), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a) (4) (1964).
One of the more difficult cases interpreting this section is Willheim v. Murchison, 203 F. Supp.
478 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd sub. norm. Willheim v. Investors Diversified Servs., Inc., 303 F.2d 276
(2d Cir. 1962) (preliminary injunction denied); Willheim v. Murchison, 231 F. Supp. 142
(S.D.N.Y. 1964), aff'd, 342 F.2d 33 (2d Cir. 1965) (dismissed on motion for summary judgment). The lawsuit was one of many growing out of the Alleghany Corporation-IDS affiliation, a veritable deluge of litigation which, in the weary words of Judge Friendly, "must be
unparalleled in American corporation law." Willheim v. Murchison, 342 F.2d 33, 35 (2d Cir.
1965). Grossly oversimplified, Alleghany Corporation, a holding company, owned controlling
interest in IDS, advisor to Investors Mutual, Inc. A band of insurgents led by the Murchisons
mounted a bitterly contested proxy contest which was ultimately successful in ousting Alleghany's incumbent management, the Kirby group, and giving the Murchison group all nine
seats on Alleghany's board of directors. Moonv's 1968 BANK & FINANCe MANUAL 1083. Two

shareholders of Mutual then sought a preliminary injunction to prohibit IDS from performing
its management and underwriting contracts. Plaintiff's theory was that the transfer of control
within Alleghany constituted an "assignment" of the management and underwriting contracts
with IDS, which caused their immediate termination. Willheim v. Murchison, 203 F. Supp.
478, 479 (S.D.N.Y. 1962). The motion for preliminary injunction was denied on the ground
that there was no transfer of a controlling block of IDS stock, nor, for that matter, had the
change in Alleghany management been effected by a sale of its stock. On appeal to the
Second Circuit, the denial was affirmed for the reason that no showing of irreparable injury
had been made. Willheim v. Investors Diversified Servs., Inc., 303 F.2d 276 (2d Cir. 1962).
On later motion by the defendants for summary judgment, the district court followed its earlier
reasoning and dismissed. Willhein v. Murchison, 231 F. Supp. 142 (S.D.N.Y. 1964). Significantly, the court conceded that had the change in control of Alleghany been effected by a
transfer of its stock, there would have been an assignment terminating the IDS contracts. Id.
at 144-45. This interpretation had been urged by the SEC. Id. at 144. The Court of Appeals
was not so ready to accede to this proposition, but admitted its arguendo. Willheim v.
Murchison, 342 F.2d 33, 37 (2d Cir. 1965). Still, there was no transfer of controlling Alleghany stock, and neither could the court find a congressional intention to remedy internal
and "democratic" shifts in control with automatic termination of contracts. Accordingly, it
affirmed. Id. at 33.
One commentator concludes that the interests of fund shareholders can only be properly
protected if a transfer of real control, such as existed in Willheim, is interpreted to effect a
termination. Comment, Termination of Management Contracts Under the Investment Company Act of 1940, 63 COLUA. L. REv. 733, 744-48 (1963). Certainly there was a change in
the IDS management as a result of the proxy victory, for the Murchisons installed eight new
directors on the IDS board, Clint Murchison, Jr., becoming chairman. Willheim v. Murchison,
342 F.2d 33, 36 (2d Cir. 1965). It would seem that if the Murchisons could not have done
this directly by purchasing Alleghany or IDS stock (absent reinstatement by fund shareholders), the transfer of control should not be sanctioned merely because it proceeded by a
different means. In the ultimate analysis, the Act is seeking to protect fund shareholders
against change in management occurring without their assent. Investment Company Act of
1940 § 1(b)(6), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-I(b) (6) (1964). Rather than improper court interpretation, however, in this instance we are dealing with inartful draftsmanship or congressional
oversight. (As Judge Friendly points out, Congress had little reason to consider this precise
problem in 1940. Willheim v. Murchison, 342 F.2d 33, 40-41 (2d Cir. 1965).)
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after its termination would then require shareholder approval. 40 0 Unfortunately
the Act, at least as interpreted by the courts, has been ineffective in dealing
with modem problems attendant upon transfer of control.
To illustrate how a transfer of control may still operate to a fund's direct
pecuniary disadvantage, though the mechanism is slightly more subtle than looting
or dumping, the SEC cites the following example:
[N]ew management agreed to pay for the retirement of a class of preferred
stock of the old management organization, a registered broker-dealer, for
a consideration of up to $450,000. The consideration, however, was not paid
by new management but by the fund under an agreement whereby the old
manager would receive approximately 50 percent of the fund's brokerage
commissions for a period of 7 to 15 years. At the time of the agreement
the fund had assets of less than $10 million. Most funds of that size utilize
virtually all of their brokerage to obtain supplementary investment advice,
pricing services for their shares and other services commonly available from
broker-dealers in return for such commissions. Thus, the creation of an
obligation to use fund brokerage commissions to pay for a transfer of the
advisory function meant that an asset of the fund which should have been
utilized for its benefit was used for the sole benefit of its managers. Such
an obligation also adds pressures to generate brokerage commissions irrespective of investment considerations.' 4 01 (Emphasis added.)
In a statutory context, the leading case under the Act is SEC v. Insurance
Securities, Incorporated.4 2 Insurance Securities, Inc. [ISI] served as investment
advisor of "Trust Fund" - a registered mutual fund - and distributed its participation certificates. 4 3 Four of the directors of ISI collectively held over seventy
per cent of its stock, each owning 30,000 of 166,000 shares outstanding. 4 4
Though n6 one of these directors held more than about eighteen per cent of
ISI's stock, an amount low enough to presume non-control under the Act, 40 ' the
Court of Appeals recognized that transfer of a large portion'40 0 of their collective
seventy per cent would result in a transfer of control. 4 7 By proper timing of
the sale, and by assuring continuous control of the fund's proxy machinery, the:
transfer was accomplished without risking the loss of the management, contract
Since the purchaser4 would accede to the management position in spite of a
technical termination and reinstatement of the contract, the controlling block
* 1400 Investment Company Act of 1940 § 15(a), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15(a) (1964). Consent,
of course, can be absolutely guaranteed for all practical purposes. As Professor Loss observed,
and his remarks are particularly applicable to mutual funds, "[tlhe widespread distribution of
corporate securities, with the concomitant separation of ownership and management, puts the
entire concept of the stockholders' meeting at the mercy of the proxy instruments." 2 L.
Loss, Scu'rIIs REGULATION 857-58 (2d ed. 1961).
1401 PUBLIC POLICY STATEMENT 150.
1402 146 F. Supp. 778 (N.D. Cal. 1956), aff'd, 254 F.2d 642 '(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 358
U.S. 823 (1958).
1403 Id. at 778-79.
1404 SEC v. Insurance Sec., Inc., 254 F.2d 642, 645 (9th Cir. 1958).
1405 See note 1398 supra.
1406 40.8 per cent of ISI's total outstanding shares. SEC v. Insurance Sec., Inc., 254 F.2d642, 646 (9th Cir. 1958).
1407 Id. at 650. The identity of the purchasers who would gain control is not disclosed in
the opinions. It does appear, however, that they were a small group, affiliated among them-'
selves, id. at 645, and "headed by defendant Kaiser" (not one of the four mentioned directors). SEC v. Insurance Sec., Inc., 146 F. Supp. 778, 779 (N.D. Cal. 1956).
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of ISI stock commanded an exorbitant price of $50 per share, in contrast to its

book value of only $1.81.1411

The SEC brought suit against the selling directors, charging that the receipt
of such a premium constituted a violation of section 36 of the Act and asking
for an injunction as well as an accounting and restitution of the price in excess of
book value 140 9 The district court dismissed the complaint with a very brief
opinion, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed.1 1 °
In the opinion of Judge Hamley, the termination provision of section
15(a) (4) was the exclusive remedy provided by the Act, regardless of the

price received for the transfer, and there could be no objection as long as the
requisite shareholder reinstatement was obtained. 411 Thus, section 36 was inapplicable 12 and the SEC was out of court.34 Nevertheless, the court did
engage in some discussion of the section 36 claim, and in the process formulated
some questionable law.
The SEC maintained that the amount received for the ISI stock in excess
of book value - which excess appears to have totaled some $3.25 million 44 represented payment for the sale of a fiduciary office and an appropriation of an
asset of the fund.4 5 That is, the ISI profits which could be expected to accrue
after the transfer of control should not be considered a salable "good-will" asset
of ISI. Since the transfer would automatically terminate the contract, and since
the fund, in law, was free to negotiate elsewhere for mainhgement services, any
"good-will" belonging to ISI is instantly amortized. Hence, the excess price received for the ISI stock represents a capitalization of the fund's asset - the right
to allocate its future advisory fees to whomever it may wish to engage with the
corresponding opportunity to reduce its cost by the amount of the premium. 416
1408 SEC v. Insurance Sec., Inc., 254 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1958). The Court of Appeals
in the ensuing litigation admitted that "ihe purchase price . .. necessarily reflected the value
which [ISI] ...

will derive from the fees paid, and expected to be paid, by the Trust Fund."

Id.
1409 SEC v. Insurance Sec., Inc., 146 F. Supp. 778 (N.D. Cal. 1956).
1410 SEC v. Insurance Sec., Inc., 146 F. Supp. 778 (N.D. Cal. 1956), aff'd, 254 F.2d 642
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 823 (1958).
1411 SEC v. Insurance Sec., Inc., 254 F.2d 642, 648-49 (9th Cir. 1958).
1412 The Commission always considered section 36 applicable to the sale of an advisor's
fiduciary office. SEC Investment Company Act Release No. 354 (May 11, 1942), [1941-44
75,281.
Transfer Binder] COH FED. SEC. L. REIP.
1413 SEC v. Insurance Sec., Inc., 254 F.2d 642, 651-52 (9th Cir. .1958).
1414 This is the premium received by the four selling directors ($48.19 per share, 68,000
shares). Id. at 646. The purchasers also acquired another twenty thousand shares from other
stockholders of ISI. From the court's figures, it appears that this additional stock was purchased at the same premium. Id.
1415 Id. at 647.
1416 This view of the facts brings the case into close parallel with the "diversion of corporate opportunity" cases, especially Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 349 U.S. 952 (1955). See generally Jennings, Trading in Corporate Control, 44 CAL.
L. REv. 1 (1956). In Perlman control of a steel corporation was sold at a premium to persons
desiring a captive source of steel. If the purchasers had simply bought the steel at a higher
price, instead of paying for control, the benefits would have inured to the corporation rather
an to the abdicating officer and principal stockholders. Those who sold control had thus
diverted an opportunity of the corporation and were liable in an action for accounting and
restitution.
Analogously, the purchasers of Insurance Securities Inc. sought, in part, an outlet
for the managerial services of Leland M. Kaiser and his associates. See Record, pp.
55-88 passim. Thus, they paid $4,240,720 for the controlling shares of a corporation
with a service contract. 254 F. 2d at 646. Presumably, they would have been equally willing to enter into a direct agreement with the Trust Fund and to perform
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The Court of Appeals was willing to assume that the defendant-directors
were fiduciaries with respect to the fund, 4 1' a proposition which is not disputable, 418 but then concluded that there was no illicit sale of fiduciary office. The
rationale was that since the fiduciary relationship arose from the management
contract, and since that contract automatically terminated on assignment, the
fiduciary obligations of the directors were immediately extinguished.' 419 The
reinstatement of the contract by the shareholders then resulted in a new fiduciary
nexus between the fund and the new management. Hence, even if section 36
did encompass the "well-established [principle] of equity"'1420 that an office of
trust may not be sold, the SEC was still out of court. This argument is, to say
the least, a bit facile. 42
Moreover, the court ignored the obvious manner in which the directors
used their office - by exploiting their control of the proxy mechanism - to
enrich themselves. Clearly the proxy control was an integral element of the
transfer scheme, for unless reinstatement of the management contract could be
assured, the directors could not have demanded the exaggerated price for their
stock. The Supreme Court has said in Pepper v. Litton:4 2 .
He who is in such a fiduciary position cannot serve himself first and his
cestuis second .... He cannot utilize his . . .strategic position for his own
preferment....

He cannot use his power for his personal advantage . ..

no matter how meticulous he is to satisfy technical requirements. For that
services for $4,240,720 less than the Trust Fund was presently paying, amortized over
a term of years. If this assumption is correct, the director-defendants in effect diverted a bargain purchase of managerial services to their own profit. Cf. Pouzzner
v. Westerly Theatre Operating Co., 67 F. Supp. 874 (D.R.I. 1946), aff'd, 162 F.2d
821 (1st Cir. 1947) (lease and sublease); Paw Paw Say. Bank v. Free, 205 Mich.
52, 171 N.W. 464 (1919) (same); Durfee v. Durfee & Canning, Inc., 323 Mass.
187, 80 N.E.2d 522 (1948) (purchase and resale); Gilmore v. Gilmore Drug Co.,
279 Pa. 193, 123 At. 730 (1924) (same). In any event, the Trust Fund was deprived of the opportunity to bargain with the purchasers. Comment, Protecting the
Interests of Mutual-Fund Investors in Sales of Management-CorporationControl (Or, Policing
the Traffic in Other People's Money), 68 YALE L.J. 113, 127-28 n.57 (1958).
1417 SEC v. Insurance Sec., Inc., 254 F.2d 642, 650 (9th Cir. 1958).
1418 Brown v. Bullock, 194 F. Supp. 207, 229 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 294 F.2d 415 (2d Cir.
1961); Insuranshares Corp. v. Northern Fiscal Corp., 35 F. Supp. 22, 25 (E.D. Pa. 1940);
see the excellent discussion and collection of authority in Comment, supra note 1416, at 121-24.
1419 SEC v. Insurance Sec., Inc., 254 F.2d 642, 650 (9th Cir. 1958).
1420 Id.
1421 The court's reasoning on this point is very ably refuted in Comment, supra note 1416:
Although the court accurately characterized the defendants as fiduciaries of
the mutual fund, its determination that their fiduciary office was not transferred
through the sale of controlling shares in Insurance Securities seems untenable. True,
the sale of stock, working a technical termination of the service contract by operation
of section 15(a) (4), and thus theoretically ended the fiduciary relationship between
the management corporation and the investors, and discharged everyone in that corporation of his fiduciary duties to the investors. [sic] In actuality, however, the
renewal of the contract was a manifestation of the dominance and control over the
investors upon which the director-defendants' fiduciary status was based. The sale of
control did not occur until after the transferors had utilized the investment organization's proxy machinery to frame the reinstatement issue, comment favorably upon
the purchasers of control, solicit investor votes, and recommend the renewal of the
service contract.... Since, in Insurance Securities, [management's proxy] control was
actually exercised to achieve reinstatement of the agreement, termination of the contract was illusory, and the powers and fiduciary duties arising from it remained
throughout in the management corporation. Defendants therefore had fiduciary positions which they effectively transferred through the sale of their controlling stock.
Id. at 124-26 (emphasis added).

1422

308 U.S. 295 (1939).
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power is at all times subject to the equitable limitation that it may not be
exercised for the aggrandizement, preference, or advantage of the fiduciary
23
to the exclusion or detriment of the cestui.-1
(Emphasis added.)

In a situation strikingly similar to the ISI case, the Delaware Chancellor
stated the law this way: "[I]f defendants [selling stockholders in a fund management company] in fact used the power of their fiduciary positions for personal
gain they are legally responsible regardless of the form and sequence of their
undertakings."' 424 (Emphasis added.) This view places the emphasis not on a
sale of fiduciary office, but rather on a sale of the influence and power attaching
to the office of trust. If a director or trustee may
not sell his office, neither may
1425
he sell his ability to install another in his place.
Beyond this precept of the common law, the Investment Company Act
itself declares that the national interest is adversely affected "when investment
companies are... operated, [or] managed ... in the interest of ... investment
advisers... rather than in the interest of all classes of such companies' security
holders .

"1426

1423 Id. at 311.
1424 Krieger v. Anderson, 40 Del. Ch. 61, 173 A.2d 626,632 (Ch. 1961).
1425 Gerdes v. Reynolds, 28 N.Y.S.2d 622, 651-52 (Sup. Ct. 1941) (collecting authority).
1426 Investment Company Act of 1940 § I(b) (2), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-1(b) (2) (1964). See
72 HARV. L. REV. 1176 (1959). A case quite similar to the instant case arose in Delaware
and was decided purely on state law grounds. Krieger v. Anderson, 40 Del. Ch. 363, 182
A.2d 907 (Sup. Ct.), aff'g, 40 Del. Oh. 151, 177 A.2d 203 (Oh. 1962), original motion for
summary judgment denied, 40 Del. Oh. 61, 173 A.2d 626 (Ch. 1961). Defendants in Krieger
were the principal shareholders of Texas Management Company [TMC], which, in turn, was
investment advisor of the Texas Fund. A small group of businessmen who wished to purchase
TMC formed a corporation, Funds, Inc., to consummate the deal. The defendants sold their
controlling TMC stock to Funds, Inc., for $1,350,000, though the book value of TMO was only
about $126,000. The sale was conditioned upon shareholder reinstatement of the contract with
TMC. The five man board of directors of Texas Fund unanimously recommended reinstatement, and the shareholders, of course, followed that recommendation. The three non-affiliated directors of Texas Fund were also made parties defendant. Plaintiff, a shareholder of
Texas Fund, sought to recover the premium paid for TMC stock, charging that the amount
paid over book value constituted compensation to selling defendant shareholders of TMC for
the expectation of reinstatement of the contract. Plaintiff further alleged that the selling defendants dominated the board of directors of Texas Fund, procured the necessary reinstatement by means of this domination, and hence had sold their fiduciary office or influence for at
least $1 million.
Defendants' original motion for summary judgment was denied, the Chancellor holding
that there were unresolved issues of fact as to actual domination and the "fair value" of the
TMC stock. Krieger v. Anderson, 40 Del. Ch. 61, 173 A.2d 626 (Ch. 1961). In his opinion
denying the motion, the Chancellor recognized a "corporate opportunity" element in the
plaintiff's claim:
[I]t would appear that plaintiff is actually contending that defendants, by their
use of their control of the Fund board, deprived Fund of the opportunity to negotiate
directly with the purchaser for some or all of the "premium" it was allegedly willing
to pay for securing the Management stock and thus the service contracts [management and underwriting]. Id. at -, 173 A.2d at 633.
The Chancellor centered his attention, however, on the issue of the "fair value" of the TMC
stock, and was willing to include as an element the "good will" or "expectancy" value arising
from the possibility of renewal of the contracts. According to the Chancellor, this "good will"
[W]as an element of value built up by the defendants and is not to be ignored
merely because of [sic] the Investment Company Act requires a termination of advisory contracts when control is sold. The termination provision is to protect the
investors of the Fund. If such good will value is not to be considered a legitimate
element of value inhering in such stock, it is for the Congress to say so. Id.
It later appeared that non-control stocks of other management companies had been selling
at around thirty-seven times earnings. This represented approximately the same capitalization
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In the ISI case, the courtes central difficulty was, perhaps, that it could not

comprehend the nature of damage inflicted upon the fund. 142
had concluded:

7

The trial court

No claim has been made in the complaint or otherwise that the business of
Trust Fund has not been conducted efficiently or honestly or that the investors of Trust Fund have suffered any loss or damage of any kind with
respect to their interest in Trust Fund by reason of any act or conduct of
[ISI] or its officers or directors. 14 28
The Court of Appeals experienced a similar conceptual difficulty and asserted that
"[t]he price received by appellee-directors for their stock in [ISI] did not come
from the coffers of the investment company, but from outside purchasers."' 4 29
of future earning which inhered in the premium paid for the control shares sold by defendants. The Chancellor was impressed, and concluded that "fair value" had been received
for the TMC stock while "fair value" in terms of satisfactory contract performance had been
received by the Fund. Accordingly, defendant's renewed motion for summary judgment was
granted. Krieger v. Anderson, 40 Del. Ch. 151, 177 A.2d 203 (Ch. 1962).
The Supreme Court of Delaware agreed with the Chancellor that the principal issue was
the "fair value" of the TMC stock, and was similarly impressed with the prevailing priceearnings ratio:
[S]hares of management companies had been sold at prices ranging in the neighborhood of 37 times earnings. [Plaintiff] also conceded that the per share price paid
for the [TMC] stock was within the same capitalization rate. Plaintiff further specifically conceded that if the control shares had the same value as non-control shares,
he was out of court. Krieger v. Anderson, 40 Del. Ch. 363, , 182 A.2d 907, 909
(Sup. Ct. 1962). Of course, plaintiff was not at all willing to admit that control shares have
-,
177 A.2d
the same value as non-control shares. Krieger v. Anderson, 40 Del. Ch. 151,
203, 204 (Ch. 1962). The tranfer of control shares terminates the advisory contract, as has
already been seen, and this contract is the management company's most valuable asset. Admitting that, as a practical matter, there is almost no danger of a fund going elsewhere for
management, it does not follow that the expectancy of contract reinstatement belongs to the
shareholders of management. Analyzed in terms of corporate opportunity, however remote
that opportunity might be, the fiduciary may not appropriate gains for himself. Nevertheless,
the Delaware Supreme Court was unimpressed by plaintiff's argument. Since the sale had
been conditioned upon reinstatement, the court reasoned, the buyers got precisely what the
sellers had-there was no diminution in value because of the statutory termination of contracts
- and hence the price for the TMC stock reflected its "fair value." 40 Del. Ch. 363, -,
182 A.2d 907, 909 (Sup. Ct. 1962). This fairly admits a direct sale of fiduciary office, but
that did not seem to trouble the court. In the final analysis, the decision appears to be based
on an inability to comprehend the potential harm suffered by the fund. Rhetorically, the court
inquires, "What wrong has been done to the Texas Fund stockholders?" Id. at -,
182 A.2d
at 909. That question is not without an answer. (1) Legally they have been deprived of an
opportunity to recapture a portion or all of the premium through direct negotiations. (2)
Much more importantly, they have been deprived of a significant equitable safeguard. There
is an ever-present danger that the new managers installed by the old may not be competent
or even interested in the welfare of the fund shareholders. To remove the temptation that
self-interest will cloud the judgment of the incumbents, the law of fiduciary obligations demands
that these men not sell their influence or their office for personal gain. The fairness of the
transaction to the buyer and seller is irrelevant to a consideration of the protection required
for the fund shareholder.
1427 The common law applicable to breach of fiduciary duty does not depend on an element of demonstrable damage.
The rule, inveterate and uncompromising in its rigidity, does not rest upon the
narrow ground of injury or damage to the corporation resulting from a betrayal of
confidence but upon a broader foundation of a wise public policy that, for the purpose of removing all temptation, extinguishes all possibility of profit flowing from a
breach of the confidence imposed by the fiduciary relation. Guth v. Loft, Inc., 23
Del. Ch. 255, -,
5 A.2d 503, 510 (Sup. Ct. 1939). Accord, Irving Trust Co. v. Deutsch,
73 F.2d 121, 124 (2d Cir. 1934); Ballantine v. Ferretti, 28 N.Y.S.2d 668, 680 (Sup. Ct.
1941).
1428 SEC v. Insurance Sec., Inc., 146 F. Supp. 778, 780 (N.D. Cal. 1956).
1429 SEC v. Insurance Sec., Inc., 254 F.2d 642, 651 '(9th Cir. 1958).
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One might as cogently argue that a diversion of corporate opportunity is not
actionable because there is no direct outlay of corporate funds.
However this may be, and without further belaboring the point, the better
commentators have uniformly discommended the decision. 43 ' Nevertheless, the
effect of the case is to carve a large loophole in the law of fiduciary relations, a
law which should operate to discourage in limine the indulgence of self-interest
by those in positions of trust.143 ' At the very least the minimal standards of Insuransharesshould be restored to vitality by ridding the law of the notion that
automatic termination of advisory contracts instantly relieves those in control
of an advisor of their obligations to the fund. Anything less leaves the law of
fiduciary deterrence sadly wanting.
Perhaps the SEC had set its sights too high in the ISI case; at least the
court in Krieger v. Anderson 4 . felt so about the plaintiff before it:
[P]laintiff's contention would lead to an anomalous result. Owners of
stock of a management company who have built up the value of their
shares through the years by the exercise of business ability and good judgment are forbidden ever to reap [rape?] the reward of their labor... This
conclusion offends one's sense of fairness. If overriding considerations of
public policy requires [sic] a curb on the right of owners of management
contracts to realize the full value of their assets, it is for Congress to say
so."13 (Emphasis added.)
Possibly taking its cue from Krieger, and with the ISI disaster anything
but forgotten, 4 3' the SEC abandoned the courts and brought its case to Capitol
Hill. The Commission was careful to point out the nature of the conflict of
interest involved in the sale of management control, observing that it is in the
interest of retiring management to obtain the maximum price for its control
interest, even though this may result in the installation of less competent or scrupulous advisors. Moreover, the Commission noted, the excessive premiums paid
by purchasing management exerts pressure on them to recoup their purchase
price as swiftly as possible 43 ' - presumably through otherwise unnecessary
charges against the fund for management fees or practices which result in recapture of excessive brokerage. Clearly, there is a serious deficiency in the law
of fiduciary duty here, the Commission properly argued, and something should
be done about it. In the measured terms of the SEC:
1430

Eisenberg & Lehr, supra note 1194, at 192-95; Greene, Fiduciary Standards of Con-

duct Under the Investment Company Act of 1940, 28 Go. WASH. L. Rv. 266, 274-78

(1959); Comment, supra note 1416; 72 HARv. L. REv. 1176 (1959); 13 Sw. L.. 376
(1959); Statement of Richard Jennings, 1967 House Hearings 642. Contra, Jaretzki. The
Investment Company Act: Problems Relating to Investment Advisory Contracts, 45 VA. L.
REv. 1023, 1026-34 (1959); Note, Mutual Funds and the Investment Advisory Contract, 50
VA. L. REv. 141, 152-53 (1964).

1431
1432

Ballantine v. Ferretti, 28 N.Y.S.2d 668, 680-81 (Sup. Ct. 1941).
40 Del. Ch. 363, 182 A.2d 907 (Sup. Ct. 1962).

1433

Id. at -,

1434

The impact of the ISI case may have contributed to a development appearing in the

182 A.2d at 910.

Wharton Report:

[A]fter the original part of the study was nearing completion, the Commission

requested that it be expanded to include an analysis of the activities of investment
company advisers, which had previously been considered to be outside the [statutory]
scope of the study. WHrARTON REPORT 1. See id. at 429, 461-62.

1435

PUBLIC POLICY STATEMENT

150.
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The shareholders, and in many situations the unaffiliated directors, are in
no position to take an active role in the selection of new management organization [sic] or in the determination of the terms and conditions of the
sale. The shareholders and the unaffiliated directors need be consulted only
in connection with the last step in the sale - approval of the new advisory
contract. At that point their alternatives are limited. They must either
accept the new contract, continue with an existing management that may
be unable or reluctant to perform its duties or have no management at all.
Under these circumstances any concern over possible unfairness to the fund
resulting from the sale is likely to be outweighed by the prospects of 'having
no manager at all or having to retain a manager who has been deprived of
an opportunity for an advantageous sale of the management organization
and who may be unwilling or unable to function properly.
The manager of a mutual fund is unquestionably in a fiduciary relationship to it. Consequently, the transfer of that relationship for a price
has some elements of the sale of a fiduciary office. Sale of a fiduciary office
is strictly prohibited at common law because of the conflicts of interest
which are involved. In the transfer of mutual fund management, however,
as in the related area of management compensation, certain of the protective provisions of the Act have had the somewhat ironical, and presumably unintended, effect of diluting the
1 36protections provided by common
law principles of fiduciary responsibility.
The lessons of ISI and Krieger were not wasted, for by 1966 the Commission
had adopted a "soft line" on transfer of management control. In language strongly reminiscent of the Delaware Supreme Court's reaction in Krieger,'4.. the SEC
sought to avoid the somewhat visceral objection that had been interposed:
"[A]pplication of the strict common-law principle might well be unfair insofar
as it denies to the retiring management any compensation for the elements of
value in the relationship which they may have built up over the years."' 4 "
Accordingly, its legislative proposals to the Ninetieth Congress sought only to
deal with management transfers that would be affirmatively burdensome or inequitable to the fund. 439 This approach would at least restore the law to a
level just below the minimum standard of Insuranshares,if nothing more. The
proposed subsection 15(g) advocated by the Commission, however, was conspicuously absent from the Senate substitute bill, S. 3724. Nor is it to be found
in either of the bills presently before Congress. Nevertheless, this should not be
cause for great alarm in view of the proposed amendments to section 36 of the
Act.
The committee report on S. 3724 makes it clear that the deletion of the
subsection 15(g) recommendation was not intended to leave the present loophole in the law of fiduciary duty. Rather, the subsection was considered surplusage in view of the requirement that total compensation be reasonable (thus
preventing new management from overcharging a fund in order to recoup its
1436 Id. at 151. See also 1967 House Hearings 77; 1967 Senate Hearings 170.
1437 See text accompanying note 1433 supra.
1438 PUBLIC POLICY STATEMENT 152.
1439 S. 1659, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. § 8(e) (1967); H.R. 9510 and H.R. 9511, 90th Cong.,
1st Sess., § 8(e) (1967). The subsection was drafted so that its applicability to a situation

such as the Alleghany-IDS relationship could not be disputed. Cf. note 1399 supra.
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outlay) and the broad powers given under section 36 to counter any breach of
fiduciary duty arising in connection with a transfer of control. 44 '
If the pending legislation is not amended to include a provision similar to
the originally recommended subsection 15(g), care should be taken that the
legislative history clearly discloses an intention to include the substance of subsection 15(g) within the scope of section 36. If this is done, amended section
36 should be an adequate remedy.
VII. Conclusion
This Survey has attempted to trace the development of the mutual fund
industry, depict its modem contours, and explore the role of federal legislation
within the industry's operational framework. In 1940 the nauseating litany of
abuses catalogued by the SEC in its monumental Investment Trusts Study incited Congress to pass the Investment Company Act. The prosperity and integrity
of the post-Act industry testifies to the perspicacity of Congress in so discharging
its duty to the investing public.
That the 1940 Act is broad in scope and comprehensive in nature is undeniable; yet it cannot reasonably be asserted that the Seventy-sixth Congress
intended for it to serve as the ne plus ultra of effective federal legislation within
the investment company sphere. Indeed, Congress included a provision in the
Act that authorized the SEC to examine future industry developments and "report the results of its studies and investigations and its recommendations to the
Congress. "1441
The Commission utilized the power granted it by the Seventy-sixth Congress
when it engaged the Wharton School of Finance to conduct a study of the
mutual fund industry. The conclusions of that study, embodied in the Wharton
Report, were supplemented by the findings of the SEC's Special Study task force,
which were enunciated in the Special Study. Jointly these documents provided
the foundation upon which the Commission's own report to Congress, the Public
Policy Statement, was built, and upon which the legislation now pending before
Congress rests. Simply put, the SEC's position, manifest in the current legislative
proposals, is that while the modem investment company shareholder is not losing
money in exactly the same manner as his pre-Act predecessors did- through
outright looting, for instance -he is losing money through high sales loads and
overly generous management fees.
The proposals now pending before Congress propose to remedy his plight.
One wonders if the present Congress will have the fortitude to follow the lead of
its 1940 antecedent and enact regulatory measures to remedy existing inequities,
or choose to remain on the sidelines, entrusting
the fortune of over five million
442
citizens to "haphazard voluntary solutions."'

1440 S. REP. No. 1351, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1968).
1441 Investment Company Act of 1940 § 14(b), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-14(b) (1964). For a discussion of the history of that subsection, see notes 412-21 supra and accompanying text.

1442 In introducing S. 3580 before the Seventy-sixth Congress in 1940, Senator Wagner
noted that "[the problem of the protection of the investor and the national economy is too
vital to permit of haphazard voluntary solutions." 86 CoNG. REC. 2845 (1940) (emphasis
added).
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If Congress does opt for playing the role of a passive bystander, it is to
be fervently hoped that the reasons conjured up to excuse its idle posture are
less superficial than those proffered by several distinguished senators who opposed the passage of S. 3724 in 1968. Lamenting the lack of a "public outcry"
in support of the bill, 4 "' and asserting that the proposal rested on inadequately
researched underpinnings, 4 44 they supported a motion to recommit the measure
to the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency. 44
As for the "outcry" argument, it need only be noted that President Johnson's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice found
the American public "indifferent" to the threat that organized crime poses to
our society. "4 6 Would any Congressman advocate suppressing a measure designed to eradicate organized crime because of a lack of popular support? In
the same vein it may be observed that Reverend Martin Luther King's death
roused Congress to pass a bill to provide "fair housing throughout the United
States,"'"' and Senator Robert Kennedy's assassination precipitated a step towards
effective firearms control. 44 In light of this morbid precedent one may ponder
what sort of financial cataclysm must occur before congressional disciples of the
"outcry" argument are afforded the clamor they demand.
The argument that the legislation has been inadequately studied is equally
absurd. The industry's ills have been meticulously analyzed and are documented
in three reports prepared over a span of eight years before being transmitted to
Capitol hill. Congress will soon enter its third year of study regarding mutual
fund legislation and a wealth of material has already been churned out by the
appropriate congressional gristmills. Indeed, the hearings on S. 1659, and its
identical House counterparts, H. 9510 and H. 9511- bills that embodied the
1443 The Senators from Illinois seemed to be especially eager to correlate the popular support
granted the legislation with the desirability of aiding in its passage. In the course of the Senate debate on the proposal Senator Percy observed that "if conditions in the [mutual fund]
industry are as unwholesome as they are painted by the proponents of this legislation, I think
I would have received at least a letter or two." 114 CoNG. REc. S9477 (daily ed. July 26,
1968). A short time later Senator Dirksen intoned:
There have been no scandals, certainly no major scandals, no abuses, and no
widespread public interest or demand for legislation. If there has been, I have not
seen it. I have not seen it reflected in the mails or by telephone calls, or from any
other source that I know. Id. at S9479.
Said Senator Bennett:
[T]here is no public outcry for this legislation. . . . I requested the SEC to send
me all of the communications favoring and opposing this legislation because all of
my mail was opposed to it.
I did receive from the SEC less than 400 communications in which some comment could be considered favorable to some legislation in the mutual fund industry
was given. I do not consider 400 letters out of more than 4/ million shareholders
- less than 1 in more than 10,000 - as representing a consumer outcry for the proposed legislation. 114 CONG. Rac. S9413 (daily ed. July 25, 1968). See also S. REP.
No. 1351, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 57 (1968).
1444 See 114 CONG. REC. S9475, S9477 (daily ed. July 26, 1968) '(remarks of Senator
Percy); id. at S9473 (remarks of Senator Bennett) ; id. at S9479 (remarks of Senator Dirksen).
1445 The motion was made by Senator Bennett. 114 CONG. Rac. S9429 (daily ed. July 25,
1968).
1446 PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE,
THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 188 (1967).
1447 42 U.S.C.A. § 3601 (Supp. 1969).
1448 The Gun Control Act of 1968, 82 Stat. 1213, amending Omnibus Crime Control and
Safe Streets Act of 1968 tit.
IV, 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 921-28 (Supp. 1969), became law on October
22, 1968.
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ideals propounded by the SEC in its Public Policy Statement - consist of over
two thousand pages of printed matter. That Congressmen should bemoan a
lack of research with such resources literally at their fingertips proves again that
slow grind the wheels of bureaucracy.
With no less at stake than the welfare of five million investors and the
integrity of the securities markets, it is submitted that Congress must not fail to
discharge its duty to the American investor. The tools, either S. 34 or S. 296,
are at hand.
9
Richard H. Farina"
John P. Freeman4 ..
James Webster 4"5'

1449
1450
1451

Text accompanying notes 1006-1448 supra, Appendices A-C infra.
Text accompanying notes 1-456 supra, Appendices A-O infra.
Text accompanying notes 457-1005 supra. -

[June, 1969]
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APPENDIX B
Advisory Fee Rates and Expense Ratios of Externally Managed Mutual
Funds with June 30, 1968 Net Assets of $100 Million and Over for Their
Fiscal Years Ended July 1, 1967- June 30, 19681
Name of Fund
(In Order of Net Assets
at June 30, 1968)

Investors Mutual, Inc.
Dreyfus Fund, Inc. (The)
Investors Stock Fund, Inc.
Wellington Fund, Inc.
Affiliated Fund, Inc.
Fidelity Trend Fund, Inc.
United Accumulative Fund
Fundamental Investors, Inc.
Investors Variable Payment Fund, Inc.
ISI Trust Fund (Formerly: Insurance
Securities Trust Fund)
Investment Company of America (The)
Fidelity Fund, Inc.
United Income Fund
Fidelity Capital Fund, Inc.
Puritan Fund, Inc.
Hamilton Fund, Inc.
Technology Fund, Inc. (Formerly:
Television-Electronics Fund, Inc.)
Putnam Growth Fund (The)
Enterprise Fund, Inc.
Keystone Custodian Fund, Series S-4
Diversified Growth Stock Fund, Inc.
Chemical Fund, Inc.
Manhattan Fund, Inc.
Price, T. Rowe Growth Stock Fund, Inc.
Delaware Fund, Inc.
George Putnam Fund of Boston (The)
United Science Fund
State Street Investment Corporation
American Mutual Fund, Inc.
Dividend Shares, Inc.
Financial Industrial Fund, Inc.
National Securities Series - Stock Series
Channing Shares - Growth Fund Series
Keystone Custodian Fund, Series K-2
Axe-Houghton Fund B, Inc.
Ivest Fund, Inc.
Boston Fund, Inc.
Putnam Investors Fund, Inc.
Group Securities - Common Stock Series
One William Street Fund, Inc. (The)
American Investors Fund, Inc.
Eaton & Howard Stock Fund
National Securities Series - Growth Stock Se
Colonial Fund, Inc. (The)

Net Assets
Average
Advisory
Expense
Ratio
June 30, 1968 Net Assets Fee Rate
(millions) (millions)' (per cent)' (per cent)'

(1)
(2)
$3,017 $2,939
2,464 2,116
2,215 1,947
1,817 1,911
1,615 1,393
1,402 1,273
1,400 1,355
1,362 1,284
770
1,076
1,028
726
695
714
589
520
600
527
440
117
446
344
500
538
315
367
426
377
373
366
376
342
341
259
266
282
80
334
279
274
262
181
258
224
195

(3)
0.30
.50
.30
.25
.23
.39
.36
.40
.31

(4)
0.30
.55
.30
.39
.31
.50
.38
.48
.31

.604
.34
.39
.36
.44
.38
-.50

.60
.50
.49
.39
.56
.48
.62

.43
.41

.59
.53
1.075
.54
.63
.37
.70
.55
.69
.44
.39
.49
.59
.45
.66
.60
.63
.55
.71
.925
.56
.56
.71
.46
.88
.57
.61
.60

.635
.546

.47,
.29
.48
.40
.50
.35
.36
.43
.43
.30
.667
.50
.50
.556

.558
.735

.47
.41
.50
.32
.60
.50
.50
.47
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Continued
Name of Fund
(In Order of Net Assets
at June 30, 1968)

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Expense
Advisory
Average
Net Assets
Ratio
June 30, 1968 Net Assets- Fee Rate 3
cent)'
(per
cent)
(per
(millions) (millions)

Washington Mutual Investors Fund, Inc.
Selected American Shares, Inc.
Value Line Special Situations Fund, Inc. (The)
Oppenheimer Fund, Inc.
Keystone Custodian Fund, Series S-3
Eaton & Howard Balanced Fund
Commonwealth Investment Company
Institutional Investors Mutual Fund, Inc.
Massachusetts Fund (Formerly
Massachusetts Life Fund)
Windsor Fund, Inc.
Federal Street Fund, Inc.
Diversified Investment Fund, Inc.
Putnam Income Fund, Inc.
Stein Roe & Farnham Balanced Fund, Inc.
Winfield Growth Fund, Inc.
Scudder, Stevens & Clark Common Stock
Fund, Inc.
Loomis-Sayles Mutual Fund, Inc.
Bullock Fund, Ltd.
Penn Square Mutual Fund
Dow Theory Investment Fund, Inc.
Scudder Special Fund, Inc.
Keystone Custodian Fund, Series S-2
Pioneer Fund, Inc.
Mutual Investing Foundation - MIF Fund
Keystone Custodian Fund, Series K-1
Price, Rowe New Horizons Fund, Inc.
Keystone Custodian Fund, Series B-4
Security Equity Fund, Inc.
Energy Fund, Inc.
Colonial Equities, Inc.
Istel Fund, Inc.
Commonwealth Capital Fund, Inc.
Channing Shares - Balanced Fund Series
Johnston Mutual Fund, Inc.
Shareholders' Trust of Boston
Scudder, Stevens & Clark Balanced Fund, Inc.
Supervised Investors Growth Fund, Inc.
National Securities Series - Dividend Series
Depositors Fund of Boston, Inc.
Texas Fund, Inc.
Diversification Fund, Inc.
Value Line Income Fund, Inc.
Lexington Research Investing Corporation
Average
Mean
Median

(1)
246
231
206
200
199
193
192
189

(2)
224
215
68
119
155
200
186
154

(3)
.489
.50
.75
1.245
.566
.50
.48
.14

(4)
.64
.60
.94
1.655
.56
.58
.58
.25

188
185
180
176
171
161
161

163
115
159
168
171
133
81

.50
.45
.50
.49
.2810
.48
.45

.54
.70
.56
.65
.45
.54
.77

161
156
154
152
151
149
148
140
133
133
131
131
129
126
122
119
115
114
112
112
111
111
107
104
103
102
102
100

146
144
132
157
124
55
128
105
113
129
77
133
30
68
17
82
36
109
84
92
115
43
100
95
92
94
95
76

.50
.46
.24
.49
.50
.50
.566
.50
.43
.546
.52
.56c
.50
.50
.48
.50
.50
.50
.50
.50
.50
.50
.50
.50
.50
.50
.51
.60
.47
.47
.50

.61
.60
.38
.57
.69
.64
.56
.67
.64
.54
.70
.56
.85
.85
.88
.75
.69
.65
.67
.65
.62
.93
.62
.56
.62
.57
.80
.85
.61
.59

1 Not including four funds (Fletcher Capital Fund, Inc., Putnam Equities Fund, Inc.,
Putnam Vista Fund, Inc., and Second Fiduciary Exchange Fund, Inc.) which were in
operation for less than the entire fiscal year.
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APPENDIX C
H.R. 8980 -

THFE STUCKEY BILL

I. Introduction
On March 13, 1969, Congressman W. S. (Bill) Stuckey introduced H.R.
8980' in the House of Representatives.2 The bill proposes to amend the Investment Company Act of 1940 to provide, in its sponsor's words, "a much larger
measure of consumer and investor protection for shareholders in investment
companies - mutual funds - while at the same time preserving the principles
of free enterprise'and corporate democracy-'
Like each of the recent mutual fund reform bills,' H.R. 8980 deals with
many of the problems spotlighted by the SEC in its Public Policy Statement.'
Indeed, the bill contains several provisions which are identical to those contained
in S. 3724 and the two pending Senate bills, S. 34 and S. 296. Lest the
House bill be classed with the Senate bills that trace their ancestry to the
Public Policy Statement, one must hasten to add that H.R. 8980, designed
as it is to protect the industry from its investors, is clearly the black sheep of
the fund reform family.
Mr. Stuckey has attempted to justify this remarkable transposition by waving
the twin banners of "full disclosure" and "corporate democracy."' As to full
1 H.R. 8980, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
2 115 CONG. Rac. H1764 (daily ed. March 13, 1969).
3 Id. at H1727 (remarks of Mr. Stuckey).
4 The bills are reducible to three categories: (1) three identical bills submitted to Congress by the SEC and introduced on May 1, 1967-S. 1659, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967);
H.R. 9510, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967); and H.R. 9511, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967); (2)
the two amended versions of those bills introduced in 1968 - H.R. 14742, 90th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1968); S. 3724, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968); and (3) the pending Senate bills-S. 34,
91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969); and S. 296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
5 E.g., management fees, see text accompanying notes 13-50, infra; sales loads, see text
accompanying notes 51-55 infra; and contractual plans, see text accompanying notes 56-61
infra.
6 Mr. Stuckey's esteem for the philosophy of disclosure and the principle of corporate
democracy has a familiar ring about it. Reprinted in the 1967 House Hearings is a letter
written by Mr. Robert Augenblick to Congressman John E. Moss concerning mutual fund
management fees. At the time he wrote the letter, Mr. Augenblick was the President of the
Investment Company Institute, a group that one Senator has characterized as "the principle
2 Average net assets (approximate) for fiscal years ended July 1, 1967 to June 30, 1968,
calculated by dividing operating expenses by the expense ratio appearing in column (4).
3 Ratio to average net assets for fiscal years ended July 1, 1967 to June 30, 1968, on
the basis shown in the Commission's PUBLIC POLICY STATEMENT 98.
4 The fee is a combined investment management, administrative, and trusteeship fee of
0.50 per cent of the aggregate amount which the investor pays or agrees to pay into the fund.
As a per cent of net assets, this arrangement results in a lower rate if the net asset value of the
investment increases and a higher rate if such value decreases. See note 1053 supra and accompanying text.
5 Includes a performance fee. See Appendix A supra.
6 Includes investment management and recurring fees paid to the trustee. See notes
1057-58 supra and accompanying text.
7 Includes investment supervisory fee and administrative service charge paid to the investment adviser.
8 Includes management fee paid to the investment adviser and a continuing fee paid to the
principal underwriter, which is closely affiliated with the adviser. See notes 1063-64 supra
and accompanying text.
9 Includes both the fees paid to the fund's investment adviser and to its business manager.
10 The fee is based on the fund's income.

NOTRE DAME LAWYER

[June, 1969]

disclosure, the Congressman noted: "The truth-in-mutual-funds law enacted
by Congress in 1940-the Investment Company Act of 1940-like the other Federal securities laws, embodies the principle of 'full disclosure' as the main bulwark
of investor and consumer protection in the field of mutual funds. ' '7 Proceeding
from that fantasy,8 he briefly outlined the Act's key disclosure requirements, and
gave them his unqualified endorsement:
Under present law, mutual fund shareholders are provided complete
information about each fund in a prospectus approved by the SEC as to
full disclosure, by four quarterly reports and an annual report filed with
the SEC and various State agencies[,] by a SEC approved proxy statement
before each shareholders meeting, by the requirement that management
and sales compensation must be approved annually by a majority of the
shareholders or the directors, including a majority of the unaffiliated directors, and if this is not enough the SEC has ample authority now to require
more disclosures.
And, if the SEC needs more authority to insure fuller disclosure, I
will support such legislationY
Addressing himself to the need for additional legislation to strengthen the
1940 Act, Mr. Stuckey was at pains to identify his bill with the disclosure
approach to mutual fund reform:
Last year, there were many good features of the SEC's proposals, which
I have included in my bill. These will update the Investment Company Act
of 1940, and will tighten up some loose areas where disclosure could be
more complete and managerial responsibility more distinctly defined.'0
The rationale behind Mr. Stuckey's fixation for disclosure, as opposed to
regulation, lies in his esteem for the principle of corporate "democracy." "The
basic assumption of corporate democracy," we are told, is
that each shareholder buys into a company voluntarily and can sell his shares
at any time he does not like the company or its management, but that while
lobbying organization for the entire [mutual fund] industry . . . " 114 CONG. REC. S9426
(daily ed. July 25, 1968) (remarks of Senator McIntyre). Mr. Augenblick stated in part:
We... believe [that certain testimony quoted from the 1940 Senate Hearings] makes
clear what Congress "intended to achieve in 1940" with respect to management fees
namely, full disclosure and the right of shareholders to decide for themselves
within the framework of the traditional modes of corporate democracy. 7967 House
Hearings 822. (Emphasis added.) As will be seen from the perusal of the major
"reforms" incorporated into Mr. Stuckey's bill, the bill could not be more self-serving from
the industry's point of view had it been drafted by the Investment Company Institute.
7 115 CoNG. REc. H1727 (daily ed. March 13, 1969).
8 If Mr. Stuckey was suggesting that the Investment Company Act is primarily a disclosure statute he was wrong. See, e.g., Testimony of Commissioner Hugh F. Owens of the
Securities and Exchange Commission Before the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency
on S. 34, April 15, 1969, at 10 [hereinafter cited as 1969 Senate Hearings]:
It is true that [certain information is] disclosed to the shareholder. This, however,
is a federally regulated industry and that regulation goes beyond disclosure. That
policy decision was made by the Congress in 1940-and with ample basis. The
question now is what must be done . . . to make the existing regulatory scheme more
effective. (Citations omitted.)
See also text accompanying notes 197-200, 339-42 supra.
9 115 CONG. REc. H1728 (daily ed. March 13, 1969).
10 Id.
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he is a shareholder, a majority of the shareholders and the directors they
elect each year will run the company.:"
When combined, the Congressman's dual ideals result in the following
questionable premise which pervades H.R. 8980: Any law that empowers the
SEC and the courts
to substitute their judgment for that of the shareholders and elected directors
on such matters as management compensation and sales commissions ...
would do violence to the constitutional right of the majority shareholders.., and let the minority shareholders or the SEC and courts make
the most important
decisions a company makes, i.e., management and sales
12
compensation.
Thus surfaces the enigma of H.R. 8980. On the assumption that investors
who purchase and hold fund shares have at their disposal "complete information about each fund," Mr. Stuckey finds it a simple matter to bring the rules
of corporate "democracy" into play, thereby subjecting fund control to majority
rule and requiring that the members of the dissenting minority suffer in silence
or sell out. To the Congressman, suits brought by dissenting shareholders to
remedy evils perpetrated by the unjust stewards of the modem fund scene are
anathema. This contempt for an oppressed minority's judicially amplified voice
manifests itself in the bill's management fee and sales load provisions.
II. Management Fees
The provisions of H.R. 8980 dealing with management contracts are transparently designed to unqualifiedly immunize any conceivable scheme of compensation short of open thievery. This rather remarkable result is achieved by
raising a conclusive presumption that all terms of an advisory contract are fair
and equitable if approved "by all of the unaffiliated directors" and by those
shareholders holding two-thirds of the outstanding shares. 13 We have already
seen that the Wharton sample of 107 fund stockholder meetings did not include
a single example of a management proxy committee which would have failed
to deliver the two-thirds ratification demanded by the Stuckey bill.' 4 The
Wharton results are not unexplainable. 5 As to directorial approval, it is interesting that the Stuckey bill requires the vote of the unaffiliated directors in order
to put the contract beyond the law,'" even though the same bill would retain,
with some dilution, a definition of interested persons contained in the bona fide
reform bills of the other chamber.' Directorial approval, then, will be obtained
11 Id. Mr. Stuckey underscored his reverence for the principle of corporate democracy
thusly: "I believe in corporate democracy just as I believe in political democracy." Id.
12 Id. The Congressman's premise is not made less questionable by the presence of provisions in the Investment Company Act that permit the SEC to prescribe management fee
payments and sales load levels for certain investment companies in certain instances. See
Investment Company Act of 1940 § 27(a)(5), (b)," 15 U.S.C. § 80a-27(a) (5), (b) (1964).
Sess. § 8(a) (1969).
13 H.R. 8980, 91st Cong., st
14 See note 1126 supra and accompanying text.
15 See notes 1102, 1105-10, 1121-32 supra and accompanying text.
16 H.R. 8980, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. § 8(a) (1969).
17 Compare H.R. 8980, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(3) (1969) with S. 34, 91st Cong., 1st
Sess. § 2(3) (1969) and S. 296, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. § 2(3) (1969) and S. 1659, 90th Cong.,
Ist Sess. § 2(3) (1967).
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from precisely the same men under the Stuckey bill as at present. We have
seen that the farce which now surrounds the vote of the unaffiliated directors5
results from the close relationships permitted by the Act's definition of affiliated
person 9 and the complete practical and economic impotence of these men to
bargain on an arm's length basis with the advisor.2" In the pervasive effect it
assigns to approval by unaffiliated directors, H.R. 8980 enshrines further an
already ludicrous exercise in form.
It should be further noted that the Stuckey bill dilutes in every possible way
the role of the directors in the negotiation of management contracts. The Investment Company Act presently requires that the contract "precisely" describe management compensation, 2 and the Senate bills would require further precision in
order that the contract may be carefully and intelligently considered by the
fund's directorate.2 2 Congressman Stuckey's bill, on the other hand, cripples
an already weak provision of the Act by deleting all requirements for exactitude
in the contract.2" The Georgian is obviously troubled by the thought that the
Senate bills would permit the fund directors' judgment to be "supplanted" in
a judicial proceeding.2 Actually, the Senate bills emphasize the role of fund
directors by articulating their duty to request and evaluate data pertinent to an
informed judgment of the contract while his own bill does not.25 And again, the
Senate bills both assure that fund directors will be furnished the information
relevant to their deliberations, while the Stuckey bill prefers to permit the directors to consider the contract in total ignorance or only in light of the selective
data which the advisor wishes to present. 26 H.R. 8980 is, in short, difficult to
reconcile with the Congressman's notion that the "principles .. .of corporate
democracy"27 require responsibility for the terms of the agreement to rest on the
judgment of the directors.
The Stuckey bill, as noted, borrows the concept of "interested person" from
the genuine reform bills,2" and then emasculates it. The Congressman betrays an inherent distrust for men "corrupted" by the SEC, " for his bill declares
former employees of the Commission unfit for the office of distinterested director, 0 perhaps on the premise that these people are a bit too likely to understand
18 See notes 1019, 1056, 1136, 1175, 1360 supra and accompany text.
19 See notes 1136-41, 1154-59, 1163-65, 1169-75, supra and accompanying text.
20 See notes 1100-02 supra and accompanying text.
21 Investment Company Act of 1940 § 15(a), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15(a) (1964).
22 S. 34, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 8(a) (1969); S. 296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 8(a) (1969).
23 H.R. 8980, 9 1st Cong., 1st Sess. § 8(a) (1969).
24 115 CONG. Rc.H1728 (daily ed. March 13, 1969).
25 Compare H.R. 8980, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. § 8(c) (1969) with S. 34, 91st Cong., 1st
Sess. § 8(c) (1969) and S. 296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 8(c) (1969).
26 Compar.e H.R. 8980, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 8(c) (1969) with S. 34, 91st Cong., Ist
Sess. § 8(c) (1969) and S. 296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 8(c) (1969); see also notes 1357-60
supra and accompanying text.
27 115 CONG. REc. H1727 (daily ed. March 13, 1969).
28 Compare H.R. 8980, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. § 2(3) (1969) with S. 34, 91st Cong., 1st
Sess. § 2(3) (1969) and S. 296, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. § 2(3) (1969). See also note 1173
supra.
29 115 CONG. REc. H1728 (daily ed. March 13, 1969). Cf. Shipley, The SEC's Amicus
Curiae Aid to Plaintiffs in Mutual Fund Litigation, 52 A.B.A.J. 337 (1966). But see Loomis
& Eisenberg, The SEC as Amicus Curiae in Shareholder Litigation- A Reply, 52 A.B.A.J.
749, 753 n.25 (1966).
30 H.R. 8980, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(3) (1969).
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the industry's workings and might undertake to review demands of the mercenary
managers. Apparently the taint of SEC employment is vicariously visited upon
members of a Commission employee's family and further infects relatives of
"former
[Commission] personnel within the past two fiscal years of such com3
pany." '
Even W. S. (Bill) Stuckey recognizes that a director's judgment may be
somewhat clouded by a substantial financial interest in the subject matter of his
deliberations,3 2 and hence he retains a provision of the 1967 bills which would
classify such persons as "interested."3 3 S. 3724 represented a compromise with
the industry since it required a non-retroactive Commission order determining
this status," while the House bill picks up the language of S. 3724 and further
requires a mandatory administrative hearing before any such order may issue.s
For practical purposes, the hearing requirement should effectively stymie SEC
implementation of this provision.
Mr. Stuckey's SEC phobia is carried to its ultimate in section 19 of his bill.
That section would make it a criminal offense for former employees of the Commission to participate in any manner in a lawsuit against an investment company, its advisor, or its underwriter. 8 The prohibition is not limited to SEC
attorneys in possession of otherwise unobtainable information, but apparently
extends to all SEC staff as well as to the receptionist, switchboard operator, or
maintenance man who may own shares in a fund and wish to bring suit for even
the most patent mismanagement.
So long as Congressman Stuckey was closing courthouse doors to the SEC,
he was not prepared to stop with management fees and sales loads. Accordingly,
H.R. 8980 lifts language from the Senate bills, especially S. 34, which would
amend section 36 of the Act to proscribe breaches of fiduciary duty involving
personal misconduct." The House bill, however, attempts to raise the level of
proof presently required to establish a section 36 action, and also seeks to restrict
the effectiveness of any injunctive relief which might be granted by limiting the
injunction so that it may operate upon a person only in respect to his functioning in one of the enumerated capacities.3 Presumably, an advisor-underwriter
would not be divested of control if an injunction were obtained against him, for
31 Id. The specific language is somewhat puzzling: "[Any member of the immediate
family or any present Securities and Exchange Commission personnel, or former personnel
within the past two fiscal years of such company ....
32 Cf. note 1165 supra and accompanying text.
33 Compare H.R. 8980, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(3) (1969) with S. 34, 91st Cong., 1st
Sess. § 2(3) (1969) and S. 296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(3) (1969).
34 S. 3724, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. § 2(3) '(1968). See also S. 1659, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. §
2(3) (1967); H.R. 9510 and 9511, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(3) (1967).
35 H.. 8980, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(3) (1969). That the hearing is intended to be
mandatory is in conformity with Mr. Stuckey's general intention to further eviscerate this
section. Moreover, a change made in drafting section 4(b) of Congressman Stuckey's bill
makes it abundantly clear that the intent of the draftsman is that the hearing may not be
9

waived. Compars H.R. 8980, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 4(b) (1969)

with S. 34,

1st Cong.,

1st Sess. § 4(b) (1969).
36 H.R. 8980, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 19 (1969). Cf. note 29, supra and accompanying
text, this Appendix.
37 Compare H.R. 8980, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 20 (1969) with S. 34, 91st Cong., 1st
Sess. § 20 (1969). See also note 1320 supra.
38 Compare H.R. 8980, 91st Coig., 1st Sess. § 20 (1969) with S. 34, 91st Cong., 1st
Sess. § 20 (1969).
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he could continue to act in the other capacity. Moreover, the Stuckey bill may
purport to insure that available remedies for violation of section 36 are restricted
to injunctions, 9 but the proposal is entirely unclear on this point since the pertinent language has been omitted by the draftsman." The important innovation,
however, as far as Mr. Stuckey is concerned,41 is contained in a proviso which
he would append to section 36 mandating "[t]hat the Commission before instituting.., action shall have accorded defendants a fair opportunity to comply
'
as required by the Administrative Procedure Act."42
This proviso is incomprehensible. Injunctions are permitted, even under H.R. 8980, for isolated acts
which occurred up to five years before the relief is asked, making it somewhat
difficult for the Commission to afford an "opportunity to comply" prior to
bringing suit.43 This would seem to preclude SEC resort to section 36 for any
violation which it discovers after the fact, but in view of the tenor of the rest
of the bill, this may be the intended result. More importantly, there is nothing
in the Administrative Procedure Act which, in the wildest flight of imagination,
might be applied to SEC action under section 36. The only conceivable provisions Mr. Stuckey may contemplate are contained in sections 4 and 8 of the
Administrative Procedure Act.4 4 The former section deals with the opportunity
for voluntary adjustments and consent decrees in cases where an administrative
adjudicationis required by statute to be determined on a record after opportunity
for an agency hearing;4 5 and the second, section 8, requires an agency to give
an "opportunity to... achieve compliance" with the law before the agency may
suspend or revoke a license which it has granted. 6 Congressman Stuckey's citation of the Administrative Procedure Act appears devoid of rhyme or reason.
The Commission has not been completely written out of the Investment
Company Act by the Congressman from Georgia, for the SEC is permitted to
"intervene... in any action or suit to enforce any liability or duty created by
...

section 15 (d) of [the Act] .

. . .""

This language is not in the present Act,

but is to be found in all the genuine reform bills, 8 for each of the legitimate bills
also amends section 15(d) of the Act to contain an enforceable standard of
reasonableness for management fees. Since H.R. 8980 does not alter a jot or
tittle of section 15(d), the grant of this right of intervention is either a meaningless gesture intended to disguise the Stuckey bill by maximizing its similarity to
the Senate bills, or simply matter copied from the bona fide bills and inserted
39 Compare H.R. 8980, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 20 (1969) with S. 34, 91st Cong., 1st
Sess. § 20 (1969).
40 Compare H.R. 8980, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 20 (1969) with S. 34, 91st Cong., 1st
Sess. § 20 (1969). The House bill reads "award such injunctive against such person." There
are two possible interpretations. The draftsman may have intended to write "award such
injunctive relief against such person" or "award such injunctive or other relief against such
person." It is possible that some language was intentionally omitted, and that the error
lies in omitting too much. This would favor the validity of the first reading.
41 115 CONG. Rae. H1728 (daily ed. March 13, 1969).
42 H.R. 8980, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 20 (1969).
43 Id. Cf. S. 34, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 20 (1969); S. 296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 20
(1969).
44 Administrative Procedure Act §§ 4, 8, 5 U.S.C. §§ 554, 558 '(Supp. III, 1967).
45 Id. § 4, 5 U.S.C. § 554 (Supp. III, 1967).
46 Id. § 8, 5 U.S.C. § 558 (Supp III, 1967).
47 H.R. 8980, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 22 (1969).
48 S. 34, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 22 (1969); S. 296. 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 22 (1969); S.
1659, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. § 23 (1967). See notes 1375-76 supra and accompanying text.
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into the bogus bill with neither concern for nor appreciation of its significance.
Having made SEC participation in court actions meaningless and having
also made it impossible for a private litigant to draw a sufficient complaint by
reason of the conclusive presumption, the Congressman takes a further step to
discourage any form of shareholder suit. The mechanism is not terribly sophisticated - he simply makes it a federal crime for a plaintiff or his lawyer to bring
a "strike" suit."' The quotation marks are Mr. Stuckey's and appear in his bill,
which neglects to define the term. It gives pause that the Georgian is willing
to make criminal conduct which he does not define more precisely than by
punctuation. The marks themselves indicate that the word is either (1) a
technical word used in a non-standard sense, (2) ironical, or (3) slang. 0 Under
these circumstances, it is submitted that this provision of Mr. Stuckey's bill suffers
some imperfection.
III. Sales Loads
H.R. 8980 promises to leave unchanged the sales load levels now extant in
the fund industry and further undertakes to insure the legality of future load
hikes. It may be observed that the Stuckey bill's approach to fund sales charges
is at variance with the SEC's recommendation that "mutual fund sales charges
should be lowered.""1 The language which effects this paragon of congressional
obstinacy is found in section 12 of the bill.
Subsections (a) and (b) of that section empower the NASD and the SEC
to promulgate rules
in order that the price at which [shares issued by unit investment trusts and
mutual funds are] offered or sold to the public shall not include an excessive
sales load but shall allow for fair and equitable compensation for sales
personnel, broker-dealers, and underwriters, and for fair and equitable
sales loads to investors, unless such sales load is included in a written contract approved by all of the unaffiliated directors and two-thirds of the
shareholdersas provided in [this Act].5 2 (Emphasis added.)

As is apparent, any mutual fund may escape the bill's "fair and equitable" requirement if the underwriting contract is approved by all of the fund's unaffiliated directors as well as those investors holding two-thirds of the fund's
shares.
Perhaps this voting requirement is one of the provisions Mr. Stuckey was
referring to when he observed that one of the objectives of H.R. 8980 was the
preservation of "corporate democracy." Given the mechanics of the fund industry's operational structure, coupled with the demonstrated prowess of fund
management blocs to entrench themselves by stocking the fund's board with
"friendly" unaffiliated directors,13 one wonders if an exclusion such as that
49
50
51
52
53

H.R. 8980, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 19 (1969).

A MANUAL OF STYLE 143-44 (12th ed. 1969).
222.
H.R. 8980, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 12(a) (1969).
See notes 1019, 1056, 1136-41, 1154-65, 1169-75, 1360 supra and accompanying text.
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created by Mr. Stuckey might not be more appropriately classified under a less
patriotic guise -corporate
totalitarianism, for instance. It surely may not be
argued that the shareholder approval quota contained in the exclusion serves
any purpose other than that of increasing the power of the fund's controlling
group. The proven ability of the management-dominated proxy committee to
shuffle through the mindless blob of paperwork accumulated through a proxy
solicitation - and come up with the necessary votes - testifies to the uselessness
of any scheme that puts faith in the voting formality engaged in by the industry's
shareholders.54 Moreover, the very fact that the mutual fund shareholder has
entrusted his savings to "experts" for investment on his behalf tends to impeach
the merit of any proposal which seeks to provide investor protection by depending on the investor to exercise an expertise he neither has nor cares to acquire.
If Mr. Stuckey's sales load provisions are enacted, it is submitted that the
fund industry's czars will enjoy a discretionary reign unparalleled since the preAct era, when the robber barons of the investment company industry succeeded
in bilking the investing public out of 1.1 billion dollars.55
IV. Contractual Plans
The most noxious facet of the contractual plan sales scheme is the front-end
load. The SEC recommended the "penalty" load's abolition in the Public Policy
Statement," a course of action already undertaken by three states that ban the
sale of plan shares within their borders." The Commission has since endorsed
S. 34, section 16 of which proposes to amend section 27 of the Investment Company Act in such a way that the impact of the front-end load is somewhat
cushioned.58 The SEC has recognized that its present stance represents a compromise from its original position, but views the projected effect of S. 34 "as a
significant improvement of the present situation."5 9
Unlike the Senate bill, H.R. 8980 eschews a confrontation with the frontend load, opting instead for a series of milktoast refund right provisions. Accord54 See notes 1102, 1105-10, 1121-32 supra and accompanying text.
55 The parade of horribles that lend substance to this assertion is discussed at length in
Part III of the Survey. See generally notes 266-346 supra and accompanying text.
56 The Commission's position was not equivocal: "The Commission therefore recommends that the Act be amended to prohibit the deduction of front-end loads in future sales of
investment company securities." Public Policy Statement 247.
57 See notes 124-126 supra and accompanying text.
58 The analysis of section 16 in the Senate's committee print of S. 34 explains how the
"cushioning effect" would be achieved:
This proposed section provides that not more than 20 per centum of any 1 year's
payments may be deducted for sales load, and the entire deduction during the
first 4 years may not exceed 64 per centum. This change would permit the seller
of a plan to continue to collect approximately the same amount of sales load over
the first 3 or 4 years (at the seller's election) as he does under present law. However, the load would be spread out more evenly over that period. ANALYSIS OF S..
34, at 9.
59 1969 Senate Hearings 11. It should be noted that S. 296 the other Senate fund reform
bill now pending, contains a provision that would outlaw the imposition of the front-end load.
S. 296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 16(a)(1) (1969). Though the bill's ban of the front-end load
is in accordance with the SEC's wish, its rather avant-garde approach to fund sales loads (proposing to repeal section 22(d) of the Act), caused the Commission to endorse the somewhat
more temperate tenor of S. 34. See 1969 Senate Hearings 11.
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ingly, section 16 of the House bill adds a new subsection to section 27 of the

1940 Act providing that:
"(a) the purchaser has an absolute right of refund within sixty days of
purchase of the full amount of the first two payments, including the full
amount of the sales charge, and the net asset value of any additional payments made plus the full amount of the sales charge on such additional
payments, and
"(b) refund within the first twelve months after purchase of the full
amount of the sales charge if the planholder chooses to withdraw by reason
of financial hardship caused by"(1) disability as a result of injury or illness of the planholder
which prevents him from engaging in gainful employment for thirty
consecutive days;
"(2) the illness or injury to a dependent member of the planholder's family which requires the hospitalization of the dependent
member for a consecutive period of thirty days; or
"(3) unemployment for thirty consecutive days of the planholder
or the head of the household of the planholder.
"(c) any planholder's monthly payments may be stretched out or indefinitely postponed, without penalty, in order to assist a planholder over
periods of other more urgent cash needs;
"(d) up to 90 per centum of any planholder's net asset value may be
withdrawn in cash at any time and also reinvested at a later time without
any charge whatever; and
"(e) any planholder may terminate his plan and redeem his shares for
cash at net asset value at any time without any charge whatever." 60
The inclusion of the refund right provisions in H.R. 8980 seems to evidence an intent on the part of the bill's draftsman to assuage the plight of the
beleaguered victims of the penalty load. However well intentioned may have
been the draftsman's motives, it cannot be reasonably asserted that the amendatory language will have a pronounced effect on the plan companies. An array
of companies that account for ninety-eight per cent of the plan industry's business

have already voluntarily adopted a refund right framework identical to that
embraced by the House bill.6
V. The Entry of Banks into the Investment Company Industry
One of the primary objectives of the two bills now pending before the
Senate is to amend "various provisions of the securities laws to permit banks to
operate commingled managed agency accounts in competition with mutual
funds." 6 2 To that end, both bills contain provisions designed, inter alia, "to make
it clear that no provision of law prohibits a bank from creating or operating a
registered investment company which is a collective fund for the investment of
60 H.R. 8980, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 16 (1969).
61 Compare id. with 114 CONG. REc. S9411 (daily ed. July 25, 1968) (remarks of Senator
Bennett).
62 ANALYSIS oF S. 34, at v. Although the statements in the Committee Print speak only to
the language of S. 34, it may be noted that the provisions of S. 296 which relate to the entry
of banks into the investment company industry are identical to those of S. 34.
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managing agency accounts and for funding direct
members of the public.""3 The amendatory networks
which are crafted to permit the banking community
for the investor's dollar are conspicuously absent from

investments by individual
found in S. 34 and S. 296
to compete with the funds
Mr. Stuckey's proposal.

VI. Fund Holding Companies or "Super Funds"
Like all recent fund reform bills, H.R. 8980 contains a section designed to
regulate the super funds. The House bill's super fund provisions are contained
in section 7 of the bill, and are similar to those in section 7 of S.34 and S. 296.
The lone difference between the House bill and its Senate predecessors is that H.R.
8980 proposes to ban the operation of all super funds that sell their securities
to the public at a price that includes a load, and would further limit the acquisition of shares by such companies to an amount not in excess of one per cent of
the "acquired company's" shares.64 The Senate bills take a slightly more liberal
tack. They would grant exclusions from prohibition to any super fund that
did not impose a sales load in excess of one-and-one-half per cent, so long as the
fund did not acquire more than three per cent of the total outstanding stock of
the acquired company.6"
The comparative stringency of the House bill's super fund provisions makes
it the bill which most nearly approaches the position that the SEC's Public Policy
Statement called upon the Congress to take: to amend the 1940 Act "so as to
prevent the creation and operation of [super funds]."" It may be added that
this is the only instance where Mr. Stuckey's bill hugs the SEC line more closely
than its fund reform predecessors.
The House bill's "harder line" approach to the super funds is, however, impossible to reconcile with the objectives of the bill as announced by its sponsor:
"[T]o provide a much larger measure of consumer and investor protection for
shareholders in investment companies - mutual funds - while at the same time
preserving the principles of free enterprise and corporate democracy".. (Emphasis added.) If it is "free enterprise and corporate democracy" Mr. Stuckey
seeks to maintain, he should be informed that if his bill is enacted in its present
form, its super fund provisions will make the sale of shares by at lease one mutual
fund now registered under the Investment Company Act a criminal offense. This
is so because First Multifund of America, Inc., a super fund registered under the
1940 Act, charges a one-and-one-half per cent sales load on its shares,68 and
63 Id. at 12. The section referred to is section 12(d) of S. 34. The language of S. 296
on the point is identical.
64 H.R. 8980, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 7 (1969).
65 S. 34, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 7 (1969) ; S. 296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 7 (1969). The
Senate bills contain a further restriction to the effect that no super fund may require that any
portfolio fund redeem more than one per cent of the portfolio fund's shares held by the super
fund within any thirty day period. This language is not included in section 7 of the House
bill, probably because it was felt that the House bill's one per cent ceiling on super fund
acquisitions would adequately safeguard portfolio companies from onslaughts of redemptions
by capricious super funds.
66 PUBLIC POLICY STATEMENT 323.
67 115 CONG. REc. H1727 (daily ed. March 13, 1969) (remarks of Mr. Stuckey).
68 As recently as April 23, 1969, First Multifund was advertising itself as "The Fund with
a portfolio of at least 15 Growth Funds." Wall Street journal, April 23, 1969, at 32, col. 1
(midwest ed.). The notation "I V2z
% LoLoad" was also present in the ad. Id.
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hence will be unable to qualify under the House bill's exemption. 69 The Senate
bills, on the other hand, have been constructed by less shortsighted draftsmen and
have made provision for First Multifund, permitting super funds to sell their
shares so long as the sales load imposed does not exceed one-and-one half per
cent.70

69
70

See text accompanying note 64 supra,this Appendix.
See text accompanying note 65 supra, this Appendix.

